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The thesis takes as its starting-point the revolution of XXth. century theol 
:ogy against late XIXth. century liberalism as to the status and value of hist­
orical event. While XlXth. century liberalism regarded historical events as 
relatively unimportant channels for the delivery and illustration of timeless 
divine truths, recent and contemporary theology tends to regard historical 
events as all-important and crucial in and by themselves, and not merely be- .
:cause of the timeless truths abstracted from and mediated through them. 
Existentialist theology interprets this revived emphasis on historical event as 
implying the radical historicity and temporality of man, and expresses this 
interpretation by means of the concept, the ’moment’, which designates a con- 
:crete, temporal-spacial, particular event within man’s historical life, apart 
from which man does not become an authentic person and does not encounter 
truth. Further, existentialist theology stresses man,man himself, in his free- 
:dom and in his genuine becoming, as the only fruitful answer to the question, 
'what is the meaning of history ?’, in contradistinction to answering it in 
terms of political, economic, sociological, and geographical laws, processes, 
and cycles. The thesis thereafter investigates the main works of three import- 
sant existentialist theologians, Bultmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard, with a view 
to discovering those ways in which they interpret and employ this concept, the 
'moment'. It discovers that in spite of divergences (which it analyses and 
evaluates), these three thinkers display a certain unity in their teaching on 
the 'moment' , a unity which can hardly be understood as fortuitous. An attempt 
is made to understand this unity as springing from common roots in all three, 
and an attempt is made to indicate what these roots are. It is argued that 
while the facile and 'popular' explanation of this unity would stress the 
philosophy of existence as the background and seed-plot of the notions of hist- 
:oiy of Bultmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard, this is neither the only possible nor 
the most plausible explanation. This explanation ignores the common biblical 
background of Buber (a Jew) and of Bultmann and Kierkegaard (Christians). The 
thesis argues therefore that Buber's notion of 'historicity' and his use of the 
concept, the 'moment', spring mainly from his Hasidic interpretation of Old 
Testament revelation with its firm emphasis on the 'everydayness' of God's 
historic self-disclosure. Similarly, it #
derives Bultmann's emphasis on historicity and temporality and his use of the 
concept, the 'moment', from his conviction that the events of Christ’s career 
mean, the utter cruciality of particular, historical-temporal events and 
encounters within human existence. It derives Kierkegaard's postulation of 
the Moment from his conviction that the original Christ-Moment described in 
the New Testament implies a contemporary, identical Moment within human exist- 
sence. Thus it is argued that biblical revelation generally and the'eventful' 
ministiy of Christ in particular necessarily imply the doctrine (and scandal) 
of particularit.y. Thus the conclusion is drawn that the Moment is a logically 
necessary and existentially most relevant category for theology. Behind the 
'moment', it must be insisted, stands historic biblical revelation and the 
crucial events of Christ's life and death. Thus the 'moment' is not merely 
a category borrowed by theology from the system of concepts of the philosophy 
of existence, but a thoroughly biblical, Christian category without which bib- 
slical revelation and Christ's incarnation would lose their relevance for mod- 
:ern man. The unity of Bultmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard on the 'moment' is 
seen to centre mainly on their common assertions that the present 'moment' 
implies a distinction between primary (i.e. personal, historic, dynamic, 
temporal) revelation and secondary (i.e. propositional, 'informational1, 
conceptual, ethical, social) revelation; that the 'moment' is the vital disloc- 
:ating gap between a determining past and a chosen future, and is thus man's 
only assurance of authentic becoming, without which man would have no history; 
that the 'moment' faces considerable opposition from certain common elements, 
which are fully analysed; that the 'moment' implies a notion of revelation 
basically (if we may so express it) 'impartational', historical, and temporal, 
as opposed to one which is basically 'immanentist', and consequently regarded 
by existentialist thought as unhistorical, untemporal, and 'unworldly'. Yet 
it is admitted that the concept cuts sharply across certain strong traditional 
theological strands, and certain problems corresponding to these are therefore 
raised and fully discussed, to show how certain re-interpretations and re- 
evaluations require to be made if the concept, the 'moment', is to be fitted 
into the fabric of theology. Amongst these problems the following would seem
to be of the greatest significance ---  the problem of propositional theology,
the tentative solution to which is suggested by the 'de-generalization' or the
3’de-objectification’ of dogmas; the problem of Church and community, in which 
the alleged weaknesses of existentialists on community are discussed, and an
1attempt ma.de to assess the positive contributions of existentialism (in 1
particular, by the special meaning it gives to ’historicity’, and by the 
interpersonal encounter) to ecclesiology; the urgent problem of the two great 
divergent approaches to systematic theology, the ontological (as exemplified by 
the approach of Tillich) and the existentialist (as exemplified by the approach 
of Bultmann)• These two approaches are compared and the conclusion drawn that 
the concept, the 'moment*, favours the latter approach, which is evaluated 
against the biblical notion of historic revelation as basically an interpersonal 
encounter between God and man*
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1INTRODUCTION AND PREFACE.
LIBERAL CHRISTIANITY AND THE HISTORICAL
In liberal theology the ’historical1 as a theological 
category is depreciated.® Liberals regard historical events as dispen- 
isable shells, through which are mediated nourishing kernelso The hist­
orical is quite relative® What was significant in the life and ministry 
of Jesus was that through him there came spiritual and ethical principles 
of vital importance for man’s well-being® The principles were of vital 
importance, not the events in which they were manifested® In this view 
the ’historical' is thought of as merely accidental® Sometimes to des- 
scribe something as historical implied that it was dated, conditioned, 
and sometimes even falsified®
For example, the Ritschlian definition of history is 
that "®*. the truth of history consists in the moral truths revealed 
through the teachings and examples of great men® Thus Jesus' teachings 
are of higher value than his action® His action is to be correlated 
with truth by finding in it motives or intentions which can be translated 
into moral principles or objectives® History has meaning as the laborat- 
sory in which truth is discovered; once the truth has been grasped and 
communicated to posterity, the history itself ceases to be of decisive 
importance. Mark tells Jesus' story to propagate the truths he learned 
from Jesus" (James M. Robinson, The Problem of History in Mark, London, 
1957) P* 8)« Speaking of Hamack's classic, What is Christianity ?,
Rudolf Bultmann says, "It will be noticed how Hamack reduces the keryg- 
:ma to a few basic truths of religion and ethics® Unfortunately this 
means that the kerygma has ceased to be kerygma: it is no longer the 
proclamation of the decisive act of God in Christ® For the liberals the 
great truths of religion and ethics are timeless and eternal, though it 
is only within human history that they are realized, and only in con- 
:crete historical processes that they are given clear expression® But 
the apprehension and acceptance of these principles does not depend on 
the knowledge and acceptence of the age in which they first took shape, 
or of the historical persons who first discovered them® We are all 
capable of verifying them in our own experience at whatever period we 
happen to live® History may be of academic interest, but never of para­
mount importance for religion"(Kerygma and Myth, London, 1953) P° 13)° 
Speaking of the turn of the twentieth century, James M. Robinson says, 
"The century opened with the older generation still following the 
Ritschlian approach to God in terms of ethical idealism, and to Jesus as 
the historical fact exemplifying that ideal"(A New Quest of the Historic- 
:al Jesus, London, 1959) P* 40). Georges Florovsky comments that 
people are interested rather in the 'eternal truth' of the Christian 
message, than in what they are inclined to call the 'accidents' of hist- 
:ory ('The Predicament of the Christian Historian', Religion & Culture, 
London, 1959) P* 140). And he also agrees that theological liberalism, 
"•®o at least from the Age of the Enlightenment persistently attempted 
to disentangle Christianity from its historical context and involvement, 
to detect its perennial1 essence' ('das Wesen des Christenturns'), and to 
discard the historical shells" (Florovsky, op. cit.,p. 141). Because of 
this, "The historicity of Christianity was reduced to the acknowledgement
* ,
of a permanent ’historical significance* of certain ideas and principles, 
which originated under particular conditions of time and space, but 
were in no sense intrinsically linked with them” (p. 141)* From these 
we can form some kind of idea of the way in which theological liberal- 
:ism regarded the historical«
MORE RECENT AND CONTEMPORARY CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND THE HISTORICAL
The view of the historical here tends to be that 
the historical events themselves are crucial, decisive, and indispens- 
:able© Christianity is so rooted in history that to uproot it is tanta- 
imount to destroying it as a religion© In the events described in the 
New Testament God has so acted as to alter radically the character of 
history and of time© The historic Christian events brought something 
quite new into existence that was not there before© Time and history 
are indispensable for a truly human existence© The events of the New 
Testament affected not merely that time in which they happened, but all 
human time as such© These events show that our time is of a different 
quality than otherwise we might have imagined© The events of Christ 
demonstrate that what comes to us, what we apprehend and understand, 
come to us only in and through our time and history© The revelation 
of Christ can only be understood as the essential and inalienable 
historicity of man© Thus James M. Robinson writes of the theology of 
Bultmann that the kerygma must proclaim that God is encountered
within one’s historical existence” (The Problem of History in Mark© 
p. 18). And Professor John McIntyre writes, ”It is now a theological
commonplace to emphasise the fact that Christianity is a historical 
religion© In this view we hear such statements as: 'God acts in hist- 
:ory', 'God reveals Himself in history', 'The incarnation is the centre 
of history1, and so on* The idea of history and ideas about history 
enter into most interpretations of the person and worlt of Jesus Christ 
and into almost all accounts of the theology of the Old Testament or of 
the New Testament, that is, into almost all of what is called 'Biblical 
Theology'* What is not always realized is that historical conceptions 
of this sort are unique to our time; that because of developments 
not only in theological thought concerning the subjects peculiar to 
itself but also in the fields of historical methodology and of the 
critique of historiography, our understanding and our interpretation of 
the historical element in the Christian faith are not the same as those 
of any previous generation" (The Christian Doctrine of History,
Edinburgh 1957 > P» 3)* ”••• It has not been commonly realized that
this conviction of the rootedness of Christianity in history commits the 
Christian exponent to a quite specific doctrine of history © • • ....<>. 
Just as God by His many actions in history ©.<> in certain specifiable 
places and in definite historical times transformed all men's previous 
views on history but also history itself The impression too often
given is that history is something in which things happen, a structure 
in which the events of Revelation and Redemption take place, a framework 
relatively unaffected by the action of God and man that occuir within 
it” (McIntyre, op. cit«, p. 11). These quotations from McIntyre's book 
sum up admirably the liberal position as to history and the modem 
revolution with regard to it© Professor Ian Henderson, writing of 
Bultmann1s treatment of the historical, says this : ”... Bultmann has
been at pains to distinguish his position from that of the old Liberal- 
:ism which reduced Christianity to a number of timeless truths. Over 
against such a view he insists that Christianity is basically an event© 
In Christ something has happened. And Bultmann goes on to emphasise 
the unique and universal reference of the Christ event. In Christ,
God has done something which is of decisive importance not only for the 
life of St. John or St. Paul but for that of each of us and of all our 
contemporaries to whom the Christian gospel is preached to-day" (Myth 
in the New Testament, London 1952, p. 39)® Florovsky gives much the 
same picture of modem theology. "'Christianity is a religion of hist­
orians'. It is a strong phrase, but the statement is correct. 
Christianity is basically a vigo#rous appeal to history, a witness of 
faith to certain particular events in the past, to certain particular 
data. These events are acknowledged by faith as truly eventful©
These historic moments, or instants, are recognized as utterly momentous 
In brief, they are identified by faith as 'mighty deeds' of God,
Magnalia Lei© The scandal of particularity, to use the phrase of Ger- 
ihard Kittel, belongs to the veiy essence of the Christian message©
The Christian Creed itself is intrinsically historic*, ©©.........
Accordingly, it may be justly contended that 'the Christian religion is 
a daily invitation to the study of history'" (The Predicament of the 
Christian Historian, p. 140). Speaking directly of contemporary 
theological work, Florovsky continues, "©©© the essential historicity 
of Christian religion has been rediscovered and re-emphasised, precisely 
during the past few decades, and a fresh impact of this reawakened hist­
orical insight is strongly felt now in all fields of contemporary
theological research --  in Biblical exegesis, in the study of Christian
history and liturgies, in certain modem attempts at the ‘reconstruction 
of belief*, and even in the modem ecumenical dialogue’" (Plorovsky, pe 
141)* Prom all of this we can surely gather the revolution that has 
taken place in theological thought with regard to the historical element 
in Christianity, and also that the discussion of history occupies an im­
portant place in the non-theological sciences and disciplines«
THE QUESTION "WHAT IS THE MEANING OF HISTORY ?"
In view of this comparatively recent theologic- 
sal revolution, and in view of the universal importance ascribed to the 
quest for meaning in history, we must ask this question: what exactly 
can Christian thought contribute to the discussion based on the question 
'what is the meaning of history ?' ? These terms themselves, and
their interpretation,are so confused and ambiguous in contemporary dis- 
:cussion that an initial attempt must be made to distinguish between 
them in order that the ground may be clearedo Otherwise the Christian 
contribution would itself be involved in the confusion and ambiguitye
We may begin by making a preliminary observat­
ion; it does seem that Christian thought can contribute very little to 
the discussion if ‘history* is equated with ’world-history*, and if the 
key-term‘meaning* signifies any of the following traditional interpret- 
:ationso
Christian theology can contribute little if by
'meaning* is meant tracing the hand of God, and so God's Justice and so 
on, in world- or universal history© Thinkers are now aware of what
?we might call the fragmentariness of history® McIntyre, conscious of 
blatant injustices in history, goes so far as to assert that there are 
elements in history ’meaningless1 for God as for man® That is, there 
are moral unfairnesses and inconsistencies ultimately irreconciliable 
with the notion of God* If they were reconciliable with God they would 
lose their character as evil® The message of history, as Bultmann has 
reminded us, is always ambiguous® Professor Butterfield has mentioned 
some of these ambiguities in history and we shall consider them shortly 
belowo And as Butterfield has pointed out, the futility of finding 
the hand of God in historical events is made clear by such a book as 
Voltaire's Candide, crammed as it is with the moral inconsistencies of 
worldly phenomena, of which the most significant is the Lisbon earth­
quake of 1775® But in the last analysis, what makes the glib and optim- 
:istic attempt to find the hand of God in history really futile is the 
Christian doctrine and saandal of particularity# Just because Christ- 
:ianity claims that God has acted in histoiy in a particular land 
(Israel) or through a particular people (the Jews) or in a particular 
man (Jesus of Nazareth), this means that God has not acted or revealed 
himself eveiywhere or at all tikes or through all men in the same way®
It is really the historicity of Christian revelation itself that makes 
the attempt to find the hand of God in universal history so hopeless®
Paul Tillich is also aware of the great moral inconsistencies which the
X For this, see McIntyre, op. cit., pps® 40 f#
history of man displays® "Marly death, destructive social conditions, 
feeble-mindedness and insanity, the undiminished horrors of historical
existence --  all these seem to verify belief in fate rather than faith
in providence” (Systematic Theology, I, London 1953? pps. 298-9)®
And Tillich issues a warning that we would be wise to heeds "Faith in 
providence is paradoxical# It is an 'in spite of'. If this is not 
understood, faith in providence breaks down, taking with it faith in 
God and in the meaning of life and of history# Much cynicism is the 
result of an erroneous and therefore disappointed confidence in individ- 
sual or historical providence"(op. cit., p. 298). Tracing the hand of 
God in world-histoiy would therefore seem to be an unprofitable business 
for the historian#
Nor can Christian theology contribute a great deal
if the question is meant in the sense, what is the pattern that runs
through world-histoiy ? A valid answer to a question of this iind
presupposes a certain standpoint. It presupposes that the historian
is suspended above, or above and at the end of history, in much the
same way as we observe the pattern running through a carpet or tapestiy
by being suspended over it and observing it as a whole® But man
cannot be thus suspended over the historical process. Besides,he cannot
contemplate it as a whole since the pattern is not yet completely
woven, since the carpet is as yet unfinished. It is observations such
as these that form the spearhead of the Iiierkegaardian attack upon the
Hegelian attempt to trace Hegel's celebrated 'List der Vemunft'.
But not only is the pattern of history incomplete from the point of view
of the future , but also from the point of view of the past# Voltaire
criticised Bossuet because Bossuet's universal history was not, Voltaire
contended, really universal; that is, it did not take cognizance of the 
whole of the past® The philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey becomes veiy rel- 
:evant at this point* Dilthey realized that there are vast limitations 
in our knowledge of the past. For our knowledge of the past depends
SEupon the survival from the past of hermenautical documents of a certain 
character* Since the content of these, compared with the totality of 
the events of past history?is fragmentary in the extreme, it is therefore 
senseless to speak of tracing a pattern in a whole which does not exist* 
But man's understanding of the past is further limited, according to 
Dilthey. He prefers to speak of historical interpretation as an art, 
just as Schleiermacher preferred to speak of divination* Historical 
knowledge is therefore not like mathematics, with results provable and 
demonstrable. There exist vast differences in this divination between 
individual historians, and agreement upon a generally accepted pattern 
in past history seems therefore something of a wild dream*
Nor again can Christian theology contribute much to 
contemporary discussion if by finding meaning is meant the attempt to 
find the causes of world-history and of world-historical events © In
3€ Dilthey, ErlebnisausdrtLcke, meaning1 vital expressions' or 'expressions 
of lived experience'. For Dilthey's views on this matter, see H.A* 
Hodges? The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey. London 1952, pps. 131 f*
practice, what such an attempt amounts to in the long run is what Bult-
:mann designates historicism   the attempt to interpret history in-
analogy with nature, concerning itself with causality. But this fails 
truly to 'understand' history because it leaves out the essence of histoij 
itself, which is man in his thoughts, desires, inner motives and ideals, 
in short, man in his peculiar human freedom* In stead of a valid under- 
:standing of history this method gives us a mechanistic sociology of 
history and historical eras. Croce and Barbara Ward are very critical 
of such historiographies, and Martin Buber (as we shall see in a later 
chapter) has this type of attempt in mind when he criticizes what he 
terms 'the quasi-biological thought of to-day'. In short, no under­
standing of the springs of historical events is possible without an 
analysis of the mainspring of history, which is man himself, in his con- 
:crete situation.
It is just as difficult for the Christian theologian 
to contribute something very worth while, if by finding meaning is 
meant the attempt to find and learn lessons in history* Herbert 
Butterfield's views (in Christianity and History, London 1949? Cap*
3, pps. 48 £•)» a-1*6 very interesting in this connection* Butterfield 
makes the point that a historical judgement from which we might learn 
lessons is an extremely long-term process. Thus, Butterfield points 
out, the military aggrandizements of Frederick the Great and Biswarck j  
seemed, at the time, to be operating under the blessing of heaven. The 
curse and tragedy of what Butterfield calls Prussian militarism did not 
become apparent until later, until 1918, or was it 1933? or was it 
1945 ? At any rate, the lesson we learn in an event when it is actually !
occurring seems almost bound to be very premature* The good citizens 
of Frederick or the enthusiastic supporters of Bismarck hardly perceived 
the real evil in and the impending judgement upon their dependance upon 
military power. Thus judgements of world-history are premature* But 
even after a time are they true ? It can be doubted. Thus, histor- 
sians today will hardly agree that it was Prussian militarism alone 
that gave rise to the tragedies of 1933 and 1945* What about the geo- 
political, the economic, the ideological factors at work in German hist- 
:ory in the past few generations ? In short, is the curse of Prussian 
militarism the only or even the main lesson we can discern in modem 
German history ? Thus, clear and obvious lessons are not so easily 
found in history as might at first be imagined* And an attempt to 
subsume various lessons deduced from a study of historical events under 
a general lesson meets with no greater success* Thus, not everyone 
will agree with Butterfield when he writes (op. cit., p. 60) that,
"..* Judgement in history falls heaviest on those who come to think 
themselves gods, who fly in the face of providence and history”, and 
that a man who apes providence and blasphemes God ”..* brings more 
rapid tragedy on the world *•• than the people who give half their lives 
to wine,women and song”. Without denying that this is true enough, it 
is to be doubted that Butterfield learned this lesson from his study of 
historical events alone. Most probably he learned it from the Old Testa- 
sment, and, applying it to history, found it not without validity* But 
this is different from an unbiased study of history yielding clear and 
unambiguous lessons so obvious that no demand is made upon our decision* 
Thus if the attempt to 'find meaning in history' is confined to learning
lessons in it, the attempt cannot be expected to yield many results 
commensurate in importance to the contemporary discussion of the meaning 
of history*
And finally, if by finding meaning in history is meant 
the discernment of the goal or purpose towards which universal or world- 
history is tending, there does not seem again a great deal which a spec­
ifically Christian theology can contribute* The objection here is that 
again a standpoint at the end of history is presupposed. The paradox 
is that we cannot stand at the end of a process which is still occurr­
ing* yet this method demands it. If it be supposed that a historian 
can find the goal of history, it must be clear that he does not find it 
merely from his historical studies. He comes upon it by his decision* 
Thus if the goal of history is for him the fulfilled Kingdom of God, he 
does not come upon this from his survey of present and past historical 
events, but only in his own personal religious decision for the as yet 
unfulfilled Kingdom* Thus his decision is paradoxical*
From this discussion it is clear that it is extremely diff­
icult to contemplate past and present world- or universal history as an 
objective reality, and trace the just hand of God operating in it, or 
find a meaningful pattern running through it all, or find the causes 
which lie behind historical events, or find clear and unambiguous lessons 
from past events alone, or discern an obvious goal or end towards which 
the multipliciity and complexity of world-historical events are tending*
In short, something much more than the mere examination of historical 
happenings is required* For this reason, we see that there is good just­
ification for either the conscious rejection or the tacit ignoring of
the attempt to find meaning running through world- or universal history 
apparent in the thought of, amongst others, Bultmann, Croce, Dilthey, 
Collingwood, Buber and Kierkegaard*
What answer therefore can Christian thought possibly 
give to the question 'What is the meaning of history?' ? The answer is 
imperative because, as we have indicated above, the modem theological 
revolution against the older liberalism implies that Christian thought 
has a quite unique doctrine of history, and that in some way God's revel- 
iation in Christ has altered not merely man's thinking about history but 
also history itself* It is my contention that Christian thought can only 
make a valuable contribution to the discussion if 'meaning in history’ 
is treated in the following way* We must treat the question as 'what is 
the essentially historical ?! What makes history possible ? What is 
history ? What distinguishes history from, say, nature, the historical 
from the natural ? What is the essence of history ? What is the fund- 
:amental metaphysic of history ? What are the correct interpretations 
of the terms 'history' and the 'historical' ?
Treated in this way, I think t&at the question becomes 
fruitful from the Christian point of view* Certain recent and contempor- 
:ary thinkers find the essence of history in man, and more especially in 
man's present* The specifically Christian thinkers interpret the 
Christian view of history as teaching that as God revealed himself in 
certain events within a certain Personal Life, meaning is given to man's 
existence within certain specific events at certain specific times* Thus 
the disclosure of meaning in both cases is discontinuous in time and frag-
/fragmentary in history © The quite specifically Christian doctrine and 
scandal of particularity is thus transferred from the Incarnate Life of 
Christ to the personal life of man* Thus, if it is so that Christianity 
teaches that through certain events in the history of the past there came 
something quite new and decisive, this alters time and history in their 
actuality by implying that through certain events and in certain times 
in our history there comes to us truth, revelation, authentic existence*
Christianity therefore offers to persons in their time and history the
possibility of meaningful existence.
This particularity of events, encounters, and times 
which is a necessary consequence of biblical revelation is expressed 
and dealt with by much modem thought by means of the common root-term
the Voment* In this thesis an attempt is made to examine this term
(and its implications) as used by certain thinkers, two of them, Bultmann 
and Kierkegaard, from the Christian tradition, and the third, Buber, 
from the Hebraic tradition. But all three, significantly, are within 
the tradition of existentialist philosophy. This thesis therefore tries 
to show that the historicity of biblical revelation in general, and more 
especially the historicity of the life and career of Christ, reveals 
clearly the essential and inalienable historicty of man qua man, and to 
demonstrate that this human historicity cannot be conceived or discussed 
without some category like theVoment^ or its synonyms. We can therefore 
say that this thesis amounts to a detailed, critical examination of the 
fundamental theological and philosophical category of the umoment/(o
PREFATORY NOTE
This note is intended to give some outline of the plan 
of the thesis as a whole, discussing the sources which have been used and 
the question of 6riginality* The thesis tries to offer an original 
discussion of and solution to the contemporary problem of history. It 
does so mainly by means of the category of the 'moment1, and by linking 
up inextricably the historicity of biblical revelation as a whole and - 
the historicity of Christ's Life and Ministry on the one hhnd, and the 
essential historicity of personal existence on the othero Discussion 
of historicity with this two-fold reference will be found more especially 
in the Introduction and in the concluding chapter*
It tries to offer a re-interpretation of existentialist 
thought from a new point of view, namely from the point of view of its 
use of the category the 'moment' (and its synonyms), with special refer- 
:ence to the works of Bultmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard* Bultmann's 
work has been discussed in chapter I, Buber's in chapter III, and 
Kierkegaard's in chapter IV* This has involved a detailed treatment and 
re-interpretation of the original sources, and an attempt to relieve 
the inevitable tedium of this work is offered by relating their teach- 
:ing to wider theological and philosophical contexts* But we hope that 
the sheer weight of evidence which emerges from such a detailed examinat- 
:ion of the sources helps to establish this category - the 'moment' - 
as a crucially important one with which theologians will have to come to 
terms in future work* In these chapters too an attempt has been made
Jl :
to relate these thinkers to each other, to show where they are similar, 
where they differ one from another, and where their respective strengths 
weaknesses, and emphases lie* At the same time, we have tried to relate 
their work to the ongoing discussion of contemporary theologians.
The select bibliography shows most of the relevant works used in the 
compilation of the thesis, and the notes con&fcLn detailed references to 
works quoted and used in the text®
Then the thesis tries to demonstrate that the doctrine of the 
'moment1, derived as it is from the doctrine of Christ's Incarnation 
itself, does raise certain problems (already under discussion in con- 
:temporary theology) which demand discussion and elucidation. In deal- 
:ing with these problems we have tried to advance contemporary discuss- 
:ion, not least by relating each to the key-concept of the 'moment'.
The main problems raised and dealt with within the thesis are these — - ’ 
the problem of finding an experiential norm (chapter I); the problem 
of the doctrine of immanence (chapter II); the problem of Faith and 
Reason from the point of view of the Moment, in Kierkegaard (chapter 
IV); the problem of propositional theology (chapter V); the problem of 
the structure of Christian faith (chapter V); the problem of church 
and community (chapter V); and the problem of the two approaches to 
theology, the existentialist and the ontological (chapter V). Having 
made these preliminaiy observations, we are ready to turn to the first 
chapter, which concerns the use made by Rudolf Bultmann of the category 
'the moment1, and of the problems that this raises for our solution.
i
- Wtafen the  qf'r ;« iS tier; o f  f i n d i n g  :r;o 
roh^d, m  & &  ' to thin?; of the e:‘t^-pt to Hit
a rarmjtog tltroi:;«h fae dentn,rio>
Trie u y ie T p T e t& r o f  M a tofn? 81>-;:•.*.:;'•*:• hmnn.if at a 
from o h itm  he cm- &uy~*-ey lh~y nono'’nne or-r&ad art ' 
L# c&yi o-Us**?*^ » as a $peatshnr? the i cnnt :h
pirn o :in;,\- / '■■ "he h h-,. ;:hh. ~h; ft* o laorhTrif
C H A P T E R  O N E
T H E  ' M O M E N T '  I N  T H E  W O R K S  O F
R U D O L F  B U L T M A N N
■■ jfgff' 1 ■ — • ’ ’ ' " ’.p’";;;; ■
:/••'• r =‘= - - ■ -. 5 ; ’ ; = , to the no ---■/•
01
■ t. Inn ■'■-;■ ■'t.of neo?..:nrr. ?irt pot h/■"■'o which *pan4 ,o
l-C <v ;’ 0 ;T" ■ ."•.? --:0 ;  ^ hO
Ui.vi -rO.nt hoi, m  hi.a hit; hoe nppj n,..prh ;
£ ;m rire  sad  hhe l i i d - i ' ' e  inooono.on ; ; f  t h ;  ?hi . in  :-v.
When the question of finding meaning in history is 
raised, we are apt to think of the attempt to find a 'silver thread1,
ix
a meaningful pattern,running through the centuries and the rnillenia0 
The interpreter of history stations himself at a roint above the process, 
from which he can survey the panorama spread out below him, and from which 
he can observe, as a spectator, the significant strands in history which 
give meaning to the whole*. This is the standpoint taken, on the whole, 
by historiographers whose works are analysed by Pitirim A. Sorokin in 
his book, "Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis" (London 1952)*. 
Surveying the field of all known history, these thinkers are interested 
in whole eras, in cultures lasting several centuries or more, in the rise 
and fall of civilizations* And when we consider, for example, a work 
like Karl Jaspers' Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, we find 
Jaspers' attention directed initially to the so-called Axial Era in the
«-l
first millenium before Christ, and then subsequently to the attempt to 
delineate meaningful eras in world-history, culminating in the post­
renaissance Technological Era© And when we find Christian theologians 
trying to find meaning and patterns which span^ the centuries we see that 
they were trying to much the same thing* So in St. Augustine's be 
Civitate bei we find him exposing the world-significance of the Roman 
Empire and the barbaric invasions of the fifth century0 He is interest- 
:ed in the rise and fall of states and empires* Taking as his stand-
i
:point the future final consummation of last judgement and resurrection, 
he stands above and at the end of history, and looking down and back, 
tides in the light of his exalted perspective, to expo3e the significance
of present and past events. Oscar Cullmann too, in his Christus und 
die Zeit, taking the Christ-event as the mid-point of histoiy, attempts 
to see the significance of events before that point and after it, in the 
light shed by the Christ-event itself. Therefore Cullmann finds within 
history a Heilsgeschichte, and speaks of the Heilsplan that runs through 
history*
But when we turn to the view of history expressed in 
Rudolf Bultmann1s Gifford Lectures History and Eschatology .(Edinburgh 
1957)* we meet a sharp rebuff in the form of a stem prohibition.
Standing over against the man who complains of the meaninglessness of 
the historical process as a whole, Bultmann rebukes him: ,fDo not look 
around yourself into universal history”(p.155)* Behind this prohibit­
ion lies the whole background of existentialist thought, stemming in 
first place from Kierkegaard, with his scathing satire on the Hegelian 
disciple, who surveys from his lofty perspective the unfolding of the 
centuries according to Hegel1 s celebrated List der Vemunft.
Bultmann raises the question whether there is in history 
a meaningful core, from which histoiy gains its essence and its meaning® 
His blunt answer is that the meaning and core and essence of history are 
to be found in man. And in answering thus he believes himself to be at 
one with Burckhardt, Toynbee, Dilthey, Croce, and R.G. Collingwood®
H 11 ...the historian........ cannot take a stand outside history at an
'Archimedean point'", R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 127®
*  i i
4.
There is more to Bultmann’s position than, is apparent on the 
surface. This concentration on human existence as of first importance 
is to be found in those thinkers of the existentialist tradition who make 
up Bultmann’s philosophical background. The most obvious of these, 
Martin Heidegger, has admitted that the basic task of philosophy is to 
give an^ exposition of the structure of human existence, 'being-there’, 
’Dasein'* When we examine the contents of Bultmann's Theology of the 
New Testament, vol. I, we discover that the greater part of the book is 
devoted to the consciousness of the primitive church and to the elucidat- 
:ion of human existence prior to the revelation of faith and after it.
It is this that lies behind the rhetorical criticism of Bultmann that he 
is not interested in theology but in anthropology. Dr. John Macquarrie^ 
(in An Existentialist Theology, London 1955> P« 1&2), speaking of 
Heidegger, says: "The stuff of history —  if we may so speak —  is 
therefore existence, and that means possibility". On the same page, 
he gives Heidegger's definition of the German 'Historie' as " ...the
I
disclosure of man in his historic possibilities, and the more history 
understands possibilities, the more penetrating it is". And it does not 
matter the period of his career at which we examine Bultmann’s works, 
we are forced to admit that with regard to the centrality of human exist­
ence, Bultmann is extremely consistent.
nultmann is interested in the life of man. He points 
out that the life of man is made up not only of thought and actions 
(Collingwood) but also of reactions to ' Widerfahmisse’ , encounters and 
happenings in the world about him. There is no possibility of man being 
anything but being-in-the-world. Man's life is directed to the future
* «:*
for which he is responsible,, What a man does in the present is
revealed in the futureo But what of the past ? We must not think of
our history as a present determined by our past which in turn determines
our future® The past is determinative of course in so far as it brings
us into our present situation and its problems which demand solution.
For Bultmann the causal connection which might exist between past and
future is broken by a lacuna - the present® Bultmann believes that
the present is the moment of decision, in which a man decides what to
C
accept and what to /eject of his past, and what meaning the future is
3£to have for him® For Bultmann freedom exists in the moment of the
present for man, and in it the future for him is open®
What rele’Vance has the Christian faith at this 
point ? Christianity holds that man does not possess the freedom 
necessary for a present decision l® The Christian faith perceives that 
a man’s past is something that fascinates him, with which he is, however
IE R. Bultmann, Preaching:Genuine and Secularized, essay in Religion and 
Culture« London 1959 > P» 242: "True preaching is that which preaches
Jesus Christ as Lord, whatever its words and ideas. Thus it is crucial 
that he be present as Lord in the preached word itself, and that where 
this word resounds the end of the world be present to the auditor, in 
that it places before him the decision, whether he will belong to the old 
or to the new world, whether he will remain the old man or become a new 
man".
unwillingly, in love* Relative freedom in the present he may have, hut 
not radical freedom. Since man's existence is an ever-future one, man 
must became^Tree from himself and also free for himself. Man's belief 
that he already possesses this freedom is a sign of his illusion. Man 
can neither possess nor earn this radical freedom, he can only have it 
as a gift (see Histoiy and Eschatology, Chapter X, especially pps* 150
f.)*
There are those who minimize the differences between
Bultmann1s account of human existence and that given by existentialist
philosophers. But at this point, in Bultmann’s insistence upon man's
A
lack of radical freedom for separating his past from his future by decis- 
:ion, the divergence of Bultmann from existentialist humanism is writ 
largeo Bultmann writes (Essays:Philosophical & Theological, London 1955 
p. 84)> "In actual fact, man is not free to respond to the future, nor 
is he free in his decisions, for he has always in reality decided in fav- 
:our of his past as it is. He remains involved in dread and sin, and 
in everything he does he gets more and more securely attached to them. 
Manifestly that is a judgement which can only be accepted as a self- 
condemnation. Whoever sought to accept it as an illuminating Weltansch- 
sauung would already have falsified it". ".<>. It is only liberation 
from himself that can be man's true liberation0 If he cannot free him- 
:self from the world and the past and himself, God can0 And the way in 
which God does it is by forgiveness of sin. That means simply the 
obliteration of man's past, and talcing him to be what he is not —  the 
man of the future; it means relieving him of dread and thereby making him 
free for the future"(Essays, p. 85).
The relevance of Christian faith is that it holds that it is just this 
freedom that it receives as a gift. In Christian faith, man is freed 
from the bonds of the past, from the ’old man'. This message, we must 
note, proclaiming radical freedom for man from his past, is not a 
general idea or theory, to be apprehended conceptually or intellect­
ually* It is a highly personal concrete word addressed to you and to 
me* This message of the gift of the grace of God is revealed in Jesus 
Christ* For the New Testament, Jesus Christ is the eschatological 
evento This means that in him God has set an end to the old world; 
the old world has reached its end for the believer in that he has come tc 
his end as the old man and is now, by this gracious word in Christ 
spoken to him, a new man, a free man. Bultmann would not have us think 
that God's eschatological event is something that belongs to the facts 
of past history. How could that be, when the end has to do with man's 
present life ? No, God's eschatological event becomes present event evei 
again in the church's proclamation. The appearance of Jesus within 
the facts of history is the speaking of God's eschatological word, and is
3E R. Bultmann, Preaching:Genuine and Secularized, in Religion and Cult­
u r e , pps. 240-1: "This, then, is the content of preaching:the appearance
of Jesus is the end of the old world and the dawn of the new ........
Jesus’ appearance is thus seen not as within history but as the END OF 
HISTORY. But the paradox of preaching is this, that the event which 
puts an end to histoiy has occurred within histoiy. The communication 
of this event ... is correctly understood only when it is understood as 
the call to see in this appearanee the end of the world ... according to 
the New Testament at least, Christian preaching says that Jesus' 
appearanee was not an event in the world but means the end of the world".
but the first in a series of such appearances, or eschatological events 
(histoiy and Eschatology, p. 151)*
0
This is also the standpoint of Bultmann’s TheJLogy of the 
New Testament, vol. I (in which see pps. 37 !•)• The earliest Christian 
churchiis described there by Bultmann as the 'eschatological congregat­
ion'^. 37). " By designating itself ... as the congregation of Codec.",
says Bultmann, "the earliest church declared that it itself was the ful­
filment of the hopes of the apocalyptists", (p. 38)° Bultmann means by 
this that the earliest Christian community believed that the ’end of 
days' had come upon it© l/e read that "the earliest Church knew that it 
had been given the 'Spirit', that gift of the end of days which according 
to the Jewish view had departed from Israel with the last of the prophets 
but whose impartation was promised for the end of days"(p. 41)°
Bultmann quotes a typical primitive Christian prayer - "Let the Lord 
come, and let this world pass away"(p. 41)° Of the Christ-event we 
read, "Jesus' having come was itself the decisive event through which 
God called His congregation(Church)....Jesus' coming itself was already 
eschatological occurrence"(p. 43 )»  Of Jesus' preaching, Bultmann says,
" «•• it is evident that Jesus has this conviction: This age has run 
out. The summary of his preaching in the saying, 'The time is fulfilled, 
and the reign of God is at hand'(Mk.1:15)> is appropriate"(p.5)°
Speaking also 6f the Resurrection, Bultmann writes, "For God made this 
event the eschatological occurrence, so that lifted out of all temporal 
limitation, it continues to take place in any present moment, both in 
the proclaiming word and in the sacraments"(p. 303)°
The statement that we made above (pps
that 'the appearance of Jesus within the facts of history is the speaking 
of God's eschatological word, and is but the first in a series of such 
appearances, or eschatological events' is so basic to Bultmann's view 
of the moment and so decisive in his whole thought, and raises so many 
problems, that we must now give it serious thought and discussion.
In the first place, we cannot help noticing at least a 
superficial resemblance between Bultmann's position and that of Paul 
Tillich in his Systematic Theology, volumes I and II* We find Tillich 
defining salvation as reclaiming from the old and transferring into the 
New Being (Sys.Theol., II, p. 192)* When Tillich hastens to add that 
this must be understood primarily as meaning the fulfilment of one's 
existence, we see that there is in Tillich’s thought a strand close to 
Bultmann's, namely the centrality of human existence in theology and 
history. So too Tillich defines regeneration, which means the 'new 
state of affairs', the 'new eon', brought by the Christ (Sys. Theol.,
II, p. 204)° The material norm of systematic theology for Tillich is 
1 the New Being in Jesus as the Christ as our ultimate concern ’ (Sys-. 
Theol*, I, p. 56). For Tillich, Jesus is the Christ precisely because 
it is he who brings the new eon, the new reality. And the significance 
of the title 'Christ' as applied to Jesus lies for Tillich in the way it 
points, by contrast, to man's existential situation (Sys* Theol., II, 
p. 30)* Here again we perceive the centrality of human existence in his 
thought© And another similarity between Bultmann and Tillich is of 
course that they are both concerned with a new existence, a new reality, 
a new life*
But where I feel these two part company is over the
content that they would give to the hew Testament category 'ephapax', 
once-and-for-all0 This matter is of such importance that I feel that 
Bultmann's theology must stand or fall by it©
What content then does Bultmann give to the term 
'ephapax' ?* We note that it differs little from that given to it by 
Kierkegaard, whose views in detail we will examine in a later chapter.
It does seem, that both Bultmann and Kierkegaard are agreed that the 
Christ-event witnessed to by the hew Testament is but the first in a 
series occurring ever since, but indistinguishable in content from it I 
The Christ-event is number one in an identical series, how Bultmann 
would not agree, nor, I think, would anyone, that the term 'ephapax* 
means that the Christ-event was literally unrepeatable, because unrepeat- 
:ableness is a quality that attaches to every past historical event, 
whether it be the murder of Caesar or something that happened yesterday0 
All histoiy is literally unrepeatable0 hor would Bultmann agree that 
the Christ-event was 'ephapax1, unique, because it revealed something 
from the mind of God that otherwise would have remained a mystery© 
Importance would then attach itself to the revealed truth and not to the 
revealer and his career; Christianity could then detach itself from hist- 
*ory and become a philosophy, which was was precisely the mistake of the 
XlXth century and early XXth century liberals© Bultmann would say that 
the Christ-event was 'ephapax', unique, because of its universal valid-
* Vide e.g. Rom0 6:10, Heb.7:27.
/validity for salvation and its applicability to every life* lan 
Henderson, in his Myth in the New Testament, (London 1952), pps. 44- 
45 f writes: " *•• on Bultmann’s view ... the most important thing about 
Christ' death •** is that unlike the death say, of Julius Caesar, it has 
an all-decisive significance for your life and mine11** But the crucial
point is here ---  there is completely lacking in the theology of Bult-
:mann (and in that of Kierkegaard before him) any difference between 
the impact of the Christ-event on the first witnesses of it in the New 
Testament and the impact of it today on you and on me* The two events 
seem, that is, to be essentially identical*
Now clearly we find a quite different story in the 
theology of Tillich* For Tillich the original Christ-event, described 
in the New Testament, is normative for us today* And it is so, it seems, 
in this way. Tillich comes close to Bultmann because he dislikes 
revelation thought of as knowledge about God or about divine matters, and 
because he regards it as the " *... manifestation of the ground of being 
in events, persons>and things* Such manifestations have shaking, 
transforming, and healing power"(Sys* Theol., II, p. 192). The disclosure 
of God in histoiy means the experience of transformation and healing 
(Lat. Salvus, healthy, healed)* When Jesus as the Christ manifested 
himself originally in hisory the salvation and revelation he brought 
then were final, complete, unchangeable* But revelation and salvation
3E
Cf* S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, (Princeton 
1941)» P<> 345* "The eternal happiness of the individual is decided in 
time through the relationship to something historical”.
f .J
as received by us living under the conditions of existence are always 
preliminary, fragmentaiy, and changeable© This seems to sum tip Tillich's 
views as to the 'ephapax' character of the original Christ-event, 
indicating a decisive difference between that event then and our appropr­
iation of it now© And this in turn gives a norm, a yardstick, against 
which we could measure our subjective experience, our appropriation of 
the benefits of Christ© The saving and healing in Jesus as the Christ 
are never relative; as the Christ, the bringer of the hew Being,the new 
eon, he must transform every form of relativity in his healing and saving 
power. Therefore, every claim that there has taken place within existence 
salvation, healing, and revelation, fragmentaiy and preliminary though 
they must be, must be judged by rhe saving power in Jesus as the Christ© 
Thus the Christ-event is normative over Christian experience; it is by 
no means simply the first in a series of events in no way distinguishable 
one from another. The original Christ-event towers in completeness and 
in significance over all subsequent appropriations of its benefits© The 
difference between Tillich and Bultmann is obvious (see Sys. Theol©!, 
pps© 162 f.)©
Now this difference between Bultmann and Tillich is 
naturally of great interest and importance in itself, especially for 
students of both theologians. But the difference has a wider area of 
importance, since it brings to our notice a larger problem, and one by
which Bultmann1s version of Christianity stands or falls --  namely, the
question of a norm, an# objective norm, which governs and rules our so- 
called subjective experience© To this larger and all-important question 
we now tumo
Bultmann1s view of the meaning of the concept 
' ephapax1 —  that the original Christ-event is but the first in a ser- 
:ies of events beside each of which the original is virtually indisting­
uishable is a view that could be described very easily as 
outrageously subjective® Is there no criterion by which our present 
experience of the Christ-event is judged and controlled ? Is there not 
something which tells me in a given moment whether I am or not being 
addressed by the genuine Christian kerygma ? Is the content of the 
original Christ-event identical with the content of what I appropriate in 
the moment of encounter and decision ? Does the kerygma which encounters 
me in the moment carry within itself its own authentication, without ref- 
serence to some external norm ? Must I measure the validity or the 
authenticity of the kerygma solely by its concrete effect on me in the
here and now ? When we recall Bultmann’s view of the ’ephapax' concept 
the
it does seem that^above questions must be raised, and that the student of
Bultmann must give some kind of answer to them® The importance of such
questions is well recognised in contemporary theology*, Hermann Diem,
in his Dogmatics, (Edinburgh 195Sjl chapter I, argues that it is just these
o
questions that divide contemporary theo^Jl’ans one from another, and that 
nowhere is this divergence more apparent than in the rift between the 
Barthian and the Bultmannian campso
In this section of our argument we shall demonstrate 
that if we reject Bultmann1s view, an acceptable and constructive alter­
native is anything but easy to fiiid® Let us return then, first of all, 
to the views of Tillich® At the outset, we must not fail to recognise
c' M
that a plain divergence exists between Bultmann and Tillich in that 
the one is an existentialist and the other an ontologist® What we mean 
by this is that while for Bultmann existential modes and attitudes are 
paramount, for Tillich ontological descriptions are basic® Tillich’s 
ontological proposition that ’God is being itself’ is rejected by Bult- 
:mann, because this seems to be speech about God apart from faith and 
histoiy0 Bultmann will not allow this, insisting that to speak of God 
rightly is to speak inevitably at the same time of man and his exist­
ence® Also if God is spoken of as ’historical1 Bultmann interprets 
this as God as existentially relevant to man. Another preliminary 
objection that the disciple of Bultmann might make against Tillich's 
ontological propositions is that terms like 'being itself', 'ground of 
being', aa^only meaningful when regarded against the context of man's 
„ perpetual state of having to become0 It is not so easy, he might
retort, to make purely ontological assertions about God without involv- 
:ing oneself at some point, in the existential. We mention this 
because, if valid statements could be made about God from philosophy, 
and an ontological description of God be reached apart from existence and 
histoiy, we might manage to construct some norm or criterion for our 
subjective experience; but it is very doubtful if this can be done®
Tillich holds then, as we have seen,that the original 
historical Christ-event witnessed to by the New Testament is, in its
iL
original appropriation, full and final and absolute and unchangeable, 
and therefore normative for our subsequent experience and appropriation 
which is by comparison limited, conditioned, and fragmentaiy.
* See Sys. Theolo, I, pps® 143, 152, 155, 162®
If this is so, we must ask how one acquires information about this 
Christ-event ? Certainly not, says Tillich, by means of historical res- 
search; the so-called quest for the historical Jesus was a failure, as 
must be any attempt to give a foundation to Christian faith by the invest 
igation of history (Sys® TheoiU, II, pps. 118, 121, 123, 130)® Thus, if 
we rule out the historical approach, what is the alternative ? It does 
seem as though the only remaining one is that faith® Supposing a radic- 
:al historical scholar doubted the factual existence of Jesus of Nazareth 
nineteen centuries ago, then is faith able to overrule his historical 
scepticism and assert that such a person really did exist ? Now 
Tillich believes that faith can do soe He holds that faith can guaran- 
:tee the once-upon-a-time factuality of Jesus® Mo.® The historical 
foundation of Christianity is an essential element of the Christian 
faith itself and <>•• this faith, through its own power, can overrule 
sceptical possibilities within historical criticism* (S.ys« Theol ®, II, 
pps. 130 f.)© At this point Tillich and Bultmann are one; for Ailt- 
mann too it is preposterous that purely historical criticism could give 
or take away from Christian faith. His position is clearly that Jesus 
Christ the Word of God comes to man again and again in the keiygma, and 
if this event happens now it must have happened then® But Bultmann 
will not allow the original Christ-event a larger content or a greater 
objective certainty than the event of the keiygma now; we apprehend the 
keiygma now existentially; the original kerygma was apprehended then in 
identical manner* 'The kerygma now is identical with the kerygma then; 
it is, it must be, self-authenticating® For Bultmann it is faith 
that guarantees the one keiygma then and now® There is no aspect of
the keiygma which is apprehended non-existentially, and which then 
becomes a norm or a criterion for our here and now existential apprehen- 
ssion. We must now asks what does Tillich mean by his assertion that 
faith can overrule scepticism in historical criticism?
We shall not quarrel with Tillich when he says that 
faith guarantees the evidence of the New Being in the Now (Sys. Theol®,
II, p. 13l)o Certainly faith is existential participation --  by
faith we share in the existential benefits of the Christ® But we 
must insist that this proposition is not a purely ontological description 
of the Christ® For it is really an existential one® What we see.the 
New Being to be is dependent in some measure upon what we see the old 
being to be, and that is derived from existential analysis® If so, 
we must renounce all talk of a purely ontological description of Christ 
which could be a norm for our here and now experience® For what is 
normative for our here and now experience is dependent to some extent 
upon our analysis of human existence® When Tillich goes on to say that 
”••• faith guarantees a personal life ®..«. in which the New Being has 
conquered the old being" (p. 13l)» we must be careful in our interpret- 
iation® To say that Jesus as the Christ is the bearer of the power of 
the New Being is again not to make a purely ontological statement nor to 
give a purely ontological description* For New Being can only have 
meaning in contrast with old being, and since we cannot have an idea of 
what old being is from the Christ alone, we can only derive it from 
analysis of human existence which is fallen and inauthentic© But here 
again existential analysis becomes normative® how can faith guarantee 
a personal, concrete life ? Certainly by participation, if this means
that we approach the Christ with our concrete old being and have this
conquered and set right by the power of the New Being of which he is the
bearer® But is this not tantamount to admitting that what we can know
of this Life which bears the power of the New Being is confined to those
elements of it which are relevant to our concrete here and now existence?
That is, the New Being which conquered then must be identical with the
so
New Being which conquers now, no more, no less. And if this iSj, what
has happened to the normative function attributed to the original Christ-
Lt
event ? It can ha,rdly be normative if we can only approach^with our 
estranged and fallen existence® In what sense therefore can Tillich’s 
account of the Christ-event be different from and more satisfactory than 
Bultmann's account of the kerygma, every point of which can only be 
approached existentially ? If objective knowledge gained by the crit- 
:ical historian cannot give nor take away from our faith, then exactly 
what type of objective knowledge can become a norm or a criterion for 
our here and now appropriation ? Of course it is possible to answers 
The hearing and appropriation of the Apostles, but this is presupposed 
by and included in the keiygma itselfo
Having failed to find so far in Tillich any objective
norm by which we could measure our experience, we must pursue the matter
further© Faith can guarantee the evidence of the New Being in the now
and' also therefore the personal life in which this New Being has appear-
:ed« But what is this New Being ? It is, says Tillich, "the picture
of him in whom the New Being has appeared" (p. 132). We can agree
with many of the statements that Tillich makes about this pictui-e® No 
special trait can be verified in it with certainty: the picture is two-
r w
/two-fold, being made up of the life which appeared and the reception of 
it by the first witnesses; to be safer though, we must insist that the 
picture is made up of one element, the account of it given by the first 
witnesses; behind this we cannot go to the life which 'actually1 appear-
a
sedc We cannot separate two elements out because we can only know of 
this life from the apostolic accounts., We agree too that this picture 
is perceived by participation if this means that every aspect of it has 
existential reference and relevance«, But does faith guarantee this 
picture ? Yes, says Tillich, it guarantees it as " <,.<> the adequate 
expression of the transforming power of the hew Being in Jesus as the 
Christ" (p. 132). If this picture of the Christ is merely effective 
in transforming human existence (fallen and inauthentic) then it would 
seem to be no different from the kerygma of which Bultrnann speaks *
The same could be said of it® We encounter this picture only by partic­
ipating in it, when we encounter the hew Being which it conveys, which 
overcomes and corrects our old being® Bultmann insists that the kerygma 
is properly appropriated when we allow it to affect our existence; every
point of the kerygma must be appropriated existentially® Are there
cl
elements in Tillich's picture which must be appropriated, or which can be 
appropriated, nonexistentially ? I think not. If the picture or the 
kerygma @@htaift©4 two types of elements, existential and nonexistential 
elements, how could we approach the latter class if both Tillich and 
Bultmann rule out the approach of historical criticism ? We conclude 
therefore that the picture of Christ who is the bearer of the power of 
the hew Being?(or, in short, the kerygma of the apostles), can. only be 
approached and appropriated by existential, concrete, here and now partic- 
sipation, which rules out the possibility of there being any extra-
/extra-kerygmatic norm or criterion which objectively criticizes, 
controls or judges our subjective appropriation of the power of the hew 
Being®
, , Tillich is certainly aware of the acuteness of this problem in
modern theology, but seems unwilling to take up Bultmann1s radical and 
seemingly dangerous position® It seems to me that this unwillingness 
leads to a contradiction which runs through Tillich's theology,(to which 
we shall have to return in our concluding chapter)® The contradiction 
is this: For instance, while wishing to maintain the normative- 
objective function of the Christ-event, he completely abandons this posit 
:ion when he deals with the Resurrection* The Resurrection, says 
Tillich (see Sys. Theol., II, pps. 181 fo), cannot be an objective- 
normative event in the past because it simply cannot be indicated as an 
historical event in space and time by historical research® It s cert- 
:ainty as an event is created by our subjective appropriation of the 
Christ's existential victoiy® Because the hew Being in the Christ over- 
:comes the old being in us now, we become certain that old being was 
conquered once by the hew Being in Jesus as the Christ® This is the 
opposite of maintaining that our present experience is stabilized and 
controlled by the original Christ-event® WhenTillich says that " ... 
this event (i.e. the Resurrection)happened first to some of his follow­
ers who had fled to Galilee in the hours of his execution; then to many 
others;then to Paul;then to all those who in every period experience his 
living presence here and now", the idea of a past objective event with a 
normative function seems to have been abandoned. Our present experience 
of the power of the hew Being creates the certainty of the victory of the
hew Being's power in the past. Thus, says Tillich^(Sys. Theol0, II, p® 
179) > "It is the certainty of one's own victory over the death of exist- I 
:ential estrangement which creates the certainty of the Resurrection of
1
the Christ as event and symbol; but it is not historical conviction or j 
the acceptance of biblical authority which creates this certainty". j
There can be no distinguishing between the event then and the event now, 
they are identical and to the original event and our present sppropriat- j 
:ion of it can be applied the symbol, Resurrection^ (op. cit®, p® j
181)® At the same time, and here we come to the heart of the contra­
diction, Tillich seems to take up an opposite and contrary position.
He is forever using the term 'participation in ' (see op® cit.,
pps® 204 f.)® We participate in, 'enter' (p. 204) the objective reality 
of the New Being which, says Tillich, precedes our subjective participat­
ion. And when Tillich writes that"the subjective consequences are 
fragmentaiy and not the basis for claiming participation in the Christ"* 
(p. 204),it is hard indeed to see what he means® If we rule out of 
court 'subjective consequences' how could we possibly be aware that 
we were participating with our old beiiig in the power of the new ?
Tillich argues that we could only claim participation in the Christ on
the basis of our faith --  the faith which accepts Jesus as the bearer
of the power of the New Beingo How could our faith possibly do such a 
thing except by constant reference to our having participated in the 
power of the New Being with our old being, i.e. without consequent 
reference to subjective consequences ? So the contradiction in Tillich^ 
theology becomes apparent®
So Tillich speaks also of Justification. Justific-
Justification, "in an objective sense, is the eternal act of God”
(p. 205)«> But by what means can the unjustified man perceive an eternal 
act or offer of God ? Surely he can become aware of such a reality 
only when God justifies him in his actual, here-and-now fallen state and 
accepts him as he is ? And when Tillich writes (p. 205) that Justificata 
sion, like Regeneration ” ... is first an objective event and then a 
subjective reception”, this contradiction in his thought becomes very 
apparent•
Tillich wants to find some objective controlling and normat- 
:ive basis for Christian faith which would enable him to reject the 
out and out subjectivism of a thinker like Bultmann® Yet his own treat­
ment of terms and concepts like ’participation1, ’Resurrection1, 
'Regeneration*, 'Justification' will not allow him to do so. It still
seems as though one really must accept Bultmann's position in full --
that is, to admit that we can find no factor outwith the kerygma which 
can be apprehended nonexistentially, and which could become normative 
for our present experience. The only alternative is to argue that the 
Christian faith, the knowledge of God and of ourselves,can be gained in 
some way that by-passes our history and existence, against which all 
appropriation and subjective consequences may be judged® But I think 
that an examination of Tillich's theology demonstrates the extreme diff­
iculty, if not the impossibility of doing anything like this®
One further comment about Tillich requires to be made.
Such statements as 'the believer enters into a pre-existent objective 
reality greater than his own subjective appropriation', seem to be,
(and we shall return to this in the concluding chapter), in the last 
analysis, at least partly ecclesiastical statements® It is true, as 
the book of Job points out (Job 15:7)» that we are not the first men to 
be b o m  -—  we take our place in that vast procession of believers xdiich 
stretches back to Abraham* Others have believed and decided and have 
been renewed before us* For this reason there is within the Church,
of which the Church appoints herself editor, a great mass of confessions
and lives® But it is one thing to point to the wisdom of consulting 
the biographies of the saints, and quite another, as Kierkegaard was well 
aware, to exalt this mass of recorded experiences as normative for our 
present appropriation® For them is a sense in which,(as we each one face 
our concrete historical existence waiting to be realized), we really are
the first to be bom. Tillich's talk of participation seems to be then,
in part at least, a reading back from the collected experiences of the 
individual members of Christendom® But we shall have to re-examine this 
matter more fully in our concluding chapter® |
j|
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If we find it impossible to find in Tillich's theology 
an objective norm, nonexistentially approachable, then can we find such j 
a norm elsewhere ? If Bultmann's position seems dangerous and therefore 
untenable, can we find an alternative position elsewhere® Bultmann's 
position has been attacked and discussed in so many places it is difficult 
to decide on a starting-point® But we can find a possible alternative 
in Mr. II.P. Owen's Revelation and Existence (Cardiff 1957? especially 
chapter 7> The Historical Element, pps. Ill f.)«
Now Owen plaihly dislikes Bultmann's view of the"moment*-
that in it eternity crosses time whenever God speaks to man through an 
encounter, and that the present encounters which Christians enjoy were 
made possible by the past events of Christ's life and death (Revelation 
and Existence, pps. 117-8)® He dislikes these statements not because 
they are not part of Christianity (he admits that they are), but because 
Bultmann has made them the distinctive offence of the Gospel (op. cit., 
p. 118). This, says Owen, they are not, because such assertions could 
just as easily be made of Old Testament events (op. cit. p. 118).
For Owen the distinctive offence of the Gospel lies in the statement 
that "the eternal God himself entered time and took time into his own
nature --  that he himself entered Historie and made it Geschichte"
(op. cit., p. 118)® Owen can only give meaning to this statement by- 
interpreting it by means of the thought-system of the Epistle to the 
Hebrews® At the conclusion of his earthly ministry, Christ entered 
Heaven taking with him his earthly work which is continually re-enacted 
there; the work that he did here he continually offers before his 
Father's throne in the heavenly places (op. cit., pps® 116, 133)«
This is certainly a myth, says Owen, but one that can be believed by mem- 
:bers of the Church, the Body of Christ animated by Christ's Risen Life, 
where the myth is lived out (op. cit., p® 133)® Therefore the Bult- 
rmannian language that says that God CAN transform existence must be 
rejected in favour of the statement that God HAS transformed it; the 
language that says that God CAN make time historic must be rejected in
Important references to Hebrews can be found in Owen, op. cit., ups® 
116,117, 133®
favour of the statement that God HAS made it historic (op. cit., p.
133)• And this is available in the Church as first-fruits. It is this 
belief, says Owen, that the natural man finds scandalous, and which 
constitutes the distinctive Christian offence. Now certainly, if this 
were so, we would have something objective by which to measure our concrete 
experience --  Christ's risen, perfected, fulfilled, victorious, object­
ive life made available in the Church, beside which our own participat­
ion would be fragmentary, or, as Owen puts it, mere'first-fruits', which 
in this context means much the same thing, (op. cit., p. 133)•
It seems to me that if natural man objects to Owen's 
account of the specifically Christian Gospel, he can hardly be blamed for 
doing so* It does seem to me that natural man could raise at least 
three objections to Owen's version of the kerygma*
First, he could point out that Owen's doctrine 
implies the denial of truly historical and temporal existence; Owen's 
view seems to mean that authentic existence can only be realized within 
the context of the Church's worship and life* Admitted that the Church 
has an important part to play in the achievement of authenic existence 
(Bultmann would clearly not deny this), what then about the world and 
existence-in-the-world ? Is existence-in-the-world completely cut off 
from the achievement of authenticity ? If it is held (as it is by 
Bultmann and Heidegger and other existentialist thinkers), that man qua 
man is always and everywhere historical and temporal, then Owen's eccles- 
:iastical view would appear to be unsatisfactoiy0 It might of course
be said that the Church and its life represent a scandalon to belief; 
but ecclesiastical history is so appallingly ambiguous that one must 
hesitate toUtam. s&ytiffl# that ecclesiastical scandals are within the will 
of God® This type of assertion seems to me to be very dangerous®
Second, he could point out that Owen's account of
Christianity, and especially his account of the Christ-event is meaning-
of
:ful only if one accepted the thought-system^, and especially its rel- 
Jiance oft Platoni^ dualism® But surely it cannot be held that the dis­
tinctive offence with which the Gospel confronts modem man is the 
Platonic 'two worlds’ system of thought?
Third, the natural man could point out that Owen's 
account of Christianity would seem to demand of him understanding and 
acceptance of the Judaistic thought-system centering on the sacrificial 
rites of the Jerusalem Temple® Certainly the author of Hebrews has 
this in mind when he writes of Christ entering into the Holy of Holies 
to offer a perpetual sacrifice (Hebrews, chapters ^ and 10). Here
there is a dualism presupposed again this time between the two sides
of the Veil in the Jerusalem sanctuary® Hardly anyone would say that 
the Hebrews christology was meaningless® No doubt, when it was first 
conceived by the author, it was a magnificent attempt at re-mythologiz- 
sation; no doubt also, to its original recipients, it was intensely 
meaningful, and conveyed to them, by means of its concepts, the essence 
of the kerygma® But this is a very different thing from supposing tint 
its concepts form part of the enduring fabric of the Christian faith, 
and that acceptance of its thought-systems^ (Platonic and Judaistic);
3Eis obligatory on contemporary hearers of the kerygma!
It seems then, that if Owen finds it difficult to 
accept Bultmann1s account of the encounter in the moment because it is 
thoroughly subjective, his own suggested alternative seeking after a 
type of objectivity is also unacceptable* We turn now to a subject just
as important --  to Owen's views on the possibility of finding objective
certainty in the judgement of the past®
The impossibility of erecting the Christian faith on 
the more or less approximate results of historical research has never 
found clearer or more incisive expression than in the works of Kierke- 
sgaard. Owen recognizes this (op. cit., p. 128). Owen concedes that 
if the New Testament is examined objectively, the result of this is that 
what is reported there is only more or less probable (op. cit., p. 128)* 
Because of this, the purely historical approach to the Gospels yields 
' only a veiy low degree^or a very high degree of uncertainty. Historical 
knowledge, says Owen in agreement with Kierkegaard, can never be more 
than approximation-knowledge (op. cit., p. 128)® Let us suppose that 
the subjective approach, faith, possesses certainty® What then is the 
relationship between the two approaches, the objective historical
XImplicitly this raises the question of whether a book like Hebrews is 
capable of being demythologized (i.e. existentially interpreted)if we 
reject Owen's type of interpretation. To this question we shall return 
in our concluding chapter*
approach on the one hand, and the subjective approach by faith on the 
other ? Owen's quite astounding answer is that faith may infuse the 
historical approach with its own certainty, and make more or less 
probable facts objectively certain (op. cit., pps® 129-30). We must 
be careful in stating our own position here. The view we have outlined 
is that because we experience the power of the Jesus Christ event now, 
it must have happened then. To use Owen's terminology, this certainty 
which faith confers is subjective -—  it cannot be given apart from 
faith. Or it might be better to say that the certainty which faith 
yields is inter-subjective. But Owen is explicit that faith confers 
upon the biblical events not merely significance but objective certainty®
What meaning can this assertion possibly have ? 
Certainty is objective, I should say, when it can be freely demonstrated 
by one person to another, the requisite intelligence alone being
granted. Thus, one mathematician can demonstrate to anyone with the 
requisite intelligence that 2 + 2  = 4* This is so true that no one would 
question it, and it remains true apart from the emotions and experiences 
of those involved in its demonstration® But when historical science 
deals with New Testament narratives it is a very different matter. If 
an historian agreed that it was more or less probable that a certain 
Jesus of Nazareth lived who used language indicating that he was God, 
neither Owen nor any other theologian would be able to demonstrate to 
him that this was objectively certain® If he attempted to do so, he 
would soon discover that the certainty he possessed was closely linked 
with his personal faith, and that for this reason was radically 
subjective certainty, or that it was inter-subjective in relation to his
fellow-believers. Certainly the historian would deny that this 
certainty was objective, because it cannot be freely and universally 
demonstrated and communicated®
Indeed, when we examine Owen's position further, we 
see further dubious qualities in this so-called 'objective certainty'. 
FOr example, philosophy and objective thought are forbidden by Owen to 
examine this objective certainty which faith confers on historical 
probabilities (op. cit., p. 130). Philosophy cannot by its v e ry nature 
examine how faith and the historical approach are related to each other, 
or how the former acts upon the latter. All that Owen can say is that 
the subjective element may 'infuse' the objective aoproach with certain-
sty. 'The only language we are allowed to use is metaphorical--
theyLction of faith upon the objective approach is compared with the 
action of light in infusing or pervading the air. Now this may be so® 
But if so, all talk of objective certainty must be given up® For how 
could the certainty so achieved be objective if the means by which it is 
achieved cannot even be discussed by means of ordinary philosophical 
or historiographical language ? That within the 'Christian circle'
(as Tillich calls it), theologians can and do use language which is mean- 
singful amongst themselves is undeniable, but the certainties so disuss- 
:ed are, rightly speaking, inter-subjective, or objective only within 
the circle® Owen's use of the term subjective seems to be very differ- 
sent from the use of the term in the world at large.
If faith possesses, as Owen asserts, certainty, why is 
this not sufficient for the believer ? His attempt to find objective
certainty cannot have as its object communication to others® Certainty 
cannot be imparted apart from faith itself® Does the attempt not there­
fore Indicate that faith alone is unable to bear the burden ? When we 
remember that it has been pointed out that Bultmann has been trying to 
apply the principle 'by faith alone' to belief just as Luther applied it 
to life, Owen's alternative does seem to be something much less than 
'sola fide'®
Further, from an examination of this seventh chapter of 
Owen's book, we see that Owen is working with a definition of history 
which Bultmann would categorically reject at the outset of the discuss- 
:ion® Speaking of Mk. 8:27-29 (St. Peter's Confession at Caesarea 
Philippi), Owen asks, "Did St. Peter utter this confession as, when, 
and where St. Mark relates ?" (op. cit., po 121)® And in another place 
he argues that it is probably right that 'Christ really did rise from the 
dead', but that a personal acceptance of the risen Christ makes this 
wholly certain (op. cit., p. 131)® And when Owen in this chapter 
searches for objective certainty, it is quite clear from the context 
that he means certainty that 'such-and-such a biblical event really did 
happen1 ^op. cit., pps. 129-30)® In that case, Owen obviously means by 
history, histoiy 'wie es eigentlich gewesen'. And it goes without saying 
that Bultmann would reject any such definition (as would Dilthey, 
Collingwood, Croce, and others). History, 'wie es eigentlich gewesen', 
can assure us that Jesus died, but never that Jesus died for me.
It is also clear that Owen himself is well aware of 
the unsatisfactoriness of his own proposition that "Faith bestows
certainty upon facts WHEN and BECAUSE it perceives a divine significance 
in them" (op. cit., p. 129). In fact the proposition becomes futile 
when Owen Admits that disagreement is inevitable about the certainty 
and significance of different parts of the Gospel stoiy (op. cit., pps® 
130-1). In some cases the objective probability may be lacking and in 
others the requisite faith may be lacking, so that disagreement becomes 
inevitable. It is astounding to read however that Owen holds that 
although disagreement about details in the Gospels may be inevitable, 
what remains is sufficient to allow us to assert that 'God was in Christ 
reconciling the world unto himself' • For one thing, this Bultmann 
would never deny, so that one wonders why this statement (op. cit®, p. 
131) is included in the book at all. But what is the definition of 
details ? Is the story of the Virgin Birth a detail, or the story of 
the Ascension, or the traditions of the Empty Tomb ? Agreement on 
these points seems a long way off! And if we see,(as many of us do), 
significance in the stories of the stilling of the storm, the cursing of 
the barren fig-tree, the healing of the Gadarene demoniac, does this 
significance bestow objective certainty on the facts as reported by the 
evangelists ? This is surely to enter the sphere of the most violent 
controversy, in which objective certainty seems left far behind. How 
on earth does one's faith 'infuse' or'pervade' the various degrees of 
probability or improbability which attaches to these stories ?
Many would question too Owen's statement that " e©® 
faith can discern certainty in the synoptic narrative and not in the 
apocryphal gospels because the former possesses a purely objective prob-
/probability which the latter altogether lack" (op. cit®, p. 130). The 
trouble with this is that many scholars would not draw such a firm dis­
tinction between the two types of story, and there is also the view 
that in certain Gospel stories the transition is actually being made 
from one type to the other. This is a further radical invalidation of 
Owen's principle. It is perhaps a little unfortunate that Owen chose 
to examine Mk. 8:27-29> a synoptic passage much beloved of the form- 
critics,Bultmann and Dibelius. Thus, when Owen asks whether this incid- 
ient really did happen as reported, he seems to be unaware of how the 
form-critics assaulted the 'wie es eigentlich gewesen' conception of 
historyo Thus the 'happenedness' of Mk. 8:27-29 can only be discussed 
against the background of the consciousness of the early Church. And 
this is without doubt a purely historical question, and no amount of 
faith in the risen Christ can affect the validity or the invalidity of 
the answer given to it.
But those who desire some empirical norm by which the 
authenticity and validity of the Kerygma may be judged are by no means 
exhausted by thinkers like Tillich and Owen. The desire seems to be so 
powerful in modem theological discussion, that we meet it again in the 
work of someone who is far from being unsympathetic towards Bultmann and
his central concerns  in the work of Dr. John Macquarrie, in his lat-
s.est book, The Scope of Demythologizing, (London i960)® The general 
aim of this work is to show that no matter how fruitful Bultmann's new 
approach to the Christian faith is, there is yet a limit which is reached, 
beyond which we dare not go, a limit which has been set by Bultmann him-
/himself (op. cit., p. 11)® The book demonstrates how this limit is 
met with within certain spheres each of which Macquarrie analyses and 
discusses most competently, spheres like those of exegesis, dogma, 
kerygma, philosophy, language, and so on. But here our special concern 
is with how a limit to the existential method is met with in the sphere 
of history. Therefore our concrete concern here is with Macquarriete 
third section, DEMYTHQLOGIZING AND HISTORY, op. cit., pps. 58-101®
Macquarrie gives a masterly summary of the existential- 
:ist approach to history under several propositions whose general fruit- 
sfulness and value in modem theology he does not challenge (op. cit®, 
pps. 81 f.). The first is that "Historical reflection has for its 
subject-matter human existence in the world" (op. cit., p. 81); the 
second is that "In historical reflection, the reflecting subject partic­
ipates in a peculiar way in the object of his reflection" (op. cit®, p® 
85); the third is that "The function of historical reflection is to prov- 
lide a self-understanding" (p. 86); the fourth is that "Historical 
reflection is concerned primarily with possibility" (op. cit., p. 88)® 
Each of these propositions are discussed in turn.
But the 'limit1 we have been speaking of is reached 
because Macquarrie fears that if the method based upon these proposit­
ions is pushed too far certain very undesirable results would emergeo 
In short, Macquarrie fears that if this approach to history is followed 
to the end of the line we would have a radical "subjectivizing" of 
history (op. cit., p. 91)® He asks, "How can we know that it is a
GENUINE possibility that is being set before us, unless it can be pointed 
out in histoiy ?" (op. cit., p. 90). On the same page he asks,
"How can we know what can be done except on the basis of what has been 
done ?" This question is important because its implication is that a 
certain knowledge of Jesus objectively pre-exists our existential exper­
ience of the keiygma. Yet Macquarrie rejects completely (as we 
have seen Tillich does too) the notion that "faith can be made to depend 
on historical research" (op. cit., p. 92).
His fears make him make certain demands. He 
demands "a minimal core of historical factuality which cannot be reason­
ably doubted" (op. cit., p. 93)* This minimum that he demands is 
"simply that there was someone who once exhibited in history the possib­
ility of existence which the keiygwa proclaims" (op. cit., p. 93)*
Talk of following Christ, he says further, might be ridiculous " ®.® 
if there were no assurance that the possibility of Christian existence 
has been fulfilled by someone under the conditions of real' life" (op® 
cit., p. 93)* Theologically expressed, "the minimal assertion is that 
the 'Word became flesh and dwelt among us'..." (op. cit., p. 93)*
We must not "throw out the objective-historical altogether" (op. cit®, 
p. 93), as the existentialist approach to histoiy might seem to tempt 
us to do. The precise nature of Macquarrie's fear is expressed by 
him thus: "Because human existence is not pure possibility but always 
possibility conditioned by facticity, we need some empirical anchor if 
we are to recognize any possibility as a genuine one and be assured 
that we are not being invited to chase after a chimera" (op. cit., p.
95)* Existentialist theology in its approach to histoiy needs therefore
" ... the assertion that there really was this kind of person, that 
this possible way of life has actually been exhibited in history11 (op. 
cit., p. 95)* And Macquarrie does not hide the fact that it is really 
•objectivity1 he is after when he writes, "The objective fact which is 
of importance is that around nineteen hundred years ago this kind of 
life was concretely manifested and shown to be a genuine possibility 
of historical human existence" (op. cit., p® 97)® The limit of 
demythologizing in the sphere of history has thus been reached for Mac- 
jquarrie in that he "would like some assurance‘that in a world which 
seems so inhospitable to it there HAS BEEN a life of this kind ——  that 
the Word has become flesh" (op. cit., p« 101).
These views are obviously so important and far-reaching 
that they deserve the most careful discussion that we can give them® 
First, we must point out that all talk of 'historical objectivity' 
comes up against the insight, which I consider an 'assured result' of 
modem theology, that there can be no direct observation of the past® 
Therefore, as we pointed out when discussing Tillich's position, all 
that we can know of the life of Christ is strictly confined to the 
apostolic accounts in the New Testament which itself is kerygmatic in 
nature® Thus, all searching for objective factuality comes up against 
this hard and insuperable truth.
Next, we note that a sceptical or objective historian need 
hardly deny that nineteen hundred years ago one Jesus lived, that he 
preached, taught, provoked the Jerusalem authorities, was executed by
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them, after which his followers were scattered. Macquarrie hints as
much,(op. cit., p. 93 f*)> when he points out that nowadays Christ-
myth theories, (theories holding that there never actually was any such
person as Jesus), are left with hardly an advocate, except those who
are really political and ideological propagandists. Macquarrie claims
that the Gospel writers were not indifferent to objective historical
factuality by pointing to the "plain factual assertion about the past"
that " ... In the fifteenth year of the reign of Tiberius Caesar,
Pontius Pilate being governor of Judea...... &tc©" (in Lk. 3*1 f®)* *
Now this, I feel, no historian worth his salt would dream of denying®
For to deny this is surely to sink to the level of the propagandist
who is so prejudiced that he would assert that no Jesus of Nazareth 
i t
ever livedl ButAis not without significance that these words from 
Lk. 3*1 f® contain no offence© That is, they certainly anchor some- 
: thing empirically within history, but they certainly do not proclaim 
Jesus1 link with the Father, they do not assert that in him the v/ord 
became flesh and dwelt among us, or that God was in Christ reconciling 
the world unto himself (II Cor© 5*19).
The whole point about the lifejof Jesus in the Gos- 
zpels is surely that they are bluntly toSBGBB^biographical--------
* Op. cit., pps® 94-95*
they are not for instance interested in Jesus1 personal appearance, in 
his family background and heredity, in his inner psychological develope-
:ment, points of great import to the biographer or the novelist  ------- -
but rather that they are keiygmatic. That is, above all else they pro­
claim Jesus1 intimate link with God, that they challenge man to believe 
that the career of the Son is meaningless without the presence and power j
of the Father; in short, that his life was transparent to God©
If this is the hard core of the life of Jesus, then j
the crux of the matter is here: can we be assured objectively that this
really did happen in the past ? Now it does seem to me that Macquarrie 
can be interpreted as implying that we can. He seems to suggest that 
before we can go on to assume the fruits of the life of Christ into our 
own existences, we must be assured that we are not chasing after a j
chimera; that is, we must be assured that "the Word became flesh and 
dwelt among us" (op. cit., pps. 93> 101), that "this kind of life was 
concretely manifested" and that "there really was this kind of person"
(op. cit., pps# 97 &nd 95 respectively), that "there was someone who 
once exhibited in history the possibility of existence which the kerygma 
proclaims" (op. cit., p. 93)*
On the face of it, there does not seem to be anything 
particularly unreasonable about these demands. But on a second examinat- 
:ion, my difficulty with these demands is this0 If we can be objective­
l y  assured of these things apart from and prior to our own existential 
participation or appropriation, it seems to me that God and the action .
of God must lie open and plain upon the face of histoiy, available to 
any academic historian. For when Macquarrie introduces the concept 
'Word* into the discussion he simultaneously introduces the concept 'God 
for the point about the Word is that it is the 'Word of God'.
Similarly, when he uses the concepts 'kind of life', 'kind of person', 
he again implies the concept 'God'; for surely the type of life dis- 
:played by Jesus is one in which although he possessed full humanity, 
his unity with God was not broken. Again, when he introduces the 
concept 'possibility of existence' he again simultaneously introduces 
the concept 'God'; because Jesus' type of existence was one in which 
the ambiguities and temptations of a fleshly existence were overcome, 
just because the ground of Jesus' existence was God, or the power of 
Godl And it is in these things that Jesus' existence was significant 
and unique, in his unique link with and manifestation of God.
When we see this clearly, we must immediately ask: 
can the objective historian assure us, before our Christian appropriat­
ion takes place, or before we actually hear and respond to the kerygma, 
that there actually was a life in which God was manifested, in which 
God had revealed his power active in the production of a 'certain type' 
of existence ? Now I do not think that he can; this is my difficulty 
in finding an objective-empirical assurance of the type Macquarrie seems 
to want.
Surely the objective historian cannot perceive these 
things because of his scientific methodology alone. If he asserts 
that he is able to perceive them in his assessment of the past events
recorded in the Gospels, then surely he does so only because he has 
already decided that in the Jesus proclaimed in the kerygma the power of 
God was indeed manifested, as Tillich would express it, in overcoming 
an old type of existence (old being) and replacing it with a new kind of 
being (New Being).
I repeat, only because the historian has decided. For it 
is clear to me that concepts like 'God1 or the 'power of God' are not 
universally available to historical methodology as such, but only to the 
decision of Christian faith. Other 'explanations', (or we might say 
rationalizations), of the life of Jesus than 'God' are possible (or the 
presence or power of God); so also are other explantions why the evangel­
ists wrote this or wrote that, or ascribed this or that to Jesus. Our 
decision in faith may of course prevent us from accepting these, but this 
does not mean that objectivity is not left behind. If this scientific 
objectivity is ruled out, then it seems also that the 'empirical 
anchor'for which Macquarrie pleads (op. cit., p. 95) is denied us. So 
it does seem again that however unsatisfactory and subjective Bultmann's 
position seems to be, we must come back to it if we wish to utilize the 
existentialist attitude to history. I say this because I suspect that 
if we weffe to accept an empirical anchor of the type Macquarrie seeks, 
this might almost completely invalidate the four existentialist proposit­
ions which Macquarrie has given us (op. cit., pps. 81-88). These 
four seem to me to hang together logically, and I find it hard to see how 
we can logically go along with them so far, and then draw a limit, paving 
them off when embarassing, much in the same way as we pay off a no longer 
necessary taxi-driver. For I suspect that scientific objectivity, and the
historical methodology which it implies, are in the last analysis 
incompatible with the existentialist approach to history. An empirical 
anchor, fixing a Jesus of Nazareth of some kind or another in the 
history of the past, is not likely to be denied us, I think, by the so- 
called objective historian, however sceptical he may be. But in 
placing the 'historical factuality' of Jesus beyond all reasonable 
doubt, such a historian, I feel, has done very little indeed for the 
kerygma. For the Keiygma is interested in a Jesus in whom God is 
manifest, in a Jesus whose life is transparent to the Father, in a Jesus 
whose existence is maintained by the power of God. But this can never 
be approached objectively, but only by faith, by decision, by persons,! 
participation. Surely Paul Tillich is right when he writes (Sys.Theol., 
I, p. 151) t  "The being of Jesus as the Christ is determined in every 
moment by God. In all his utterances, words, deeds, and sufferings he 
is transparent to that which he represents as the Christ, the divine 
mysteiy. While the Synoptic Gospels emphasise the active maintenance 
of this unity against demonic attacks, the Fourth Gospel emphasises the 
basic unity between Jesus and the 'Father'. In the Epistles the 
victoiy of the unity over against the powers of seperation is presuppos- 
:ed, though sometimes the toil and burden of this battle is indicated* 
However, it is never a moral, intellectual, or emotional quality which 
makes him the bearer of the final revelation. According to the witness 
of the whole New Testament and, by anticipation, also of many passages 
of the Old Testament, it is the presence of God in him which makes him 
the Christ. His words, his deeds, and his sufferings are consequences 
of this presence; they are expressions of the New Being which is his
being" o
It should now be clear that in attacking Bultmann's posit- 
:ion from three directions, those of Tillich, Owen, and Macquarrie, that 
these three lines in the last analysis converge, and give the appearance 
of a single attack* For it is clear that in their own ways, and with 
their own terminologies, all three writers are really demanding the same
thing  some kind of objective norm derived from an historical lmow-
:ledge of the Jesus of the pasto They do this, I think, because of 
the radical and seemingly dangerous'subjectivity' of a historical 
position like Bultmann's* But it should be equally clear from our 
examination of their criticisms that it is, to say the least of it,
extremely difficult to suggest an alternative view to suggest an
objective noim or criterion from an examination of the past which could 
judge and control and stabilize and criticize our own hearing of and 
response to the keiygma* But more important still, it is hard not to 
conclude that if an objective basis for Christian belief is sought 
ouk^with the kerygma, the significance and value of faith in God is 
violated, the existential relevance of the Christian faith greatly 
diminished, and the whole existentialist approach to Christianity as an 
historical religion perilously undermined*
We have given so much space to this discussion because 
upon it depends the validity of Bultmann's views on meaning in history, 
and the validity of his notion that Jesus Christ becomes present again 
and again as eschatological event in preaching and in the sacraments«
The point that we have reached is that God's decisive event happens again 
and again. This eschatological event is not generally perceived and 
objectively apparent, but is a highly personal concrete experience or 
encounter which happens in a ’moment1 of time* This 'moment1, so integral 
to Bultmann's theology, as it was to Kierkegaard's thought, is, and this 
is the central conviction of this thesis, basic to an understanding of 
Bultmann's theological project, and much other existentialist theology 
besides* There is hardly a concept so common in Bultmann's writings*
As a concept, it is of course not confined to Bultmann. We know that 
it is to be found in the works of Hamann, who was a potent influence on 
Kierkegaard, in whose thought the concept is of course absolutely basic | 
and indispensable* One of Kierkegaard's motives in writing the 
Philosophical Fragments,(as we shall see in the chapter on his thought), | 
was to introduce the concept, the 'Moment', into thought and theology*
The word occupies an important place in the ontology of Martin Heidegger 
in his Sein und Zeit(Tdbingen 1927 > 6th edition 1949)* And since it is 
acknowledged that Bultmann is philosophically indebted to Heidegger, we 
should keep this fact in mind throughout our discussion of Bultmann's use
XXX
of the word* According to Dr. Macquarrie , the Augenblick in
Heidegger is the 'authentic present' in which there is disclosed the past
*"We cannot demonstrate to anyone that God's revelation is there in Jesus 
Christ", Bultmann, Essays, p. 113«
^See "J.G. Hamann", by R. Gregor Smith, London I960*
3GO£in An Existentialist Theology, London 1955? pps. 194 f®
(in the sense of facticity) and the future. The Augenblick is a moment 
of decision, and in the resolve to which he is called by conscience, 
man's past, present, and future are brought together, and his self is 
unified. This concept, the moment, is also to be found in the thought 
of Martin Buber (see chapter III), and also in the thought of Karl Heim, 
who has been strongly influenced by Buber. As for Kierkegaard (a detailed 
discussion of whose views we will reserve until chapter IV), we may say 
at this point that it was the 'momentless' of his age which he truly 
dreaded. As Mr. H.J. Blackham says of him, "Kierkegaard had the ...<> 
vision of the tendency of the age which reached its limit in an unlimit- 
:ed panorama of abstract infinity, unrelieved by even the slightest 
interest, a sea of desert". If we apply these words to the temporal 
process in particular, the same words might have been written of Bultmann.
We must now make a few preliminaiy remarks about Bultmann's 
use of the word 'moment' itself. In his earlier Marburg essays, the 
word Augenblick is placed within quotation-marks, as though he were aware 
that he was using it in a quite special sense?(cf. Kierkegaards in both 
Philosophical Fragments and Concluding Unscientific Postscript the word 
Moment is printed with a capital letter). But when we move from, say,
* Six Existentialist Thinkers, London 1952, p. 54
a 1951 Marburg essay to his Gifford Lectures* of 1955> is interest­
ing to find the word unquoted, as though in the intervening period 
he had worked it thoroughly into the context of his thought, as 
though it had won a familiar place there.
It is interesting to# find in the Gifford Lectures'" 
that Bultmann has given a lightning-sketch of historiography where he 
distinguishes sharply between thinkers who are aware of this crucial 
present, the moment, and those who are not; he shows approval of those 
who do, and disapproval of those who do not. In his works there is, 
of course, a whole complex of terms closely linked with the moment, 
such as 'here and now1, encounter, 'from time to time', concrete 
event, 'again and ever again', repeatedly, and so on.*** Naturally 
our discussion will concern these terms too.
Our method in this chapter will be to select some of
the more typical and important usages of this concept^ the *momen1^ in the
works of Bultmann from his essays of the early nineteen thirties down
to his recent works such as the Gifford Lectures and his Jesus Christ
and Mythology (London I960): we shall classify them by arranging them 
*History and Eschatology, Edinburgh 1957*
**in chapters IX and X.
*** One interesting and important synonym for the moment is the 'now', 
discussed in Kerygma and Myth,edited H.W. Bartsch,E.T.,London 1953*
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under categories, which will have the additional advantage of making 
comparisons between Bultmann and other thinkers easier* If we do this, 
the following categorization would seem to be demanded by the material 
before us«
(1 )IN THE MOMENT COMES SELF-UNDERSTANDING AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE.
Bultmann, agreeing with his foimer Marburg colleague, 
romance philologist Erich Auerbach, says that the whole of personal life 
can be contained in a 'moment1. This reality is formed subconsciously 
and results from the sum total of all our experiences, our hopes, our
XXtentative interpretations of our life and its encounters. This real- 
sity is not a metaphysical substance,(Bultmann rejects any interpretation 
of human existence in terms of substance). Although formed apart from 
consciousness, it may attain to consciousness in 'moments' of reflection* 
Here we have a 'moment' in which comes self-knowledge through reflection, 
(History and Eschatology, pps. 107-8).
*See Auerbach's MIMESIS i Bargestellte Wirklichkeit in der abendlMnd- 
sisdheii Literatur, Bern 1946; Eng. Transl., MIMESIS : The Representation 
of Reality in Western Literature, Princeton 1954• See especially his 
last chapter where Auerbach discusses such modem realist writers as 
Proust and Virginia Woolff.
XXIt is hardly necessary to point out that for Bultmann our interpretat- 
:ions of life remain always tentative;for him it is axiomatic that we are 
always 'on the way'. Our self-understanding needs repeated correction 
from fresh encounters.
Bultmann also holds that in the 'moment1 we become conscious 
that being is an unknown quantity, but it is only in the 'moment' that 
we have this knowledge; we can neither retain nor possess it (Essays, 
p. 7). Behind Bultmann's view here is veiy probably the conviction
that for most of our time we 'read off' the nature of being, the nature
of our being, from our experience of other people. Thus, for us most 
of the time being is not an unknown quantity at all, because we simply 
conceive our being as a concrete example of the general rule —  human 
nature in general. There is no doubt in the minds of most of the 
existentialists as to the invalidity of this procedure. It is in the
'moment' that we are made aware of this fallacy — - in it we are given
a glimpse of the mysterious quality of beingjwe see that it is not some- 
:thing we have as a lasting posession; it is 'ever before us'.
For it is the 'moment' that reveals our existence as one 
threatened by insecurity; in the 'moment' insecurity breaks in upon a 
man (Essays, p. 8). The same contrast as above presents itself* Most 
of our time is spent upon building up a certain security. In our world 
security seems a good and desirable thing. It takes various forms 
social (politics and economics), emotional (stoicism and the techniques 
we employ to prevent dialogue and encounter), intellectual (acceptance 
of ideologies and thought-systems constructed by others), moral (strict 
duty-doing and conformity to established norms of behaviour and attitude) 
religious (pious formalities and lip-service subconsciously designed to 
keep the Unknown at bay). Thus we can see the relevance of Bultmann's 
view. Our fortifications are pierced from time to time by the occurr-
/occurrence of the 'moment* which discloses to us our inner insecurity. 
Insecurity, the disclosure of the unknown quantity of being, is not in 
Bultmann's view something which must be excluded at all costs, but some­
thing that belongs to the 'essence' (if we may use such a question-begging
at
term in, an existential^ context) of existence, something that makes human 
existence truly human. Thus again the 'moment' is one of self- 
knowledge.
Because the 'moment' is one of self-knowledge, it is a 
commonplace to read in Bultmann that in it man can either lose or gain 
his real (genuine, authentic^existence (Essays, p. 17)• Without the 
moment we remain sunk in ignorance of the basic insecurity of human 
existence. " ... The genuine life of man", writes Bultmann, "is always 
befoie him; it is always to be apprehended, to be realised" (History and 
Eschatology, p. 140). " ... The future is open in so far as it brings
the gain or loss of our genuine life, and thereby gives to our present 
its character as moment of decision" (op. cit., p. 141)* Hor is the 
moment of self-knowledge a different one from the eschatological moment
German, eigentlich;this is an Heideggerian categoiy. So is self- 
understanding, Selbstverstandnis. They have been discussed in 
Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pps.39 and 65-6.
in which God discloses himself to man in Christ. For Christian faith is 
itself a self-understanding. The gift of faith is also simultaneously 
an understanding of the self. For Bultmann then, existential self-under- 
sstanding is something that a man cannot learn in the abstract. He 
can only learn it here and now in the moments of encounter (Keiygma and 
Myth, p. 203).
(2 )WHAT COMES IN THE MOMENT C M  BE GRASPED BUT NOT POSSESSED0
Bultmann quotes Gogarten with approval to the effect 
that 'sonship1 (relative to God) is not a quality naturally and univer­
sally possessed by man qua man, but something that man can only grasp 
again and again in ‘moments'. Sonship is the goal of histoiy, and for 
this reason must happen within histoiy and nowhere else (Histoiy and 
Eschatology, pps. 153-4) • Bultmann is quite clear in his theology as cl 
whole that we can never have knowledge of God as a lasting possession or 
as a permanent insight (see Essays, p. 7)» Rather this knowledge has 
to make its way against temptations from within man's being, which give 
him the illusion of being master of his own destiny. Therefore Bultmann
*According to Bultmann of course the specific paradox of the Christian 
doctrifcd of histoiy is that the end or goal of histoiy has already happ- 
sened within histoiy. Thus this doctrine is offensive because it does 
not think of histoiy as linear and progressive.
views the sphere of human existence as a battlefield in constant motion | 
and turmoil, between the 'momentaiy' disclosure on the one hand, and 
elements from within existence on the other, which oppose it and try to 
stifle it.
Bultmann gives a list (see Essays, pps. 7 £•)> to which we 
can add from elsewhere in his worksj* of elements in existence which can 
easily become opponents of the insights of the'moment’. This list is as | 
follows* The cares of daily life; Bultmann's view here probably is j 
that there is nothing essentially evil or inauthentic about eveiyday 
cares* They are indispensable to life in the world* Everyone takes 
on worldly responsibility, of work, family, earning a living, of secur- 
sity for one's dependants. Thus we have in the teaching of Jesus,
" . .o your heavenly Father knows that you have need of all these things" 
(Mt.6:32). The cares of daily life are in fact dialectical in nature.
*According to Bultmann, the relationship of the believer to the world is 
always dialectical. Worldly things are necessary, but the believer's att- 
situde is to be as though he was in fact not immersed in them, so that 
genuine eschatological existence is a possibility. These things are 
not to assume an importance which thwarts the believer's eschatological 
life before God. Hence we have Bultmann's fondness for St. Paul's des­
cription of life in I Cor.7*29 f °  as the life of "...one who participates
in the life of the world but does so with an inner aloofness --  'as if
(he did it) not’.’(Theology of the New Testament, pps. 351-2). For refer­
ences to the believer living authentically as 'one who...... but yet as
if not1, see Essays, pps. 86, 112, 150, 154> 181> 228, 270; also Theology 
of the New Testament,!, pps. 182, 240. These references all refer 
primarily to I Cor. 7s29 f* This^undoubtedly one of the keys to under­
standing Bultmann's views on history as eschatological existenceo And 
it underlies the above discussion on the potentially inauthentic elements 
in daily life.
Inseparable as they are from human life, and good in their place, when a 
man becomes so immersed in them that the 'moment1 cannot break through, 
they become evil and give rise to inauthentic existence. Another such 
element is 'wishes'. Another is 'plans'. Plans are concrete orderings 
of the future without which life in the world would become impossible* 
Like cares, plans are dialectical; they may or may not exclude the 
•moment1, they may allow or forbid the possibility of authentic existence 
'Crazes' are listed by Bultmann, so are 'pleasures', which give rise to 
an unending circle of pleasures. The existentialist in Bultmann 
becomes apparent when he lists false forms of community, living together. 
These become inauthentic when they overcome genuine freedom and isolat­
ion. There may be an echo here of Heidegger, who has demonstrated 
the constitution of human existence by the voice of the impersonal mass
Xof human beings, das Man. The 'moment1 would seem to presuppose a cert-
XX
:ain degree of reservation and independence where the person is not 
sunk in the mass,*** where he can be aware of the nuances of truly person 
sal existence. And of course all existentialist thinkers are aware of 
this tension, potential or actual, between person and society, person 
and community. 'Action and Work' are listed too by Bultmann. A false 
emphasis on these would seem to overcome that certain passivity, recept-
*See Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 91°
**"Real belief lies in the preservation of detachment in the actual
concrete situations of life --  a detachment which makes decision and
action of real import, because in it man thinks and acts as a free 
agent", Bultmann, Essays, p. 10.
***For a typical existentialist treatment of the dangers of false forms 
of community, see Karl Jaspers, The Individual and Mass Society, in 
Religion and Culture,(essays in honour of Paul Tillich), London 1959?PPSc 
37 f. Cf. Jaspers, Man in the Modem Age, London 1951? pps. 40f.
/receptivity which the 'moment' presupposes. Thus work is also dial- 
:ectical in nature, capable of being regarded as an end and not a means, 
and capable of becoming evil. 'Moralistic security through duty- 
doing' is also condemned by Bultmann. By our fulfilment of the de­
mands of a code we build up a defence against the intrusion of a crisis 
into our existence, againSi- a moment of guilt, judgement, cleansing, 
and renewal.*
Another element listed by Bultmann in this connection 
is a false belief in God (see Essays, pps. 8 f«)« This is a well- 
constructed belief,or as Bultmann prefers to call it throughout his 
works, a Weltanschauung, with which'one is armed against the demands of 
the 'moment'. But real belief in God, to the contrary, and we shall 
return to this subject often again in these pages, is achieved in the
*Cf. Bultmann, Theology of the hew Testament, I, p. 264s man's
effort to achieve his salvation by keeping the Law only Jeads him into 
sin, indeed this effort itself in the end is already sin ... Sin is 
man's self-powered striving to undergird his own existence in forgetful- 
sness of his creaturely existence, p procure his salvation by his own 
strength". "The way of works of the law and the way of grace and faith 
are mutually exclusive". " ... through the Law man is le#d into sinn- 
:ing" •
'moment' and only in the 'moment'. Another element is self-will, which 
sets itself up against the intrusion of God into life. As we have said, 
Bultmann thinks of the sphere of existence as a Battlefield, and in this 
instance the Battle cause is 'not what I will, But what thou wilt' 
(Essays, p. 7)»* Extreme suffering can also oppose the 'moment' and this 
insight is discussed in section (8) of this chapter.
As we have seen, the disclosure of the 'moment' always 
involves a self-understanding. This also, says Bultmann, cannot Be 
possessed or retained. This is Because our apprehension of the self- 
understanding depends upon our understanding of the imperative involved 
By it in the concrete situation (Keiygma and Myth,p. 204)* Here we 
have an analogy. The analogy is Between the interpersonal encounter 
on the one hand and the God-man encounter on the other. Thus the self- 
tinders tanding to Be gained in the 'moment* is compared By Bultmann to tha. 
understanding given in the encounter with another in love and trust.
This latter, we know, can only Be kept pure and fresh By the concrete
It is, I think, crucial to grasp this element in Bultmann's thought that 
emphasises that there is constantly going on in man a conflict between 
authenticity and inauthenticity. Behind Bultmann's whole view of the 
'moment* is the conviction that the knowledge of and the Belief in God 
"... has to keep on making its way in the face of all temptations which 
continually arise out of man's Being.•."(Essayjs,p . 7)« This is exactly 
analogous to the conflict which we shall analyse in chapter III in the
thought of Buber the battle which follows from the intrusion of the
'Thou' into the It-world, which says Buber,is^bovered by a 'crust*. See 
chapter III.
r. vO -
connection with the other being maintained. If it be severed, it is 
only a matter of time until the understanding vanishes. In similar fash- 
:ion, our existential self-understanding depends on our repeated 
encounter with the Word of God which relates us to God in Christ. Thus 
Bultmann is fond of quoting "His compassions fail not, they are new every 
morning", as an invitation to man concretely to relate himself to God 
again and again (Kerygma and Myth, p. 204)* Here then we have another 
reason why the knowledge of God and of one’s self cannot be retained or 
possessed. Unlike other^conceptual or scientific)knowledge, this know- 
:ledge depends for its survival upon a concrete historical act of the 
whole man. Thus man's supreme ethical counsel is to relate himself in 
this way or to open himself towards relation; temptations are continually 
rising out of man’s own being militating against the fulfilment of this
counsel. Thus this existential knowledge cannot be possessed or retained
It can only be momentarily glimpsed insofar as man overcomes considerable 
temptations and immerses his total being in history, orientating it 
towards being over against himself.
Bultmann's views here op revelation and knowledge will 
cause many searching questions to be asked, and many doubts to be raised.
Is it true that what comes in the 'moment' cannot be possessed or re­
stained ? For example, classical theology, both Protestant and Cathol- 
tlGy. have emphasised a deepening of awareness, of spirituality; in short, 
that there is a certain'progress'in the Christian life. But if we take 
Bultmann's views seriously, it seems as though after a 'moment' has 
occurred, there is dire danger of relapse into the 'status quo ante'.
What, it may be asked, is the value of a 'moment', of an experience, if,
6* '
after it has passed, there is little or nothing of it to be retained ? 
In other words, can there be much value in a purely ’momentary’ insight 
or awareness ? Another objection is possible. If it be granted that 
there are significant ’moments’ in existence in which disclosures are 
made to us, what is the connection between these disclosures and 
memory ? We can remember, can we not, what was disclosed to us in the 
’moment’ ? If not, what possible significance can it have ? And here 
is yet another objection. There are experiences through which men pa,s
3€to emerge altered. It is for this reason that we have the phrase ’the 
discipline of suffering’. Is it not this- that lies behind the 
Apostle's question to the Galatians 'Have ye suffered so many things 
in vain ?' (Gal.3*4)? 3h short, is the value of the 'moment' not to 
be doubted because it seems transitory and evanescent ? It is to 
these questions and to this type of objection that we must now address 
oui^gelves0
Our method shall be this. First, we shall enquire if 
Bultmann's view of revelation and revelatory knowledge is so peculiar, 
and if not, where similar views may be found. Second, we shall take 
up the question of the communication between the Church and world, and
X Cf. II Cor. 11:24 f.
enquire whether Bultmann's view does not mean that the Church cannot 
validly communicate its ethical and social insights., Then third, we 
shall examine the place of memoiy in theology and in the Christian life*
First, is Bultmann's view of revelation and revelatory 
knowledge so peculiar; if not, where can we find similar views ? We may 
begin by looking at Paul Tillich's discussion of revelation, trying to 
show how similar his view is to that of Bultmann.* Tillich refuses to 
allow any separation between revelation and salvation* Revelation comes 
in the presence of a salvatoiy power which shakes, transforms, and heals
(Sys. Theol., I, p. 143)• "Revelation mediates knowledge a know-
sledge, however, which can be received only in a revelatory situation"
(op. cit., p. 143)• This revelatory situation he defines as 'through 
ecstasy and miracle'. Bluntly, " * .. the knowledge of revelation cannot
XAt various points in this thesis comparisons are made between Tillich and 
Bultmann, in which close similarities are indicated. Thus we do try to 
show that both of them belong to the 'existentialist tradition',« But this 
is actually a half-truth. For we must recognize that there is a vast div- 
sergence as well as a great similarity between Tillich end Bultmann. The 
relation between these two thinkers will be dealt with in our concluding 
chapter, but at this stage, we may make the following comments. Bultmann 
is an existentialist. Tillich cannot be called an existentialist without 
strict reservation. There are, I am convinced, two strands in Tillich, 
the ontological and the existentialist. Thus, from the point of view of 
the second strand, Tillich does make use of existentialist analyses, and 
is aware of the great contribution thau existentialist thought can make 
to theology. Thus we find him throughout both volumes of his Systematic 
Theology using the concepts of concrete revelatory event and encounter.
But it is strictly this second (existentialist) strand in the thought of 
Tillich that we are discussing and utilizing in the discussion to follow. 
But we ought not therefore to forget the first, the ontological Tillich, 
which we shall encounter and with which we shall compare the existential- 
sist Tillich in our concluding chapter, q.v.
be seperated from the situation of revelation" (Syst. Theol., p. 143)" 
Tillich means that the knowledge so gained is not analogical to our oth- 
ser knowledge, say, of the natural world. We are therefore prohibited 
from simply adding this piece of knowledge to our other pieces of know- 
sledge (so that, for example, in certain circumstances our items of know- 
sledge gained through revelation could contradict items gained in scient­
ific research)o Our revelatory knowledge gains it validity from the 
ecstatic situation through which it was given,. It follows of course 
from this that the knowledge gained through ecstasy and miracle, in 
contrast with our knowledge of nature, is generally and universally 
incommunicableo It can be grasped only by those who have themselves 
participated in this ecstatic-miraculous situation® Since revelatory 
knowledge comes through & shaking-ecstatic-miraculous situation^ the 
nearer we are to them temporally, the more we grasp the knowledge such
XX
situations convey® And the converse is also true® Thus Tillich 
says, "Knowledge of revelation is knowledge about the revelation of the 
mystery of being to us, not information about the nature of beings and 
their relation to one another" (Syst. Theol., I, p. 143)® Here we 
are reminded of a celebrated statement of Kierkegaard, to the effect 
that "No knowledge can have as its object the absurdity that the eternal 
is historical --  the object of faith is not the teaching but the
*Buber terms these ’items of information1;see our discussion of Buber in 
chapter III.
XXThis is what lies behind Bultmann’s conviction that knowledge of God 
and of ourselves depends on repeated encounter®
teacher" (Philosophical Fragments, transl. by David F. Swenson, Princeton 
1936, p. 50)* Thus for both Tillich and Kierkegaard, revelation does not 
mean, abstractable, propositional, and possessable knowledge which one 
can retain permanently and communicate universally, but knowledge of the 
way in which God, the Other, comes to us; that is, in and through our 
time and history, through ecstasy and miracle, through a temporal condit- 
:ion granted by God himself(Kierkegaard), Thus revelation is always 
knowledge of our historicity®
It is from this point of view that Tillich criticizes 
another widely held view of revelation, namely that one that makes revel- 
Jation an ecclesiastical propositional commodity, imposable by authority 
(Syst. Theol., I, p. 161).* The point about such ecclesiastical 
authority is that it causes a seperation between the revelatory event 
and those who are asked to receive it®** Tillich points out that these 
ecclesiastical authorities are opposed to the participation of believers 
in the situation, and in so acting they are handling revelation as thou^i 
it were their property* Presumably it would be Tillich’s view that the 
office of ecclesiastical authority is to point men to their historicity, 
and to those conditions within their history under which God discloses 
himself, rather than purvey information and propositions about divine
xIt will be clearly seen in what follows that Tillich's criticisms of 
ecclesiasticism are not unlike Kierkegaard's.
**In our concluding chapter we argue that the ecclesiastical over­
emphasis on revelation may invalidate the truths of man’s essential 
worldliness, historicity, and temporality.
matters by their authority. This would be^own view, though I should 
prefer to say that the Church's commission is to remind men of the 
'momentary' character of their time, and to proclaim that God can only be 
met with in and through their time and history®
What ought not to be forgotten is that if it is held 
that revelation is information which could be abstracted from the situat­
ion, transmitted, communicated generally, and even imposed, then the 
'moment' in which we received this information would be secondary, only 
relative in importance to the information which it conveys. But since 
the XXth. century revolt against the XlXth. century liberal view of hist-
X:ory , it is very doubtful indeed if this is possible®
Kierkegaard, discussing the question of what a contempor- 
:ary of Christ might do for one of his successors (Philosophical 
Fragments, pps. 86 f©), gives a suggestive description of what this 
service might be. All that he could do is to state, 'I believe that 
so-and-so has taken place, althogh I know that it is a folly to the under 
sstanding and an offence to the human heart'. That is, witiiout faith 
on the part of the listener, the related fact would be nonsensical® 
Belief, without the conditionAby God in the Moment, is impossible®
XSee our discussion of XlXth. century liberalism in the Introduction and 
in the concluding chapter®
Here again we see that revelation is not information or propositions
directly and generally communicable. In much the same way, Tillich
(Syst. Theol., I, p. 123) suggests that if an individual asserts that he
has been grasped by a revelation, and if he wished to communicate the
content of this, and if he woie oo try to communicate the content in gen-
serai, the communication could only take the form of a report of what he
asserts he has received. But, Tillich points out, he would fail to
m>Ko
communicate the revelation, because he^could receive it as revelation 
would require himself to have been grasped by the revelation as well®
We grasp mathematical or chemical knowledge, but Tillich's terminology 
reverses this order; he speaks of the 'power of revelation to grasp®..' 
(Syst. Theol., I, p. 138). This brings out well the difference between 
the two types of knowledge. This pOver to grasp, says Tillich, is 
attributable to the Word of God, which is not a word of ordinary language, 
a word imparting information. Thus for (the existentialist) Tillich 
the content of revelation is not information, nor propositions, nor 
abstractions from the concrete situation, but is inextricably bound up 
with the situation, with the'moment' itself. Thus for Tillich as for
Bultmann what comes in the concrete experience can be grasped but not
possessed.
Second, we go on to discuss the relationship between
the Church and the world, and the form of communication..possible between
the one and the other. If it is true that what comes in the 'moment'
is so non-possessable and incommunicable, what then about the Christian
insights which the Church proclaims to the world? Can the Church not 
abstract these insights from concrete situations, write them, an cl print
them, distributing them as the Church's witness in the affairs of the 
world. This is what the Church does in relation, to example, certain 
ethical spheres, such as war and disarmament, divorce, economic aggress- 
:ion and injustice, race relations* and so-on. Are not these
revelations in so far as they are meant to represent the will of Cod in 
relation to certain vital spheres of existence ?
H. Richard Nieb^r, in his book,The Meaning of Revelation
(New York 1941 > pps. 93 f*)> defines revelation as "that part of our 
inner history which illuminates the rest of it and which is itself intell- 
:igible". He quotes Professor Whitehead, "Rational religion appeals 
to the direct intuition of special occasions and to the elucidatory power 
of its concepts for all occasions........the special occasion to which
we appeal in the Church is Jesus Christ. But from that special occasion 
we also derive the concepts which make possible the elucidation of all 
the events of our history". Nie^ur writes (op. cit., p. 94)» 
"Revelation means the point at which we can begin to think and act as raem-
:bers of an intelligible and intelligent wofld of persons"® He offers 
the following definition of revelation, "when we speak of revelation we 
mean that something has happened to us in our history which conditions 
all our thinking, and that through this happening we are enabled to 
apprehend what we are, what we are suffering and doing, and what our pot­
entialities are" (op. cit. p. 138). The value of revelation is stated 
thus, "What is otherwise dumb fact becomes related, intelligible and elo- 
:quent fact through the revelatory event. To the extent that revelat- 
:ion furnishes the practical reason with an adequate starting-point it
may be said to be validated"(op. cit., p. 138). But so far very little
has been said about the content of revelation. So, and perhaps most
significantly of all, Niebhur defines that: "Revelation means God, God 
who discloses Himself to us through our histoiy as our knower, our 
author, our judge and our only saviour" (op. cit., p. 152).
These are very impressive statements which will 
require careful consideration, because they do seem, on the face of it, 
to contradict in part at least the ’momentary', ecstatic-miraculous 
view of revelation which we have outlined above. One point had better 
be made clear at once. This doctrine of momentary revelation does not 
mean that all the events of our histoiy are elucidated. We have (in the 
Introduction) already pointed out that many thinkers are impressed by 
what we have called the fragmentariness of histoiy. That is, even 
though there are moments of revelation and elucidation, elements do 
remain which have a positive character of evil and of injustice, elements 
which do not have meaning and significance for God himself, and which 
cannot therefore be fitted into some over-all pattern. A thinker like 
McIntyre would hardly share N ie b ^ ja r^ confidence that the revelation we 
are given in histoiy "make possible the elucidation of all the events in 
our histoiy" (op. cit., p. 93)* Just because Christianity finds meaning 
given in some events and not in others, it implies the fragmentariness of
Xhistoiy. It is not clear from ^iebhur's discussion of revelation that
Bultmann rigidly distinguishes his doctrine of history from that of 
pantheism, where, he says, " ... the meaning and goal of history are to 
be seen in each successive moment" (Kerygma and Myth, p. 116).
he takes seriously this doctrine of fragmentariness.
And then secondly, I think the contradiction we
have indicated on the previous page is only an apparent o n e   it is
actually based on an ambiguity in the use of the word 'revelation1. For 
there are, I think, two senses in which we can use it, and I shoul like 
to call these the primary and the secondary. In the primary sense, 
the word means the revelation by God of himself. This is the meaning 
that the word has in our above discussion of the views of Bultmann,
Kierkegaard, and Tillich. This is the primary meaning of the word--
the disclosure by himself of God's nature in so far as that nature can 
be apprehended by the believer. In this primary meaning of the word, 
revelation is, of course, 'momentary' (Bultmann), ecstatic-miraculous- 
shaking (Tillich). Niebl^r does in fact recognise this; he does so 
when he writes that "Revelation means God.....who discloses Himself to us 
through our history....."(op. cit., p. 152).
But there is also the secondary meaning of the word. 
This meaning refers to the fact that the revelation of God does have 
repercussions for our thinking and understanding and apprehending. God's 
dislosure of himself alters our relationship and attitude to the world ar- 
sound us. It does supply us with concepts and insights. Thus God's 
disclosure of himself has important consequences for us with regard to 
ethical and political and social subjects.X but we must understand that
It is, I think, a fair criticism of Bultmann that he does not always draw 
this aspect of revelation out enough. He concerns himself almost wholly 
with revelation in the primary sense of the word. As we shall see in the 
concluding chapter, this causes difficulties when we come to examine his 
attitude, for example, to the church.
these insights, these concepts, derive from the 'momentaiy' disclosure, 
They are parasitic upon and derivative from that experience, and are, as 
Tillich rightly insists, inseperahle ultimately from ite Mebiijur is
right when he says that "Revelation means God....... ", but the thinking
and the practical reason which he also mentions are strictly dependent 
upon the content of the revelatory event. I am convinced that the prim- 
:aiy and the secondary meanings of the term 1 revelation' must be kept 
strictly apart. Much theological confusion can result from failure to 
do so.
That Tillich recognizes this distinction there can be little 
doubt. He distinguishes between the ’Word of God1 on£ the one hand, 
and1information about divine matters’ on the other (Syst. Theol., I, 
p„ 138)* Of this information Tillich points out that although it would 
he perhaps of ethical interest, or of cognitive interest, it would lack 
all the characteristics of revelation, which he holds to be the power to 
grasp, to shake, to transform (Syst. Theol., I, p. 138J. Tillich 
succjj^tly defines his attitude to this matter thus:"If the Word as a 
medium of revelation is not information, it cannot be spoken apart from 
revelatory events in nature, histoiy, and man" (op. cit., p. 138).
It follows from the above arguments that the correct procedure 
for the fulfilment of the Church’s task is not to present ethical or 
social insights as her gospel, buttressed with apologetic material 
designed to show the reasonableness and efficiency of Christian insights
Xin practice. Rather the Church’s task is to point men to the correlat- 
:ion in time which is revelatory (Tillich), to the occurrence of a 
’moment’ of disclosure in their time and histoiy (Bultmann), which may 
yield an insight rich in quality, hut which is not itself a mere insighto 
This is, I think, what existentialist theology has to say about the 
Church's proclamation to the world.
Third, let us turn to the argument from memory. Can 
it not be said that the value of a ’moment' is just that its content 
can be remembered by the experiencing subject ? Surely what is disclosed 
is not so evanescent that it vanishes immediately from memory after the 
conclusion of the ’moment' ? In order to answer these questions, let 
us examine what three thinkers have to say about histoiy and memory; 
first, John McIntyre (The Christian Doctrine of History, Edinburgh 1957? 
pps e 104 ft .History and Memo ly), then Kierkegaard, and then Bultmann.
According to McIntyre, (op. cit., pps. 104 f«)» there 
are, roughly, three functions exercised by memoiy in regard to history.
The first is that it affords a man transcendence over the temporal f1ux,
*See a book like L.H. Marshall's The Challenge of New Testament Ethics. 
London.1950, which seems to be little more than a commendation of the 
teachings of Jesus with regard to their efficiency in building up a sound 
and happy society. But the effect of such liberalism soon becomes appar­
ent. Thus, the Soviet Union between the wars took a similar line to 
Jesus with regard to sex and divorce from motives of political cominon- 
sense and expediency, while despising Christian theism. This is the dir­
ect effect of seperating primary and secondary revelation.
enabling him to survey this past, enabling him especially to perceive 
the necessity exercised by the past, and thus his partly, at least, 
determined future: moreover, memoiy enables a man to see that the past 
did not happen with the force of necessity, and thus in the present 
memoiy (in Dr. Niebljur's phrase) serves as the 'fulcrum of freedom for
XXman in histoiy1. The second function of memory in relation to histoiy, 
according to McIntyre^ is that memoiy supplies man generally with an 
enormous mass of accumulated wisdom and infoimation. Here there is 
wide gulf between the thought of McIntyre and the thought of Bultmann. 
With this kind of interpretation Bultmann will certainly have nothing to 
do! If this view is held, then the theology of encounter would seem 
to have been left far behind. This is a, liberal view of revelation, 
a seperation being made between what is disclosed and the disclosure- 
event. ■ We have already seen that the validity of the former depends on 
experience of the latter, of the 'moment*. And revelation does not 
consist information. Existentialist theology does not mean by this
This is admitted by Bultmann --  "In so far as the histoiy from which
I come is operative in my past, the recollection of that history also 
belongs thereto". Also, "Of course memory plays an important part in 
human life, but it has existential significance only when I make my own 
particular past present through recollection", Kerygma and Ijyth, p. 115, 
Bultmann to Schniewind in a discussion of memory.
XXIt was of course Kierkegaard who pointed out that recollection and exam­
ination of the past has value in demonstrating that the past'happened*, 
but by happening, by coming into being, showed that it did not need to 
happen. The study of history is thus for Kierkegaard the study of change. 
We shall take this up again in chapter IY on Kierkegaard where we shall 
examine the work of Barbara Ward;it will also be discussed in our conclud­
ing chapter.
that we ought to ignore past written wisdom, but it does mean, as we shall 
see when we come to look at Bultmann's view of memory, that what we 
encounter in past writings is not informative wisdom in the abstract, but 
a person from whose experience the'wisdom1 is distilled and recorded..
That is to say, this second point of McIntyre's does not seem to me to be 
sufficiently aware that the interpretation of past documents and records 
involves in the last analysis an intersubjective encounter.
The third function of memory in relation to Iiistoiy made
by McIntyre is that memory supplies man in general and the Christian in
particular with the mighty acts through which faith is created, this
memoiy in concrete terms being the Bible, There is here obviously an
even wiaer gulf apparent between this kind of view-point and the whole
theology of Bultmann, For Bultmann totally rejects the view which holds
that our relationship to biblical events depends on memoiy. Writing
to Schniewind in the Entmythologisierung debate, Bultmann says: "I cannot
regard the reproduction of the events of the years 1 - 30 as the equival-
sent of the eschatological enounter". This is because memoiy " • in
so far as it reproduces facts of the past in their purely worldly actuality
can imperil and even destroy 'historic' existence, as Nietzsche
*This is, as we shall see in chapter III one of the corner-stones of 
Buber's doctrine of man's relation to the past through written records.
Nor should we fail to hear in it a clear and direct echo from the phil­
osophy of Dilthey.
3£3£Kerygma and Myth, p. 115.
showed in Vom Nutzen und Nachteil der Historie filr das Leben. ..... 
Bultmann rejects this point of view because if accepted, it would invalid- 
Jate and make redundant his whole notion of encounter*, For memory, in 
the ordinary sense, recalls past events in their external factuality 
and thus attempts to see past history *wie es eigentlich gewesen*. 
Thisjfpartly what Bultmann means by ‘events in their purely worldly 
actuality1. Ordinary memoiy tries to see an event ‘scientifically1, 
that is, in its interconnections with other events in the world, or as 
one of a causal series. Bultmann holds that these events cannot be the 
concern of the theologian simply because memory, thus understood, can 
try to recall them without the process of existential encounter occurr- 
:ing. Bultmann*s positive view of memory we shall attempt to approach 
from the standpoint of Kierkegaard's teaching on the theological signif- 
iicance of memory.
We shall deal with Kierkegaard* s view of the Moment in greater 
detail in chapter IV. It suffices therefore to say here that for Kierke- 
:gaard the decisive Moment of existence is one of disclosure of the 
Paradox, that is, God in temporal form. But God is thus perceived only 
because He himself grants the necessary condition. But the disclosure 
is such, says Kierkegaard, that the learner, the believer, " ... will
3E3Enever be able to forget the Teacher1*, that is, God himself, the content
3Eop. cit., p. 115.
^^Philosophical Fragments, pps. 12-13.
of the Momento To forget the Teacher, says Kierkegaard, means that man 
returns to his former state, that is, the state preceding the hew Birth. 
The condition was a ’trust' for which the learner would always be requir- 
:ed to render an account® Thus the learner must completely 'appropriate
X
the Condition', and 'profoundly apprehend the Truth'®
Now the main point about Kierkegaard's view of memory is that 
» the truth remembered by the learner is not mere 'insights', or concepts, 
nor mere information about divine matters, but God himself, originally 
disclosed in the Moment® Kierkegaard is clear about this: "When the 
Teacher is gone from the disciple in death, memory may bring his figure 
before him; but it is not on this account that the disciple believes, but 
because he received the condition from God, and hence is enabled to see,
XXin memory’s trustworthy image, the person of God". Nothing could be 
plainer; in the Moment the believer encounters the person and presence of 
God; memory then functions existentially in mediating a re-encounter 
with the same God as actuality® It is from this Kierkegaardian view
XXXthat we now examine Bultmann's view of memory® The core of Bultmann's 
position is that memory, properly and existentially understood, so 
j penetrates past events recorded in documents, that
XPhilosophical Fragments, pps« 12-13 
xxop. cit., p. 53*
As we shall see in chapter T f on Kierkegaard, Bultmann's doctrine of 
the 'moment' is, in many respects, derivative from that of Kierkegaard®
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what is met with is not an external happening in a world of happenings, 
but the interpretation of it, and the interpreter's understanding of
3£existence as a challenging possibility for my own life. Thus for Bult- 
:mann the proper function of memoiy is to reproduce past events in such a 
way that they always have existential relevance for me in that they con- 
:front me with a decision for or against a certain understanding of my 
own personal existence» Thus the theological or religious function of
memoiy is not to remember the physical attributes or interrelations of 
happenings like an earthquake or a motor-car accident, but always involv- 
ses the process of interpersonal encounter on the level of the understand- 
:ing of existence*
This is the core of Bultmann's position on the theological 
function of memoiy* Is it the right one ? At least this can be said 
for it* It does seem to be a Christian one, that is, produced by 
the proper interpretation of biblical events* Thus, it is undeniable 
that the proper attitude to take up to the record of a biblical event is 
not sheer surprise or mere interest. If I read the story, for example,
3EX
of St. Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus , the proper response
3£ Bultmann to Schniewind: " ... the historiarfs personal encounter with
the past o*. takes place not by his reproducing the events of the past in 
memoiy, but by his encountering in those events of the past (as his own
histoiy) human existence and its interpretation  ......... The recollect-
;ion of the kerygma *.. as a sacramental event ... re-presents the events 
of the past in such a way that it renews them, and thus becomes a person­
a l  encounter for me", Kerygma and Myth, p. 115*
^Acts 9:1 f*
for me to make is obviously not to be stunned by the un-naturalness of 
the account, nor to try to conjure up again the event as it might well 
have appeared to an onlooker, but obviously to so enter into the narrat- 
:ive, that sharing Saul's existential attitude to Christianity, I may 
also hear the Lord's voice speaking to me demanding of me decision for an 
understanding of myself as a creature of God and a follower of Christ*
It is for these reasons that Bultmann will have nothing to do with any 
theoiy of memoiy which indicates that its function is merely to re­
produce the past !wie es eigentlich gewesen'; within such a view there is 
little room for encounter and the 'moment'* It is certainly because of 
his great loyalty to the notion of encounter that Bultmann insists on 
interpreting memoiy in this existential way. Thus he writes to 
Schniewind, "I am deliberately renouncing any form of encounter with a.
phenomenon of past history *.*• in order to encounter the Christ proclaim-
x
:ed in the kerygma, which confronts me in my historic situation"*
It is now time to recapitulate* Our starting-point in 
this section was Bultmann's view that what comes in the'moment' can be 
grasped but not possessed or retained* We have examined some of the 
sources of this, and concluded that the doctrine will raise criticism 
and doubts* In order to see what lies behind the doctrine we have 
proceeded in four ways* First, we saw the large part played in its
kerygma and Myth, p. 117•
production by Bultmann's analysis of human existence as the sphere in whicl 
authenticity was constantly challenged by dialectical elements which, 
although inseperable from life in the world, yet contained the possibility 
of becoming inauthentic and evil when man was so attached to and absorbed 
in them that the 'moment' has no chance of occurring* In face of this 
existential situation, man is obliged to maintain an inner independence 
or aloofness which recognized the secondary quality of these elements 
and their importance. Second, we have seen that Bultmann's view of 
revelation as 'momentary' is not so peculiar; it is to be found in the 
work of other thinkers in the existentialist tradition; and in particular 
we looked at the thought of Kierkegaard and Tillich. There we found 
the extreme difficulty of seperating off and mailing independently relevant 
the disclosed (as concepts or mere insights) from the disclosure-event. 
Third, we applied this to the business of the Church's witness in the 
world, and discovered that the main link between Church and world was 
not ethical or political or apologetic (in the bad sense of the word), 
but MtiJtji kerygmatic. Fourthly, and finally, we enquired whether it was 
not possible to retain and possess revelation of God and the understand- 
:ing of the self through memory* We compared John McIntyre's views cn 
this with Kierkegaard's and Bultmann's and found it deficient in several
3£ Here again is the relevance of the understanding of man in I Cor* 7*29 
f« in the thought of Bultmann.
directions. I'rom an examination of memoiy as an existential function 
we saw that the 'content1 of the revelatory 'moment' (as strictly person- 
sal) was such that by definition it could not be recollected in the us-
:ual way, and thus possessed and retained in anything like the same way
as mathematical knowledge or chemical formulae could be remembered.
Thus we concluded that revelatoiy 'information' could not be retained
and possessed by means of memory --  although memory could mediate an
encounter from which certain insights are derivative. All these fact- 
iors then lie behind and are relevant to Bultmann's conviction that what
comes in the 'moment' cannot be possessed and retained, and must be kept
in mind when the doctrine is assessed or evaluated.
This doctrine is, as we shall see, a far-reaching and 
all-pervasive one in Bultmann's thought. We shall meet with it again; 
for example, when we come to deal with Bultmann's views on the 
'Weltanschauung'. Then, after we have discovered Buber's and Kierke- 
sgaard's views on this same matter, we shall have to make a final 
assessment of it when we come to deal, in our conclusions, with the 
wider problem of propositions! theology ^ as a whole.
(3) THE 'MOMENT1 IS ONE OF DECISION WHICH AUTHENTICALLY RELATES THE 
PAST TO THE FUTURE IN THE PRESENT.
We have already seen that the 'moment' is the decisive 
focal point, the fulcrum, between the past and the future* The 
'moment' is decisive because it dislocates the determining causal conn- 
section between the past and the future. In the 'moment' we are 
called upon to decide whether we are to choose the meaning of the
Xfuture, or simply allow the past to determine it for us.
The responsibility which fills the 'moment' is not only 
directed to the-future, but also to the heritage of the past in the face
XXof the future. With reference to dtcision, Bultmann says that 
Christianity involves the concept of the voice of God —  a voice direct- 
:ed to a concrete being-in-the-world, and in time, which comes to him 
in the 'moment1, demanding obedience, which requires decision and
XXXaction, which m  turn involve the preservation a certain detachment 
^History and Eschatology, pps. 141-3•
XX '. op. cit., p. 143*
3HB£Essays, pps. 9-10 > cf. again the understanding of existence in I Cor. 
7:29 f*
Such a decision cannot fall under the criticism of science ( because it 
cannot be totally derived from the natural happening that may lie behind 
the occurrence of the 'moment1), and in it man can lose or gain his real
3£existence. As we have already seen, the Christian faith regards the 
•moment1 as the point at which an end is set to man’s history as the old 
man, and the point at which begins man’s history as a new man, a free 
man* The Christian faith regards this freedom of man from his old, 
inauthentic self, as the gift of God’s grace, gifted only in the ’moment’ 
of decision, and not a general immanent quality, universally possessed,,
This is the merest outline of Bultmann’s views on this matter, 
yet even so brief an outline demands certain comparisons and comments * 
This view of the structure of past, present, and future is to be found 
beneath the immediate surface of all of Bultmann's thought. We must 
not fail to grasp here, for instance, that this present ’moment’ of 
decision is actually that geometric point at which Bultmann finds meaning
in history --  it is at this point that meaning is available, and nowhere
else. At this point man can exist (Lat. existere = to stand out from... 
nonbeing, nature, &tc.) in a sense in which no other entity can exist.
Assays, p. 17.
3°£Bistoiy and Eschatology, p. 151
That is, man is unique because he can choose his way of existence, rather 
than have his form and essence determined for him, say, by natural law*
We can see this more clearly in relation to so-called naturalistic 
interpretations of history. By these Bultmann means theories which 
regard man in analogy with and merely as a sphere of nature. Nature is 
dynamic only in accordance with certain laws which govern it. It is 
unthinkable that nature should behave out of accordance with these laws; 
if it seems to do so, that is because we have mistakenly identified laws, 
or because the laws under which nature operates are as yet undiscovered.
Historical naturalism regards history as a similar process --  there are
laws which describe the causal connection between the events which con- 
:stitute history, and this leads to the notion of the predeterminism of 
historical happenings. Now Bultmann will have nothing to do with such 
theories. He makes a most definite distinction between history and
nature. The difference between the two is that although both are temp-
:oral, history is constituted by human actions (p. 139)® His more det­
ailed criticisms of historicism (history understood in analogy with 
nature) are that it understands histoiy as a natural process, and regards 
as its task the "establishment of facts ... and finding out the laws of 
their connection"; historicism has also taken over the idea of evolution | 
which is a biological concent o30*36 Bultmann points out that modem
3£See History arLd Bschatology, chapter VI, Historicism and the Natural-
:isation of history,(The Abandonment of the Question of the Meaning in 
History), pps. 74-90.
“ op. cit., p. 139«
X3£3€ op. cit., p. 78j cf. Essays, pps. 99-100, where Bultmann criticises
another illegitimate importation into anthropology from biological science. 
This is the interpretation of man as merely the instance ofjj'general rule, 
as a specimen of a genus of natural beings.
natural science, developed in the XlXth century, took over man as the 
subject of its enquiries; it dealt with him as 'real' only in so far as
he was part of the world of 'sense experience'; any existence of man
then becomes the study of all the factors (e.g. geographical, social, 
and economic) which constitute man*X We see in Bultmann's rejection of 
all such views the importance he attaches to man as a creature with the 
possibility to choose his future self, a possibility realizable in the 
freedom gifted to him in Christian faith, in the decisive 'moment' 
between past and future®
Other theological thinkers in the existentialist tradition 
are also strongly opposed to interpretations of man which regard him as 
a mere thing in the natural process without a future of his own® For
3/21 ^example, Paul Tillich, in deal/w?th the XlXth centurv existentilist 
protest against the Hegelians, states that what the Hegelians failed 
to see absolutely was that existence was the sphere of estrangement and 
not reconciliation, dehumanisation and not 'the expression of essential 
humanity'. For Tillich, unredeemed existence "is the process in which 
man becomes a thing and ceases to be a person". In history man is
^History and Eschatology, p. 8; a modern substitute for the study of 
history in this sense tends to be more and more sociology, which might 
be termed a morphology of histoiy.
threatened by self-destruction and meaninglessness* Anart from Christ-
Xsian faith, Tillich is aware of the danger of historicism also*
We are reminded here of Bultmann’s philosophical back- 
sground in the philosophy of existence, and of how other thinkers there 
are keenly aware of this problem of historicism, in which man is regard­
e d  as becoming in accordance with inescapable law or causality, in
much the same way as an acorn becomes an oak tree* H.J. Blackham,
XXdealing with the philosophy of Heidegger, uses a key-phrase,
'brute existence'. This brute existence in Heidegger is a 'night' 
out of which I come by means of my activities and projects ('Entwurf' )«, 
This brute existence can only be given intelligibility and value by 
personal existence* Blackham describes this brute existence and the 
consequent meaninglessness in this ways "Bread is the experience of 
Bothing* What happens ?.oo*. This is an experience of brute existence 
denuded of meanings, the high-tension power of raw actuality; it 
uncovers the marvellousness of pure 'is-ness', contingency, which 
reason covers up and is therefore a revelation of Being, and renews 
the wonder of philosophy and gives a new impulse to the 'why'of science *
K Syst* Theol*, II, p. 28.
XX
Six Existentialist Thinkers, London 1952, p. 102.
***op. cit., p. 104.
Blackham analyses 'brute existence' again, "The experience of hothing,
then, is an eclipse of the intelligible world and a precipiation into what
is, which recovers the pristine wonder which first raised the question of
Being* But Being is not what-is, brute existence, any more than it is
Xthe intelligible world"* What then is this ‘brute existence* if it is 
not that to which meaning must be given by means of the discovexy of laws,
yy
and out of which man must stand m  his personal existence?
We have already referred to Dr. Macquarrie's analysis 
of Heidegger's 'Augenblick'* Macquarrie writes:"The moment differs from 
the inauthentic present in this, that it is not a bare present but 
carries with it a disclosure of the past (what has been, the limitation 
of facticity) and of the future (what can still be, the possibility that
3Q€3£remains open". He writes thus of Heidegger's present decision: "The 
unification (i.e. of the self) is brought about because in resolve past, 
present, and future, the threefold structure of existence as temporality, 
are brought together". Heidegger's 'decision' is thus defined:
"Resolve looks to the future .•* and the resolve is accomplished in the 
authentic present, the moment of decision in which both past and future
3EXXXX
are disclosed"* The significance of the present 'moment' situated
3£ op. cit., p. 105.
existere = to stand out from...*
^^ A n  Existentialist Theology, p. 194*
* * * % .  cit., p. 195.
S3ESX3E -i Ar
O p 0 C i t * ,  p .  1 9 5 *
between past and future is described thus by Macauarrie: "because man is 
temporal in this way, he is also historical (geschichtlich). History 
is possible for him because his temporality is not just that of a being 
within time (Innerzeitigkeit), but rather a being constituted by past, 
present, and future in such a way that at any given moment not only the 
present but the past and future as well are disclosed to him and are real 
to him".x
a
It will be seen that the similarities between Bultmann and
Heidegger here are obvious the threefold distinction of past, present..
and future; the decisive character of present resolve, decision; the 
unification of the temporal and historical self in the present ’moment1.
As we shall see presently when we look at Kierkegaard’s views on past, 
present, and future, it seems fairly certain that both Bultmann and 
Heidegger have been influenced by Kierkegaard here, but whether Bultmann 
has been more directly influenced by Kierkegaard or by Kierkegaard 
through Heidegger, it is impossible to say* Yet there is a radical 
difference between Bultmann and Heidegger here which ought not to be 
overlooked. In the theology of Bultmann the authentic unification of the 
self within the past-present-future structure, and the possession of
op. cit., p. 160.
the freedom, the radical freedom, to choose the meaning of the future 
from a range of possibilities, is possible only by the gift of radical 
freedom in the 'moment* of God's grace in Jesus Christ. This does 
constitute a serious difference between the two in the matter of man's 
temporality.
Another theme in this connection which links "Bultmann to
other thinkers in the existentialist tradition is of course the import-
:ance which he gives to decision, resolve* The 'moment' for Bultmann
is always a 'moment' of decision* 'Decision' is such an important
theme in the existentialist thinkers, that we could hardly omit even a
brief reference to it here. Perhaps we may limit ourselves to Heidegg-
:er* Blackham writes thus of Heidegger's decision: "Dasein, then,
being possibility, exists by projecting itself, and these tentative
x
projects are interpretations, not conceptual but existential".
He describes the relation between decision and concepts in Heidegger in 
this way: "These existential interpretations of human existence (Rntwurf). 
realised possibilities, are not in themselves intellectual conceptions, 
they are forms of human being; but all forms of knowledge derive from
33£them". This thread of 'decision' runs of course all the way through
3QQE
Bultmann's study of history in the Gifford Lectures* He quotes the
KSix Existentialist Thinkers, p* 92.
op. cit., p. 93*
History and Eschatology, see pps. 146, 152, 155? 135? &tc*
example of bilthey and Heidegger with approval in their emphasis on
X
decision, he instances decision as the proper response to the
XXChristian proclamation, he states that man's freedom from himself is
XXXalways realised in the freedom of historical decisions, he instances
the Christian category of sonship and agrees with Gogarten that it can
xxxx
only be grasped over and over again in the decisions of life, 
he shows approval of Collingwood when Collingwood defines thought as 
"an act of man in his entire existence, as an act of decision".
The concept of decision in the present 'moment' is an obvious point of 
contact and comparison between Bultmann and the existentialist thinkers, 
and also a point in Bultmann's doctrine of history where he seems in- 
sdebted to his philosophical background.
Another point of contact between Bultmann and his existential
:ist background is his concern with the future. According to Bultmann,
man's relation to the future is that he is responsible for it; this
responsibility is inseperable from his responsibility over against the
past in face of the future The responsibility for our future
*op. cit., p. 146.
“ op. cit., p. 152.
“ op. cit., p. 152.
3EX3EK . , n c zop. Cit., p. 153•
XX3QEX , , r
op. Cit., p. 135*
X3HQQQE . ,op. Cit., p. 143*
resides in the present. One of Bultmann's key-terms in his understand-
sing of history is 'historicity' (geschichtlichkeit). He means by tills
that man's understanding of himself must always be as someone future;
A
when man's genuine, authentic self is mentioned, he must mean, by this 
his future self, the self offered to him as (of God) by his future
Other interpretations of history are approved or rejected by the touch­
stone of their attitude to the future; so historicism is rejected because 
it sees past, present, and future in a causal series, as a determined
353Econtinuity, instead of the future being regarded as open. The similar- 
iity between Bultmann's thought here and the 'Augenblick' of Heidegger 
can be demonstrated by comparing a quotation from Bultmann's Gifford 
Lectures with several quotations from Blackham on Heidegger* Thus 
Bultmann writes; " ... the present is the moment of decision, and by 
the decision taken the yield of the past is gathered in and the meaning 
of the future is chosen; ...this is the character of every historical 
situation; in it the problem of meaning of past and future are enclosed
XXX
and waiting, as it were, to be unveiled by human decisions1'e In
similar vein Blackham writes of Heidegger's attitude to the future:
"Dasein is seen to be an existence already found in the world in the
*op. cit., pps. 109, 121-2, 150, 151* 
op • Cl*t p • 141 •
“ op. cit., p. 141.
condition of becoming, and therefore facing an open future with the
power to be, and bound up with other beings encountered in the world"*A
^are1 is also an attitude related to tne future: "Care (Sorge), then,
is the structure of the mode of existence of one who exists by anticipat-
:ihg what he will be in a world in which he is found and to which he is 
X3E
boundn0 Here then is another point in Bultmann's doctrine of history
where he seems indebted to his existentialist background --  his inter-
X3E3Espretation of man as a being orientated towards the future*
Bultmann's stress on man's future is not only of hist­
orical or of philosophical interest, but has also important doctrinal 
repurcussions, shown, for example,in his interpretation of central 
New Testament themes. We can illustrate how this works out from the 
case of one traditionally troublesome doctrine, the doctrine of Justific­
ation. It seems clear that a great many of the traditional interpret-
:ations are unsatisfactory, and fail to do justice to the New Testament. 
For example, the traditional Reformed doctrine that Justification means 
simply that God quite irrationally takes the sinner to be that which he 
is not, has been described as a forensic fiction. In the Roman Church,
3£Blackham, op. cit., p. 95* 
op. cit., p. 95*
*XXBlackham on Heidegger, op. cit., p. 101: "History is thus only object­
ive in being subjective:it is a specific product of a man orientated 
towards the future".
an reaction to Luther's view, stress has been laid on the infusion of 
sanctifying grace in the Sacrament of Penance, in order to make the 
sinner worthy of forgiveness; this has been said to be meaningless in 
that forgiveness, as a free gift, has been emptied of content* In cert- 
fain (extreme) Wesleyan circles, exaggerated stress on personal sanctific 
sation or holiness, interpreted moralistically, has been seen to fall 
short of the New Testament's specific statements that Justification is 
by divine grace. If none of these givep a satisfying meaning to the 
New Testament concept of Justification, it does seem that the doctrine, 
interpreted from the standpoint of Bultmann's analysis of man's histor- 
:icity, does just this. If man's existence is not substance, 
but is rather temporality (Zeitlichkeit), then any theological doctrine 
must reckon with the structure of this temporality. In his doctrine 
of forgiveness, Bultmann does just this. For Bultmann, justification, 
or forgiveness, means the obliteration of man's past by God; it means 
taking him to be'what he is not' only by taking him to be the man of the 
future.** With this can be linked Bultmann's teaching on the genuine 
or authentic self. Justification means the offering of the future to 
s man as a gift. It means the offering to man of his genuine self, the 
man that he ought to be, and the man he can become in the future by
XAs we shall see more especially in chapter II, Bultmann's rejection of 
the category of substance is one of the most far-reaching elements in 
his theology over against orthodoxy*
a3€History and Eschatology, pps. 150-1; cf. Essays, p. 85, pps. 178 f*
repeated decision for God's grace. This interpretation, it seems 
clear, does justice to the New Testament concept and preserves its 
unmerited character; it does justice to man's historicity and temporal- 
sity, and flows directly out of Bultmann's view as to the significance 
of histoiy that in history there is the possibility of a 'moment'
in which God sets an end to man's histoiy as the old man and gives him 
a new beginning, a new history, as a free genuine man; in this 'moment' 
the past is linked authentically to man's future.
This discussion of the structure of man's temporality 
as a past and a future seperated decisively by a. present 'moment' 
would be incomplete without even a brief mention of Kierkegaard. In
3E.his Philosophical Fragments Kierkegaard is aware that man's temporal 
structure is that of a decisive present between a past and a future.
He is aware of the dangers of historicism --  the regarding of man's
past as determining his future. Thus he tries to persuade us that 
there is no inevitability about the-past. This is because, he says, 
the past " o.. came into being", and by so doing proved that it was not 
necessaiy.** What he means by 'coming into being' he explains as
XXX
" ... becoming is an actuality brought about by freedom".
x One o f the main purposes of Kierkegaard in writing the Philosophical 
Fragments, as we shall see in chapter IV, was to present the Moment
as a theological categoiy.
^Philosophical Fragments, p. 63.
XXX C aop. cit., p. 04.
l-to
Of course there is a certain immutability or inevitability about the' 
past "••• in •• that 8.its actual ’thus1 cannot become different; but 
does it follow from this that its possible ’how’ c^ould not have been
• Xrealised in a different manner ?" So he finds freedom in the becoming 
which actualised the past, because the opposite view would completely 
Obliterate man's future as possibility. "If the past had become neo- 
sessary it would not be possible to infer the opposite about the future; 
but it would rather follow that the future was also necessary".
Thus necessity is an enemy of man's authentic becoming: "If necessity 
could gain a foothold at a single point, there would no longer be any
XS3Edistinguishing between the past and the future". Necessity's
intrusion would mean that there was no lacuna between past and future, no
dislocation in the causal connection between past and future. For this 
reason Kierkegaard was opposed to to his generation as 'a prophesying
X30QEgeneration', one that believed that the future could be inferred from 
the past.
One of the great values of the study of the past is, for 
Kierkegaard, the discovery of freedom and becoming in it. "The 
immutability of the past has been brought about by a change, namely the
Xop. cit., pps. 64-65*
**op. cit. p. 63.
*3QE . .op. Cit., p. Op*
****0p. cit., p. 64; as e shall see in chapter III, Buber is likewise 
opposed to 'prediction' for the same reasons.
change by which it came into being; such an immutability does not
5Eexclude all change, since it did not exclude this change". The past
is a demonstration of change and becoming for Kierkegaards "...if the
past is donceived as necessary, this can happen only by virtue of forge
3EXsing that it has come into being”. All that is required though to 
c^ feat the absolute reign of causality is a present 'moment1 in which 
free change is a possibilitys "All change is excluded, subjecting the 
concept to a temporal dialectic, only by being excluded in every 
moment”. But if the possibility of the 'moment' be allowed, then 
inevitability,(determinism,)in its absolute sway between past and fut- 
sure, is broken.
The 'moment' then, a key-concept in the theology of Bultmann 
is a 'moment' in which a man's past and his future are authentically 
related through freedom, which is a gift of God.
(4) IT IS IN THE'MOMENT* THAT FREEDOM AND TRANSCENDENCE EXIST : THUS 
FREEDOM IS M  EVENT.
We have seen that in Bultmann's view the eschatolog- 
:ical event becomes present reality again and again in the 'moment',
Since freedom is given by this event, freedom can never be a possessaole
3£ T , .
quality, but can only become a reality over and over again. It is
only in the'moment' that one can be detached from tangible things so 
that life may follow the pattern of God's will.** It is typical of man's 
situation for Bultmann that man is subjected to the pressure of various 
motive forces. Responsive to every and any motive force, man cannot 
be his authentic, genuine, self. But in the 'moment' man stands as him*
3QEX
jself above the pressure of these motive forces. But this does not
mean that freedom is conferred so that man may act motiveless, without
following a 'nomos'. Rather, freedom is conferred that enables man
to act in accordance with that 'nomos' which man understands and affirms
^History 3nd Eschatology, p. 152, cf. Preachings Genuine and Secularized, 
in Religion and Culture, London 1959, P« 239*"Freedom is not a natural 
attribute of man, but is an occasional event, and it occurs only when
man is freed from himself by the word of forgiveness and so becomes open
for ijig demanding question wiiicr he encounters in his neighbour •
**Essays, p. 7*
3£3€3€Essavs, p» 7«
of kjklch
as his 'nomos’, a 'nomos' through J### fulfilment^man realises and becomes
X
himself. Freedom conferred in the 'moment' is not only freedom from 
motive forces and from oneself, but also always freedom for what my part-
• T XXJicular 'nomos1 demands, through which I attain to my genuine existence.
Bultmann asks whether radical freedom is not in reality identical with 
xxxinsecurity. Man's present situation is produced by constraint, so that
real freedom can only be gifted to him. Thus, "the Christian view of
freedom indicates that freedom ..... is not a quality, but can only be
xxxx
an event at any given time".
No discussion of Bultmann's views on freedom would be adequate 
without reference, however brief, to Bultmann's essay, The Significance, 
of the Idea of Freedom for Western Civilization, in Essays, pps© 305 f®
In this essay Bultmann shows concern over the dehumanizing tendencies of
our modem world, with its science and technology, and its political,
*Es says, p. 307. So Bultmann interprets Jesus' protest againts legalist-] 
tic Judaism in The Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, London 1952, 
pps. Ilf, In Jewish legalism " ... obedience .0 that .. man owes to Cod 
and to his o.emand for good is understood as a purely formal one; i.e. as 
an obedience which fulfils the letter of the law, obeying a lav/ simply 
because it is commanded without asking the reason, the meaning, of its 
demand ........obedience cannot be radical, genuine obedience so long as
man obeys only because it is commanded --  so long, that is, as he would
do something else if something else were commanded, or, rather, would not 
not do the thing in question if it did not stand in the commandment.... "« 
Thus the Jewish legalists did not understand the obligation to affirm and 
understand a 'nomos' as one's own, as one that was the only way to authen- 
:tic existence.
10^ ssays, p. 307. We note here that 'freedom' in Bultmann is almost 
invariably freedom for as well as freedom from.
3€X3£Essays, p. 310. What Bultmann means here is probably that man's 
connections with the cares and securities of the world, because dialect- 
sical, are tenuous;thus he lives and must live in insecurity to prepare 
himself for the 'moment1.
X3QE3L 2Essays, p. 310.
economic and cultural organisation* In face of all this, he sees that 
the sphere of man's freedom is shrinking rapidly* Where then, does man's 
freedom reside ? Bultmann's answer to this question is two-fold©
First, by reflection on history and on tradition. Histoiy is the story 
of past possibilities which can become present possibilities for us, end 
thus history is the stoiy of freedom. And second, by understanding the 
profound truth that "true freedom is only to be found in constraint" ,KX 
This restraint Bultmann finds in the transcendent God addressing man and 
liberating him. There is no absolute freedom, freedom to act in 
accordance with no 'nomos' at all© Freedom can only occur by means of 
a voice speaking to us, offering us our genuine self as a gift. Apart Iran 
this, there is only submission to various authorities© But the hearing 
and obeying of such a voice presuppose a radical humility and openness, 
without which man remains unreceptive to the word of the grace of God©
Apart from this, there is no guaranteed recipe for lost free- 
:dom. There is only reflection of histoiy and tradition (with their 
testimony to human possibilities), radical humility and openness, despair 
over our own capacities to attain to our possibilities — —  perhaps we
^Essays, p. 310.
3E3£Essays, p* 32$.
3aaEEssays, pps. 323 £ •
3€aaStEssays, p. 322.
can paraphrase all of Bultmann's thought here and say that in the 
'moment1 where these all converge, freedom can be gifted, freedom for a 
new history,- freedom to be our genuine selves and thus freedom for our 
future, freedom from our old selves, and freedom for the other, which is 
love©
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(5) IN THE 'MOMENT* GOD ENCOUNTERS MI.
This aspect of Bultmann's thought has been dealt with 
and presupposed through/out this chapter. This is the 1 moment' that 
gives significance to history, marking the end of the old history and 
the beginning of the new; Because this is so, the Christian believer 
is unique in that he can stand at the end of history and look back;
only in this sense can man speak of history being fulfilled because
the eschatological event, marking the 'end' of history has already happ-
Xsened within history. The paradox of history in the Christian view 
is just that the end of history happens now, again and again, in the 
'moment'. The 'end' of history (both 'telos' and ' eschaton')is that 
man should be encountered by God in the 'moment' and be renewed by him. 
Thus: "Since human life is lived out in space and time, man's encounter 
with God can only be a specific event here and now". Similarly, 
"Christian faith ... believes that God acts upon us and addresses us in
XXXthe specific here and now". Bultmann defines faith thus: "Faith ...
^History and Eschatology, pps. 151-2. 
3gEKerygma and Myth, p. 196.
K3£*op. cit., p. 197°
can only be an event occurring on specific occasions, and it can only 
remain alive when the believer is constantly asking himself what God is 
saying to him here and now". Thus God’s disclosure of himself to man is 
strictly ’momentary’•
This is an emphasis of theology in the existentialist 
tradition. Paul Tillich, in a very fine passage, makes similar points 
to Bultmann’s in a lightning sketch of the biblical 1 Heilsgeschichte' . 
Tillich tries to show how the disclosure of God must always be in and 
through time and history, that there cannot be any such thing as a 
suprahistorical or metahistorical revelation. ”... Revelation and sal­
ivation cannot be seperated. Moses must remove his shoes before he can 
walk on the holy ground of a revelatory situation: Isaiah must be touched 
by a burning coal for the sake of expiation before he can receive his 
vocational revelation; Peter must leave his environment and follow Jesus 
before he can make the ecstatic statement that Jesus is the Christ; Paul
must experience a revelation of his whole foing when he receives the
XXrevelation which makes him a Christian and an apostle”. This list could 
be described as a list of decisive biblical moments. There is another
Xop. cit., p. 198*
^S.yst. Theol., I> p» 161.
passage in Tillich has a startling similarity to Bultmann’s thought on 
man’s historicity: ’’Historical revelation is not a revelation in history 
hut through history. Since man is essentially historical, every revel- 
:ation, even if it is mediated through a rock or a tree occurs in history. 
But history itself is revelatory only if a special event or a series of 
events is experienced ecstatically as miracle”.* Tillich's meaning is 
important here. In Bultmann also the notion of historicity does not mean 
that disclosure takes place merely in history. For all knowledge, 
mathematical, physical, metaphysical, is acquired in history. But exist- 
sential knowledge is realised not merely in but through historical events, 
and in such a way that what is disclosed can never lose its original conn- 
section with the disclosure-event. This is, in fact, one definition
of historicity which will be presupposed and elaborated throughout this 
thesis.
3ESyst. Theol., I, p. 134* ®ie reader is again reminded that here again 
we are comparing Bultmann with the existentialist Tillich;as noted before, 
the distinction between the two strands in Tillich’s theology, the existent­
ialist and the ontological, will be indicated in the concluding chapter.
**Vfe can illustrate the difference between scientific and existential 
knowledge by pointing out that when a chemical experiment has been conclud- 
sed and results obtained, these can be tabulated and utilized without
reference to the disclosure event, i.e., the experiment. But this is 
quite impossible with existential knowledge, which always has reference 
to the event in and through which it was originally disclosed.
IV/ J
(6) THE NATURAL EMCEES OF THE *MOMENT! ARE WELTAHSCEAITIEEW, MYSTICISM, 
IDEAS, PROPOSITIONS, PROGRAMMES, INSTITUTIONS.
Bultmann dislikes the 'Weltanschauung* "because its
possession can be a flight from historicity, an escape from decision,
an escape from the enigma of the 'moment1, an escape from man's real
existence. A 'Weltanschauung* masks the insecurity which in Bultmann's
view is the hallmark of genuine existence. And obviously, Bultmann
is opposed to the 'Weltanschauung* just because it can be owned, possess-
:ed, permanently retained, and applied and applied inauthentically over 
xand over again.
Bultmann objects just as strongly to mysticism.
3EX
In mysticism, history is denied and by-passed. Mysticism, being 
^SBBihistorical, also implies flight from the enigma, from the claims, 
from the decision of the 'moment*. The trouble with traditional 
mysticism, from -bultmann's point of view, would seem to be that it 
includes only a half of the genuine Christian (dialectical) relationohip 
to the world. Mysticism perceives the secondary quality of worldly
^EssaystP. 8*
“ qp. cit., p. 19*
***0?. cit., pps. 9f 97-8, 106, 112, 153-
1affairs and projects inherent in Christian eschatology. hut it moves
from this recognition to the implication that the world is to be deniedo
It includes within itself the Pauline fas though one did not have'
while rejecting the Pauline 'having1 integral to the Pauline paradox
(I Cor.7 :29 !•)• Mysticism seems to imply that we are neither of
this world nor in this world. And just because it fails to affirm the
world, it fails to see the relevance of the love which is demanded in the
foment1 in the world of time and events. Thus facing the believer is
an either/or: *' ...either a mysticism which would like to make a tangib-
:le reality of the non-mundane transcendent in ecstasy, or a dialectical
relation to the world such as Paul describes in the well-known words....
....(I Cor.7*29-31)"** In the developement of early Christianity, in
the West, a "new relation to the transcendental world" is worked out,
" ... developing within ecclesiastical Christianity in asceticism and
monasticism and giving Catholic piety its peculiar character, while in
Protestantism it leads to the dialectical relation to the world of tak-
:ing part in the commerce and the affairs of the world with an inner
detachment. Inside Christianity, as outside, the new relation to the
3EK
world becomes operative in mysticism...... And the failure of myst-
:icism is this. . Only those who live dialectically related to the world
^Essays, p. 228.
“ op., cit., pps. 228-9*
as St. Paul enjoins, are free to love.* For the man who has faith is 
freed by it from over-involvement in worldly cares and concerns# He 
has not denied nor rejected the world as has mysticism, but has affirmed 
it in such a way that he can be free to turn away from it in order to 
love, for the world becomes a new place for the believer in that it 
appears as a sphere producing situations demanding ’love' from him#
This ’love1 is not an immanent emotion, but a concrete response demanded
from the believer inja concrete situation at a specific time --  in the
’moment1 of encounter® Enmeshed and caught up in worldly cares,
concerns, and plans, man finds this turning-aside impossible. Thus 
mysticism, by rejecting the world^fails to appreciate the Pauline paradox, 
and fails to meet the demand to love which comes out of the ’moment’ of 
encounter.
But this concrete and ’momentary’ response which is love 
can also be stifled by what Bultmann calls programmes, organisations, and
*op. cit., p. 86.
**op. cit., p. 112.
***The decision demanded of me, according to Bultmann, is ” ... my decis- 
:ion to live for the person I am meeting as my ’neighbour’ at that part- 
sicular time. This living for one’s neighbour is called love, and it is
a love   which unites the two people who m e e t ....... at a given
time”(op. cit., p. 155)• F o r further references to Bultmann’s fondness 
for the understanding of existence as in I Cor. J i29 fo, see Bultmann, 
Theology of the New Testament, I, pps® 182, 240, 551-2; Macquarrie, An 
Existentialist Theology, pps. 158-9; H.P. Owen, Revelation and Existence9 
p. 46. A full interpretation by Bultmann of the implications of I Cor. 
7:29 fo is to be found in his essay, Preaching:Genuine and Secularized, 
p. 241, in the Tillich 'Festschrift', Religion & Culture.
institutions. These, he holds, can easily become a cloak for loveless- 
:ness, stifling the cry for help from a concrete 'thou' encountering me 
in the 'moment1 (Essays, p, 16), Again, man is dialectically related 
to these programmes and organizations just as he is to worldly cares and 
plans* Organizing and programming are necessary to life, even to that 
aspect of it which concerns love and benevolence* But here again, man's 
existential obligation is to organize, but to do so as if "he did not". 
The difficulty about this doctrine in our time is of course the develope- 
:ment of the welfare-state which assumes responsibility more and more
i
for the needy and the troubled in society, Bultmann realizes this
and is convinced that the more "love" and"benevolence" are taken over
by the state, the less opportunities there will be for 'momentary'
x
encounters on the personal level demanding love and care® It seems then 
as if the solution to this dilemma is to realize that a great deal of 
institutional and organized'love' is merely a substitute for human 
apathy, and also that situations will never die out that demand a human, 
I-Thou response for which there are only inauthentic institutional sub­
stitutes* After all, 'love' is not merely a matter of providing 
cash, shelter, food, and so-on; perhaps individuals with a superfluity 
of these need an I-Thou response as much as, or more than any*
^...*We have to consider how the organization which is carried out,and 
which can effect the welfare of the individual, actually impoverishes 
the life of the individual and similarly of society. The more the 
elimination of want and need is made a matter for the state, the more 
human love and mercy is made to die out" - Bultmann. Essays, p. 317*
In the same way, an idea of God, a proposition describing God and 
his act, a religious Weltanschauung which we use to interpret the world, 
may delude us into thinking that we really believe in GodK : the possess-
of the idea, proposition, or Weltanschauung may blind us to the existence 
of the real God who confronts us only in the 'moment1 •
But does that mean, it may be asked, that Bultmann is forbidding ! 
all possibility of a Weltanschauung ? Bultmann believes that it does rot, 
and does offer a criterion by which genuine Weltanschauungen can be diff- \
:erentiated from false. A Weltanschauung can be genuine only when it era- i
|
serges again and again in the midst of varying kinds of encounters and j 
'moments'. This means that a genuine one must be closely linked up to a 
personal history, it must have an existential reference, and for this 
reason we can say that a Weltanschauung is legitimate the more it 
expresses historicity: that is, the more it helps a person to come to
grins with his personal existence, with the incounters and 'moments' of
Cf. "In truth, strange as it may sound, preaching is secularized when the 
sermon or instruction preseiits doctrinal statements which are to be believ- 
:ed. Doctrinal statements have the character of general truths, which 
one can hold to be true. But holding something to be true is not believ-
:ing it  ....  Believing in Christ does not mean holding high ideas about
his person to be true, but believing in the Word, in which he speaks to us, 
through which he wants to become our Lord", Bultmann, Preaching:Genuine 
and Secularized, op. cit., pps. 239-40*
3€3£Essays, p. 8. Cf. Preaching:Genuine and Secularized, op. cit., "Christ- 
:ian preaching is not the propagation of a philosophy .... it does not 
pronounce general truths, for which one can speculate, which one can dis­
cuss. .It is authoritative direct address, transmitted through men and 
demanding faith". Genuine Christian preaching must " ... really strike 
the hearer in his concrete situation.. L p - w ) .
x
his life* A Weltanschauung must always refer to a self-understanding*
This las?^?^Bultmann’s is of the first importance, and
we must therefore give it more consideration. We note how his views
in duorfat*#
on the undesirability of Weltanschauungen are^ with his teaching that what 
comes in the ’moment1 cannot be retained as a possession* Such a poss- 
session would be a Weltanschauung. There is here a c le a r parallel to 
my point of view given above with regard to primary .and secondary revel- 
:ation. We maintained that no confusion must be made between the two 
types of revelation. Thus a Weltanschauung is typically secondary 
revelation. And just as we said that the validity of the secondary 
depended on the experience of the primary, thus a Weltanschauung, to be 
valid, depends on the ’momentary' self-understanding which it enshrrnes. 
The Weltanschauung, to put it another way, can never lose its connection 
with the situation which gave rise to it, and thus can never have an inde- 
spendent existence of its own. This means that it is possible to crit­
icise Bultmann's view of revelation and make the fatal mistake of confus-
m th
sing the secondary, Weltanschauung-type of revelation ffttjtq the primary,
history and Eschatology, pps. 148-9*
1 momentary1 type•
Thus there is a truth that we can in fact possess and retain
3Eafter the experience of the 'moment1. This is that in time and in 
history, in a 'moment' there is given a disclosure of God and of one- 
sself; that it is in coming to grips with our existence-inthe-world 
that God discloses himself and ourselves to us. It is the insight 
that we are essentially temporal-historical creatures, hound indissolub- 
:ly, if we would be authentic, to our history (to its events and people 
and encounters), and to our time (to its 'moments'). This then is 
the Weltanschauung that is ours after the experience of the 'moment', 
which is the criterion of every other Weltanschauung, philosophy, or 
theology that we encounter. To investigate their validity we must ask: 
How far does this point man to his time, as the sphere where God and 
himself are to be met; how far does this help man to realise his own 
radical historicity ?
The present writer remembers Professor Karl Jaspers say in the
lecture-room, "The philosophy of existence knows of no truth that a man
may purchase for twelve francs, put in his pocket,, and lay on his desk".
*Unless we were able to do so, we would be existential schizophrenics, 
inhabiting tro different spheres at the same time, but without there 
being any connection whatsoever between the two. We shall discuss 
this matter again when we come to consider, in chapter III, Buber's 
view as to the relationship between the world of Thou and the world o f  
It.
This, the dislike of 'systems1 and 'propositions' and Weltanschauungen, 
is a very familiar theme amongst existentialist writers and thinkerse 
But of Bultmann, it cannot he said that he believes that there is no
possessable truth there is one, the radical historicity and temporal
:ity of man#
But there is another reason for Bultmann1s dislike of the 
Weltanschauungen which men hold to be true. This is because a Weltan­
schauung represents a general understanding of human existence, and my 
existence a mere instance or example of the general rule. It is an 
'ax iom "of existentialist thought that there is no such general understand- 
sing of human existence. There is about what happens in my existence
X3£a special quality which is peculiarly mine. The sphere proper to
general rules and ..classes is, of course, the sciences, and we have
already seen how Bultmann is opposed to the understanding of history in
*\o
analogy with nature. Thus we caiw say that there is^general description 
of human existence, except that man is historical and temporal.
We have already noted Bultmann's aversion to mysticisnu 
If mysticism is1the direct apprehension of God by the soul1, its danger
^Essays, pps. 78-79*
**When Bultmann writes (Essays,p. 79) > "I have MY life to live, as I have 
MY death to die11, we can perhaps hear an echo of Heidegger1 s category
1Jemeinigkeit1 •
for Bultmann lies in that it is direct. In mysticism disclosure thus 
takes place in history (it must) but not through history; mysticism thus 
radically ignores man* s historicity and temporality. Thus it is common 
to find mysticism being depreciated in the existentialist thinkers.
Thus H.J. Blackham writes.of manfs attempted escape from his concrete 
situation "in mysticism or positivism or intellectualism" as being the 
"ethical tension at the heart of Jasper’s philosophy". Paul Tillich is 
also well aware of the dangerous character of mysticism. "Mysticism",
g
writes Tillich, "liberates from the concr\te-sacramental sphere and its 
demonic distortions, but it pays the price of removing the concrete char- 
:acter of revelation and of making it irrelevant to the actual human sit­
uation. It elevates -man above everything that concerns him actually, 
and it implies an ultimate negation of his existence in time and space". 
Barth recognises this indifference of mysticism also towards our actual
...mysticism is the higher consecration of man, which he secures by exer- 
:cising towards the external world, both passively and actively, the
existence-in-the-world: "Muemn ) means to close eyes and mouth;..
greatest possible reserve".XXX
3€Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 52.
**Syst. Theol., I, p. 156.
3ay£Church Dogmatics,1:2, Edinburgh 1956, p. 519*
Bultmann holds that mysticism and Weltanschauungen are both 
opposite to a belief in God* For they both imply a flight from histor- 
sicity, from ’the enigma and the decisive question’ (Essays» p. 8) of 
the 'moment', and therefore from the insecurity which Bultmann holds to 
be the hallmark of authentic existence* In these, man tries to master 
himself, to possess himself, to gain security for himself. All these 
add up to man's belief in himself, which is the opposite of real belief 
in God.*
This phrase 'flight from historicity' is important, and 
links Bultmann's thought here with that of other existentialists, of 
whom we will consider briefly Heidegger and Kierkegaard0 Heidegger is 
certainly aware of the popularity of this flight into inathentic exist­
ence: "Heidegger ......  describes the process by which each one in a
/
necessary conformity to established usages, judgements, and opinions, is 
assimilated to the general forms of human existence. This is the great 
alibi, the proof that all the time I was in respectable company, the 
flight from personal responsibility, the escape into anonymity . OCo I 
gain the solidity and the assurance of this massive existence, and I 
reinforce it with my own acquiescence. To resist and break with this
acr Uh
mode of existence in order to realize other possibilities would create^
*Essays, p. 19•
ip:
in my own personal life. There is in me the strongest tendency to
avoid the issue, to take refuge from my original situation, the human
plight,in the comfort and assurance of this anonymous and approved mode
of existence. And that is what leads me to misinterpret my situation,
virtually to think of myself as a thing in a world of things, as a given
substance with certain properties, and thus to take refuge from myself
as existing solely in my relations and in my acts as possibility, as
xhaving to choose and project myself”. This passage illustrates those
themes which are common to Bultmann and the existentialist thinkers ---
the flight from historicity, from insecurity, the escape into anonymity 
rather than be oneself, a flight and an escape which find their exprecs- 
:ions in the possession of 8. Weltanschauung and in mysticism.
’’The escape into anonymity rather than be oneself”    th.es
xx
words remind us necessarily of Kierkegaard’s The Sickness unto Deathc~ 
This sickness for Kierkegaard is despair, and this despair can assume a 
triple form**3** One can be in despair (a)at not being conscious of hav- 
ling a self (despa/r improperly so-called); in despair (b) at not willin 
to be oneself; and in despair (c) at willing to be oneself. This sick- 
ness Kierkegaard believed to be universal* ”At any rate, there has
*Blackham, op. cit., p.
transl.by Walter Lowrie, Princeton 1951*
3E3BE . . r jop. cit., p. 7*
lived no one outside of Christendom who is not in despair, and no one in 
Christendom, unless he be a true Christian, and if he is not quite that,
9l
he is somewhat in despair after all”. Kierkegaard was opposed to the
anonymity of his age just as he would have been to ours: u *•. That man': 
life is wasted who lived on, so deceived by the joys of life or by its 
sorrows that he never became aware and in the deepest sense received an 
impression of the fact that there is a God, and that he, he himself, his 
self, exists before this God, this gain of infinity, which is never
XXattained except through despair”. Moreover, he was shocked by the
organised anonymity of his age. ”And, oh, this misery, that so many 
live on, and are defrauded of this most blessed of all thoughts; this 
misery ..... that people employ them about everything else ..... that 
they heap them in a mass, instead of splitting them apart, so that they 
might gain the highest thing, the only thing worth living for....”*
He asks his contemporaries whether tjaey shall be remembered as long as
XXXXX
the world stands, ” ... or without a name thou didst cohere as
XXXXXX
nameless with the countless multitude”. Kierkegaard, like rult-
:mann was also aware that anonymity was closely linked with intellectual- 
:ism and mysticism. ”The self thus leads a fantastic endeavour after
*op. cit., p. 32.
XXop. cit., p. 40. It will be noticed how closely Kierkegaard, like 
Bultmann after him (and probably influenced by him), links the disclos- 
:ure of God with the disclosure of the self.
3E3E3EX . .op. cit., p. 41*
3£3G£3GE . ,anonymity.
30GNE3QGE . ,op. cit., p. 41*
infinity,S or in abstract isolation,KX constantly lacking itself, from
XXX
which it merely gets further and further away”0 The results of
this are inauthenticity and lack of the conviction of temporality. 
Kierkegaard re-iterates the occurrence of anonymity in his contempcrar- 
iies, he never tires of teaching the frequency of those occasions when 
his contemporaries lost their selves " ... by having become, instead of 
a self, a number, just one man more,one more repetition in this ever-
XXXXslasting ’Einerlei1”• "By seeing the multitude of men engaged in
all sorts of worldly affairs, by becoming wise about how things go in 11' 
world, by getting engaged in all sorts of worldly affairs, such a men 
forgets himself j*35*** forgets what his name qs>X3BfS3€3£ (qn divine
understanding of it), does not dare to believe in himself, finds it to
yyyyjcyy
venturesome a thing to be himself, far easier and safer to be
XXXXXX in th 3
like others, to become an imitation, a number, a cipher
XXXXXXXXcrowd".
o
Xintellectualism.
^mystical type of experience. -
XXX . , . n
op. cit., p. 4°*
xxxx .,op. cit., p. 50.
XXXXXi.e. does not relate himself, to worldly affairs dialectically.
yyyyyy
anonymity again.
yyyyyyy ’»
i.e. does not realise that insecurity is a precondition of auth- 
:entic existence.
xxxxxxxx .. c,
op. cit., p. 51*
I think that the Kierkegaardian influence on Bultmann 
comes out clearly also in Kierkegaard's dislike of Weltanschauungen!
"A thinker erects an immense building, a system, a system which embraces
the whole of existence and world-history, &tc. --  and if we contemplate
his personal life, we discover to our astonishment this terrible and lud 
sicrous fact, that he himself does not live in this immense high-vaulted 
palace, but in a b a m  alongside of it, or in a dog-kennel, or at the
most in the porter's lodge  he can get the system completed ......
by means of a delusion".* Beside this quotation from Kierkegaard 
himself, we may perhaps place these from Blackham on Kierkegaards 
"There is a natural disposition, chronic in some ages, to escape from 
existence into the aesthetic and the intellectual, and to find in these 
pre-occupations a dispensation from the decisions and experience which
XXform and mature the personal self". This is a perfect description of 
the flight from historicity and from decision by means of a Weltanschau- 
sung. l<One who lives in the intellectual, claims to rise above the
X3£3£
world of change and chance, to regard and judge everything from the 
point of view of the eternal, with detachment, to put everything in its
XXXXplace in the system, co-ordinated and understood....does not live...
*op. cit., p. 68.
XXSix Existentialist Thinkers, p. 10.
3E3GE _ , . ncf. mystical experience.
XXXX
—  cf. a Weltanschauung.
I K» wV
..does not act,....does not believe11.*
These Weltahschauung-like beliefs, opposed by Bultmann 
and Kierkegaard, are of course Christian points of view, which a man holds 
uncritically just because they represent the drift of thought of his 
day; in short, what we call nowadays, ideologiese There is an excellent 
account of ideologies to be found in Alan Richardson’s Christian
3E3£Apologetics. A very brief look at what Richardson has to say about 
ideology in our present situation may demonstrate how relevant the views 
of Kierkegaard still are. Thus ideologies, for Richardson, are " ...<>
<&ssumptions, based not so much upon rational reflection as upon the
general social drift and economic developement of the times............ -~
Richardson differentiates ideology from philosophy: "Ideology differs 
from philosophy in that, since it is accepted uncritically and is not 
articulated intellectually, it is in no sense the product of conscious 
reasoning; it operates at the level of group suggestion rather than at
X30£3€that of individual thinking". Richardson is aware of how recent
critics of Christianity have fastened on to it in its inadequate and
3£op. cit., p. 10.
**London, 1947> especially chapter III, Christianity and Ideology, pps.
65-84.
“ op. cit., p. 66. ,
9QE3EX . , s sop. cit., p. 66. / -a
Weltanschauung-like forms, and have exposed it as superficial? "Religion 
is represented as being nothing more than the epiphenomenal and transit™ 
:oiy product of an ... undeveloped social order, arising from the imful- 
sfilled desires which such a social order fails to satisfy; it will there 
:fore pasS away when a just and mature order of society has been 
achieved". Richardson is at pains to express our indebtedness to all 
those writers (and especially those Marxist ones) who have brought the 
importance of this concept to our notice. This uncritical, propagandist 
acceptance of the Christian faith is not the belief of the 'moment', the 
belief which comes through regeneration and transformation, through 
ecstasy and miracle. Bultmann, like Kierkegaard before him, is most 
keenly conscious of the great perils one faces from the clamour of belief
XXwhich one faces in society. That Bultmann is fully aware of the 
dangers of ideological Christianity is apparent from an examination of 
his essay, Forms of human Community, (Essays, pps. 291 f.; see especially 
p. 296 passim), where Bultmann expresses his dislike of illogical 
Rational Socialism, and quotes with approval Gogarten's condemnation 
of the State's exploitation of the techniques of propaganda*
£
op. cit., p. 70.
**£3savs, pps. 7 f.jBultmann is closely linked here with the existential 
:ist background of his thought, cf. Karl Jaspers, The Individual and 
Mass Society, essay in Religion and Culture, pps. 37f.; also Karl 
Jaspers, Man in the Modem Age, London 1959? PPS. 40 fo
m
(7) THE SCRIPTURES BECOME THE WORD OF GOD IN THE * MOMENT1 : SO THE 
WORD OF GOD IS AN EVENT,
Bultmann holds that the 'Word of God' is not a natural, 
evident, generally discernible quality possessed by Scripture, nor is 
it the substantial content of Scripture* For Bultmann the 'Word of God 
is something that 'happens'* Scripture may become the 'Word of God',
3 £
in the concrete 'moment', in the concrete here and now of encounter.
Ul'ith
Bultmann speaks of the Word of God as God's 'act', and in accordance^ 
his well-known definition of God's act, this means that Scripture as 
the Word and act of God is always simultaneously hidden and revealed* 
For Bultmann there is no such thing as an objective miracle. There 
must always be the possibility for man to believe that an alleged 
miracle of God is nothing of the kind. That it is an authentic miracle 
is a confession that man can make only in faith, and without this faith 
man can only conclude that no miracle has occurred. God's act there- 
:fore is always both revealed and concealed. It is not otherwise with 
God's Word, which is God's act, in Scripture. That it is God's act is 
not objectively discernible because it requires faith to perceive that 
this is so, and
^Kerygma and Myth, p. 201.
since faith is unpossessable and unretainable but only gifted in the 
’moment1, Scripture can only become the Word of God in the historic 
’moment’. When this happens, this is the ’moment’ of revelation.
It is hardly necessaiy to point out here that this links up 
very closely with Bultmann’s views on hermeneutics. Bultmann*deals 
with certain hermeneutical rules which apply to the interpretation of. 
all texts (not excluding the text of Scripture). ’’The interpretation 
of biblical writings is not subject to conditions different from those
XXapplying to all other kinds of literature”. Since interpretation
always presupiooses a relationship to the subject-matter of the text, so 
the understanding of Scripture must presuppose a relationship to the 
subject-matter, namely, the action of God. how Bultmann believes that 
such a relationship, or a pre-understanding, exists in man’s enquiry 
about human existence; or, as Bultmann prefers to say, in this enquiry 
there is an ’existentiell’ knowledge of God. But this knowledge or
awareness is present not just in any enquiry about human existence, but 
in the right one, in the relevant one. Bultmann claims to have found 
such a right enquiry in the philosophy of existence, and especially in
Treatments of hermeneutics by Bultmann will be found in The Problem of 
Hermeneutics, Essays, pps. 234-261; in chapter VllI of History and 
Eschatology, pps. 110 f0; and in the last essay in Keiygma and Myth, 
Bultmann replies to his critics, pps. 191-211.
XXEssays, p. 256.
*“ we shall analyse this pre-understanding in great detail when we con- 
ssider Bultmann’s relation to the doctrine of immanence in chapter II.
the work of Heidegger, This is because he believes that Heidegger*s 
analysis of existence makes explicit the understanding of existence which 
is given with existence itself. Without such an analysis and its own
3E
Begrifflichkeit , the interpreter has not the same relationship to life 
possessed by the writer and thus fails to grasp his meaning. Thus 
Scripture fails to become the Word of God, and the 'moment1 does not 
occur.
Here we may indicate an important similarity between Bultmann
and the thought of R.G. Collingwood. Bultmann quotes Collingwood:
"The historian1s thought must spring from the organic unity of his total
experience, and be a function of his entire personality with its pract-
: ical as well as its theoretical interests" .S3€3E Surely the meaning of
this in the last analysis is that unless the biblical interpreter is
grappling with the same questions and problems as the same questions and
problems as the writer, then he must fail to grasp the writer1s meaning ?
I should like to push this discussion a little further. If it be true
that revelation comes only in the specific foment1, and if the writer
records this only in the concrete foment1 of his experience, then it
follows that his meaning can be grasped only in the same kind of 1 moment
*system of concepts.
grgr
The Idea of History, Oxford, 1949*
3E3EKfrom Collingwood, op. cit., p. 305?quoted by Bultmann in History and 
Eschatology, p. 135*
This means that the interpreter of the Bible must be grappling with the 
same kind of problem or question, and be aware of his past and his res­
ponsibility for the future, as was the original writer, for the same
kind of ’moment* to re-occur# If so, we would seem to be justified in
'ye.CL'rrence
talking of hermeneutics as the preparation for the of
3E•moments1. Therefore Scripture, an historical text, cannot be the 
Word of God in any substantial or continuous sense; it is something that 
can only become such a Word, given the existence of certain important 
and irreducible hermeneutical conditions#
X
There are hints of this doctrine in the work of both Dilthey and Bult- 
smann# Thus Bultmann writes of the philosophy of Dilthey:"Perhaps it 
may be said that eschatological perfection is, so to speak, distributed 
among the several moments of the psychical experiences from which each 
work originates, and that these moments recur in the understanding soul", 
History and Eschatology, p. 125*
Cf# H.A. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey, London 1952, pps#
137 f«> quotes from Dilthey1s Gesammelte Schriften, VII, pps. 213-5:
"The sequence of scenes in a play enables us to relive the fragments from 
lives of the characters who appear# The narrative of the novelist or 
historian, which follows the course of events, produces a re-living proc- 
:ess (ein Nacherleben) in us# It is the triumph of das Nacherleben 
that, in it, the fragments of a process are filled out ... that we think 
we have a continuity before us"#
n * '
(8) THE DIVINE ATTRIBUTES ARE PERCEIVED ONLY IN THE'MOMENT1: THUS THEY 
ALSO ARE EVENTS*
Bultmann's view here is that attributes like o.mnipot- 
jence or omniscience are not to be conceived as objectively perceivable 
and provable substantial qualities of the Deity* They are'abstract-
3£
:ions' from God's utterance and act manifested in the 'moment1,
God's all-powerfulness, all-knowingness, are such that we can never 
possess knowledge of them, retain it, and continually re-apply it0 
'The divine attributes are 'events'
is
It^this view which prompts Bultmann to say that
while enduring the captivity of a Russian prison-camp, the attribute
of the divine sovereignty is not something Objectively and obviously
apparent. Thus while in this situation it is not easy to say 
> s
"Terra ubique domini". Thus sovereignty is not a possessable dogma, 
but is something that we see (by faith) happening in the 'moment' of 
enigmatic and risky decision, when the whole of existence is at stake.
*We shall re-open this discussion when we deal, in our concluding 
chapter,with the whole problem of propositional theology.
lygma and liyth, p. 207*
3QBE . , OQop. cit., p, 198.
And it was for this reason that in the list of elements which I analysed 
earlier which rise up and militate against the insight of the ’moment’
I have included 1 extreme suffering'.
Bultmann identifies the ’moment’ revealing God’s omnipot-
x
:ence with the 'moment' in which God forgives man's sin by his grace*.
Man is enslaved to himself and to his past, and God's Word of forgiveness 
"breaks man's bonds with his old self and his past and frees him for the 
future. The only thing which can do this, says Bultmann, is the power 
of God's omnipotence. Bultmann is obviously reluctant to seperate an 
attribute of God out, and consider it in abstraction. For him the 
omnipotence of God is his act in the 'moment'. Thus ’omnipotence’ 
is only an abstract description of God's 'mornentaiy' act, and is simul- 
staneously a description of man's existential situation. Thus 
omnipotence can be described as the only power which can free man from 
his past for the future.
We find a not dissimilar standpoint in the theology of
3GE3E
Brunner. Brunner gives a list of theologians who radically doubted
3ESee the whole argument of Bultmann in his essay, The question of natural 
Revelation, (Essays, pps. 90 f«), which we shall discuss fully in chapter
II. See especially Essays, p. 102.
3E9EAs we shall see in considering the problem of propositional therlogy 
(concluding chapter) Bultmann believes that any dogma., to be authentic- 
sally Christian, must have some reference to man’s existential situation. 
This is in line with his conviction that an authentic Weltanschauung 
must express man's historicity and temporality.
3BOLDogmatics, (E.T.), vol. I, London 1949? pps* 241 f», 'The Problem of 
the Divine Attributes.
the notion of the divine attributes, because they felt that it finitized 
God, and took away from his unity and simplicity; among these, we find 
Justin, Spinoza, Amobius, Augustine, Quenstedt, and Brunner finds one 
root of the opposition to the doctrine in the philosophy of Plato. 
Brunner draws a distinction which is not dissimilar to Bultmannte (in the 
last essay in Kerygma and Tiyth ). He distinguishes between what God is 
•in himself1, and what he is1in relation to us*. God's nature, 'in 
himself', is above all finitizing qualities. But to us in our existence 
God is the Almighty, the Omniscient, the Righteous. Brunner is correct 
when he writes, "The ideas of divine attributes ... all point back to 
God's na/ture, but they express this nature of God in relation to differ-
XXsent particular aspects of the created world". In so far as Brunner's 
view means that it is impossible to speak of the attributes of God 
without simultaneously speaking of human existence-in-the-world, the 
standpoints of Brunner and Bultmann are not dissimilar in this matter.
X
except that Bultmann will have nothing to do with the notion of what 
God is 'in himself*.
^^Dogmatics, I, p. 247* Bultmann would,;say that they were objectificat 
:ions from existential experience*. . h
(9) IN THE 1 MOMENT1 TAKES PLACE ENCOUNTER WITH THE THOU.
, In the ’moment1 I encounter the. other, the Thou; in this
encounter I perceive that I am not infinite, unlimited. My existence
is circumscribed by limits --  by the claims on me of the other; in the
’moment’ I perceive these claims, and their fulfilment by me is ’love’.
In this sense I recognize that in the ’moment' I exist for the other,
y
for the ThoUo Therefore Bultmann can say: "Love means in fact being 
completely free from oneself and FOR the other person". As we have seen, 
in Bultmann freedom has always this double reference, freedom for..... and 
freedom from .
Bultmann is anxious ton strip all security away from duty-
doing. Thus he rejects the notion that our duty to love comes to us
by means of rules or axioms derived from an ethical principle. Rather
he wants us to realise that the demand to love confronts us not in ethical
rules but in the concrete Thou that we encounter in the 'moment'.
^Essays, p. 13«
op. cit., p. 108. The token of eschatological existence is my love 
the Thou; cf. I John 3*14 “ "We know that we have passed from death unt 
life, because we love the brethren", Essays, p. 150, cf. Macquarrie, An 
Existentialist Theology, pps. 210-211.
H3E3ESee Essays, p. 79 •
Cf-t 
O
'Love1 is the existential state in which a man is when he perceives the 
'good' of his neighbour, and the 'good' that is demanded of him.
For Bultmann, the 'love' that is demanded of us in the 
'moment' is opposed by 'hate'• Hate is the element in our make-up 
which opposes love, and thus produces a crisis whenever in the 'moment' 
love is demanded. We believe, and this belief we obtain from the world 
around us, that there is nothing so important as our own interest, and 
because this is so in us and in man generally, there is the Christian
XXdoctrine of original sin. But this is not an empirically verifiable, 
'natural' quality, arguable or provable, but an existential attitude 
only revealed in the 'moment' of the encounter with the Thou who demands 
love. Thus, just as bultmann refuses to allow the knowledge of God or 
oneself to become systematized into dogmatic possessions, so also does he 
refuse love to become systematized into a code or ethic which demands
XXXblind obedience to imperatives.
Bultmann draws a distinction between 'eros' and
XXXX
•agape'. 'Eros' has reference to man's self-fulfilment in drawing
*Es says,pps. 15 f* Here once again we have Bultmann's view of existence 
as a sphere where a continual struggle goes on between authenticity and 
inauthenticity.
XXop. cit., p. 15* Bultmann would doubtless say that like other doctrines 
and dogmas, this one is an objectification from the experience of the 
'moment'.
***We have already referred to above Bultmann's strictures on the Pharis- 
sees' attitude to the Law, where a command is to be obeyed just because 
it is in the Law. Cf. Theology of the New Testament, I, pps. 11 fo
30G0£Essays, pps. 72-3*
him upward to the ideal; 'agape1 is seen as the power of devotion bind- 
sing the I to the Thou©* The I and the Thou, we may add, are both 
concrete, historical, temporal, and therefore this power can only be 
realised in the 'moment1.
Such love, fulfilled in the 'moment', has a testimon­
ial or witnessing character. It testifies that a man has been freed 
from himself, from his sin, from his past; it testifies that a man 1ms 
been transferred from worldly existence into eschatological existence0 
There is only meaning in history where this existence is achieved, arid 
the#proof/ifof it, so to speak, is love manifesting itself in the 'moment', 
in the concrete encounter with the Thou.
'Agape' is further distinguished from that love which is
3D£'philos'. The distinguishing mark of 'philos' is a common concern 
with the other; in the love which is demanded in the 'moment' a common 
concern, in the sense of common likes, dislikes, or interests, is quite 
irrelevant. It is demanded only in the 'moment' and has no reason 
or ground except that of need, and the demand for the fulfilment of that 
need in the 'moment'.
3€op. cit., p© 73*
**op. cit., p. 155© .
At the beginning of this chapter we discussed, in 
relation to the works of Tillich, Owen, and Macquarrie, the question 
whether there was a norm by which the correct hearing and responding to 
the kerygma could be judged, a standard by which authentic Christian 
experience could be differentiated from inauthentic. It seems that 
clear that although Bultmann must reject absolutely the notion of an 
objective and historically scientific norm by which we could measure 
Christian experience. the only 'norm' or 1 standard1
against which we can measure our experience of God's eschatological 
event is that love which is manifested in our encounter with our neigh- 
:bour in the 'moment'.
Bultmann holds that the event in which msj/is freed 
from his past and for his future is the Word of the divine love in 
Jesus Christ which confronts him and says'Thou' to him, thus elevating
X
him into a new status with God. It is from this point of view that 
we are to understand the impressive and oft-quoted statement from Bult-
X3€
smann that only the people who have been loved can themselves love.-*
This means that it is only the man who has experienced the 'moment'
in which God's grace has freed him from the past, from sin, from himself,
from the enmftflhmgrat -in worldly care, can himself turn to the concrete 
op. cit., p. 302.
3a£Kervgma and Myth, pps. 32-3*
claims of the encounter with the Thou which happens in the 'moment’, 
which can happen in any 'moment1. To use Bultmann's own language, it
is only the man who has Been 'freed, from..........1 who is 'freed
for . •
The similarity in language here between that of Bultmann and 
is obvious.
that of Martin Buber^ Although we must postpone until chapter III a 
complete comparison between Bultmann's and Buber's view of the ' m o m e n t ' ,  
we may perhaps say a little here about the Thou. For Buber too, love 
is that which exists between the I and the Thou. "Love does not cling 
to the I in such a way as to have the Thou only for its 'content', its 
object; but love is between I and Thouc The man who does not know
Xthis, with his very being know this, does not know love......."*
It is clear how near this is to Bultmann's distinction between'agape' 
and' eros' •
We have also discussed Bultmann's distinction between 
'agape' and 'philos', the love based on common interests and concerns. 
Buber is aware of this distinction. Love, for Buber, consists in
*1 and Thou (E.T. by R. Gregor Smith), 1st edition, Edinburgh ±937» pps. 
14-15.
"helping, educating, raising up, saving". For him, love has nothing 
to do with a particular common feeling at all. "Love is the respc&nsxhi
:ity of an I for a Thou". The"dreadful point" of love is this--
"to love ALL men". Love goes out to good people and evil, wise and 
foolish, beautiful and ugly. This will perhaps indicate the close 
similarity between the thought of Bultmann and that of Buber on relation 
:ships of love.
— ooOoo-
*See I and Thou,p. 15 passim.
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This foregoing discussion of the 'moment1 and its implications 
raises a question without an answer to which our discussion would be mani-
jfestly incomplete --- namely, does not the positing of the 'moment', in
which encounter takes place, imply the coming into man's existence of 
something absolutely new, to which man had no prior relationship before 
the 'moment'; does this doctrine of the 'moment' not imply a transcend- 
:ence so complete that it excludes the notion of immanence absolutely ?
If so, does not this exclusion indicate that the doctrine of the 
'moment' is seriously inadequate ?
This specific charge (that Bultmann's theology suffers from lack 
of a proper doctrine of immanence), finds expression in Mr. H.P. Owen's
XRevelation and Existence. Owen reminds us that Bultmann has stated 
that 'the idea of immanence is radically incompatible with Christian 
theism'.** (it is a little unfortunate that Owen has not given consider- 
:ation to the possible interpretation of Bultmann's assertion, that the 
classical or traditional doctrines of immanence are incompatible with 
theism). Owen's opinion is that Bultmann"stresses the God 'without'
XXXto the total exclusion of the God 'within'".______He does not, writes
*Cardiff 1957$ we shall have to refer more especially to chapter 4> 
Encounter and the Word, pps. 52 f.
xx . , „op. cit., p. 53*
xxx ., __
op. cit., p. 53*
Owen, take seriously enough the truth that all men are created in God’s
X
image. These charges against Bultmann1s thought are re-iterated 
throughout the chapter in question.
To he fair to Owen, he allows that Bultmann indicates an imni-
sanence of a type, though in Owen's opinion, quite inadequate. He
allows that Bultmann's thought includes the suggestion that the 'imago
dei' is retained m  two ways : First, by man's power to think of God,
however negatively ; second, by man's possession of needs that only 
XXGod can answer. Yet Owen believes that this comes short of the right 
doctrine of immanence, which would assert that " ... God is actually
XXXPRESENT in man In Owen's view, any adequate doctrine of imm-
sanence would have to include this proposition.
This proposition, that God is actually present in man,
reveals an aspect of Owen’s thought that we must grasp if we wish to
understand the issues at stake. It is thoroughly spatial, and reveals
an ontology that is thoroughly substantial. There is little doubt that
Owen thinks of man's soul, his inner being, as a kind of substance.
*op. cit., p. 53.
XX
op. cit., p. 53*
***pp. cit., pps. 53-4.
U!
For instance, Owen writes, " ••• how does Christ revive this light ? 
hot by forcing his speech on us from without, but by entering us himself 
to renew the divine image that he implanted'1. Such terms as 'entering* 
and 'implanted' are significant. Again, he writes, " .... St. 
Bonaventure regards the knowledge of God as pre-existing in the depths 
of our soul like a sort of impress left upon us by the Creator so that 
the human soul knows God simply by reflecting on itself, since it is
33Emade in the image of God". Such terms as 'the depths of our soul',
and 'impress' are very significant. "St. Bonavehture locates God's 
act within, at the unseen centre of man's existence".xs3€ The signifi­
cant terms here are 'within' and 'centre'. " ... When Christ 'comes' 
to us, he 'comes' as an interior presence; he indwells the believer
3Q€3Q€through His Holy Spirit". The significant terms here are
'interior' and 'indwells'. In face of the presence of such terms, 
it can hardly be denied that Owen's ontology is in terms of substance. 
And we must grasp Owen’s criticism of Bultmann; Bultmann's inadequacy 
in the matter of immanence lies in his alleged inability to make a 
statement like this, "God is actually present in man"*
*op. cit., p. 67.
**op. cit., p. 69o
X3BE . , n r .op. cit., p. 70.
*“ op"."cit.,' p. 70*
But Bultmann in fact can and does use this kind of lang-
WL:uage; he speaks of "a proof of the'deus in nobis’" in an essay to 
which we shall require to make many references in this chapter, The 
Question of Natural Revelation. But Bultmann uses the phrase in a 
radically different sense from that given to it in classical theology. 
Classical theology, especially in its developement since Descartes, has 
held a view of man in which man is conceived as substance, a view of 
man which stands in sharp contrast to the view of existentialist though 
which views man's nature existentially rather than substantially. It 
would therefore be impossible for Bultmann to use the term 'deus in 
nobis' in the classical sense. For Bultmann, and here again we see 
his indebtedness to his existentialist background, man is to be conceiv 
;ed of in terms of historical existence. We perceive therefore that 
there must be a gulf between the thought of Bultmann about man and the 
thought of anyone who holds, as does Owen, an ontology of substance.
Bultmann uses then this traditional language of the 'deus
in nobis'; and we must ask in what sense he uses it. To answer this,
we refer to Bultmann's essay cited above* The argument of Bultmann
there is something like this* Man'cannot speak of himself, or
Assays,p. 93*
SSIn Essays, pps. 90-118.
investigate himself without, at the same time, speaking of God and 
wondering about Him. Man's investigation of himself yields a three­
fold result* First, it yields man's powerlessness, the truth that man 
is subject to outside forces that he is unable to control* In short,
it reveals man's finitude. This points man to a higher power which is
master of all others, to a God who is omnipotent* Second, it yields 
man's sense of oughtness, of obligation; his feeling that he is not a 
finished nor a fulfilled creature, but that he ought to become, that he 
is always 'on the way', and that he ought to be different from what his
past has made him* This points man to demand, to judgement which
come from outside himself; to the Holy One, who will indicate to him the 
right way to become* Third, it yields man's knowledge of his own
transience, of his experience of decay, of his sense of unachievement, 
of his radical temporality. This points man to one who is not subject
to these conditions, to an eternal and transcendant o n e  to one who
is all-complete in himself, not in a perpetual state of having-to- 
become, not subject to the law of decay* Only in this sense can we 
say that man's knowledge of himself is knowledge of God.
Perhaps here we should write 'God' in quotation-marks, for 
Bultmann holds that it not the real living God that man knows about in
3£this way* Pure speculative knowledge of God is not really knowledge 
of God at all* If man were to conclude that he really knew the living
^Essays, pps. 98, 102, 106.
1:3
God from his analysis and investigation of his own existence; this ccn- 
:elusion would actually be sin.3*' Bultmann points out that man's relat
sionship to the living God is based upon what God does for man, in his
act, in the 'moment', since man's life is historical and temporal.
It can only be said therefore that man believes in God if the following 
three conditions (which correlate with the threefold analysis outlined 
above) are satisfied.
Man believes in, has knowledge of God, if 'God' is the one
who frees man from himself in the 'moment' of historic encounter.
This is the first condition to be fulfilled. We have seen earlier, 
when discussing the revelation of the divine attributes, that Bultmann 
identifies the 'moment' revealing God's omnipotence with the 'moment' 
in which God frees man from his sinful past by the Word of his grace. 
Thus Bultmann is but re-iterating once more the main point of his belie 
in the possibility of meaning in history. In the 'moment' a dislocnt- 
:ion is made in the causal connection running from past to future throw, 
the present; man is a free creature, a new creature, his old history is 
brought to an end and he is given a new histoiy, if man knows or has 
known the 'moment' of the grace of God. . /.When this happens, man, a
*op. cit., p. 107«
**op. cit., pps. 98-102.
creature who knows direction from outside by alien .forces, knows God 
the Almighty, but not until this happens#
Second, man1s sense of oughtness brings him into a relation- 
:ship with the Holy God if the 'God'to whom he looks is the one who 
" ••• liberates man from himself, endowing him with purity, and putt- 
:mg an end to his sinful history”• Thus again we see how Bultmann
makes the ’moment1, in which man’s history is invaded by the liberating 
grace of God, freeing man from his past and gifting to him a new 
future under grace, absolutely central to his thought, Man's sense 
of obligation or of guilt alone do^not bring him into a relationship 
with God; only if the 'moment' occurs, and only if, can man truly speak 
of the Holy God*
Third, in looking out of his transience towards eternity,
or towards the 'eternal one', man has no real relationship to the
Eternal God*** It is only man's illusion that tells him that he can
thus relate himself to eternity while imprisoned in time. Man can be
actually related to eternity only if this happens; if God imparts to man
his grace, and as the Eternal One frees man from his old existence, from
thp life of Pi in and care and dread and over-involvement in worldly
*op. cit., p. 106*
**op. cit., pps. 106 f.
concerns, and giyeS Miffl a new free relationship to himself and the 
world of the other.* It is almost unnecessary to point out again the 
utter centrality i?hat Bultmann accords the 'moment1 (a 'moment' in which 
God acts) in his thought#
Prom this we conclude that Bultmann's theology contains 
a doctrine of the divine immanence0 hot, admittedly, the traditional 
doctrine of immanence; still a doctrine of immanence it is<> Man's 
nature, prior to any special revelation, includes 'gaps', 'wants', 
'needs', 'longings', which point to a being devoid of these, a being 
who is all-perfecto Such a being would, if man were in relationship 
with it, perfect and fulfil man's nature. As we have pointed out in 
all fairness to Owen, he does recognize this aspect of Bultmann's thought. 
But we feel that Owen's account does not give Bultmann's position full 
enough consideration at this point , because he omits all reference 
to Bultmann's important conclusion, namely, that God, of whom man can 
think and in his existence long for, encounters man in an historical 
'moment', and I in time fulfil man's deepest needs, which we may term
X
op. cit., pps. 108-9* Cf. History and Eschatology, p. 153* "o*. history 
comes to its end in the religious experience of any Christian 'who is in
Christ'• In his faith he is already above time and history............
In his faith the Christian is a contemporary of Christ, and time and the
world's history are overcome. The advent of Christ is sn event in the
realm of eternity which is incommensurable with historical time....... ..
the Christian ... is above time and the world....."#
In this sense it is a natural revelation.
Revelation and Existence, p. 53-
eschatological freedom® Man's being lacks, longs for and craves for 
something, and this longing prepares man for the historical encounter 
with the living and acting God, who fulfils these deep needs of man's 
nature, although not necessarily 'fulfilling' them in the v/ay expected 
by man. That is, God's fulfilment of man's needs transcends and
w\ o
corrects them; God's act cannot be'accomadated'by man's existential 
situation.
At this point we may profitably make several observations 
about our comparison of these two types of immanence, Owen's and 
Bultmann’So First, we must distinguish Bultmann's view from the
3£classical 'via negativa'0 Man does not come to a knowledge of God at 
all by a contemplation of his own nature, to which God's nature is the 
opposite® In short, Bultmann does not hold that God is merely that 
which we are not. To the contraiy, as we have insisted, Bultmann holds
that by examining himself, man can come to no real knowledge of the true
God at all® That knowledge, for Bultmann, is existential knowledge, 
gained in that 'moment' when God invades man's time, confronting him in 
history, and freeing him by his act® The 'via negativa' is not an hist
sorical method at all; Bultmann's is thoroughly historical®
*Bultmann points out that the eternity man learns about in his existent- 
:ial self-analysis is "a negative conception", Essays, p. 109.
This brings to our notice another significant point. The 
view of immanence that Owen favours is that of St. Bonaventure, whose 
view can be called 1 contuition’, Contuition is the process in which 
” »«• the human soul knows God simply by reflecting on itself, since if 
is made in the image of God11*** Or to quote another definition, 
contuition ”... is .. the apprehension in a perceived result of the
/A
presence of a cause which we cann qt perceive intuitively"* It seems
to me that this view of immanence suffers from- at least two defects<?
First, it does not seem to take seriously enough the doctrine of
original sin; namely, that in some sense, the divine image is defaced
by man’s transgression. Therefore any revelation based upon the percerjh
:ion of such an image will inevitably be distorted* Bultmann does not
fall into any such error* All through the essay we hove been quoting,
heiis at pains to point out that any analysis that man may make of his
ow#n existence does not bring authentic knowledge of the living and
acting God* But this objection seems perfectly valid against St*
Bonaventure and subsequently against Owen. Second, the method is
thoroughly unhistoricalo In it, there is no context, no ’other’, no
’wn-rld’. Man could come to knowledge of God in this way while living in 
3£Owen, op. cit., p. 69*
“ op> cit., p. 69.
that of Etienne Gilson, in the Philosophy of St, Bonaventure, ^ London 
1938)> pps. 400-1, quoted by Owen, op. cit., p. 69*
an existential vacuum, Man is simply an object to himself as subjectc 
Nowhere else, I suspect, could we find such a contradiction of the) 
HeideggerisR insight that man is 'Dasein', or such a Cartesian view of 
knowledge. This view of immanence therefore, in which man is so radic­
ally unhistorical and untemporal, would be completely unacceptable to 
those who accept, upon existentialist and biblical grounds, the radical 
historicity and temporality of man.
While Owen criticizes Bultmann's view as over-intellectual
3Eand his view of revelation as propositional , iHHk his own lies wide open 
to these very criticisms. Thus Owen's statement that "God IS truth 
and to believe in him is to acknowledge him as true" reveals the intell- 
sectualistic and propositional nature of his view, inis is just as . 
true of his assertion that " ...He (i.e. the present writer, ) hopes
to be able to see the truttl of Christ's teaching, and even, sometimes,
3Eop. cit., p. 71. Owen completely misses the point of Bultmann's theol- 
:ogy here* There is hardly a stronger emphasis in Bultmann's thought 
than his denial that 'what God is saying to me here and now' (Owen, op. 
cit., p. 72) can be objectified into a general proposition. God's dis- 
: closure of himself gives me a meaningful self-understanding and also 
meaningfully relates me to my situation at a particular 'moment', hut 
the whole point about this insight is that it cannot be turned into a 
proposition, generally meaningful, no matter the form of words in which 
I try to express it. Thus an imperative is inseperable from an indicat- 
:ive. What would AiLtmann's alternative be ? Only that what is dis- 
:closed in the 'moment' is a vague, shadowy, contentless, image of God, 
quite unrelatable to my existential situation. But such a view would be 
nonsensical. While we are becoming used to critics of Bultmann complain- 
:ing that his theology is unacceptable because devoid of the possibility 
of propositions, it is a little hard to find Owen saying the exact oppes- 
s ite J
“ op. cit., p. 65©
XXX . , r z -op. cit., p. op*
to practice it; but he has never experienced anything that he would call 
an encounter". There is little doubt that these are thoroughly intell 
sectualistic views of immanence. Yet, Bultmann’s view is one that 
regards man in his totality; if man is given awareness of God and of his
own existence, this is not merely intellectual knowledge for since
self-awareness is an integral part of man's total being any change in it
• • 3£is 'ipso facto' a change in man's total being. So, to return to
Bultmann's central theme, the revelatiop of God does not merely inform.
man but transforms him. It does seem to me that Owen's view of imman-
Su-pra*
Jence seems to be static and intellectual and jSMMS^ diistorical, while 
Bultmann's seems to be dynamic and existential and thoroughly historical
We must now try to examine Bultmann's doctrine of 
immanence at a deeper level, first by examining Bultmann's theology in 
itself, and then by comparing it with that of other thinkers. We have 
seen that Bultmann rejects any view of man that is substantial rather 
than historical and existential. He obviously does not regard the soul 
as a kind of substance which could have an 'impress' left upon it by the 
hand of its Maker. "In the genuinely Christian view, man is, body and 
soul, the creature of God, and no pre-existent spark of heavenly light—  
KThis'is an insight that Owen seems to have totally missed.
as if that were his real "being — - is to be distinguished from his 
psychosomatic existence"• Bultmann is concerned throughout bis theol- 
:ogy with man's historical existence* To use the terminology of 
Heidegger, he believes that man is 'Geschichtlich1, a category which 
is applicable to man as 'Dasein*. With 'Geschichtlichkeit' is closely 
linked another category of 'Dasein1, 'Zeitlichkeit', which means temporal-
30E
:ity* Man's special temporality is in being inseperably connected
with past, present, and future* This means that in describing man, the 
only valid statements that we may make are existential, not substantial* 
Therefore, just as classical theology could make statements like 'man is 
mortal and substantial soul', modem existentialist theology must say 
'man is historicity and temporality'. Thus it is impossible to speak of 
man without simultaneously speaking of that which consitutes him, that
if ffwhich is, so to speak, his essential ingredient, namely time, in its
peculiar human structure of past-present-future * Grasping this, we can
go further'and say, man is temporality, and within man's temporality is
to be discovered the divine immanence. Thus God is hidden in man as
temporality and is to be encountered only through it* For if God is to
be discovered elsewhere than in the special structure of past, present, 
^Theology of the New Testament, I, p. 168.
3°EFor these terms, see Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, pps. 160, 
32.
and future, then man’s temporality in the sense in whichfre have describe 
it is a fiction. Here we must hasten to correct a possible misinter­
pretation. Of course those of St. Bonaventure’s persuasion must 
admit that man cannot be seperated from time in the sense that man is 
always in time. But Bultmann's "Zeitlichkeit" means something differ­
ent --  it means that man is confronted by knowledge of God and of his
self not only in but through time, through history, through the past-
present-future structure. Just as classical theology could state that
x'God is present in the soul of man', 'God has left an impress in the 
soul of man', so existentialist theology must state the same kind of 
things, except that it always must substitute 'historicity' and 
'temporality' for 'soul'. It can say that God has left an 
"Anknttpfungspuhkt" (contact-point) with himself in the historicity of 
man. Thus in existentialist theology the concepts 'historicity' and 
'temporality' seem to have displaced the concept 'soul' in the context 
of the doctrine of immanence* If Bultmann's essay The Question of 
Natural Revelation is carefully examined, it will be found that those 
deep desires and cravings and longings experienced by man qua man 
are existential in the sense that they are historical and temporal.
*Cf..Owen, op. cit., p. 67: " God is not'trying to SAY' someTHING 
to us; he is trying to BE someONE IN us".
We mean by this that they are all rooted in man’s essential connection 
with time in the past-present-future structure* For example, there 
are man's subjection to forces alien to himself (like death) which cut 
short his future, his feeling tjiat he is forever on the way and missing 
himself continually in the swift passage of time, his sense of unachiev- 
:ement, his subjection to decay* This is the core of Bultmann's 
doctrine of immanence*
The position that we have reached so far with regard to the 
doctrine of immanence is thiss God has indeed left a witness of himself 
in man; he has left, if we may be allowed to use traditional language,
Xan impress upon man's total temporal and historical existence* In 
creating man integrally connected with an historical existence, God has
formed that existence in such a way that man is pointed to God as 
X"God is the mysterious, enigmatic power that meets us IN the world and 
IN time", Bultmann, Essays? p* 9«
"God's action with man through his Word naturally has no point of 
contact (Ger. Anknttpfungspunkt) in man or in human intellectual life,to 
which God must accomadate himself", Essays, p. 135*
"The question of his own real being which engages the attention of the 
mar who seeks to be himself and has lost his self, is the point of 
contact (Ger. Anknttpfungspunkt) for God's Word", Essays, p. 136*
"Man's sin is the point of contact (Ger. Ankntipfttngspunkt) for the ... 
Word of grace* One cannot then point to this or that point of contact 
(Ger* Anknttpfungspunkt) IN man, in his intellectual life and in his hist- 
:ory. Rather is MAN IN HIS EXISTENCE, TAKEN AS A WhOLE, THE POINT OF 
CONTACT (Ger. Anknttpfungspunkt), And for this reason it is also true
that there is no faculty in m a n  no religious faculty possessing a
special receptivity for God's Word. What we designate as a special rel- 
sigious faculty or disposition or receptivity can represent just as much 
a hindrance as a help for hearing God's Word", Essays, p« 137»
"God's Word confronts man in his whole existence ," Essays,p. 131 o
" ...the task of preaching in the New Testament is ... conceived . .in sudi 
a way.••.that we cannot speak of a point of contact (Ger. Anknfipfungs- 
spunkt) for the Word of God in man's intellectual life", Essays, p. 138*
possibility. (God as actuality is disclosed only in the 'moment'.)
Or, by imparting to man the quality of temporality (in the past-present- 
future structure) God has 'impressed1himself upon that temporality in the 
sense that he is the only factor or power who can break man's connection 
with a sinful past in the present 'moment' and give him the possibility 
of a new existence in the future» God is immanent in man's time and 
history as existing, not in his soul! Thus man's total historical, 
psychosomatic existence suggests God as possibility®*
If this standpoint of Bultmann's be accepted, then we can
proceed to interpret other theological statements from it. Thus John
Macquarrie quotes the famous prayer of St. Augustine, "Thou hast formed 
us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find their rest in
Thee",, and gives it an existential interpretatio n  namely that the
On reflection, I should not be happy at the total elimination of the 
notion of substance from anthropology. Quite apart from its actual deriv 
ration, and from its exact usage in mediaeval and post-mediaeval theology 
there is one valid insight that the concept seems to guard and retain. 
This is the insight that there is something 'lasting', 'enduring', in the 
temporal 'I' who experiences. Thus, there must be some continuity 
between the 'I' who experienced in 1940? and the 'I' who experienced in  
1950, and the 'I' who experiences in I96O0 Despite continually deveiop- 
:ing and changing self-understandings, it must be in some sense 
'substantially' the same 'I' which experiences. The alternative would 
be utter lack of continuity. But this means that my 'I' is dif'/erent 
from A's, as A's is from B's® Thus 'substance' used in this way comes 
to guard individuality, and is thus different from the classical notion 
that all soul is the same substance with the same impress upon it.
This is doubtless a pernicious idea. But the existentialists would have 
to agree that all existence qua existence is 'substantially' the same 
in so far as it is all related to the three-fold structure of temporal- 
sity. And the main trouble with the classical idea of substance is of
course that it makes possible the subject-object- approach to God, and
makes redundant the concept of historicity. In its classical usage, it 
is certainly incompatible with existentialist theology.
anxiety inseperable from historical existence in the world may incline 
man to God, the Creator, the ground of being,* So also does Macquarrie 
interpret Schleiermacher's famous 'Geftihl der schiechthinnigen 
AbhMngigkeit' • This feeling (cognitive feeling, and not mere emotion), 
another condition of man’s historical existence, may lead man to God the 
Creator, and so far as it does, is not this feeling also an aspect of
3E3€3€the divine immanence ?
But to move on to our comparisons, we must ask if Bultmann’s 
doctrine of immanence is so unique ? Is it so peculiar to Bultmann 
himself ? Or has it wider-spread roots in the existentialist tradit-
:ion, as over against classical theology ? Certainly if we examine 
another theology also in the existentialist tradition, namely the 
theology of Paul Tillich, we find views there which suggest a view of 
immanence not unlike that of Bultmann's, although unlike that of
~ . 3BOE3EOwen1s#
Speaking of the preparation in history for the coming of 
Christ, Tillich writes: "The universal quest for the hew Being is a
consequence of universal revelation. If it claims universality,
*An Existentialist Theology, p. 71•
snr
op. cit., p. 75,
***Further references in Macquarrie's book might be indicated, especially 
in pps. 79 fo, beginning with this sentence on p, 79* "'-foe connection 
of the ontological interpretation of affective states with the knowledge 
of God is, however, implied in other Pauline passages".
cannot be too strongly emphasised at this point again that here 
we are going to compare Bultmann's theology with the theology of the 
existentialist Tillich. As indicated already, we shall indicate in our 
concluding chapter the divergence between the existentialist and ontolog- 
• ical strands du TnJion's t h e o l o g y  or a w.; o l.e e
Christianity implicitly maintains that the different forms in which the 
quest for the hew Being has been made are fulfilled in Jesus as the
3€
Christ''. Here we have, first,’universal revelation’; this refers to 
the revelation of God imparted at creation, and thus must mean, in some 
sense, immanence. ’The quest for the Hew Being’ is a mark of human 
existence qua human, and therefore is existential and not substantialo
30?'Hew Being', analysed by Tillich in contrast with 'old being’ , is a 
want, a lack, a need, a longing. The different forms of the quest 
become one in that they are 'fulfilled' by Jesus as the Christ. There 
is hardly need to point out here the similarities in thought and lang­
uage betwwen Tillich and Bultmanno
Tillich is interesting when he deals with his so-called 
method of correlation which underlies, he maintains, his theology as s. 
whole. "Symbolically speaking, God answers man’s questions, and under 
the impact of God’s answers man asks them. Theology formulates the 
answers implied in divine self-manifestation under the guidance of the 
questions involved in human existence. This is a circle which drives 
man to a point where question and answer are not separated".
^Sygt. Theol., II, p. 103*
**in Syst. Theol., II.
3Bg£Syst. Theol., I, p. 69.
■'<?J u
From this it should be clear that human existence itself is the 
Ankntipfungspunkt for the self-disclosure of God, and not an impress or 
image in man's substantial soul.*
We can indicate again how Tillich comes out against the contuit- 
:ion view of immanence. Tillich writes: "The answers implied in the 
event of revelation are meaningful only in so far as they are in correl­
ation with questions concerning the whole of our existence, with 
existential questions. Only those who have experienced the shock of 
transitoriness, the anxiety in which they are aware of their finitude, 
the threat of non-being, can understand what the notion of God meanso 
Only those who have experienced the tragic ambiguities of our historical 
existence and have totally questioned the meaning of existence can under­
stand what the symbol of the Kingdom of God means" (Syst. Theol,, I, 
p. 69).
3£
I have deliberately not pushed the comparison between Bultmann and 
Tillich too far at this point. This is because there are two elements at 
least in Tillich's words that might be suspected, from a strict^existent­
ialist point of view. First?this * question/answer1 terminology is arnbig- 
:uous in that it could lend itself to a propositional interpretation. 
Tillich is not clear here that the answer of revelation to the existent- 
:ial question is strictly personal and not propositional. Whereas Bult- 
:mann is always crystal-clear at this point. For Bultmann, the answer is 
God, it is personal. Thus Bultmann writes to Schniewind: "I AM trying to 
substitute anthropology for theology, for I am interpreting theological 
affirmations as assertions about human life. What I mean is that the
God of the Christian revelation is the answer to the vital questions,the
existential questions" (Kerygma and flyth,pps. 107-8)• Second, when 
Tillich speaks of the circle which drives man to a point where question 
and answer are not seperated, it is unclear whether there could be room 
within this circle for event, for the historic 'moment'. In fact, it is 
difficult to decide really if we are dealing here with the existentialist 
or the ontological Tillich. The immense difficulty in interpreting his 
theology is that it is sometimes hard to decide whether we .have come up 
against the existentialist or the ontological strain. In our concluding 
chapter we indicate both of these5tnis does not altogether remove the d.if f- 
:iculty of deciding about specific passages. At any rate, there is 11htle
doubt here that Tillich's theology comes cut against Owen's and St. Bona-
:venture's. The suspicion that we might have here that the ontological 
Tillich / (please see next pageJ
Thus, TillicHsuse of such terms as 'existential questions', 'anxiety',
'the tragic ambiguities of our historical existence', indicate how he
diverges from the totally unhistorical contuition view favoured by Owen.
And there is a general similarity, subject to the reservations we have
pointed out, between Tillich's conviction that 'only those who have
experienced the tragic ambiguities of our historical existence .... can
understand what the symbol of the Kingdom of God means', and -hiltmann's
notion that our experience of existence-in-the-world, and the threats
and fears it brings, produce a seed-plot for a notion like 'God'. In so
far as there is a strand in Tillich's theology which see that God is
immanent in man's awareness as historically existing, he is not dissimilar
to Bultmann and diverges sharply from Owen. Tillich's exploitation of
existentialist analysis, which is the main factor seperating him from a,
contuition view of immanence, comes out clearly here: " ... systematic
theology ..... makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the 
the ontological Tillich/ is speaking is confimed by Tillich when he 
writes of the point where for man question and answer ere not sepera/teds 
"This point, however, is not a moment in time. It belongs to man's ess­
ential being, tc the unity of his finitude with the infinity in which 
he was created and from which he is seperated. A symptom of both the 
essential unity and the existential seperation of finite man from his 
infinity is his ability to ask about the infinite to which he belongs;the 
fact that he must ask about it indicates that he is seperated from it" 
(Sy^t. Theolo, I, p. 69). For Bultmann the point most certainly is a mom- 
rent in time, a concrete encounter. For Bultmann, man deludes himself if 
he imagines that his awareness of his finitude gives him real knowledge of 
the living, infinite God. His awareness is merely an Anknttpfungspunkt.
For Bultmann, it is unthinkable that there exists a unity in man, of f in- 
si tude and infinity. And the phrase 'man's essential being' would be an- 
rathema to an existentialist like Bultmann or Heidegger or Sartre. As we 
shall see in our conclusions, it is most probably the ontologist Tillich 
who speaks in this way. But yet Tillich's emphasis on »questions concern- 
ring the whole of our existence', with 'existential questions’, (Syste 
Theol., I, pps. 68-9) does seperate him decisively from that tradition 
upheld by St. Bonaventure and Owen.
existential questions arise......... .The analysis of the human situation
is done in terras which today are called 'e x i s t e n t i a l ' T h i s  same 
exploitation is further shown by this: "God is the answer to the question 
implied in human f i n i t u d e " T h e  divergence of a thinker like Till- 
lich from St. Bonaventure' s and Owen’s tradition is further demonstrated 
in passages like this, discussing the so-called ontological argument for 
the existence of God. For Tillich, the supreme value of this’ argument ’ 
(it is, for him, not an #argument*at all in the usual sense) is that it 
reveals that ” ... an awareness of the infinite is included in man’s
3QEKawareness of finitude...". Thus Tillich's thought is differentiated
again from the thought of Owen; there is no indication here of a divine 
image impressed into a substantial and unhistorical soul. ~
Here we make a point of considerable importance which we 
shall develop in detail in our chapter on the work of Kierkegaard. It 
is that any theology which develops from that of Kierkegaard (e.g., those 
of Barth, Bultmann, Buber), is simply bound to diverge sharply from a 
doctrine of immanence like that of St. Bonaventure or of Owen. The 
notion that there is in man's soul a divine image or impress which man
HSyst. Theol., I, p. 70.
anr
Syst. Theol., I, p. 72. Of. Essays, pps. 107-8, where Bultmann argues 
that man’s experience of finitude is a contact-point for the divine revel- 
sation, which we have described by saying that this experience represents 
an element in the divine immanence.
^^Syst. Theol., I, p. 228.
^^^But Tillich's thought here is far from being identical with that of 
Bultmann; we shall re-open Tillich's attitude to the ontological argu- 
:ment again when we compare him finally with Bultmann in the conclusions.
need only contultivel^ was fiercely attacked and repudiated by 
Kierkegaard® Thus Kierkegaard writes: "In order that he may have the 
power to give the condition the Teacher must be God; in order that he 
may be able to put the learner in possession of it he must be Man®
This contradiction is again the object of faith, and is the Paradox, 
the Moment. That God has once for all given man the requisite condit- 
:ion is the eternal Socratic presupposition, which comes into hostile 
collision with time, but is incommensurable with the temporal and its 
determinations". Thus, the Kierkegaardian revolt was in great
part a revolt against a much over-emphasised ’ classical’ doctrine of
the divine immanence in man. That Kierkegaard proceeded too far is at
3G£least arguable, But we mention this point here in order to show 
how theologies deeply indebted to the Kierkegaardian revolution share 
to a greater or less degree in this rejection of classical immanence®
While on this subject of immanence, there is one other 
thinker, seminal and highly influential, whose work we can scarcely 
ignore, Martin Buber. Although we shall deal with Buber’s views on 
the ’moment1 in our next chapter, he has certain passages with important
^Philosophical Fragments, p. 50.
^ ^ n  fact, we shall argue so in chapter IV. • In Kierkegaard’s view there
seems tojflittle room for any kind of immanence at all®
IkipliccLbiw
^ for the doctrine of immamence that we must deal with here®
One of the more important criticisms of the contuition-typ
of view of immanence, was that it was, t h o r o u g h l y  unhistorical, that it
did not take account of man as always man-in-the-world. Owen seems to
imply that contuition could be carried out in abstraction from history,
with a subject 'I' examining itself as object. With such a view, Bube
will have nothing to do. "Spirit is not the 'I', but between ’I* and
'Thou1. It is not like the blood that circulates in you, but like the
air in which you breathe. Man lives in the spirit, if he is able to
respond to his ’Thou’. He is able to, if he enters into relation with
his whole being. Only in virtue of his power to enter into relation
¥is he able to live in the spirit". “ This is tantamount to a complete
rejection of Owen's position® For what is the 'power to enter into
relation' if it is not one of the conditions of historical existence;
that is, existence in the world, in time, in history, in a context of
other Thous? And Buber's view that ’Spirit ... is like the air in
ike
which you breathe' surely means that divine is immanent in the totality 
of historical existence.
Another such rejection of the contuition-view can be cited:
*1 and Thoui 1st. edition, Edinburgh 1937 > p. 39*
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nIf a man does not represent the ’a priori' of relation in his living;
with the world, if he does not work out and realise the inborn 'Thou'
on what meets it, then it strikes inward. It develops on the unnatur-
:al, impossible object of the 'I1, that is, it develops where there is
no place at all for it to develop. Thus confrontation of what is over
against him takes jjlace within himself, and this cannot be relation, or
presence, or streaming interaction, but only self-contradiction. The 
man may seek to explain it as a relation, perhaps as a religious relat- 
sion, in order to wrench himself from the horror of the double inner-
ganger; but he is bound to discover again and again the deception of
the explanation. Here is the verge of life, flight of an unfulfilled 
life to the senseless semblance of fulfilment, and its groping in a
3£maze and losing itself ever more profoundly". It is hard not to 
conclude that when Huber writes 'confrontation of what is over against 
him takes place within himself, and this., (is a)., contradiction1, 
he has in mind something like St. Bonaventure' s contuition, ho thing 
could be clearer; for the self to seek for reality within itself, 
without historical meeting, is for Buber 'a groping in a maze'.
And finallyjLe may clinch the divergence of Buber from
any contuition-type view. Buber writes as follows : "His sense of
»Thou1, which cannot be satiated till he finds the endless 1Thou1, had 
*op. cit., pps. 69-70.
i  1*
_L w' • ^
the 'Thou* present to it from the beginning; the presence had only to 
:come real to him in the reality of the hallowed life of the world” 
That man’s sense of the Thou leads him to the Thou in historical meet 
is what we have been trying to argue throughout this chapter* And i 
realisation in the ’hallowed life of the world’ is the same thing, is 
it not, as fulfilment, and yet more than fulfilment, in the 'moments’ 
of an existence which is thoroughly historical ?
-----------.----0O0------------------
3Eop. cit., p. 80©
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Before we consider Buber1 s teaching on the ’moment', 
we might recapitulate a little on what has already been said. The 
'moment' as a concept is not uncommon in thinkers and writers of the 
existentialist tradition, and Bultmann's position we have already 
examined in detail in chapter I. Since the thinkers we are consider­
ing share a common biblical and existentialist background, we will not 
be surprised to hear again and again common chords striking through their 
teaching. In this third chapter we will be struck often by chords, 
themes, common to, for example, Buber and Bultmann.
The 'moment* is a brief span of time for which we 
must keep ourselves open and responsive. The possibility of its 
occurrence demands what Bultmann calls a dialectical relation to the 
world. Our spiritual culture should be directed towards this openness, 
this readiness. The 'moment' seems no sooner to have arrived, than 
it is gone. The 'moment' is one of awareness, of disclosure, of revelat- 
:ion, of self-knowledge, of encounter, of love. It is the 'moment' 
that dislocates our past from our future, and thus gives time and hist- 
:ory meaning and significanee. What comes to us in the 'moment' is 
not easily retained and possessed; the awareness it brings has enormous 
force and persuasion in the 'moment', quickly fading, and for this 
reason it is difficult to construct from it a philosophy, a Weltanschau- 
:ung, a system of ideas. We must learn the lesson that to come to the 
knowledge imparted by the 'moment', we must ourselves experience the
'moment1. The 'moment1 is the essence of and is implied by man's 
temporality and historicity, without which these concepts would be left 
empty and meaningless. Unless man's time is punctuated by 'moments', 
it cannot be truly said that he has a history.
It would be a mistake to assume that this concept occ-
:urs only in theology or philosophy wherever the word 'moment' is found.
There are a great many terms, and we shall encounter this especially in
Buber, which, when examined, mean much the same thing. For example,
we have seen in the work of -^ultmann that when we encounter the terms
'meeting', 'concrete event', 'encounter', that the 'moment* is but the
temporal aspect of these. The reality of the 'moment' is also implied
other
when certain writers use certain^phrases.
The 'moment' is the concrete temporal expression of 
the views that follow; that we only really know or understand what we 
have lived through; that a religion can only be believed by those who 
have in time committed their life to it; that truth only comes to those 
who, realizing their temporality and historicity in a radical sense, 
commit themselves to their history and their time, and realize truth 
only discontinuously in event or encounter.
Let us now turn to a brief examination of some of the 
terms used by Martin Buber which have special relevance for our subjest. 
First, we notice that often Buber uses the precise word 'moment'. Often 
too he uses 'moment of...', or 'moments of...'. Other terms that he 
uses are as follows s-
ta) The Present,
b)The Instant,
c)*From time t t  time...',
d)Presentness (of man),
e)Relational event in which something comes to us,
f)The opposite of 'duration1 (a negative term),
g)The presentness of the 'Thou',
h)The 'hour* in which...,
i)The decisive moment,
j)Incidents or situations lacking temporal duration,
k)The response to the Thou,
l)The present of man,
m)Present incident,
n)The 'here and now',
o)The opposite of continuity (a negative term), 
p)The opposite of an unbroken continuum (a negative term), 
q)The act of relation in time, 
r)Repeated acts of relation in time,
s)To 'realize something anew in the world each day...*, 
t)The continual penetration of human life with relational events, 
u)The original relational event (usually in reference to the history of 
people or group), 
v)The continual renewing of relational event, 
w)The meeting,
x)The times when the world of 'It' can be left for the world of relation, 
y)»From time to time at every parting of ways',
(z)The delicate appearance of the 'Thou' in the world of 'It',
(A)'*Isolated moments of relation in which we enter the unbroken world 
of 'Thou"1,
(B)The moment of supreme meeting,
(C)Repeated decision,
(D)The encounter.
We may make these few comments on Buber's terminology*
Terms like 'moment', 'Instant1, and so-on require no comments* But of
his other terms we can say this* We note from them that Buber is
concerned with man's time and how he lives it* He is concerned with
the fact that in man's time he is encountered by something new which in-
svites him into relation with itself* In man's time Buber is clear
that there is lacking 'duration' or ' continuity';man's time is for him
' fragmentary’. This is a negative way of saying that time is
'punctuated' by moments, by hours, by presents* To these supremely
valuable and significant points in time man ought not to prefer duration
or continuity* To long for continuity is one of man's most dangerous
temptations. We note also Buber's use of 'penetration'. He reminds us
that man's time and man's everyday world is penetrated again and again
by something new. On the other hand, he can also say that again and
again man can enter into another reality again and again, but not
continuously. This represents a two-way movement in which something
moves towards man and man, in response, moves towards something; the
i\v bme
Coincidence of these two^constitutes the occurrence of the 'moment'. We 
note also Buber's fdndness for the terms 'renewal' and 'anew*. Thus he 
again emphasises the discontinuity of man's time; man's experience, his
moment, do not bring him the kind of knowledge he can possess once and 
for all, except the knowledge of his existential obligation to renew. 
Finally, we note Buber’s fondness for the terms ’present',1 presentness1, 
and 'presence*. Buber calls upon men to exploit their presentness, to 
realize that they must achieve their genuine life in the given 'now*. 
With these rather bald comments on Buber's terminology, we must now turn 
to a detailed consideration of Buber's teaching on the 'moment'. We 
shall do so just as we did in the case of Bultmann, by arranging our 
material for discussion under several headings. hot only has this the 
advantage of orderliness; it enables us to see how the headings we used 
in Bultmann* s case in chapter I approximate sometimes to those we use 
for Buber, and thus makes comparisons easier to follow* The main 
sections in Buber's treatment of the concept 'moment' are these that 
follow*
: . .
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(l) THE REALITY OF THE PRESENT 1 MOMENT1 .
The ' moment1 is a real filled, present, character­
ised by meeting,relation. The present in Buber is really adjectival, 
for what constitutes the ‘moment1 is the present 'Thou1. If the 'Thou' 
were not present, there would be no ‘moment1. In the absence of the 
'Thou' there is only the past.*
The appearance of the 'Thou' is uncertain, unexpect- 
:ed, uncontrollable. Man is unable to construct a sequence which is
continuous, in which arrangements could be made*?or the appearance of the
*See I and Thou, Transl. R. Gregor Smith, Edinburgh 1937 > p. 12. Cf. 
Buber's paper, Elements of the Inter-human, transl. R. Gregor Smith, priv- 
:ate typescripts- Here we find the closest possible linking together of 
the 'moment', the 'present'(of time), 'present'(Adjectival), and 'pres- 
sence1. "This awareness..(of the other)..is only possible when I step 
into an elemental relation with the other, that is when he becomes a pres­
ence to me. So I describe awareness in this special sense as 'personal' 
making present", p. 13* "For the proper content of the inter-human it 
is necessaiy, as we have shown.......that each one means and makes present
the other in his personal being", p. 19. "In genuine conversation the 
tu-ming. of the partner takes place in all truth, that is, it is a turning 
of the being. Every speaker means the partner or partners to whom he 
turns as this particular existence. To 'mean'someone in this connection 
is at the same time to exercise that degree of 'making present' which is 
possible to the speaker at that moment. The experiencing sense and the 
real fantasy which completes the findings of the senses work together to 
make the other present as a whole and as^unique being, as the person that 
he is. But the speaker does not merely perceive the one who is present to 
him in this way, he receives him as his partner; that means that he con- 
:firms so far as it is for him to confirm, this other being. The true 
turning of his life to the other includes this confirmation, this accept- 
:ance. Of course, such a confirmation does not mean approval; but in no
matter in what I an against the other  ...... I have affirmed him as a
person", pps. 20-21.
**As arrangements are made for, say, a scientific experiment.
'Thou* and thus for the occurrence of the ’moment1.* Nor has man con- 
strol over the duration of the 'moment*. "The moment", says Buber,
"is lived in a 'duration' whose purely intensive dimension is definable
3QEonly in terms of itself". For the 'moment* to occur there must be
an 'I' ready for mutual action with the 'Thou', and thus the 'moment' 
requires openness, readiness, co-operation*
Buber says that there are 'moments' when the world-order 
is transitorijjfly revealed to men, but hastens to point out that what
3E3£3€is revealed here is not 'the ordered world’. The 'ordered world', 
obviously, is that controlled, used, and co-ordinated world arranged by 
man's science and technology. But this is not the world-order.
Moments of revelation radiate beams which stream into the ordered world, 
and dissolve it again.*** I think that Buber means that in such 'mora- 
sents' there is revealed the underlying reality, which lies beyond and
Cf* " ... the deity is always present but in every hour in the appear-
sance that pleases him, that is to say, he does not allow himself to be
limited to any form of revelation, and he does not allow himself to be
limited to any form of revelation, and he does not limit himself to any
of them;   he bestows his grace and mercy on whom he will, and
lets no one oJ.er a criterion for him nor himself orders any", Martin 
Buber, in The Prophetic Faith, chapter V, (New York, 1949)> pps. 43-59? 
quoted in The Writings of Martin Buber, edit* W. Herberg, (New York 
1956), p. 165. Cf. "With his words 'I shall be present howsoever I 
shall be present', he describes himself as the one who is not restricted 
to any specific manner of manifestation, but permits himself to be seen 
from time to time by those he leads and, in order to lead them, to be 
seen by them after the fashion which he prefers at the given moment", 
Martin Buber, Moses, Oxford 1946, pps. 119-140;quoted in Herberg, op. 
cit., p. 188.
**I and Thou, pps. 30-33*
***! and Thou,p. 31•
beneath the forms and orders of man and his industry. The 'moment's1 
revelation is given, not constructed. What is given in the 'moment' 
is primeval jit is also universal.
Such 'moments', says Buber, are immortal, the most transit- 
sory of all, and no content can be secured from them.* Rather than 
furnish knowledge from which a Weltanschaung could be constructed, the 
'moment' supplies power. (We think here of Tillich's view that revelatory 
experience is ecstatic-miraculous-shaking). This power, says Buber,
3QE"invades creation and the knowledge of man". We must make here one 
important preliminaiy observation; Buber's use of terms like 'dissolves', 
'invades' makes us suspect a hint of antipathy, of opposition, between 
that world ordered by man's ingenuity on the one hand, and the power and 
insight of the 'moment' on the other. Our further examination of Buber 
will confirm this suspicion; so that here we have another similarity 
between Buber's thought and Bultmann's. Bultmann, as we have seen, is 
always clear that what comes through the 'moment' finds stiff opposition 
waiting for it in the tightly organized, institutionalizedjMafl# 
life of man, whether on the social -political level, or in the cares,
plans, wishes, work, of the personal everyday level.
*0p. cit., p. 31* Cf. Bultmann and Kierkegaard; for Bultmann too the 
'moment' is eternal, in it man is lifted out of history;no possessable 
content is securable from Its for Kierkegaard, as we shall see, the 
Moment is eternal, filled with eternity; for him also, the Moment does 
not give possessable knowledge.
yy . , 7*iop. cit., p.
***It is this that necessitates the inner aloofness of the dialectical 
relationship to the world.
i . i
Buber centres the reality disclosed in the ‘moment1 with 
the world ordered by man and his ingenuity. Each ’moment', each meet­
ing, is not completely isolated; each has something in common. Each 
is a sign-post which points to the underlying world-order.K Or, each
"meeting assures you of your solidarity with the world”. Men, in 
their 'moments', dip into one reality which is universal. This world- 
order disclosed in the 'moment' is to be contrasted with the world in 
which we live every day and make our living for one thing it is
3£unreliable. This means that it'takes on a continually new appearance'. 
What is probably behind the thought of Buber here is that in this world 
scientific laws describe the invariable reaction of things;they are 
thus not merely descriptions but 'prophecies'. They claim to be univ- 
sersals. In contrast to this, the world that appears to man in the 
'moment' "cannot be held to its word". It is, speaking scientifically, 
unreliable. We are reminded here of Bultmann's views that the 'moment' 
is enigmatic, mysterious, risky.
. Another contrast with the world of everyday life and 
science that Buber makes is that the revelation of the world-order in 
the 'moment' has no duration. "It comes", says Buber, "even when it
op. cit., p. 32.
is not summoned", and "vanishes even when it is tightly held".* We 
may contrast this with the world which we arrange for examination or 
experiment —  a typically subject/object relationship. But there 
is no possibility of 'arranging* or experimenting with the world-order 
glimpsed in the transitoiy, fleeting 'moment*. It is given, suddenly,
inexplicably, and vanishes again just as mysteriously it is outwith
man's objective observation and control. It "vanishes even when it 
is tightly held". We note again the impossibility of possessing its 
content for the future, of appropriating its content as raw material 
for a Weltanschauung. It is when we try to retain it and hold it, tkcct 
it slips through our fingers and is gone. How like Bultmann*s view 
this is. Buber describes his position thuss " ... It is your present;
3Q Eonly while you have it do you have the present". These words, we
must admit, might have been written by Bultmann. Another sharp con-
:trast with our ordered, technological world is supplied by Buber
when he states that the present 'moment' " ... does not help to sus-
sx
stain you in life, it only helps you to glimpse eternity". In 
other words, the 'moment* supplies ZOE rather than BIOS. Buber doubt- 
slessly has in mind here how applied science, technology, medicine, 
sustain our life here in this world; that is their primary value.
op. ext., p. 32.
^op. cit., p. 33*
The 'moment', in contrast, helps us to glimpse eternity; it gives 
meaning to our human existence; as Bultmann says, the value of faith 
is that in it the believer is lifted above time and history#* Thus 
the insights of the 'moment' are to set over against the advantages of 
science and its applications, greater speed and convenience of travel, 
greater freedom from bodily ailments, the prolongation of our days, and 
more efficient industrial methods*
The ordinary, eveiy_day world in which we live and 
work, the world in which find means to achieve our ends, is for Buber 
the world of 'It'. Buber admits that such a world is pleasant to
XXXbehold, exciting, absorbing* In comparison with this secure and
comfortable world, what can the 'moment' offer ? These temporal epi­
sodes, 'the moments of the Thou', are lyric, dramatic, seductive,
*Histoiy and Eschatology, p. 153*
X X In Elements of the Inter-human, pps. 23 f•, Buber describes an inter­
esting application of this# In 1914 he attended a conference held to 
discuss means of avoiding the approaching war. In this conference, 
truth was apparent in the personal, I-Thou relationships that were es­
tablished; 'existential' progress was made. Yet, from the point of 
view of arranging the world better, of selecting practical, concrete 
ends and means, the conference was a failure. Indeed, it had to be 
stopped because of the rapid approach of hostilities. Buber writes 
(p. 23), "In respect of its purpose the meeting must be described as a 
failure (even though now in ray heart it is still not a certainty that 
it had to be a failure)#....". Also, on p. 24, "Nevertheless, in the 
event, not one of the participants doubted that he had shared in a triu- 
smph of the intcr-human". This is an excellent illustration of Buber's 
distinction between existential and practical knowledge.
***! and Thou, p. 33«
X
magical* They have grave disadvantages for us who ordinari/ly live 
in the attractive world of 'It*. First, they"tear us away to danger-
XXsous extremes". They make us aware of dangerous demands, demands
never contemplated in the world of ’It*. They "loosen the well-tried 
context". They raise questions that cast doubt on the solid and safe 
foundations . of the It-world. They question its security and comfort. 
This can hardly be a welcome experience, because the great satisfact­
ion of the world of 'It' is just that it is made up of answered quest­
ions, of resolved problems; its record is, says Buber, a "chronicle of 
solid benefits". In contrasty the ’moment1 shakes our It-security
by raising questions which it does not answer. It leaves us with a 
sense of unresolved mystery; thus Buber describes the*moments'of the
XXX’Thou1 as uncanny. Can we therefore be blamed for dispensing with
the ’moments' of the 'Thou' ? They are transitory;we must soon depart
from them back into our world of 'It'. Why then, it may be asked,
leave this world in the first place ? Speaking of the 'moment’s'
content, Buber asks* "Why not call to order what is over against us,
xxxxand send it packing into the realm of objects ?" How like Bultmann
this ist In other words, why not co-ordinate the disclosure of the
*op. cit., p. 34*
**See op. cit., p. 34*
■“ op. cit., p. 34; cf. for Bultmann the 'moment' is enigmatic *
3QQG€ .. ^ -z,op. cit., p. 34*
'moment' into an objectification, into a generalization, into a 
Weltanschauung which can be transmitted to all and sundry as an object, 
concAe and limited, regardless of existential participation ? Yes, 
but " ... he who lives with 'It' alone is not a man".* So to live is 
comfortable and secure. "We need only to fill each moment with 
experiencing and using and it ceases to bum".* Obvious comparisons 
here are two. First, how similar this is to Bultmann's conviction that 
action, work, and the Weltanschauung, can be sworn enemies of the 
disclosure of the 'moment'. Second, there is an obvious similarity 
between Buber's thought here and the 'flight from historicita^ -' we dis- 
:cussed in chapter I with reference to the work of Bultmann, Heidegger, 
and Kierkegaard.
The 'moment' does not vanish utterly when return to 
the It-world is made. If it did, it would be worthless. It can be 
recorded. It can be written down and transmitted, from nan to man 
and from generation to generation within a people or a religious commun- 
:ity. It can enter the general structure of knowledge. But, insists
XXBuber, "... only as 'It* can it enter the structure of knowledge".
The incident, the 'moment', the encounter, is now " ... included in the
op. cit., p. 34*
**op. cit., p. 40.
■fl
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'It1 of knowledge which is composed of ideas".* At this point a tragic 
possibility emerges. "....That which has become 'It' is left as 'It*, 
experienced and used as 'It', appropriated for the undertaking ’to find 
one's bearings' in the world, and then to 'conquer' it".* This would 
indeed be a tragedy. The 'moment' would become an object, a thing, 
utilized in a world of things. But there is another possibility.
That is for a man to free the 'moment', the past encounter, from the 
'It' of knowledge, from the Weltanschauungen, from the system. In 
what way ? By looking on it again in the present moment, and fulfill-
XX:ing the nature of the act of knowledge to be real and effective 
between men. The objectified 'moment' "... has had the nature and
XXXdisposition put into it to change back again and again". The
objectified 'moment' " ... must blaze up into presentness and enter
the elemental state from which it came, to be looked on and lived in
xxxxthe present by man".
Buber obviously means by this that in some sense an inter- 
ipreter of the past (i.e. history) must try to re-live (Ger. Nacherleb- 
sen, W. Dilthey) recorded moments. He must try to make it come to
*op. cit., p. 41; we note here that Bultmann lie Id that the 'idea' was 
an enemy of authentic revelation.
**op. cit., p. 41;although Buber uses the term 'act of knowledge', we 
must be most careful not to misinterpret him;he does not mean the impart-
:ing of knowledge, items of information, concepts, in the ordinary
sense. He obviously means, from the context, the disclosure of being in
dn interpersonal sense. He uses 'act of knowledge' analogically•
***op. cit., p. 40.
X30OE . , ^ Anop* cit., p» 4-^ •
life again in his present. He must try to regard it with the same 
feelings, the same thoughts, from the same standpoint, as the person 
who originally experienced it and recorded it, thus sending it into 
the world of It-knowledge. It is to re-experience in the present a 
past encounter through the medium of a recorded 'moment* • The end 
of all this, as Buber points out, is a disclosure or communication 
between men, between persons.
'From man to main1, 'between men' — —  these words are 
important. The interpr^,tion of past histoiy as the making present 
of a past 'moment' so that interpersonal communication or disclosure 
takes place in a personal present, is one of the strongest links bet- 
sween Buber and his existentialist and biblical background.
First, we refer to the views set forth in chapter I
on Bultmann's position that Holy Scripture becomes in the 'moment*
rather than is the Word of God. Thus in reading the Scriptures,
understanding only comes if God acts in them. We have stated that
if revelation only comes in the concrete 'moment' and is recorded
thus by the biblical writer, it follows that his meaning can only be
grasped in the same kind of 'moment'. Thus the interpreter of the
Bible must bring to his task his present (complete with problems,
tasks, questions) so that it may inter-act with the recorded 'moment'
of the original writer, for the same kind of 'moment' to recur. Thus
piefWH&icn Jfar the
biblical hermeneutics is essentially the^recurrence of 'moments’.
Thus the 'word of God' in Scripture is not a substance, but an event.
Bultmann holds of course that the validity of Christian faith depends 
on the validity of such a theory. For him, the Scriptures would 
he meaningless and valueless unless in some sense they could interact 
with our present. They would be irrelevant for him unless we were 
able to experience in our present what Isaiah, Jeremiah, Peter, 
Zacchaeus, and Paul, all experienced, recorded for us in biblical 
'moments*. To use Buber's terminology, these past 'moments', embedd- 
sed in the It-world, must become for us now 'Thous'. Th,ey must 
blaze up again and assume presentness for us. Thus for Bultmann 
the Christ-event is EPHAPAX, unique, through its repeatableness; 
because it 'has had the disposition put into it to change back again 
and again' (Buber) and become for us present encounter. It is this 
kind of conviction tjhat lies behind Bultmann's rather scandalous ass­
ertion that " ... Christus, der Gekreuzigte und Auferstandene, 
begegnet uns im Wort der Verktlndigung, nirgend anders. Eben der 
Glaube an dieses Wort ist in Wahrheit der Osterglaube". Thus Bultmann 
also writess "In the preaching of the Christian Church the eschatolog- 
:ical event will ever again become present and does become present 
ever and again in faith".
^Bultmann, Neues Testament und Hvthologie, in Kerygma und Mythos, I, 
(Hamburg 1951)» P* 46• "
3g£History and Eschatology. p. 151.
We have already noted the work of R.G. Collingwood. We 
noted how Bultmann approves the general similarity between Collingwood1 s 
views and his own. "The historian's knowledge.. says Collingwood,
" ... is knowledgeoof the past in the present, the self-knowledge of 
the historian's own mind as the present revival and re-living of past 
experiences".X " ... When the events which the historian studies are 
events that happened in the distant past, the condition of their being
OA
histirically known is that they should 'vibrate in the historian's
t
mind', that is to say, that the evidence for them should be here and
3BEnow before him and intelligible to him". " ... The historian's 
thought must spring from the organic unity of his total experience, and 
be a function of his entire personality with its practical as well as 
its theoretical interests". Similarities are obvious between
Collingwood*s use of 're-live', the 'present', 'here and now', 'total 
experience*, 'practical interests* on the one hand, and Buber's 
conviction that historical interpretation is only possible when an 
interpresonal disclosure takes place^when a man out of his total 
existential present looks at a past recorded 'moment' in his own pres- 
:ent. Thus in proper historical inetpretation, what takes place is
^The Idea of History, p. 175*
**op. cit., p. 202.
^ o p .  cit., p. 505*
not the impartation of ideas, concepts, propositions; rather it is 
men who speak to and inform and enquire of and question other men, no 
matter: how great the stretch of time that seperates them. They can 
speak from their situations to ours because the human situation is 
always the same, essentially. Anything that falls below the level of 
this is hardly the authentic, genuine interpretation of history; for 
Buber it would fall into the I-It relation.
That there is an amazing similarity between Buber’s views 
on the interpretation of history and the existentialist interpretation 
(Dilthey, Bultmann, Collingwood) is beyond all doubt; we might say that 
Buber accepts the existentialist view of history. And if we make the 
important enquiry as to the source of this ’existentialist1 doctrine in 
Buber — —  the answer is not difficult to find. The main influence on 
Buber’s views on hermeneutics has undoubtedly been the Hebrew Bible, 
with its notion of the radical historicity of revelation and disclos- 
sure. Thus Buber derives his hermeneutics from the history of Israel 
when he writes: "If history is a dialogue between Deity and mankind, 
we can understand its meaning only when we are the ones addressed, and 
only to the degree to which we render ourselves receptive .... The meari- 
:ing of histoiy is not an idea which I can formulate independent of 
my personal life. It is only with my personal life that I am able to
3Ecatch the meaning of history, for it is a dialogical meaning”.
*Buber, Israel and the World;Essays in a time of Crisis. (New York 
1948), pps. 81-82; printed in Herberg, op. cit., p. 34.
Thus the Bible addresses me in so far as I bring my present existence 
to the encounter it represents between God and Israel. For Buber, 
there is no possibility of history being factuality 'wie es eigentlich 
gewesen1 t "There can be no certainty of arriving ....... at 'what
really happened'. However, even if it is impossible to reconstitute 
the course of events themselves, it is nevertheless possible to recov- 
ser much of the manner in which the participating people experienced
3€those events". Thus true historical interpretation involves encount 
:er with a participating people in the present. Again Buber rejects 
the 'wie es eigentlich gewesen conception' when writing of biblical 
leadership: " ... I do not mean that the Bible depicts men and women 
and events as they were in actual history; rather do I mean that its 
descriptions and narratives are the organic, legitimate ways of giving
3Q£an account of what existed and what happened". What Buber calls
the 'saga element* in the Old Testament history is important for him, 
because we find in it "the reception of what befell in the minds of 
those whom it befell".30636 Thus interpretation of this history implies 
're-thinking' and re-experiencing. In the Passover celebration, God's 
providence and leading become present encounter for the participating
*Moses, (Oxford 1946), pp. 15-19» which are printed in Herberg, op. cit 
149-156; see p. 152.
^^Israel and the World, pps. 119-133> printed in Herberg, op. cit., pps 
218-30; see p. 218.
3QEHMoses, pps. 13-19* as in Herberg, op. cit., p. 155*
congregation: "In the night of the Passover, 'the assembled company 
is fused together in every year and in all the world with the first 
cult confederates and attains that unity, which existed formerly at 
the first occasion in Egypt'. As they who keep the covenant in life 
know that it is the covenant which ’YHVH our God made with us in 
Horeb*, 'not with our fathers', but 'with our very selves here this day, 
all of us being alive' (Deut. 5*2 f.), so telling the story of God's
3€leading, they experience his historic deed as occurring to themselves". 
Similarly, the decalogue can only be rightly understood when it too 
becomes present reality and addresses a person in his present: "At all 
times , in any case, only those persons who really grasped the decalog*- 
:ue, who literally felt it as having been addressed to themselves, only 
those, that is, who experienced that first one's state of being address­
e d  as though they themselves were being addressed. Thanks to its
XX
'thou', the decalogue means the preservation of the divine voice".
The significance of the tablets of the law in Judaism Buber describes
thus: "And the tables remain as 'tables of testimony' or 'tables of mak-
♦ njfr fl-reaon-ht (Ex. 32:15), whose function it is to make present unto
the generation of Israel forever what had once become word, that is, to
^he Prophetic Faith, (New York 1949)* chapter V, 'Holy Event', pps. 
43-59, printed in Herberg, op. cit., pps. 157-171; see p. 164. Buber 
quotes here from Hempel, Das Ethos des Alten Testaments. (1958)* P* 43 •
Closes, the chapter 'The Words on the Tablets', pps. 119-140, printed 
in Herberg, op. cit., pps. 181-202, see p. 192 f.
JL «_* ~j
set it before them as something spoken to them in this very hour11*3* 
Buber holds that the justification of the so-called rebellion of 'Korah 
and his band1 (Numb. 16) is that " ... in the world of the law what has 
been inspired always becomes emptied of the spiritf^yet continues to 
maintain its claim of full inspiration; in other words, that the living 
element always dies off, yet what is left continues to rale over living 
men. And the TRUE conclusion is that the law must again and again 
immerse itself in the consuming and purifying fire of the spirit, 
in order to renew itself and again refine the genuine substance out of 
the dross of what has become false. This lies in the continuation of 
the line of that Mosaic principle of ever-re current *** renewal" #3GOOG£ 
And it would be difficult to imagine a better paraphrase of the 
Dilthy-Bultmann-Collingwood type of hermeneutics than this s "The proph- 
:et fails in one hour in history, but not so far as the future of his 
people is concerned. For his people preserves his message as something 
that will be realized at another hour, under other conditions, and in 
other foms. The prophet's spirit does not, like Plato's, believe that 
he possesses an abstract and general, a timeless concept of truth. He 
always receives only one message for one situation. That is exactly
^Moses, pps. 119-140>Herberg, op. cit., p.202.
^i.e. as Buber says in I and Thou the law has become an It.
^^or we might say in 'moment' after 'moment*.
S3S£SCf. I and Thou,p. 40, where the recorded 'moment' must "....blaze 
up into presentness".
— ■kssa, chapter 'The Contradiction', pps. 182-190 = Hdberg,pps.203- 
217; see p. 215*
why after thousands of years, his words still address the changing 
situations in history".* We have already discussed in full Bultmann's 
important conviction that Holy Scripture is the Word of God only in so 
far as this Word happens in our encounter with the Scripture; that is, 
for Bultmann, the V/ord of God is not a substance or an entity, but an 
event. The Word is likewise for Buber an event. "Judaism regards 
speech as an event which grasps beyond the existence of mankind and the 
world. In contradiction to the static idea of Logos, the Word appears 
here in its complete dynamic as 'that which happens1. God's act of 
creation is speech, but the same is true of each lived moment. The 
world is given to the human beings who perceive it, and the life of man 
is itself a giving and a receiving. The events that occur to human 
beings are the great and small, untranslatable but unmistakable signs 
of their being addressed; what they do and fail to do can be an answer 
or a failure to answer. Thus the whole history of the world, the 
hidden, real world histoiy, is a dialogue between God and his creature, 
a dialogue in which man is a true, legitimate partner, who is entitled
3EX
and empowered to speak his own independent word out of his own being". 
Not only does God's providential leading of the Israelites in the
^Israel and the WorldsEssays in a Time of Crisis, chapter 'Plato and 
Isaiah', pps. 103-112 = Herberg, pps. 231-238;see p. 237 f*
^Israel and the World, chapter 'The Faith of Judaism', pps. 13-27 - 
Herberg, pps. 253-265; see p. 255*
Exodus become present event, but so does, for example, the Fall:
"The Fall did not happen once and for all* and become an inevitable 
fate, but it continually happens here and now in all its reality„ In 
spite of all past history, in spite of all his inheritance, every man 
stands in the naked situation of Adam: to each, the decision is given.
It is true that this does not imply that further events are deducible 
from that decision; it only implies that the human'being* s choice is
MX.that side of reality which concerns him as one called upon to act".
Thus it should be obvious that Buber accepts the so-called existentialist 
view of the interpretation of history. It seems to me of great import- 
:ance that he seems to do so because of the influence of the Hebrew 
Bible# This Bible, as Buber demonstrates, holds to the radical 
historicity of revelation, and thus his view of knowledge and disclos­
ure flowSfrom that, and not from some philosophy alien to or 
unsympathetic to the biblical tradition. It is not without import- 
iance that Bultmann's view here approximates to Buber's; because we 
shall try to show in the concluding chapter that the main influence on 
Bultmann's view of historicity and temporality need not be the ontol- 
:ogy of Heidegger as in Sein und Zeit, but rather the 'momentary', 
'concrete', radically historical view that the Bible takes of revelat­
ory processes. To this we shall return in our conclusions.
*It is not without interest and significance that this is in Hellenist­
i c  Greek EPHAPAX.
**'The Faith of Judaism', Herberg, p. 256.
1Buber makes his 'moment* highly personal# Because of this, 
there are two entities which must be ’momentless* They are the 
'I* of mere feelings, and the institution# Buber’s meaning here is 
probably that the 'I* of feelings does not enter into what is over 
against it with the whole of personality, but regards the world of what 
is over against it as made up merely of objects for its feeling or exper­
ience# Such an 'I* is not interested in whole persons qua persons, 
nor the mutuality of the I-Thou life#* Such an *1* shrinks from imm-
sersion in what is over agjnst it; it is not aware of the potential
r--
'Thou-ness' of what is over against it, that what is over against it
3£3Ecan become a 'Thou1# The trouble with institutions is that they
are not interested in whole persons either# For them the person becomes 
3QG£a 'specimen*• Another criticism directed by Buber against the
institution is that its knowledge is limited to the 'lifeless past that 
is over and done with'. Lifeless, because an institution is incapable 
of re-living a 'moment'; it cannot enter creatively into the past of 
a person and make it come alive again in the present moment through an 
identity of thought and imagination. Neither the *1* of mere feelings
XI and Thou,p« 40.
^^For Bultmann too, as we have seen in chapter I, love is not an 'innate' 
feeling, but the total concrete response to a whole person in a situat­
ion# As we shall see, Buber's and Bultmann's views on love are almost 
identical#
***0p. cit., p. 44» We who live in the context of 'State Medicine* highly 
dependent upon institutional care and treatment have little difficulty 
in understanding Buber's meaning here# We hear 'ad nauseam' the imper- 
ssonality of the medical institution being contrasted with the informed, 
intimate, persopi-to-person relationship of the family doctor who was 
eveiything but an 'official'#
***3Ve need hardly say that in chapter I we pointed out that Bultmann 
holds that the institution can become a sworn enemy of the 'moment'.
nor the institution can know the real, filled present, which constitut­
es the 'moment'.*
The 'moment* is characterized by the fact that in it I lay
hold of 'the deed which aims at me*. First, here we have the thought
of the transcendent. Into the 'moment* there comes something from out-
*side of the human situation, which must be grasped, as Buber says,
'with both hands plunged deep in the fire'; it is a question of now
or never. The moment is the now. If grasped, what I achieve there- 
XXsby is being* In both Kierkegaard and Bultmann, the significance of 
the 'moment' is that it makes all the difference between being and non- 
being, it is decisive for eternity. Second, here we have the notion of 
concreteness, a strong element in the existentialist tradition. In
I XX XXthe 'moment', the'charge ialaid upon me'. Or, says Buber , what
concerns me in the 'moment' is*the single deed'. A most interesting
Xop. cit., p. 44* Cf* Bultmann's essay The Significance of the Idea of 
Freedom for Western Civilization. Essays, p. 317* " we have to con­
sider how the organization which is carried out, and which can affect 
the welfare of the individual, actually impoverishes the life of the 
individual and similarly of society". " ... Where the principle holds 
good that *1 want nothing as a gift but only as my share, where every­
thing that is necessary can be legally claimed by the individual, the 
joy of giving and the virtue of gratitude lose the soil on which they 
are nourished. Where mutual relationship is regulated through organiz­
ation, trust ceases to be the bond between man and man". "The more org* 
:animation is developed, the more is the relationship to the other man 
reduced to an impersonal level, that is, dehumanized", p. 318• These 
statements could of course he duplicated many times over from the writ­
ings of other existentialists.
**1 and Thou,p. 52.
illustration of what Buber means here has been given by Ronald Gregor
Smith. Gregor Smith writes: "How often do you hear the claim made..
that it was Christianity which was responsible for the abolition of
the slave trade inside the British Empire; whereas the truth of the
matter is so complicated that the only possible generalization seems to
me to be that when a particular historical action is accomplished, the
time for it was ripe and it happened. This does not mean that I
reduce history to the level of nature, as that in autumn the plums fall
from the tree, but it does mean that historical^is an almost unravellabl
web of many different strands". This is undoubtedly true. Thus
Wilberforce had a hand in the slave-trade abolition partly because he
stood at a cross-roads in history where such abolition, through his
decision and work, was at least an historical possibility. His pecul-
:iar and unique position in the historical process was a part of the
givenness of history. In a sense, the deed aimed itself at Wilberforce
the charge was laid upon him, because he was there, just where, if we
may put it so, the hard skin over economic history had worn thin*
To use Bultmann's language, there was given to Wilberforce the possibil
:ity of decision in a 'moment' which would dislocate the causal connect-
*A Theological Perspective of the Secular, in 'The Christian Scholar', 
Vol. XLIII, March i960 (Spring), p. 21.
connection between past and future*
Thus we have Buber’s emphasis on concreteness* In 
opposition to concreteness we find Buber citing 'the centreless Many’, 
’the abyss’, both of which share in an 'irideseent' sameness** Of the 
man who concentrates on the single deed, who responds to the unique 
charge laid upon him, Buber says that he ’makes decision'.* In this 
decision there is the beginning of realization. But this decision is 
not for the one and the utter rejection of the many, the alternatives; 
rather the desire for that rejected by the decision must be gathered and 
canalised, 'sublimated* towards that which is chosen out, the one, the
MXsingle. Only this is worthy of the name of decision. Buber defines 
a devil not as one who decided against God, but as one, who, in eternity,
Xcame to no decision at all! This is a most important element in the
thought of Buber --  that evil for him is almost identical with
indecision. "The anthropological retrospective view of the person.....
.....announces to us as evil all these and other indecisions, all the
moments in which we did no more than leave undone that which we knew to
be good. But is evil then not, by its nature, an action ? Not at all;
action is only the type of evil happening which makes evil manifest. But
*1 and Thou, p. 52.
**It is hardly necessary to point out that 'decision' is another great 
emphasis shared by Buber and Bultmann, and by other existentialist think-
does not evil action stem precisely from decision to evil ? The ultim­
ate meaning of our exposition is that it too stems precisely from 
indecision, providing that by decision we understand, not a partial, a 
pseudo decision, but that of the whole soul."* In the same vein Buber 
writes: "Evil is lack of direction, and that which is done in it and 
out of it is the grasping, seizing, devouring, compelling, seducing, 
exploiting, humiliating, torturing, and destroying, of what offers 
itself* Good is direction, and what is done in it; that which is done 
in it is done with the whole soul, so that in fact all the vigor and 
passion with which evil might have been done is included in it". 
Indecision in existence takes upon itself a certain solidarity: "We have 
seen how man repeatedly experiences the dimension of evil as indecision. 
The occurrences in which he experiences it however, do not remain in his 
self-knowledge a series of isolated moments of non-decision, of becoming 
possessed by the play of the phantasy with potentialities, of plunging 
in this possession with that which offers itself; in self-knowledge, 
these moments merge into a course of indecision, as it were into a fixat­
ion in it".*** Buber shows that he is aware that decision to be valid 
must be in the right direction; that it is not enough to equate goodness 
with decision. "Therefore Moses was zealous; he was zealous for his
*Good and Evil:Two Interpretations, (New York 1953)> chapters III and 
XV, pps. 125-138 = Herberg, op. cit., pps. 89-96. See p. 91.
**op. cit., Herberg, p. 92.
***op. cit., Herberg, p. 93. A simple equation of evil and indecision 
is a doctrine which would hardly gain wide acceptance, for, of course, 
positive evil can be chosen and done. There is more to evil than indec- 
jision. But Buber is surely right when he states that indecision is 
a dimension of evil. This an important existentialist insight.
God as the one who sets a goal, and shows a path, and writes a guide to 
that path on tablets, and orders men to chose again and again,* to
choose that which is right........... tt^3®  g?]mg by his use of terms
like 'God', 'goal1, 'path1,'guide1, and so-on, Buber distinguishes him-
Vf
:self from 'secular* existentialists, and so guards himself decisively 
against the charge of sheer relativism, one of the charges so often 
brought against existentialism. For Buber there is an ethico-relig- 
:ious norm given through history. In our concluding chapter we shall
take up and discuss an extremely important point. This is that biblic- 
ial revelation, basing itself upon particular events, logically 
implies the doctrine of particularity, and thus the'moment'of time 
without which no revelation can take place. Buber certainly recogniz­
es this particularity, and sees the offence that it implies. Thus he 
writes: "Man of today resists the Scriptures because he cannot endure
X3E3Erevelation. To endure revelation is to endure this moment of possible 
decisions, to respond to and be responsible for every moment. Man of 
today resists the Scriptures because he does not want any longer to 
accept responsibility. He thinks he is venturing a great deal, yet he 
industriously evades**** the one real venture, that of responsibility??* 
To this doctrine of the offence of particular, 'momentary* revelation
*i.e. in moment after moment.
**Moses, pps. 182-190 = Herberg, pps.209-217> see p. 217.
***i.e. is offended.
****the flight from historicity.
*****Israel and the World:Essays in a Time of Crisis, pps. 89-102 = 
Herberg, pps. 238-250, see p. 244°
we shall return in our conclusions.
The man who has passed through the 'moment’ which confers 
on the him the possibility of becoming, has thereby not dispensed 
with it. To the contrary, the 'moment' means for him one thing, 
repetition in the future. The 'moment' means his decision to achieve 
his destiny again and again in the future. The decision to become 
through encounter with 'Thou-ness', originally made in the 'moment1, 
must be re-made, as Buber says, 'from time to time, at every parting
Xof ways'. There is no disclosure or revelation made once and for 
all which does not require to be renewed. "The fundamental attitude 
of the Jews is characterized by the idea of the YIHUD, the 'unificat- 
sion', a word which has been repeatedly misunderstood. YIHUD involves 
the continually renewed confirmation of the unity of the divine in the 
manifold nature of its manifestations, understood in a quite practical
XXway. Again and again, this recognition, acknowledgement, and 
reacknowledgement of the divine unity is brought about through human per­
ception and confirmation (Bewaehrung) in the face of the nitrous con­
tradictions of life, and especially in the face of that primal contra- 
sdiction which shows itself in multitudinous ways, and which we call the
xCf. Kierkegaard, Repetition, (Oxford 1942).
**i.e. in 'moment' after 'moment'•
duality of good and evil".* Thus Buber expresses his conviction that
man possesses knowledge of his own historicity the conviction that
his becoming lies in his future encounters: 11 ••• the free man ... has
only the one thing...., his repeated decision to approach his destiny"^3*
We have already noted that Buber, like Bultmann and Kierkegaard, dis-
:likes possessable and retainable knowledge in the form of a Weltanschau-
:ung, but like Bultmann, he does agree that after the experience of the
'moment' man does and must possess something the knowledge of how
he must achieve and again achieve his personal destiny, that knowledge
that he must understand himself as someone future, the knowledge that
his authentic becoming depends on his orientation towards time and its
history, and the repeated encounters that these will bring, This is
knowledge then that man is able to possess and retain. But this
'knowledge' is compared by Buber to the other type of 'knowledge'--
that of " ... purpose here and means there, which he fetches for his
purpose".** Here we have, I am sure, a reference to that type of
knowledge which belongs to the spheres of applied science and technology,
occupied with means and ends. But existential knowledge ( or perhaps
we ought to say 'awareness') is of a quite different order---it consists
xIsrael and the World:Essays in a Time of Crisis, pps. 89-102 ■
Herberg, pps. 238-250, see p. 254 f*
and Thou, p. 60.
in insight into our radical historicity and temporality. The compar-
:ison here with Bultmann’s theology is obvious Bultmann holds that
the only possible Weltanschauung is one expressing historicity, that
V
historicjfcy is the criterion which differentiates genuine from false 
Weltanschauungen, that 'knowledge* of one's own historicity is the 
only 'truth' retainable after experience of the 'moment'.
We have then to be vitally concerned with our time and 
history* Something comes to us in the 'moment', and the sphere of 
our responsibility covers our side of the encounter.* Buber warns us 
not to trouble ourselves with the other, the transcendental side of 
the relational event. The other side represents grace, and simply 
because it is grace, it would be useless for us to be concerned about 
it. It comes to us unbidden. Therefore, rather than about grace we 
should concern ourselves about our will. Mere openness, readiness,
Xfor the 'moment' is not enough. More is necessary, the will to step
3Q£into relationship with what comes to us in the 'moment'. And here
Buber makes what is a crucial point in our comparisons of him with Bult- 
:mann. For this step presupposes the ability to suspend ordinary life 
with its limitations; this is strictly necessary} and this ability and 
this will entails suffering.*** Once again, the comparison with
*1 and Thou, p. 7
**op. cit., pps. 76-7*
^^"The 'Thou'confronts me. But I step into direct relation with it. 
Hence the relation means being chosen and choosing, suffering and action 
in one; just as any action of the whole fefeing which means the suspension 
of all partial actions, and consequently of all sensations of actions 
grounded only in their particular limitation, is bound to resemble 
suffering", I and Thou, pps. 76-77*
Bultmann's thought is almost obvious. Bultmann also holds that the 
occurrence of the 'moment' presupposes in man a certain relationship 
to the world -—  a relationship which Bultmann calls dialectical. We 
have seen in detail in chapter I how Bultmann favours an understanding 
of man such as that taught by St. Paul in I Cor. 7s29 f» -—  that man 
should (he has to) engage in the ordinary everyday business and comm- 
:erce of the world but with an inner aloofness, reserve, which give him 
an inner independence enabling him to turn aside from them to deal wi^ fij( 
which is ultimate and eschatological, occurring in the 'moment'. Buber 
too teaches that authentic man must be ready to suspend those workaday 
activities of his which are of secondary importance, and will to step 
into relation with that which comes unbidden in the 'moment' of grace. 
Here we have another clear and important parallel between the thought 
of Buber and that of Bultmann* But Buber's words about our responsib­
ility being directed towards this side (as contrasted with the other 
side) of the relational meeting, with will rather than with grace, shed 
light on another contemporary theological difference of opinion, and 
stress yet further the great similarity between Buber and Bultmann.
How often have we heard it asserted that Karl Barth is interested in the 
transcendent, only in the God who is Wholly Other, and has consequently 
left little room in his theology for man in his freedom, in his willing, 
and in his deciding. (The fact that we note this criticism of Barth does 
not mean that we wholly agree with it). On the other hand, how often 
have we heard it asserted that Bultmann's theology is concerned merely 
with anthropology, with human consciousness. One of the most common 
judgements repeated in theological circles today is that of Helmuth
Thielicke, that in Bultmann’s thought nothing else takes place but
consciousness© Now apart from the truth of these criticisms, it is
apparent that in the contemporaiy theological scene there is a difference
about this veiy matter. We can say that it is possible to classify
contemporary (and past) theologies as ’this side' or 'other side’
theologies* They concern themselves, to use Buber's terms, either
with,on the one hand, the 'other side', ’grace’, or, on the other, with
our side, with will, with decision* Now it is interesting and import-
:ant that both Bultmann and Buber come down for theologies which con-
icem themselves with 'our side’. Bultmann states that there may be
depths in God that we can know nothing about, but if so, our theology
can have nothing to say about these depths. In#almost every book that
he has written, he has quoted the celebrated opinion of Melancthon,
'To know God, is not to know Him as He is in Himself, but as He is in
His saving benefits' • Bultmann is interested in God soteriologically,
as
as we meet him here in existence, andAhe confers his blessings upon 
us* Buber too is interested in God so far as he concerns our existence; 
he is concerned to warn us that we must be busy above all else about 
going out to grace and persisting in its presence* "Grace is free
and uncontrolled------ 'He bestows his grace and mercy on whom he will'-
and yet man's deeds count© Without grace there is nothing, and yet man 
must make the 'beginning'. Grace concerns us absolutely, but it can
never become the object of our acquiring. Our freedom is real, yet 
grace is 1 prevenient1 • 'The person who makes a decision knows that 
his deciding is no self-delusion; the person who has acted knows that 
he was and is in the hand of God' • These multiple paradoxes are subsum- 
sed and expressed, not resolved, in the ' turning* "<>* Since the Roman 
Catholic Church holds to the objectivity of revelation expressed in dog- 
:ma, it is both interesting and important to hear Buber replying on 
this point to Catholic criticisms: "Some time ago, a Catholic theolog-
3£3£:ian saw in this conception a 'Jewish activism' to which grace is 
unknown. But it is not so. We are not less serious about grace 
because we are serious about the human power of deciding, and through 
decision the soul finds a way which will lead it to grace. Man is here 
given no complete power; rather, what is stressed, is the ordered perspect' 
:ive of human action, an action which we may not limit in advance. It 
must experience limitation as well as grace in the very process of act­
ing".*** Thus Buber as well as Bultmann has been criticized on 
account of subjectivity, a fact which illustrates their closeness. And 
as we shall see when we come to consider Buber on 'immanence', this 
turning towards, this'going out' on the part of man, is the main elem-
i oment in man's spritual life, in his spiritual cultivation.
Herberg, in his introduction to The Writings of Martin Buber, p. 29, 
quoting and discussing Buber's Israel and the World. 'The Faith of 
Judaism', p. 17*
^the conception that inertia is the root of all evil.
3gB£Israel and the World, pps. 13-27 = Herberg, pps. 253-265, see p„ 257.
Buber gives his existential sense of values. Buber 
states that a circle can be drawn, which excludes everything, except 
the process by which a step is taken from the sphere of the ’It1 into 
the sphere of the ’Thou*.* The only thing that matters for Buber is 
’’visible, full acceptance of the present”. Buber freuly admits the 
difficulty of accepting this sense of values. For the world into 
which the demand is made that man should step, is both unreliable and 
perilous. It is little wonder that man prefers the possessing of 
things to this. But if man is to find genuineness of life, this 
self-assertion must be renounced. Here once more we note that a strugg 
:le is suggested by Buber, a struggle that goes on in the heart of
5QT
eveiyday life<>
We have already indicated that Buber comes down on the 
side of those theologies which concern themselves with ‘this side’ of 
religious reality, with the human, willing, deciding side of the relat­
ional event. But just because he is a Jew and a great Hebrew think- 
ser, he is also aware that God is also ’Wholly Other’, the ’MSysterium 
Tremendum’.3S€X Yet the paradox of the ’moment’ is that the same God 
meets us, as the 'wholly present’, the ’self-evident, nearer to me than
and Thou, p. 78.
^And which we have already compared above to the ’dialectical’ relat­
ionship to life that is found in the thought of Bultmann.
W  11* • But we must note that in life, in the 'moment1, Buber’s 
dominant stress and emphasis is on the second of these two. He indie- 
sates his choice in three ways : -
(a)' He teaches that if we explore 'the life of things and of condition- 
Jed being1, we come to the unfathomable© That is, reality, truth,
are to be met with here, in this world, in time, in history, which is 
of course Bultmann's dominant stress also©
(b) if > we deny the life of things and of conditioned being', we
X'stand before nothingness'. This is merely a negative way of say- 
sing......
(c) If we 'hallow this life' we 'meet the BVing God',* Thus God is
to met with in the existences of those who cherish their historicity and 
temporality, and realize that their time and history are holy precisely 
because the Holy One is to be encountered in and through them. This 
is, as we noted, the only Weltanschauung that Bultmann and Buber allow 
to be retained from the experience of the 'moment'*
Now Buber's conviction that man is essentially 
(if we dare use such a term in an existentialist context) historical is 
op, cit., p. 79*
so crucial both for his thought in general and his doctrine of the 
'moment1 in particular, that we must give it some more attention here. 
The cruciality of historicity in this section of the thesis is briefly 
this* I should like to here show that the Hebrew Bible (with its 
stress on concrete, historical, temporal, 'momentary1 revelation) has 
had such a profound influence on Buber's thought and work as a whole, 
that it commits him to the essential historicity and temporality of 
man, and that this in turn logically and inescapably commits Buber 
to a doctrine of the 'moment'. In short, I should like to show, by 
an examination of his work, that just because Buber is so intensely a 
Jew, he holds and must hold a doctrine of the 'moment'. This is
important for a certain reason in our concluding chapter, I in-
stend to make out a parallel case; namely, that Bultmann, just because 
he is so deeply influenced by the New Testament with its notion of 
concise, historical, temporal, 'momentary' revelation inbhe events of 
Christ, is also inescapably committed to the essential historicity 
and temporality of man, and thus also to his doctrine of the 'moment'.
Our task here is this: to show by a wide examination of
Buber's works that the work of^he Hebrew Bible in him has been to
produce a doctrine of historicity and thus inevitably of the 'moment'.
In the context of speaking of the call of God in the Old Testament,
Buber writes: "God speaks to man in the things and beings he spends
him in life, Man answers through his dealings with these things and
beings".* Speaking of man's relationship to God, Buber says:
*Israel and the World;Essays in a Time of Crisis, p. 1^20
"Any genuine life relationship to Divine Being —  that is, any such rel­
ationship effected with a man's whole being —  is a human truth, and
* &
man has no other truth. The ultimate truth is one, but it^given to
man as it enters, reflected as in a prism, into the true life relation- 
:ships of the human person". And speaking of the work of the Old 
Testament prophets in The Prophetic Faith. Plerberg has this to say 
of Buber's views :"The prophetic reality, which provides the underlying 
pattern of biblical religion, is presented as a divine-human encounter 
not in the abstract realm of a 'sacred upper stoiy', but in the full 
existential context of life, and that means history".*** And still 
speaking of Buber's exposition of prophetic religion in The Prophetic 
Faith, Herberg has this to say: "This God makes his absolute demand
upon man in the totality of life and being. For man, in the Bible, 
'stands created a whole body, ensouled by his relation to the created, 
enspirited by his relation to the Creatoi'". And speaking of
biblical revelation in Buber's theology, Herberg again perceives the 
cruciality of historicity : "Revelation comes to the individual and
XX3C3EX
the community; it comes through nature and history". And in a
note to this remark, Herberg gives an explanation of Buber's views on
“We see how relevant this remark of Buber's is to our argument that for 
Bultmann and him there is but one 'possessable' truth.
**Martin Buber, "Remarks on Goethe's Concept of Humanity", in Arnold 
Bergstraesser, ed., Goethe and the Modem Age, (Chicago 1950). Cf. 
Herberg, op. cit., p. 19*
***W. Herberg, in his introduction to The Writings of Martin Buber,p. 25. 
3a€X*Herberg, op. cit., p. 27, quoting Buber, Israel and the World, p. 27c 
3BHSEKHerberg, op. cit., p. 29.
revelation through nature, history, and 'moments1, which, it can hardly 
be denied, could almost as well have been written of the theology of 
Bultmann# "Buber distinguishes between revelation through nature and 
revelation through history. The former is'continuous'* and continually 
proclaims 'that one, though all-inclusive something, that which the psalm 
calls the glory of God' • Revelation through history, on the other 
hand is discontinuous and varied: "times of great utterance, when the 
mark of divine direction is recognizable in the conjunction of events, 
alternate with, as it were, mute times^*when everything that occurs in 
the human world and pretends to historical significance ajjpears to us 
empty of God'. Moreoever, in revelation through nature man is only the 
receiver; in revelation through history, on the other hand, 'mankind, 
being placed in freedom, cooperates incessantly in shaping its (history's) 
Course' (At the Turning, 'The Dialogue between Heaven and Earth', pps. 
57-58). These distinctions are important, but are they ultimate ? In 
a great natural catastrophe, destroying men and communities, does nature 
speak so obviously and unequivocally the same word of revelation of the 
glory of God ?".****
*This description is interesting, ip. view of the fact that in a later 
section of this chapter, we shall see that Buber holds that man's lust 
'continuity' is a sworn enemy of the 'moment'.
**i.e. 'Moments' of •••■•
***0r, as we desribed it in the Introduction, and as we shall describe 
it in the conclusions, history is discontinuous and fragmentary.
x***Note no. 90, in Herberg, op. cit., p. 541* Herberg's last point is 
valid. The great difficulty in arguing from nature t_o God has been that 
nature as well as exhibiting beauty has also been 'red in tooth and 
claw'. It is quite true that the lesson of nature is ambiguous. But 
this does not destroy Buber's distinction. It only casts doubt on his 
view that the voice of God in nature is continuous. God's voice in nature 
is also discontinuous and fragmentary.
*1
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Again, there seems to he little doubt of the Hebrew Bible's influence 
on Buber in the matter of historicity. Speaking of the message that 
Judaism has for the world, Buber says that it is this : "This is its 
message: YOU YOURSELF MUST BEGIN. Existence will remain meaningless 
for you if you yourself do not penetrate into it with active love and if 
you do not in this way discover its meaning for yijprself •. • Meet the 
world with the fulness of your being, and you shall meet God ... If you
« Xwish to believe, love0" In short, historicity again through the in­
fluence of the biblical revelation. That God comes to man in the 
things of history is described thus by Buber : "He (God) hovers over
his creation not as over a chaos; he embraces it. He is the infinite
xx
'I' that makes every !It' into his 'Thou1". Or Buber can put this
in negative terms and say : "God is not an object beside objects, and 
hence cannot be reached by renunciation of objects. God is, indeed, 
not the cosmos, but even less is he being minus cosmos. He is not to
X X X
be found by subtraction, and not to be loved by reduction". Buber 
interprets Luther's marriage as a " ... symbolic action, because he want* 
:ed to lead the believing man of his age out of a religious seperatism, 
which finally separated him from grace itself, to a life with God in the
woTlri".3**** And flpeaking of the dangers that this doctrine of historic-
XAt the Turning, 'The Silent Question', p. 44* Cf. Herberg, op. cit., 
p. 39. As we shall see, Buber and Bultmann are also close in their 
notion of love, over against the theology of Kierkegaard.
^Buber, Between Man and Man, transl. R. Gregor Smith, (London 1947)?
'The Question to the Single One', pps. 40-61, 65, 69-71 = Herberg, p.
79*
X X X  .4. ^  o nOp # Cl 0*9 p • o U •
* * * % .  cit., p. 81.
/historicity involves, Buber warns that the danger must be faced and 
overcome s " ... finitude is certainly the danger, for nothing 
threatens us so sharply as the danger that we remain clinging to it.
Ait our hope of salvation is forged on this very danger, for our human 
way to the infinite leads only through fulfilled finitude”.* In short, 
historicity again in a biblical context o Buber is close not only to 
the message of the Old Testament but also to that of the New when he 
writes thus of love s ”1 cannot love God without devoting my whole 
heart as living for the sake of my fellow-men, without devoting my whole 
entire soul as responsive to all the spiritual trends in the world 
around me, without devoting all my force to this God in his correlation
XX - \ \with man”. -But here again, committment to love invlpves committment
to historicity. Or to put it a slightly different way i "If I love
God, in the course of lovong him, I come to love the one whom God loves, 
3QEXtoo". Speaking of Israel’s struggle against idolatry and image-
making, Buber writes : "He is the histoiy God that he is only when he 
is not localized in nature, and precisely because he makes use of every­
thing potentially visible in nature, of every kind of natural existence 
for his manifestation. The prohibition of 'images1 and ’figures' was
3£op. cit., p. 83*
^^Eclipse of God:Studies in the Relation Between Religion and Philosophy 
CHAPTER IV, 'The Love of God and the Idea of Deity1, (New York 1952), 
pps. 67-84 = Herberg, pps. 97-107* see pps* 102-103*
**%>. cit., p. 103*
absolutely necessary for the establishment of his rule, for the invest-
:iture of his absoluteness before all current 'other gods'".* Thus
the idolatry-struggle was to make the God of the Bible the one who
could manifestihimself, not in a certain place at a certain time, but
XXanywhere in any 'moment*. Again, briefly, the notion of historicity 
induced by the concept of revelation in the Old Testament. Buber 
tells us that Moses modified the current idea of sacrificialism in so 
far as that idea tended to the'utilization* of God : "This sacral power 
was replaced by the consecration of men and things, of times and 
places, to the One who vouchsafes his presence amid his chosen people,
XXXif only the latter persevere in the royal covenant". Here once again
we have the Bible's influence on Buber's view of temporality, histori-
scity, and the 'moment*. Buber holds that the hope for religion in
our world is dependent upon religion's stress on the concrete, in time
and in history : "To exert an influence on contemporary man, religion
itself would have to return to reality. And religion was always real
only when it v/as free of fear, when it shouldered the load of concrete-
:ness instead of rejecting it as something belonging to another realm,
xxxxwhen it made the spirit incarnate, and sanctified everyday life".
Closes, pps. 119-140 ~ Herberg, 181-202, see p. 189©
“ Cf. Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 155 *"in every moment 
slumbers the possibility of being the eschatological moment. You must 
awaken it".
^ %oses, pps. 119-140 = Herberg, pps. 181-202, see p. 191.
^ ^Israel and the World, pps. 89-102 = Herberg, pps. 239-250, see p0 
241. We note of course in Buber's employment of the terms 'fear', 
'shouldered the load', 'rejecting', another indication of the struggle 
which goes on between the spheres of authenticity and inauthenticity.
Thus we could say that in Buber's opinion contemporaiy religion needs 
above all else, stress on the 'moment'. Buber holds, as does Bultmann, 
that man reaches truth through his ' Widerfahmisse' with events in the 
world of nature and history ...natural events are the carriers of 
revelation, and revelation occurs when he who witnesses the event and 
sustains it experiences the revelation it contains. This means that 
he listens to that which the voice, sounding forth from this event, 
wishes to communicate to him, its witness, to his constitution, to his 
life, to his sense of duty. It is only when this is true that the man 
of today can find the approach to biblical reality. I, at any rate, 
believe that it is true". The main point is again that it is
'biblical reality' which influences Buber's view of historicity.
For Buber, the essence of the Jewish soul is this : "The living God 
to whom he has pledged himself appears in infinite manifestations in
XXthe infinite variety of things and events". Could we have a plainer 
statement of 'biblical historicity! ? Again and again in his writ- 
sings, Buber uses one of his favourite expressions for historicity,
'the hallowing of the eveiyday1 s "Because God bestows not only spirit 
on man, but the whole of his existence, from its 'lowest' to its 
'highest' levels, man can fulfil the obligations of his partnership with
^Israel and the World, pps. 89-102 = Herberg, pps. 239-250, see p. 246.
^Israel and the World, 'The Two Foci of the Jewish Soul', pps. 28-40 = 
Herberg, pps. 266-276, see p. 267.
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God by no spiritual attitude, by no worship, on no sacred upper storey? 
the whole of life is required, every one of its areas and every one of 
its circumstances* There is no true human share of holiness without 
hallowing of the everyday". * And finally, we can sum up Buber's 
attitude to the historicity and temporality of man in some of his own 
words on Hasidism: "The Hasidic teaching is the consummation of 
Judaism. And this is its message to all: YOU YOURSELF MUST BEGIN.** 
Existence will remain meaningless for you if you yourself do not pene­
trate into it with active love and if you do not in this way discover 
its meaning for yourself. Everything is waiting to be hallowed by 
you; it is waiting to be disclosed irL.its meaning and to be realized in 
it by you. For the sake of this your beginning, God created the world.
He has drawn it out of himself so that you may bring it closer to him. 
Meet the world with the fulness of your being and you shall meet him". 
Thus again, under the influence of Judaism, Buber holds firmly to his 
conviction that man cannot have revelation, cannot receive truth, cannot 
rightly see God and existence, except he is correlated closely with the 
world of history and time. Surely Paul Tillich's judgement of Buber's 
significance in modem theology is absolutely right: "Religion, for 
Hasidism as well as for Buber, is consecration of the world. It is neith-
*op. cit., p. 270.
**We can see once more how Buber comes down for 'this side' theologies.
***The Silent Question, 'On Henri Bergson and Simone Weil', (New York 
1952), pps. 29-44 = Herberg, pps. 306-314* see.p. 314*
/neither acceptance of the world as it is, nor bypassing the world in
the direction of the transcendent divine, but it is consecration in the
double sense of seeing the divine in everything. This attitude
removes the dualism of a holy and a secular sphere. In spite of the
observance of doctrine and cult, in spite of its emphasis on the con- 
3E
stinuous conversation between the individual soul and God in prayer 
and meditation, the decisive characteristic of Hasidic religion is its 
way of looking at the world and acting in it. For man's action in 
the world has a significance not only for man but also for God. Man 
is responsible for the destiny of God in so far as God is in the world? 
man is called to re-establish the broken unity in himself and in the 
world. God waits for man, and the answer to man's action is divine 
grace# Man's action is not by way of asceticism or extraordinary 
deeds. It is the consecration of the moment, it is the simple act 
which is demanded from a special individual in a special situation, it 
is the acting of the anonymous people, the children and the simple ones. 
Such acting, if it is done in consecration, prepares the coming of the
3QEKingdom of God. It is messianic action". So much for the Hasidic
influence. Its effect in the thought of Buber is that " ...Significant
is the daily life and the union the 'I' achieves in the encounter with
*As we have seen already, and as we shall see again, it is man's lust 
for 'continuity', for 'duration', that militates against the 'moment'.
**Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture, (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1959)» ’An Evaluation of Martin Buber:Protestant and Jewish 
Thought', chap. xiv, pps. 194-5*
the 'eternal Thou1, and the radiation into the world of him who is unit-
• X:ed m  himself". In short, a doctrine of radical historicity.
Thus from our fairly wide examination of Buber's writ­
ings, it would seem that we can establish two facts which are beyond 
doubt. First, Buber holds a doctrine of the radical historicity and
temporality of man; man is always ' being-there *; he is always in the 
f i
world, and it^only in and through the events and Thous which make up the 
world $ $ £ man^receive the disclosure of God and of himself. Second, 
it seems clear that the main influence upon Buber's notion of historic­
ity has been the 03dTestament (historic, concrete, here and now, 'mom- 
sentaiy’) idea of Revelation, mediated to Buber through his Jewish 
faith, especially in its Hasidic variety, which has emphasised the 
mediatorial function of the 'everyday'* Not only is this conclusion 
of considerable importance in itself, if we wish to understand a great 
Jewish philosopher, but it is of immense importance for another reason 
within the context of the argument of this thesis. We have shown how 
the Bible can produce a notion of historicity and temporality; and in 
our concluding chapter we wish to take up a parallel argument, namely, 
that it is possible to account for Rudolf Buitmann's doctrine of histor-
*op. cit., p. 195*
/historicity and temporality not by merely citing the influence of 
(existentialist) philosophy, but by pointing to the Biblical notion of 
revelation again (as it has been mediated to Bultmann through the New 
Testament Kerygma based upon the concrete life of Jesus). In this 
way, we shall try to show^ that the biblical form of revelation implies 
the historicity of human existence, and thus logically also, the 
'moment1. In this way too, we shall try to show that the category of 
the 'moment' (the subject of this thesis) is a quite necessary 
consequence of biblical revelation and of the Christian Faith. But 
to this argument we shall return in our conclusions*
The 'moments' of disclosure in our experience are
discontinuous. This means that they lack continuity and duration.
But not absolutely so; for every moment points beyond itself into the
futureoK In each 'moment', in each relational event, we are allowed
to glimpse 'a consummating event'. Every moment leaves us dissatis-
:fied. We long to renew the relation, and this longing points us to
future 'moments'. Thus Buber can say that man is in 'the eternal
middle of the way'.** Thus the 'moments' of existence are not entirely
discontinuous. For there is something 'in'man, which man has had,
XI and Thou, p. 80.
**I and Thou, p. 80; we remember how Bultmann points out in The Quest ion 
of NaturaT~Revelation that " ...man .. is on the way", Essays, p. 95*
’from the beginning* ,X which makes man turn out towards the relational 
'moment*. Buber even speaks of it as a 'sense', as man's 'sense of
3£
the Thou*. Thus Buber holds that in man's creation there is created 
in him some element which points towards and longs for relation in
3EXtime and history. But this 'sense' must remain unfulfilled until
the 'Thou' is realized in actuality in 'the reality of the hallowed
3Elife of the world'. Thus discontinuity is not absolute; indeed, we
shall see presently that Buber holds that the historic 'moments' of ex- 
sistence come to constitute a world of their own, over against the 
world of 'It'.
i •' ■
Buber finds the solution of existential disunity is the 
'moment'. There is a 'moment' offered to man which Buber calls the
decisive 'moment' for in it an opportunity is given for the soul
to attain to unity, a unity in which man's splintered and dissipated 
power can be concentrated, and in this wholeness man is able, as a 
unified being, to enter singlemindedly into relation, an act which was
3E3EK
impossible for him when he was not one but many. But if such
existential unity is to be maintained (and man not to relapse into his 
former state of disunity), a condition is to be satisfied; this condit- 
XI and Thou, p. 80.
xxWe shall return to this point when we consider Buber's view of 
' immanence'.
,3€XXI and Thou, p. 86.
condition/ is man's need for decision. This 'moment' is thus decisive 
because it is not merely a 'moment' of ecstasy, but one in which man's 
will is involved. The first decision of the series Buber terms 'the 
primal mysterious decision'.* Since in this 'moment', can achieve or
t
fail to achieve authentic, genuine, being, it carries 'the mightiest 
consequences for our destiny*. Withoutit, man remains in, or falls 
back into, existential disunity, and is thus useless for the act of
3E3£3£encounter, meeting, or relation. It is significant that in Bult-
:mann and in Kierkegaard the 'moment' is crucial also just because in 
it man can gain or lose his real existence* It is (Kierkegaard) 
the moment of re-birth, and without it there can be no possibility of 
becoming*
The term 'moment' has of course the effect of suggest-
sing to us briefness, transitoriness* "Only for a moment", we say,
and we express the thought that something was exceedingly brief. "It
was only momentary*, we say, and again we indicate briefness* The
word 'moment' suggests to us something insignificantly and unimportantly
brief and fleeting, suddenly here and then just as quickly gone, as
though it had never been* Buber realises this keenly* "How powerful", 
op. cit., p. 86.
SXXAs we shall see when we come to deal with 'The Enemies of the 
moment' there is another kind of temporaiy unity attainable in mystic- 
lism which is quite unhistorical and therefore for Buber invalid.
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says Aiber,"is the unbroken world, of ’It1, and how delicate are the 
appearances of the 'Thou'".* The world in which we live every day 
(the world of ’It1) is protected from the intrusion of the 'moment* by 
'the crust of the condition of things'.* He describes the 'moment' 
thus: " ... for how inevitably short a time is it nothing to me but 
'Thou'I". What grows feeble after the expiiy of the 'moment' is'the
/ yy
actuality of its (i.e* the Thou's) immediacy'. Every 'Thou' when
encountered becomes an 'It' afterwards, except o n e  God himself.
But when we feel remote from God, this is not the absence of God from 
us, it is the absence of us from God. We remove ourselves into the 
world of 'It' from him -—  he does not remove himself from us.
The exposition of this passage from I and Thou is
interesting not only for its own sake; but also because it brings to
us an already not unfamiliar picture. This picture is that of the
'moment' trying to penetrate a highly organised and tightly planned
world, a solidly constructed life. This world is covered by a 'crust'.
The result is opposition to the 'moment's' occurrence, and a conflict
between it and the world of everyday living and working. This brings
to mind again the comparison we have already made and whose importance
*1 and Thou, p. 98*
“ op. cit., pps. 98-99*
we have already indicated. It is that in Buber, as in Bultmann, the 
authentic relation to the ordinary everyday world of commerce and work 
(the world of 'It') should be dialectical. This is because the various 
elements in it, though necessary to our life, may so claim our attention 
and absorption that they stifle the occurrence of the 'moment' and elim­
inate the possibility of authentic existence that it brings.
There is another element in the 'moment' that may give
a form of continuity between individual 'moments'. The 'moment' of
encounter, says Buber, is immersed in speech. This speech links the
'moments' together. "The moments of relation are here, and only here,
bound together by means of the element of the speech in which they
are immersed".* This is probably because, in line with Buber's
'existentialist' doctrine of history that we have already examined in
detail, the spoken word, having become an 'It' as soon as it is past,
can yet in another 'moment' take on presentness in encounter. It is
this ability of the spoken words that gives the unity. As we shall
see later, Buber allows that the unity spoken of here can develop to
such an extent that it can be spoken of as a universe, a world, over
against the world of 'It*._______ _________
*1 and Thou, p. 105*
We have now concluded the first section of our study of 
Buber. There can be no doubt of the reality of the 1 moment1 in the 
thought of Buber. In the ’moment1 lies the hidden meaning of history 
real living is concentrated in the ’moment1 which is marked by decision 
and encounter, The ’moment1 means the consecration of everyday life 
because in it God can be encountered;only in it can God be encounter-
3E3QE __
sed. The general similarities between Buber’s ’moment’ and that of
Rudolf Bultmann are also, I think, clear. We must now turn to a consid- 
seration of another aspect of Buber’s thought on the ’moment1 which, 
we shall find, emphasises insights common to Buber and Bultmann, and 
which sheds valuable light on other problems both in philosophy and in 
theology*
X"According to the biblical insight, historic destiny is the secret cor- 
:relation inherent in the current moment”, Buber, Israel and the World, 
pps. 89-102 * Herberg, pps* 239-250, see p. 244*
XX” **. living takes place in the awful and splendid moment of decision, 
your moment and mine no less than Alexander’s or Caesar’s. And yet 
your moment is not yours, but rather the moment of your encounter", 
Buber, op. cit., p. 244*
xxx"God eveiy day renews the work of the beginning, but also every day 
anticipates the work of the end”, Buber, op. cit., p. 245*
(2) THE ' M O M T1 AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PR3>1ARY AND SECONDARY
REVELATION.
That section of our study of Bultmann, "What comes 
in the ‘moment1 can he grasped but not possessed'*, should be kept in 
mind throughout this section of our study of Buber. One of the main 
purposes of this section of our study will be to show that a very sirn- 
*ilar position is to be found in the works of Buber, and to elucidate 
the consequences of this emphasis for contemporaiy theology and philos- 
sophy# We shall take up the same problem in our conclusions when we 
deal with ‘The Problem of PropQiitional Theology*•
What is the origin of characterisations, ideas, and 
representations, in religion, in art, and in poetiy ? Buber’s answer 
to this question is clear. The origin of them, in his opinion,
"are represehtations of incidents and situations that are specifically 
relational",* Or to use terminology which we worked out for Bult- 
smann, secondaiy revelation is derived from primaiy© Truths, ideas, 
insights, are abstractions from ‘moments1, from encounters© But 
their original derivation from the ‘moment* is too strong to be ignored.
XI and Thou, p. 19«
A parallel insight of Buber's is that the personal character 
of the 'moment' or encounter is objectified after " ••• the relational 
event has run its course"•* It has en/tered the world of ‘It*©
But the world of 'It' contains not only objectifications of past 
'Thous'. It is much more complex* The world of 'It' also contains
• 3E9E'items of knowledge'. These are added to by the mutual borrowing 
and lending between one historic culture and another, which increases 
the knowledge available of the 'world of objects’.*** This leads to 
a further process;man must now set about 'experiencing and using' this 
enlarged world of 'It', of objects, of items of knowledge. Inevitable 
as this process is, it yet possesses ii&dangersjthis process in which 
man immerses himself, experiencing and using, may mean the ignoring 
and therefore the degeneration of man's awareness of his essential 
historicity, and thus his ability to enter into personal relation,
X3E3QC
and therefore the loss of his spiritual life* The precise danger
would seem to be that since the world of 'It's' complexity consists 
in containing not only objectified 'moments' but also a vast mass of 
expanding (and in its own sphere quite legitimate) technological inform- 
: at ion, we should fail to see the wood for the trees, that objectified
»mnmflntB' m a y . be...smothered .with.,items of information, and that attention
*1 and Thou,p. 33? 'objectified', that is, become an object, a thing, 
an 'It'.
**op. cit., p. 38*
***What Buber probably means here can be illustrated, for example, by
the fact that India (or Israel) have borrowed extensively from the
scientific information current in Western industrial society.
****op. cit., p. 39. Cf. op. cit., p. 34 - "We need only fill each mom-
sent with experiencing and using, and it ceases to bum".
' o
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to experiencing and using in the technological sense may have an adverse 
effect on man’s primary spiritual ability, to experience the ’moment1 = 
of relation* Such warnings, from the pages of the existentialist 
writers, could be reproduced a hundredfold*
t’he objectified ’moment’, an ’It1, can tragically be 
left as an ’It’* But this objectified ’moment’ is ’the melancholy of 
man and his greatness1* It is man’s melancholy, we may assume, 
because it can be left as an ’It’; it can perish as a mere thing of the 
past, never to live again* But it is man’s greatness, we may assume, 
because the objectified ’moment1, embedded in books and narratives, in 
ideas and representations, has within it the power to live over again*
And also, it is man’s greatness, because unless the objectified ’moment’ . 
had this power to become objectified and transmitted, there would be no
XXknowledge, no work, no image, no symbol. The greatness consists
mainly though in that the ’ moment ’, ” • • • hardened into a thing among
things, has had the disposition put into it to change back again and
again".** This, as we have already indicated, is because the interpret-
ier of a past recorded ’moment’ has the possibility of interpersonal
encounter when he approaches the past record with his own present* 
op. cit., p. 3 9 *
**op. cit., p. 40.
Or^(as we have already noted)^the objectified ’moment1 " • •* must 
blaze up into presentness and enter the elemental state from which it 
came, to be looked on and lived in the present by man”.* Thus the 
process is not the imparting of items s of information, but an inter­
personal disclosure* Thus the validity of this type of awareness 
derives from the subjective experience of the person who re-lives the 
'moment1, and differs from the validity of scientific knowledge, where 
the criteria are whether it accords with formal rules (as in mathemat- 
sics), or whether it is useful and therefore valuable (as in scientific 
technology)* In existential awareness, the secondary derives from the, 
primary; the secondary only yields itself to him who in his present 
immerses himself with the whole of his being in the primary*
What, it may be asked, is the value of the life of the
man who has experienced the ‘moment’ ? Has it any value for us ?
Buber’s conviction is that its value lies in that it has a teaching
purpose to fulfil. But we must be careful in defining what this
teaching purpose isl We must reject the notion that ’teaching’
between man and man has the content of teaching a man what he must
become* It must not define and prescribe a man's essence as a person*
*op. cit., p. 40*
**op. cit., p. 42.
'The teaching must direct itself to show man ’how1 his existence is to
be approached. It must,by means of the teacher’s existence, demonstrate
the intensely personal temporal/historical nature of human existenceoK
But in attempting to do so, such a teaching-life has a thankless task,
because, in the world of ’It’ the pupils have been hardened against
existential teaching, in it they believe# themselves to be 'fully equipp-
:ed with information’. Here we have one more scathing reference to
the 'knowledge' of the world of technology, the world of ends and means.
The pupils are also hardened because, says Buber, the pupils have
’pinned the person down in histoiy and secured his words in the library’ „
This means that the living vibrating person is shackled at a point in
the past, and not permitted to rear himself up in man's present, to
live and speak again. History is no longer a living, vibrating, pulsat-
:ing, present event. Here again it becomes clear how Buber favours
the existentialist (Bultmann/Dilthey/Collingwood) interpretation of
history. Thus we see how difficult it is to communicate this view of
history and teaching in a technological era where pupils are liable to
suffer from the'hardness of heart' which makes it difficult for a life
which has experienced the present 'moment' to become 'Thou' for them,
to invite them into the sphere of 'Thou-ness', into the sphere of
“See op. cit., p. 42. Cf. Buber, Israel and the World, pps. 137-145* 
'teaching and Learning', = Herberg, op. cit., pps. 317-324*
^ I  and Thou, p. 42.
In ot&er words, 'It' has been left as 'It' in the world of objects.
presentness. Here again, we want to make a vital point. We want to 
argue that Buber favours this view of teaching, which is absolutely 
parallel to his view of history, under the influence of his Jewish 
faith with its historical/temporal view of revelation. When Buber 
discusses the 'propagation of values' within community, he is clear
• 3€that valid propagation means the propagation of 'life',of 'spirit1.
Thus this view of education involves 'the person as a whole, just as
Xdoes physical propagation'. This is because, " ... In Israel of 
old, the propagation of values itself assumed an organic character and.
penetrated the natural life of the people ..... .........We, and we only,
once received both life and the teachings together, and in the selfsame 
hour became a nation and a religious community. Since then, the trans- 
smission of life and the transmission of the teachings have been bound 
together, and we consider the spiritual transmission as vital as bodily 
propagation'. Tfcwi things are quite clear in this. The first is that 
according to Buber education, teaching, mean# an interpersonal disclosure 
of an existential type. And the second is the apparent influence of
Buber's biblical faith. He can state the same thing in a different
manner. "In these recurring encounters between a generation which has
xSee Buber, Israel and the World, pps. 137-145* 'Teaching and Learning', 
= Herberg, pps. 317-324* See p. 317*
reached its full development and one which is still developing, the 
ultimate aim is not to transmit a seperable something. What matters is 
that time and again an older generation, staking its entire existence on 
that comes to a younger with the desire to teach, waken, and shape it; 
then the holy spark leaps across the gap. Transmitted content and form 
are subordinate to the tradition of existence as such, and become valid 
only because of it. The total, living, Jewish human being is the trans- 
smitting agent; total, living, Jewish humanity is transmitted. Tradition 
is concentrated in the existence of the Jew himself. He lives it ...e.. 
....Israel is inherent in these human beings; they are Israel. Israel 
is renewed, not by what they say, but by the totality of their exist-
3E:ence©*’ This important passage proves our case in three directions
(a)From it is apparent the influence on Buber1s concept of education of 
that faith rooted in the Hebrew bible, in the religion of Israel.
(b)What is imparted is not, as Buber says, a ’seperable something1;that 
is, not a Weltanschauung, an ideology, a system of ideas. (c)What is 
imparted is primaiy revelation in the sense of something absolutely 
saMfcpersonal, expressed by Buber as ’existence’, ’holy spark’,
’humanity’. And just because authentic teaching does not mean handing 
over a Weltanschauung, M ...... teaching is inseperably bound up with
xbp. cit., p. 319*
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doing; here, if anywhere, it is impossible to teach or learn without liv­
ing. The teachings must not be treated as a collection of knowable
material..................Either the teachings live in the life of a
responsible human being, or they are not alive at all11.* It is life 
" • •.. • that realizes the teachings in the changing potentialities of
Xevery hour"• Buber’s notion of revelation and education, his reject­
ion of knowledge as a system of ideas, the formative influence on this 
of his Jewish religion, are succintly summed up by him in this way:
’’The teachings themselves are the way* Their full content is not com­
prehended in any book, in any code, in any formulation. Nothing that 
has ever existed is broad enough to show what they are* In order that 
they may live and bring forth life, generations must continue to meet, 
and the teachings assume the form of a human link, awakening and activ-
yy
:ating our common bond with our Father” • And where could we get a
clearer expression of the view, which is also Bultmann's, that the 
revelation of God can only be realized in encounter ?
Buber distinguishes between personalism and individ­
ualism* The person, for Buber, is he who says merely ’I am'; it is 
he who says merely 'know thyself, 'know thyself to have being'. Thus 
Buber's person stops short of prescribing essence. But the individual
*op. cit., p. 319*
XXop. cit., pps. 323-4*
s> ;3
goes further, too far, and says:"I am such-and-such” and in his relation- 
iship with another says:"Know thyself to have thy particular kind of
3£
being". The individual invalidly takes his own special kind of being
as his obseivation-point it is the real attraction for him. In so
doing he detracts from the worth of being in itselfo This individuality
is a form of selfishness it goes towards entities of ngr kind, my
race, ngr species. The authentic person points only to the necessity of 
realizing being-in-the-world; he points to and invites into historicity, 
temporality. He should not attempt to do more. Here again, we have 
Buber’s rejection of an anthropology of essence;it means in effect the 
rejection of a Weltanschauung-type of knowledge in favour of insight giv- 
sen in interpersonal encounter.
Buber’s rejection of a universally communicable, 
objective knowledge comes out again when he says that the ’moment' 
means that in it something has ’happened to’ man (not that knowledge was 
imparted to him in it). This is known in its existential results. After
3EHt
the passing of the ’moment' we discover the 'gift*. What comes in
the ’moment’ is non-transferable because it is a Presence, 'a Presence
as power'.3*3*3* Within this there are three strands
“See op. cit., (I and Thou), p. 64®
“ op. cit., p. 109*
^ o p .  cit., p. 110.
(a) The experience of being bound in relation.
(b) The assurance of meaning.
(c) The meaning is of this life in this world, the world of our time 
and history.
Buber comments on these three things in a way that highlights his views 
on the impossibility of a Weltanschauung-type knowledge
(a)0f the relation, man can ’give no account at all1 of how it comes 
about. Thus there is here no 'seperable something’, universally and 
objectively communicable.
(b)0f the meaning, man does not know how to 'exhibit and define the mean- 
:ing of life’; there is no 'formula or picture' for it; yet its certit- 
:ude, independent of these, is greater than the certitude of sense- 
perception.
(c)Of the meaning of this life here in this world of history, this raean- 
sing 'does not permit itself to be transmitted and made into knowledge
3Egenerally current and admissible'. This meaning can be received and 
tested 'by each man in the singleness of his bbing and the singleness of
3£3£his life'. From the encounter of the 'moment' we return bearing only 
the 'Thou' on our lips, nothing more. We can derive from the
'moment' no "knowledge" which might lessen its mysteriousness. ftor can 
we pass it on to others, saying to them: "You must know this, you must
op. cit., p. 111.
^  lutueen
op. cit., p. Ill;there is an obvious contrast here M l M existential 
meaning and the objectivity of the results of a scientific experiment, 
which certainly do not require to be tested by each man in the singleness 
of his being and life.
xxXjn SQ £ar as -fchjig »Thou' means our possessed, conviction that our real 
life lies in the future in relation and encounter, this is in accord with 
our already expressed judgement of Bultmann and Buber, that the only poss- 
:essable Weltanschauung expresses our radical historicity and temporali t y ,
X
jhis". In the 'moment' it is not revealed to us what God is,
What his name is, a definition of God, all that is disclosed is that 
God IS. God's name is I AM THAT I AM.** There is given no solutions 
of problems, no solving of riddles, no evaporating of mysteriesj only a
XXXPresence as power. Thus it is clear that for Buber 'revelation'
is revelation in our primary (interprersonal, 'momentary', concrete, 
historical, temporal) sense; it is hard not to conlude that Buber 
thinks that the secondaiy type of 'revelation' belongs properly to 
science.
But this (primary) kind of revelation or awareness is
xxxxprecisely opposite of that which man desires to have. Man desires
XXXXto 'possess God'. He wants to have 'a continuity in space and time
XXXXof possession of God'• It is not enough for man to receive mean-
:ing occasionally, discontinuously, in the 'moment' ---  he wants to
see the confirmation of meaning as something "that can be taken up and
3E3C3E3C3Chandled, a continuum unbroken in space and time that insures his
. , 3QEX30QE KXXXKXX.
life at every point and every moment". We need hardly
point out here the closeness to Bultmann's conviction that man's desire
Xop. cit•, p. 111.
**op. cit., p. 112.
“ op. cit., p. 111.
op. cit., p. 115*
3H£3O0€We have already found in Bultmann the insight that man desires 
above all else 'security'; Bultmann holds that radical 'insecurity' 
is the hall-mark of genuine existence.
3Q€3C3SaEThis is the opposite of 'discontinuity*.
xxxxxxx . . -i 12op. cit., p. lip.
for a possessable Weltanschauung is an enemy of the ‘moment’ and its 
revelation* The Weltanschauung, as Bultmann has so rightly pointed 
out, can be re-applied in life so as do away with the necessity for the 
‘moment’} it can be, as Buber, says, ‘taken up and handled’.
Buber put the same thing in a slightly different way —  
man1 longs for extension in time, for duration'. This is of course the 
diametrical opposite of what we mean by the 'moment'. This longing
3Ehas an adverse affect on faith* Faith becomes thought of as going 
out towards that which.is extended in time, and that is an object, a 
thing* Thus God becomes an object, the object of faith. The origin­
al, valid, function of faith was to complement the ‘moments' of relat­
ion, it was the human response to God's historical approach* But 
faith, infected by the desire for duration, replaces these 'momentary' 
encounters* 'Faith', so understood, cancels out the necessity for 
man's stepping out into meeting in the 'moment'. 'Faith', so under- 
t stood, has become unhistorical and untemporal -—  it is lifted out of 
the 'moments' of time and is directed to a transcendent object — - 
to 'God'. This inauthentic desire for continuity and duration mani-
3E-op. cit., p. 115♦
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maniiests/ itself also in inauthentic worship, in a cult, in a 
ritual, which have as their object an object, continuous in time** 
Dissatisfied by the existential loneliness of the ’moment’, man’s 
community-urge makes him immerse himself in the community which follows 
the cult of a representation of God, unbroken in time* ** By means 
of this cult the community as distinct from the person is united with 
its God; thus’God’ can become a possession, always accessible in the 
liturgy* Originally, the cult (like faith) was a completion of and the 
response to God’s ’momentaiy’ approach;now it displaces this personal 
response;the link between history and worship becomes broken; the object 
of the cult, ’God’, is above time and histoiy absolutely, a thing, an 
’It’, extended in space and time* Thus such a cult can lead to
inauthenticity of life it can deceive man about his historicity and
about the living God who comes to him in the ’moment’. This cult is 
parallel to secondaiy revelation; it grows out of ’momentary’ 
encounters, to be sure; but it becomes objectified when it loses its 
existential connection with the concrete happening which gave birth to 
it* The concrete happening is primary*
 ____________    So far the similarity between Buber and Bultmann
3£op. cit., p. 114*
3E3EAs we have already seen, false forms of community and the ’ clamour 
of the voices' which they contain are held by Bultmann to be enemies of 
the 'moment', deceiving us,they make us forget our solitariness, see 
Essays, pps. 7 f*
is plain they hold similar views as to primary and secondary revel- 
:ation. Primaiy revelation for them both is 'momentary1, concrete, 
historical, relational, given in historical interpersonal encounter; 
the secondaiy, though derived from the primaiy, is dangerous in that it 
may be broken off from its primary roots, and passed off as generally 
current and admissible* For them both revelation is essentially 
primary.
But here we must make another crucial point* Granted the 
general similarity, what is the main origin of Buber's views on revelat­
ion ? If it can be answered simply some alien (i.e. unbiblical) 
philosophy, such as existentialism, that is no doubt interesting. Here 
we have another interesting instance of the effect of the philosophy 
of existence on modem thought* But I should like to show 'that this 
answer is invalid. For it is possible, I am convinced, to show that 
the formative influence on Buber's distinction between primaiy and 
secondary revelation is the Hebrew Bible, his Jewish faith, especially 
as it has come to him in its Ilasidic form.
Let us then examine some of Buber's expositions of the 
biblical faith. While discussing the faith of the Old Testament proph­
ets, Buber has this to say: "Centralization and codification, undertak­
e n  in the interests of religion, are a danger to the core of religion, 
unless there is the strongest life of faith, embodied in the whole 
existence of the community, and no relaxing of its renewing activity"
*The Prophetic Faith, p. 170.
’Codification* and 'core of religion' in this quotation are obviously
secondary and primaiy revelation respectively* Discussing Pascal's
embracing of the God of the Bible, Buber remarks: "The God of Abraham,
the God in whom Abraham had believed and whom Abraham had loved ('The
entire religion of the Jews', remarks Pascal, 'consisted only in the love
of God'), is not susceptible of introduction into a system of thought
precisely because he is God, He is beyond each and every one of these
systems, absolutely and by virtue of his nature. What the philosophers
describe by the name of God cannot be more than an idea. But God,
'the God of Abraham', is not an idea; all ideas are absorbed in him".
Here Buber makes reference to the notion of primaiy revelation under the
term 'the God of Abraham', a God encountered by Abraham in the 'moment',
and to secondary revelation under the terms Videa', and 'system of
thought', So his view is really determined by the revelation of the
Hebrew bible. Still in the context of Pascal's conversion Buber has
this to say : " ... the philosopher, if he were really wish to turn his
back on that God (i.e. the God of the philosophers), would be compelled
to renounce the attempt to include God in his system in any conceptual
form. Instead of including God as one theme among others, that is, as
the highest theme of all, his philosophy both wholly and in part would be
^Eclipse of God:Studies in the Relation Between Religion and Philosophy, 
CHAPTER 17, I The Love of God and the Idea of Deity', pps. 67-84 =
Herberg, pps, 97-113, see p. 97*
compelled to point toward God, without actually dealing with him".* 
Still speaking of the God of the Bible, Buber points out the uselessness 
of secondary revelation .without primaiy : "For when man learns to love 
God, he senses an actuality which rises above the idea. Even if he 
makes the philosopher's great effort to sustain the object of his love 
as an object of his philosophic thought, the love itself bears witness
3E3Eto the existence of the Beloved". Buber's acceptance of the primary 
notion of revelation over against the secondary comes out finely in this 
passage : "If philosophy is here set in contrast to religion, what is 
meant by religion is not the massive fulness of statements, concepts, 
and activities that one customaril^y describes by this name and that men
300E
sometimes long for more than for God. Religion is essentially the 
act of holding fast to God. And that does not mean holding fast to an 
image that one has made of God, nor even holding fast to the faith in 
God that one has conceived. It means holding fast to the existing 
Gpd. The earth would not hold fast to its conception of the sun (if
5K3E3QEit had one), nor to its connection with it, but to the sun itself", 
(Eclipse of God, chapter VIII, 'God and the Spirit of Man1 = Herberg, 
pps. 108-113, see p. 108). But it is vital for our purpose here to 
note that Buber makes this distinction whilst discussing the God
Xop. eit., p. 98. The similarity here between Buber and Bultmann is too 
obvious to deserve comment. As we saw in chapter II above, in The Quest- 
:ion of Natural Revelation Bultmann argues that our existential self- 
analysif points to the notion of God, but without actually dealing with 
him. God is only to be met with in the 'moment' of encounter.
zcsr
op. cit., p. 107*
Cf. Bultmann's conviction th$t man's longing for a Weltanschauung 
(cf. Buber,'continuity) is an enemy of 'momentary' revelation.
XH3G€We remember here that Bultmann holds that faith said belief are not 
retainable entities, but 'events' in time.
disclosed through the Hebrew Bible; he is still discussing the God of 
Abraham. Secondary revelation can actually fight against primary rev- 
:elation and try to destroy it : "If the living quality of the concept- 
:ion of God refuses to enter into this conceptual image, it is tolerated 
alongside of it, ususally in an unprecise form, as in the end identical 
with it or at least essentially dependent on it* Or it is depreciated 
as an unsatisfactory surrogate, helpful to men incapable of thought".* 
Discussing Moses1 struggle against idolatry in early Israel’s sacrific- 
:ial system, Buber makes this comment : "The people wish for a tangible
3£3£
security, they wish to 'have' the God, they wish to have him at their
XXdisposal through a sacral system; but it is this security which
3E3EXMoses cannot and must not grant them". And of course it is precise-
sly this wish to ’have’ God (at their disposal) that gives rise to the 
religious ideology, the possessable Weltanschauung. Again, while dis- 
: cussing the faith of Judaism, and the question of whether there is or 
is not a Jewish dogmatics, Buber makes this important statement s 
"Dogma can arise only in a situation where detachment is the prevailing
attitude to the concrete, lived moment --  a state of detachment which
easily becomes misunderstood in dogmatics as being superior to the lived 
moment itself. Whatever is enunciated IN ABSTRACTO in the third per- 
:son about the divine, on the thither side of the confrontation of
*Eclipse of God, chapter VIII, quoted in Herberg, p. 109.
**We remember again Bultmann1s conviction that radical insecurity is the 
hall-mark of authentic existence.
C l o s e s , 'The Words on the tablets', pps. 119-140 = Herberg, pps. 181- 
202, see p. 191*
I and Thou, is only a projection onto the conceptual construct plane, 
which, though, indispensable, proves itself again and again to be 
unessential".* We could hardly ask for plainer proof that Buber 
infinitely prefers primary to secondaiy revelation, and that for 
Judaistic-biblical reasons# In another place we find his Jewish relig- 
:ion influencing Buber in the direction of primary as against secondary 
revelations "The tribes of Jacob could only become Israel by disentang- 
sling themselves from both gnosis and magic. He who imagines that he 
knows and holds the mysteiy fast can no longer face it as his 'Thou* ; 
and he who thinks that he can conjure and utilize it, is unfit for the
XXventure of true mutuality". There is no doubt that Buber’s terms 
’knowing1 and ’holding’(the mysteiy fast) imply a secondaiy type of 
revelation, and that ’facing’ it as 'Thou', and 'mutuality' imply the 
primaiy type* In Hasidism, the mystery of the person to God is "... 
rendered, however, no longer knowable"; "... The meaning of revelation 
is that it is to be prepared; Hasidism affirms that revelation is to be
XXXprepared in the whole reality of human life". The exact trouble with 
secondaiy revelation is just that it presupposes that this mystery is 
knowable within its propositions. Secondaiy revelation concerns itself 
with a God who is comprehensible, but who is rendered insufficient in
*Israel and the World, ’The Faith of Judaism', pps* 13-27 = Herberg, 
pps. 253-265*
**op. cit., p. 261.
***op. cit., p. 262.
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the crises and contradictions of life : " . •. • ■ the fear of God1 is right- 
sly called 'the beginning of knowledge' (Ps.lllslO). It is the dark 
gate through which man must pass if he to enter into the love of God.
He who wishes to avoid passing through this gate, he who begins to pro- 
:vide himself with a comprehensible God, constructed thus and not _other- 
:wise, runs the risk of having to despair of God in view of the actual it- 
sies of history and life, or of falling into inner falsehood. Only 
through the fear of God does man enter so deep into the love of God that
3£he cannot be cast out of it". Again the influence of Judaism in influen-
:cing Buber in the direction of primary revelation is apparent. This
danger of which Buber speaks here is a very real one, one of which exist~
:entialist theologians are keenly aware. As we shall see in the con-
:eluding chapter, when dealing with the problems of propositional theol-
:ogy and of community, Bultmann insists throughout his theology that
man's awareness of God and of his self-hood must be constantly corrected
and confirmed in 'moment' after 'moment' of responsible living. For
Bultmann too there can be no question of a metaphysical description of
God to which man's subsequent experience must conform;rather there must
be constant question and answer, dialogue, between Kerygma and situation
in man's existence. It is also this insight that lies behind Bultmann's
^Israel and the World, 'The Two Foci of the Jewish Soul', pps. 28-40 = 
Herberg, op. cit., pps. 266-276, see p. 269*
insistence that man cannot have belief in God as ’a lasting possession*. 
Discussing religion in the modern world, Buber asks this question - 
" ... where is religion to be found ? .......It is only to the historic—
—  or to some of them — —  that such a question can literally be address­
ed. But it is neither in their dogma nor in their ritual that the 
answer may lie; not in the one because its purpose is to formulate 
beliefs which are beyond conceptual thinking into conceptual proposit- 
:ions. not in the other because its object is to express the relation 
to the Unlimited by means of steadfast and regular performance* Both 
have their specific spheres of influence, but neither is capable of help­
ing the modem world to find faith* The only element in the historic 
religions which the world is justified in calling upon is that intrinsic 
reality of faith which is beyond all attempts at formulation and express- 
: ion but exists in truth; it is THAT which constantly renews the fulness 
of its presence from the flow of personal life itself. This is the one 
thing that matters: the personal existence, which gives actuality to the
X
essence of a religion and thus attests to its living force'*. Thus 
Buber gives the Hasidic-Jewish answer to his question; in this answer, 
the primary/secondaiy distinction is plain - 'dogma1, 'conceptual prop­
ositions', 'conceptual thinking*,'formulation', and 'expression' all 
indicate the secondary type: and 'beliefs which are beyond conceptual
gAt the Turning:Three Addresses on Judaism, (hew York 1952), pps* 29- 
44, * Herberg, pps. 306-314> see p. 307*
thinking1, 'that intrinsic reality of faith’, and ’personal existence1 
all indicate the primaiy. We shall return to this matter in our con- 
eluding chapter;it is sufficient here to note that the distinction in 
Buber between primary and secondary revelation has been profoundly in­
fluenced by his Jewish faith.
Buber admits that a certain genuine ’continuity1 is
x
possible. God is to met with here in this world, in this life, 
anew each day. This only comes about if man realizes the potency
of things in the world to become ’Thou’ for h i m  it is no guarant-
*eed, automatic, process. Man must realize that ’Its’ can come alive 
for him in his present, speak to him, and challenge him. In so far
as this process is carried out, it ’shapes man’s time’. And in so
4a?e- as the process continues, the ’moments’ of meaning and meeting 
increase in quantity until they lose 'the impression of isolatlci^sfiin- 
«ing in the darkness of the sky and gain the impression of a solid and
3E3EXstrong moon shining through a starlit night. Surely this symbol
of the moon is intended to convey a certain constancy and duration to
ft responsibly lived authentic life ? It is this process also that 
KI and Thou, pps. 114 f.
**We are reminded here of Bultmann’s fondness for the expression, that 
God’s mercies are to be realized new eveiy morning.
3QE3£ . , , i cop. Cit., p. 115*
♦ 3£builds up and guarantees community* For Buber, community does not 
come first, but rather authentic persons who have experienced the 
’moment1 commonly. It is this common experience which alone constitut-
yar
:es community and guarantees its existence*
Buber rejects the process by which man practises 
inflection to (reflexion to) the God who has revealed himself in the 
1moment’• This process is invalid because in it man wishes to concern 
himself with ’God’ and not with the world through which God reveals 
himself* But in revelation God and world are inextricably linked to-
3£sgether: "All revelation", says Buber, "is summons and sending".
3EThe 'God' of reflexion to the past is an 'It*. The comparison here
with Bultmann is almost too obvious to need comment. Bultmann too
sternly opposes the reproduction of past disclosure in their purely
worldly actuality; he does so because this process can be carried out
B1/
without one’s present being involved. For fittAill*ioo revelation
irivolves the world just because memoiy can only validly reproduce past
events by allowing them to encounter now his present-in-the-world. That
procedure of ’reflexion’ criticized by Buber, in contrast, is thoroughly
unhistorical. It concerns itself with a God who is above histopy, and
*op. cit*, p. 115.
shall return to Buber’s view of community in the conclusions.
time, and one’s present-in-the-world. Buber believes that nations 
and cultures are founded upon ’an original relational incident'.S 
But here again Buber disallows the possibility of secondaiy revelation; 
the original incident does not produce secondary knowledge generally 
available within the community# The continuity of the culture and the 
nation that it comprehends depends upon the re-living, and the re- 
encountering,of the original ’moment'. Without this, the past 'moment*
remains an ’It*, and thus strengthens the world of 'It', which can only
be spasmodically broken through by the 'glowing deeds of solitary
. . . . .  3SXspirits'•
Thus we conclude this section by pointing oui: once more 
that Buber, as well as Bultmann, dislikes merely propositional revelat-
:ion --- knowledge that man can master, possess and utilize. He there-
:fore refuses to seperate knowledge from the disclosure-moment. There 
is in his thought the closest possible connection between disclosure- 
event and what is disclosed;he holds that man cannot possibly come to 
the latter except through encounter with the former. In other words, 
man cannot attain to, unhistorically and untemporally, secondaiy revel- 
:ation by means of an inauthentic by-passing of primaiy revelation.
I and Thou, p. 54* An obvious example that springs to mind here is 
the Red Sea deliverance of the Hebrews and its function in the foundat- 
:ion of 'Israel'.
**op. cit., p. 54; we shall return to this insight when we compare, in 
chapter IV, Kierkegaard's views with those of Cullmann. Cullmann 
objects to Kierkegaard's Moment just because it implies an overleaping 
of time in a backward direction to the foundation-Christ-event, whilst 
ignoring the intervening history.
(3) CAUSALITY. FREEDOM, AND THE1 MOMENT1.
In reading this section of our study of Buber, there 
Should be kept in mind throughout section (3) of our chapter on Bult- 
imann, entitled 'THE 'MOMENT' IS ONE OF DECISION, RELATING THE PAST TO 
THE FUTURE' • We recall here that Bultmann holds that meaning can only 
be found in history (and indeed that the term 'history' itself has mean- 
:ing) if man by his choice and his decision can rise above causal laws 
and make his own history. If man were subject always and everywhere 
to causality, as are plants and animals, he would be merely an element 
in the natural world, and it would be nonsensical to talk of him as 
historical. We have seen how Bultmann rejects 'historicism', the inter­
pretation of man in analogy with na,ture. We have also seen how Bult-
I
smann holds that there is a 'moment1 given to man in which he may decide 
to become, and it is the possibility of this 'moment' that distinguishes 
man from nature. This 'moment' dislocates the causal connection between 
man's past and future. We have, in chapter I, compared this 'moment' 
to the 'Augenblick' of Heidegger in Sein und Zeit, and to the thought 
of Tillich and Kierkegaard. The importance of such a 'moment' can be 
seen perhaps from the following quotation from Karl Mannheim's 
Systematic Sociology3** "By itself living in society would not have such 
far-reaching consequences if man had not a fundamental quality which low-
xLondon 1957? P« 7*
lower/ animals lack; that quality is the flexibility of his behaviour. 
Ants and bees also live together, they too have a kind of division of 
labour and a kind of state, but, unlike man, there is no visible change
in their psychic life --  they still reproduce the same social and ment-
:al patterns, and in that sense they have no history". Mannheim agrees 
with Bultmann that ants and bees have no history; it is Bultmann's con-
:viction that 'the flexibility of ... behaviour' of which Mannheim
speaks is, in its radical sense, the gift of faith. Without such a 
gift, man has onfy^reedom to act.
We have already come across a certain duality in
Buber's thought in that he thinks of two worlds, of two spheres, two
types of reality; the one he designates 'Thou', the second, 'It'.
The 'moment', the present, presentness, belongs to the former of these 
two. But the world of 'It' and causality are closely linked together. 
'Causality has an unlimited reign in 'the world of 'It'1. We there­
fore expect to find its opposite in the world of 'Thou'. This is what 
we find; Buber states that this unlimited reign of causality need not 
cripple man, because man can from time to time leave the world of 
'It', of things, of objects, of causality, for another world where the
*It is significant how, in this important book, Mannheim deals first 
(pps. 7-27) with 'Man and his psychic equipment', before he deals with 
those social laws and forces which shape man. That is, he deals first 
with man's desires, wishes, freedom to decide and act, and so on.
^ I  and Thou, p. 51*
i.e. in moment after moment.
unlimited sway of causality is broken. The world of relation so enter 
:ed is 'Neither connected with nor coloured by any causality'. In his 
entiy into this sphere man finds assurance of freedom. In it he finds 
himself capable of decision. This is because in it man approaches the 
Face. Here we find linked up closely the 'moment' , the breaking of 
causality, freedom, decision, God. So far there is no great variance 
between the thought of Buber, and, say, the thought of Bultmann. But 
causality, proper to the sphere of 'It', can invade the sphere of the
'Thou' with disastrous results. This can happen to two entities ---
to the person, and to the nation. It can happen to the person when
he forgets that his freedom from causal forces depends upon those 
'moments' when he enters the world of relation, of the 'Thou', when he 
is assured of freedom, and can become. It can happen to a nation or to 
*1 and Thou, p. 51*
3£3£Buber thinks there is a danger of this in the times in which we are 
living: "In our time there predominates an analytical, reducing, and
deriving look between man and man. 'This look is analytical, or rather 
pseudo-analytical, since it treats the whole being as put together and
therefore able to be taken apart --  not only the so-called Unconscious
which is patent of a relative objectification but also the psychic 
stream itself, which can in truth never be adequately grasped as an ob- 
:ject. This look is reducing, because it tries to contract the rnani- 
tfold person, which is nourished by the microcosmic richness of the poss* 
:ible, to some schematically surveyable and recurrent structure. And 
this look is deriving, because it supposes it can grasp what a man has 
become, or even is becoming, in genetic formulae, and it thinks that 
even the dynamic central principle of the individual in this becoming 
can be represented by a general concept. An effort is being made 
today not merely at Max Weber's 'disenchantment' - which could be quite 
acceptable - but also at a radical destruction of the mysteiy between 
man and man. The personal life, the constantly near mysteiy, once the 
source of the most tranquil enthusiasms, is planed down" - The Elements 
of the Inter-human, transl. by R. Gregor Smith, private MS, pps. 13-
14*
3BE3£I and Thou, p. 54
a culture (as we have already noted) when the original foundational- 
’ moment' is not renewed and re-lived by succeeding generations* If p.
54 of I and Thou fcg carefully examine#, we see that its key-note is 
•again and again1, in ’moment’ after ’moment’. If the person or the 
nation makes these om^issions, what is the result ? It is that K 
"smooth causality ... rises up till it is an oppressive, stifling, fate”. 
’’Wise and masterful destiny .•. has been changed into a demonic spirit 
adverse to meaning, and has fallen into the power of causality ... 
we are laden with the whole burden of the dead weight of the world, with 
fate that does not know spirit”. The solution to such a dilemma 
lies in ” ••• a new event of meeting, which in the course of assuming 
substantial being — - out of a new .response, determining destiny, of a 
man to his ’Thou'". In short, the solution lies in re-living, re- 
experiencing, re-encountering, an emphasis in Buber which we have already 
analysed in relation to the Bultmann-Dilthey-Collingwood interpretation 
of history* 1
We have noted more than once Bultmann's aversion to
1historicism1• Buber is equally opposed to it* He attacks strongly
What ha calls the 'quasi-biological and quasi-historical thought of
and Thou, p. 54*
**op. cit., p. 54* Buber here uses 'fate* to denote causality and 
'spirit’to denote freedom. In this part of land Thou Buber makes plain 
his debt to oriental philosophy, especially to Buddhist karmatic thought.
3BO£ . , ccop. cit., p. 55*
3£today'* He attacks it because it has established 'a more tenacious 
and oppressive belief in fate than has ever before e x i s t e d ' S u c h  
thought contradicts the view that " . *** because man is the sole living 
creature known to us in whom the category of possibility is so to 
speak embodied, and whose reality is incessantly enveloped by possibilit­
ies, he alone amongst them all needs confirmation* Every animal is 
-fixed in its this-being, its modifications are pre-ordained, and when 
it changes into a caterpillar and into a chrysalis its very metamorphos­
is is a boundary; in everything together it remains exactly what it is, 
therefore it can need no confirmation; it would, indeed, be ap4bsurdity 
for someone to say to it, or for it to say to itself: You may be what 
you are* Han as man is an audacity of life, undetermined and unfixed; 
he therefore requires confirmation, and he can naturally only receive 
this as individual man, in that others and he himself confirm him in 
his being-this-man''.** The fate belief in which is established by mod-
I
:ern thought is, according to Buber, made up of several strands* One 
such is " •*• the 'law of life' of a universal struggle in which all
must take part or renounce life Here Buber obviously intends
those universal interpretations of histoiy which try to elucidate how 
xop. cit., p. 56.
^Images of Good and Evil, chapters III and IV in Good and Evil; Two 
interpretations, (Hew York 1953)> pps* 125-138 ■* Herberg, pps* 89-96, 
dee p. 94*
^^I and Thou, p• 56•
history operates in accordance with universal rules, and which instruct 
nations and individuals how they must co-operate with such laws to their 
benefito The second strand is *' ... the ’law of the soul1 which com- 
ipletely builds up the psychical person from innate habitual instincts*'. 
Buber obviously has in mind here certain mechanistic psychologies.
The use of the word 'law1 implies that such a psychology would decribe 
how the person must behave, causally conditioned, without freedom to 
decide and therefore to become. The third strand of fate cited by Buber 
is " ..<> the 'social law' of an irresistible social process to which 
will and consciousness nay only be accompaniments". Here is meant
obviously sociologies which describe man as the product of social and
economic change as being moulded radically by the group or groups
to which he belongs and in the face of which he is by his decision or 
will quite powerless. A fourth and final strand is " ... the
•cultural law' of an unchangeably uniform coming and going of historical
3£ 1structures1'. Here is meant obviously those great philosophies of 
history which divide the past into eras or periods, and from which there 
is produced by induction certain laws or predictions regarding the 
future of history. Writing in 1948» Buber points out that the
•man of today’ has two approaches to history before him which are both
xop. cit., p. 56.
^^For a sociologist's criticisms of such mechanistic psychologies, see 
Karl Mannheim, Systematic Sociology, 2, i, 'Habits and the Problem of 
Instincts’, pps. 10 f.
^^For descriptions of such sociologies see again Mannheim, op. cit.
*3eHEi,iany such philosophies of history are set forth and analysed admirab­
l y  in Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis, by Pitirim A. Sorokin, 
(London 1952J.
invalid. The first is simply to reject utterly as impossible any
attempt to find meaning in the 'promiscuous agglomeration of happ­
enings'. And the second is " ... to view history dogmatically,
derive laws from the past sequences of events, and calculate future 
sequences, as though the 'main lines' were already traced on some 
roll which need merely unroll; as though history were not the vital 
living, growing,of time, constantly moving from decision to decis- 
:ion, of time into which my time and my decisions stream full 
force. He regards history as a stark, ever-present, inescapable
3£
space". The words 'unchangeably uniform' are typical of all
these strands of fate which Buber contends the quasi-biological and 
quasi-historical thought of today bids us accept, 'The net result 
of such fate for man is that ' ... (he) is set in the frame of an 
inescapable happening that he cannot, or can only in his frenzy, 
resist". At the basis of all these 'laws' is ’possession by
I
SQE3E
process, that is, by unlimited causality’. And ’the dogma of
3E3EX
process leaves no room for freedom’.
The solution to this frightful dilemma is to be found
^Israel and the World, pps. 89-102 = Herberg, pps. 239-250, see p.
244.
3GKI and Thou, p. 56.
“ op. cit., p. 57*
in a certain type of individual. This individual would deal thus 
with the four strands of fate which Buber has singled out s-
(1) With regard to the great universal interpretations of history, 
he would 'through reversal surmount the universal struggle'.x That 
is, escape from the so-called inescapable.
(2) With regard to mechanistic psychologies, he would through
3£reversal 'tear to pieces the web of habitual instincts'.
(3)With regard to economically determined sociologies, he would 
'raise the class ban'X; that is, he would escape from the determin- 
*ing sway of class and society.
(4) With regard to 'era'-philosophies of history, he would 'stir,
3£rejuvenate, and transform the stable structures of history. That 
is, by his existence he would demonstrate that the necessary comings 
and goings of historical process were not at all necessary. Such a 
man, acting in these four directions, shatters the four strands of
I
fate in which modern thought would have us believe. For man's
uniqueness is the possibility of the 'moment'; in it there is given
what Buber calls 'reversal', the 'break t h r o u g h ' T h u s  the
'moment' in which this happens makes man's history possible.
* op. cit., p. 57*
■A*op. cit., p. 56*
hj ~ •;
In a society in which there is enslavement to causality- 
one of the obvious symptoms of this is alx^ ays the prediction or 
the prophesying of future events from those ’laws’ which are supposed 
to have emerged from our examination of past events# As we shall 
see in the next chapter when we examine Kierkegaard’s argument in 
the Philosophical fragments it was just in this connection that he 
raged against his own generation as ’’this prophesying generation”. 
Their prophesying and prediction was ample proof of their belief in 
and masteiy by fate, by causality* Buber can say very much the 
same thing : ’’Prediction from the world of objectivity is valid only
3fcfor the man who does not know presentness". It is in the present 
’moment’ that there is given awareness of freedom, and thus the poss­
ibility of decision and thus the possibility of becoming not bound 
to any objective cause;thus prediction of the future becomes in- 
:valid. What the future will aqtually be will thus depend to some 
extent upon what man does with that freedom which is a possibility 
of the 'moment'. The man who does not know presentness, the 
'moment', is severely limited. Knowing only causality, he can be 
concerned only with ends which he wishes to attain in the world of
It and the correct means of attaining them —  in short, with 
HI and Thou, p. 58*
techniques, and their study, technology. He can he concerned with
nothing else, certainly not with himself, for he knows when he
a ,
examines himself that he can do nothing with himself — - he is^creat- 
sure causally determined* There ,ufore he indulges in escapism -—  
tinkering with means and ends in the world of ’It1. This escapism 
absorbs his attention and prevents him from falling into despair
IE.about himself; ironically, this despair would be ultimately healthy, 
for it would help him to recognise the unreality of his own existence
3E5Eand so ’come to himself’. In contrast to such a man, the man
who knows freedom does not dissipate his energies in the world of 
means and ends — - he knows that he must become by means of his dec-
3HE3E3E 3E3E3E3Eiision* He has made a ’primal’ decision --  the decision to
approach his destiny here in this world of time   and this decision
involves the decision ever to renew it. Such a man Buber calls the
3E3E3E’free man’ --  free because he has known the ’moment' of present-I
Jness. We have already seen in Bultmann that the freedom which 
dislocates the past from the future is not a general, observable, 
possessable quality, but rather that ’freedom is an event’. So it 
is too with Buber : "For the responsible response to exist, the real-
XI and Thou, p. 61.
3E3ECf. Kierkegaard’s argument in The Sickness unto Death.
3£X3CI and Thou, p. 60.
yyyy
’Primal’, meaning basic, fundamental, indispensable, and also the 
first in a series without which the series would be impossible.
reality/ of the person is necessaxy, whom the word meets and claims 
in the event; and the reality of the truth is necessaiy to which the 
person goes out with united being and which he is,therefore, able to 
receive only in the word, as the truth which concerns himself, in 
his particular situation, and not in any general way”. Thus for 
Buber also, freedom is an event»
Man’s situation is characterised by paradox, by an
XXantinomy. To live in paradox, in this specific paradox between 
necessity and freedom, is extremely uncomfortable. Man dislikes 
the antinomy. There are four invalid ways in which man can deal 
with it
(i) He may accept one pole and reject the other, which is a destruct- 
:ion of the paradox®
(ii) He may try to think out a synthesis between the two --  this als
amounts to an elimination of the paradox.
(iii) He may relativize the antinomy.
(iv) He may try to deal with the conflict between the two poles
XXin some other way than with his life® The paradox is religious
X Between Man and Man, ’The Question to the Single One’, pps. 40-61, 
651 69-719 -  Herberg, pps. 63-88. See p. 85*
**1 and Thou, pps. 95-6.
(or better, existential) and not merely intellectual• If it were
merely intellectual or philosophical, there are various techniques
by which we might rid ourselves of it. There is the technique of
Kant —  to ascribe necessity to the world of appearances and free-
sdom to the world of being. This is to reconcile the paradoxical
Xxpoles. There is the Hegelian technique -—  this is to reconcile 
the poles of the paradox through a synthesis on the earthly plane, 
here, in time and history. At this point it is impossible not to 
mention Kierkegaard and his anti-rHegelian revolt. F o r Kierkegaard,
man’s experience of the paradox leads him into despair --  despair
at the human intellect's inability to comprehend or to reconcile the 
paradox.’ Melville Chaning-Pearce quotes Dr, W.M. Horton thus:
" ... a truly reverent theology ..• must reverse the Hegelian dial­
ectic ... must look for no synthesis on the earthly plane, but 
balance every thesis with an antithesis, every Yes with a Ho, and
i
then, standing helplessly in the contradiction, appeal to God for
a revelation, for an act of grace".*** Melville Chaning-Pearce
points out again the close link between the paradox and life i h ’o
Kierkegaard when he writes : "Kierkegaard's conclusion is that of
.Jan,.,van RuyabrQekl— Lwe. JimsIlaII,,fonnd,,.our lives upon a fathomless 
*op. cit., p. 96.
**aegel's name is not mentioned by Buber;but it is impossible from
the context, when Buber rejects the technique of thinking out a
synthesis between thesis and antithesis (I and Thou, p. 95)? not to
conclude that Buber has Hegel in rnind.
***Soren Kierkegaard:A Study, (London 1945)> p. 40.
0 ' 1 
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abyss’ —  an abyss which can only be crossed by the’leap in the 
dark1 which is faith, that ’happy passion1. But, for existential 
thinking, faith itself remains a ’tension’. Existential truth is 
thus a ’troubled truth’ which points to despair and so to the decis- 
:ion of faith1'. Let us now return to Buber. For him also the 
antinomy (paradox) is not just a matter of thought. It is a matter 
of concrete life* It concerns ’standing before God’• The two poles 
of it are represented first by ’I am given over for disposal1 
(necessity), and second by ’It depends on myself1 (freedom).** For 
Buber, the only valid way of dealing with the paradox is to realise 
that ’it has to be lived’.** ”1 am compelled to take both sides
XX
to myself, to be lived together, and in being lived they are one”.
For Buber, no stronger attack can be made upon the paradox than that 
of logical propositions : "It is only when reality is turned into
XXXlogic, and A and non-A dare no longer dwell together that we
i XXXX
get determinism and indeterminism, a doctrine 01 predestination
and a doctrine of freedom, each excluding the other. According to
the logical conception of truth, only one of two contraries can be
true; but in the reality of life as one lives it, they are inseperab-
:le. The person who makes a decision knows that his deciding is
no self-delusion; the person who has acted knows that he was and is 
op. cit., p. 41*
**I and 'Thou, p. 96.
***1.6. Thesis and antithesis, the two poles of the paradox* 
xxxxi.e. "-isms", theories, not existential realities.
in the hand of God. The unity of the contraries is the mystery at
the innermost core of the dialogue".X Thus for Buber also, the
A>/ t ft
paradox is something which man has to live.
A
It will be obvious from this that Buber does take 
his place (as do K-ierkegaard and Bultmann) in the 1 existentialist 
tradition'• That side of the paradox we call necessitybelongs to 
that sphere which IHiber calls 'It' --  the world of process, of
X35E
causality, of laws, of means and ends* The other side, freedom,
belongs to the sphere symbolised by the ’moment', by presentness.
In these 'moments' man is not bound to the world of causality, but 
can leave it and thus escape from the determining universal svray of 
causality in the 'It'-sphere. In returning to the 'It'-sphere man 
returns different. In this two-way movement is his life to be 
found* Man must find his total life not in one sphere nor in the
other but in both. There is the tension of the paradox --  having
to live in one sphere and having to leave it in the 'moment' for 
the other, and having to return again. Thought, as both Buber and
XIsrael and the V/orld, 'The Faith of Judaism', pps. 13-27, =
Herberg, pps. 253-265, see p. 256 f* This important matter of para- 
:doxes 'thought out' and 'lived out' will be raised again in our 
conclusions when we deal with the problem of propositional theology.
saMan is of course an 'It' in so far as he is also a biological 
organism. Thus man must accept a certain 'givenness' of biologic- 
sal and psychological heredity and so-on.
Kierkegaard are agreed, cannot deal with this paradox, but only life. 
If thought could deal with the paradox, we must notice that this ad­
mission would constitute a major attack on the ’moment’, on the 
essential historicity and temporality of man, on decision, in short, 
on the presuppositions of existentialist theology. It is for this 
reason that both -^ uber and Kierkegaard reject thought's jurisdiction 
over the paradox, and,, analogically, Bultmann rejects objectively 
verifiable dogma and prepositional theology. All must depend upon 
the ’moment';upon the ’moment’ depends whether man is or is not caus- 
sally determined, on the 'moment' depends whether man becomes an 
authentic being or remains sunk in inauthenticity. We have stated 
that Buber takes his place within the existentialist tradition. What 
does this mean at this point ? If one takes a group of typical 
existentialist thinkers, such as those whose thought is analysed by 
Mr. H.J. Blackham in his Six Existentialist Thinkers, one finds that 
there are two strands running through their work. From a reading of 
Mr. Blackham’s book itself, this becomes apparent. These two 
strands of paramount importance in the writing of existentialist are 
(i) Necessity, and (ii) Freedom. And the existentialists are prone 
to giving a good deal of attention to elucidating the precise conn- 
section between the two. So Blackham writes s "To recognize that 
these limits define the permanent possibility of my realizing myself 
in the world is the necessary disillusion and despair on the further 
side of which is the possibility of self-transcendence, for then the 
limits are accepted as the end only for particular aims and forms of 
attachment and for the general understanding, and they may become 
frontiers where Transcendence is met. The perpetuial temptatiom
to escape from this situation in mysticism^or positivism or intell-
hreoCucttr&z-
Jectualism, to refuse to recognise that there is an dual-
:ity between being-oneself and being-there in the world, that the 
authentic self which transcends the empirical world in liberty is 
doomed to frustration in the tasks and ends ana ideals which it must 
nevertheless seriously engage in pursuing, as the only way of being- 
oneself and of reaching being-in-itself, this tension is the ethical
3£3Q£situation at the heart of Jasper's philosophy"•
Buber also finds life hovering between these two poi­
ses the distance between which cannot be thought out but can only 
be lived out in the tensions of concrete existence* Hie core of 
this actual living is, of course, the'moment' in which there is the 
free possibility of deciding what is going to be accepted from the 
past and from one's givenness, what is going to be rejected from 
this, and what shape one's future self is going to take. The 
general similarities between Bultmann's and Buber’s positions are 
obvious* This brings to a conclusion this section of Buber’s 
thought, and its importance for contemporary theology and philosophy*
*Typical of existentialism is the distrust of mysticism;we have al­
ready, in chapter I, seen that Buber lists it as an enemy of the 
'moment'; so does Buber, as we shall see in a la.ter section of this 
chapter*
3Q£1Intellectualism', in the sense of asserting the supremacy of 
thought over life, and in the sense of being the constructer of a 
system, is another element much distrusted by existentialists*
^^Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 52.
(4) THE ENEMIES OF THE 'MOMENT' .
In the reading of this section on Buber's 
thought, we should try to keep in mind the sixth section of chapter 
I on Bultmann, THE NATURAL. .EKEMIES OF THE 'MOMENT*. We shall 
draw comparisons where thought possible. Throughout this fourth 
section we shall also list those elements in human existence which^
theA occurrence of the 'moment', reference to which is made elsewhere 
in this chapter*
Since in Buber the 'moment' is closely linked
with the presentness of the 'Thou', it is natural that we should 
that
findXthe world of 'It' appears as antithetical to the 'moment' and
I
to its occurrence. For Buber the 'moment' is so important, so 
meaningful and significant, that it is exclusive. Buber can say 
that the reality which confronts us in the 'moment' of encounter
X X'fills the heavens1. Its range is cosmic. All else 'lives
in its light*. But when the 'momentary' event has run its course,
i..
it becomes an 'It' in the world of 'It'; but it offends th^ world of 
'It' precisely because of its exclusiveness. It seems to the world
of 'It* that the 'moment' claims to 'exclude the universe'»K 
Hence we have one source of opposition to the 'moment' from the 
world of Jit'. It feels itself excluded from experience, from 
revelatory power, by the positing of the 'moment1. It seems though 
that this is an offence which any experiential theology cannot help 
causing. To be informed that one cannot appreciate a certain 
sphere of life, or a certain area of existential country, because 
one has not yet experienced it properly, is a most irritating exper- 
sience. There is a certain sense in which every claim to truth 
implies a certain exclusiveness. If I claim that A is true, and 
B is its opposite, this seems to imply that B is excluded from truth 
by my claim. This may cause offence. If old age chides youth 
with the assertion that youth is unable to comprehend because of its 
lack of years, this is a grave offence to youth. Exclusiveness 
as a cause of offence can be illustrated in many ways; when St,
-we
Paul writes " . . ^preach Christ crucified ... unto the Creeks 
foolishness" (i Cor. 1:23),tire point of this is that since Greek 
thought sought after truth in universals, the proclamation of the 
truth in the form of a concrete life and death was folly to the
XX
Greek mind. For the Greeks of St. Paul's day, the preaching of
Xop. cit., p. 78*
XXThis logically implies that Christianity is offensive just because 
it locates the truth in particular events and not in others;thus we 
shall argue in our concluding chapter that Christianity implies the 
offence of particularity which implies in turn the 'moment' as a 
necessary Christian category.
’' ‘1
V-/ •'
Christ was folly because, in the terms Buber uses, it ’excluded the 
universe’. Therefore it is hard not to conclude that any theology 
which takes seriously man’s essential historicity and temporality 
does imply some form of exclusiveness, and therefore cannot escape 
the possibility of giving offence. Thus Paul Tillich writes : 
"Christian theology ... implies the claim that it is THE theology, 
fhe basis of this claim is the Christian doctrine that the Logos 
became flesh, that the principle of the divine self-relevation has 
become manifest in the event ’Jesus as the Christ’. If this mess- 
sage is true, Christian theology has received a foundation which 
transcends the foundation of any other theology and which itself 
cannot be transcended." Thus Tillich perceives the offence inher-
30Esent in the specific, concrete, particular event. The ’moment’,
in so far as it claims to be a ’filled present’, (Buber), ’filled 
with eternity’ (Kierkegaard), ’eternal’ (Bultmann), is bound to be
I
offensive to those who seek for universality in intellectualism or
mysticism or science. It is of course perfectly true that eecles-
siastical histoiy abounds in instances of gross abuse.just because of
this exclusiveness, and that the doctrine of exclusiveness is one
fraught with the most frightful dangers, not always least for those 
^Systematic Theology, I, pps. 19-20.
**01. " ... strait is the gate and narrow is the way which leadeth 
unto life, and few there be that find it".
who hold it. Indeed, one cannot help sympathising with those who 
will have nothing to do with this doctrine because of its horrible 
historical consequences alone. Yet, it must also be said that 
ecclesiastical abuses, numerous and frightful as they have been, do 
not by themselves constitute a reason for not holding to some form 
of particularity and exclusiveness. After all, many theological 
doctrines (e.g. Justification by Paith, the dialectical relationship 
of the believer to the secular world as in I Cor. 7s29> analysed in 
chapter I), are dangerous and always liable to acute distortion, 
but because a doctrine is dangerous is not a sufficient reason for 
saying it is untrue. Nor should we identify a doctrine with its 
historical distortions. At any rate, Buber is clear that the 
’moment1, entering the world of ’It’ as an ’It’, is an offence to it 
because of its exclusiveness. We shall re-open this matter in our 
concluding chapter when we examine the doctrine (and scandal) of
I
particularity.
We have noted already that for Buber the world 
of ’It’ has a certain solidity over against the ’moment’. It is 
the world where we must live and make our living every day, out of 
which we are invited to come in the transitory ’ momeht1. But the 
world of ’It’ clings to us, it is fain to see us go. It offers us
3Ecomfort and security and activity in competition with the ’moment'.
*1 and Thou, pps. 33-4»
How hard it is, to use Bultmann1 s terminology, to maintain that inner 
detachment from the world of things and commerce and 'Its' which will 
allow us to turn aside to meet the ’Thou* which confronts us. "How 
powerful", writes ■‘hiber, "Is the unbroken world of It, and how delic- 
:ate are the appearances of the Thou". The 'moment* has a hard 
task finding an entrance into a world which, says Buber, is covered
Xby a 'crust'. In other contexts Buber leaves us in little doubt
XXthat he conceives the two spheres as being in mutual opposition.
He speaks of the 'moments' linking up into a world-solidarity over 
against the It-worid, and the task of the 'moments' being that of
XXXpenetrating and transforming the world of 'It'. We need hardly
note here that the 'moment' also finds opposition from the It- 
Sphere because of the universal sway of causality in it; the 'mom- 
sent' s1 task is to dislocate causal process by conferring freedom.
I
The 'moment* implies meeting, encounter, in time. 
Anything that denies encounter opposes the 'moment'. Because the 
'moment' is bi-polar, it can be denied by anything which breaks 
this structure. For example, exclusive emphasis on the 'I' as
op. cit., p. 98.
**op. cit., p. 100.
***op. cit., p. 100. This is surely Bultmann's view alsojthe world 
of the everyday takes on a new meaning for the believer as that 
sphere abounding in opportunities for concrete acts of AGAPE.
3€
subject would fall into this category. So would any theory of 
the divine immanence which regards the soul as a substance impressed 
with revelation apart from meeting the other in time and history; to 
this we shall return in our next and final section®
Another element cited by Buber as opposing the occurrence 
of the ’moment1 is mysticism* As we saw in chapter I, so does Bult- 
:mann* It is interesting that Buber criticizes mysticism for almost 
the same reasons as does Bultmann, and his colleagues in the exist”
3£3£3E:entialist tradition. He dislikes mysticism because it makes
a complete break with life in the world. In the ’moment’ a man 
leaves this world for the other world disclosed in the ’moment', but 
he must return to it immediately, except that he is now altered, 
changed, different. This world can never be the same again for 
him;it assumes a new meaning because of the experience of the
I
'moment'. But in mysticism this world is denied. The world of
SH3£It is perfectly possible for the mutuality of Buber's I-Thou relat­
ionship to be criticised from the point of view of Christian theol- 
:ogy, as being ultimately incompatible with AGAPE,with divine grace 
as it is emphasised in the New Testament. Yet this should bot blind 
the Christian theologian to the value of Buber's thought which guards 
theology against two errors;first,against the notion of man as a sub- 
:ject-I contemplating an object-God;second,against the notion of a 
God who is wholly Other revealing himself to man as, in Dr. John 
Baillie's terminology, to a stick or a stone, Man does not discover 
God as an object;God does not disclose himself to man as an object. 
Buber's I-Thou theology invalidates both of these notions, and there­
fore has great value for Christian theology.
xSee I and Thou, pps. 81 f.
3EX3E . , or- oop. Cit,, pps, 85 f*
the mystic has no relationship to this world. The tragedy of mystic 
Jisrn is that it forgets that man must live daily here in this world, 
in this life. The consequence of engaging in this type of mystic- 
iism  is a kind of existential schizophrenia s "What does it help my 
soul that it can he withdrawn anew from this world here into unity,
when this world itself has of necessity no part in the unity -----
what does all 'enjoyment of God' profit a life that is rent in two ?
If that abundantly rich heavenly moment has nothing to do with my
poor earthly moment what has it then to do with me, who have
still to live, in all seriousness still to live, on earth ? Thus 
are the masters to he understood who have renounced the raptures 
of ecstatic 'union'". As we said earlier in discussing Bultmann*s 
distrust of mysticism, mysticism completely misunderstands the 
dialectical relationship to the world;it seizes on one pole of the 
paradox only; while this relationship rejects the world in any ultim-
I
:ate sense, it yet affirms the world as a rich sphere where 'moments' 
of love and relation are constantly occurring;this latter pole 
mysticism fails to see. Thus, as Bultmann might say, mysticism 
helps man to flee from his demanding and enigmatic historicity and 
temporality.
XI  and Thou, p. 87*
We must also, for completeness* sake, include here 
man's natural desire for continuity and duration, which we have dis-
3Escussed earlier. In this connection we have already discussed man's
desire for a Weltanschauung, a system, which give!him security and a 
ready-to-hand solution to riddles and. enigmas, and we have already 
drawn comparisons with Bultmann's work. We have also seen the oppos­
ition exerted by inauthentic faith which replaces rather than com- 
splements the 'moment' of relation, and how the inauthentic cult can 
replace rather than be a resnonse to the reality which comes in the 
'moment'• We have seen too how the 'moment' can be denied by the 
man who forgets its propensity to become present reality again and 
again, and who thus regards a past 'moment' as a mere objectification. 
False forms of community (cf. Bultmann) can stifle the occurrence of 
the 'moment' also. Thus collectivism for Buber is the "last barrier
raised by man against a meeting with himself" and therefore with 
SEX 1God. He calls to contemporaiy man "to be a person again, to res- 
:cue one's real personal self from the fiery jaws of collectivism, 
which devours all selfhood". "The person has become questionable
3£" ... man desires to possess God; he desires a continuity in space 
and time of possession of God", op. cit., p. 113*
"(Man wants) ... meaning as something that can be continually taken up 
and handled, a continuum unbroken in space ana time that insures his 
life at eveiy point and every moment", op. cit., p. 115*
Man " ... longs for extension in time, for duration", op. cit., p.
113.
^Between Man and Man, 'What is Man ?', p. 201 ;cf. Herherg, op. cit., 
Introduction, p. 24*
3aaEBetween Man and Man, 'The Education of Character', p. 111.
through being collectivized ... The truth has become questionable
3£through being politicized”. Buber's paper The Elements of the 
Inter-human shows further his distrust of false forms of community 
such as propaganda-and ccllectivist-states© We cite also man's 
arrogant lust for possessions and for the security offer in preference 
to the unreliability, peril, and lack of duration characteristic
3€3Eof the 'moment' ; or we could cite man's mistaken notion of know­
ledge as consisting of items of information from the objective
JE3E3Eworld© 'Codification' and 'objectification' are both processes
fraught, for Buber, with great danger. Thus Herberg writes s 
" ....Buber's inability to accept the halakah is his fear that through 
becoming codified in the law, the demand of God is 'objectified' and
robbed of its inner power........ „^x3boe „......
God, which is 'God's instruction in his way', may not without peril 
be made into a 'seperate objectivum'"• To this business of
'objectification' we shall returh in our conclusions when we deal 
with the whole problem of propositional theology©
At any rate it is quite clear that for both Bult- 
imann and Buber, the 'moment' has Id face considerable opposition from
between Man and Man, 'The Question to the Single One', pps. 80-81, 
and Thou, p. 78*
“ op. cit., p. 42.
3t3EKXW. Herberg, op. cit., Introduction, p. 38.
X30€3QtW. Herberg, op. cit., Introduction, p. 38, quoting Two 'Ey; 
Faith, (london 1951)> p* 57*
various elements in man's personal and social life. The number of 
elements common to Buber's and Bultmann's thought are undeniably 
remarkable© Could not Herberg have written of Bultmann as he has of 
Buber?: "Many are the ways in which the self tries to evade its 
responsibility in the existential dialogue of life, but they all add 
up in the end to the erection of some protective structure of fixed 
and final general rules (ideas, programs, values, standards, &tc.)X 
to stand between the individual person and the concrete here-and-now 
which makes its demand upon him, so that it is not he that is decid- 
sing, but the general rule that decides for him". We must now 
turn to our fifth and final section of this study of Buber.
*Not only have we seen Bultmann1 s refusal to understand man as a con- 
:crete instance of a general rule, but we recall how he instanced 
ideas and programmes as enemies of the 'moment's' occurrence.
Herberg, op. cit., Introduction, p. 20.
(5) THE 'MOMENT1, THE SPIRITUAL LIFE, AMD THE DOCTRMB OF IMMANENCE.
As this fifth section of our study of Buber is read 
there should be kept in mind throughout our argument in chapter II, 
where we discussed the 'moment' and the doctrine of immanence, and 
where Buber's ideas on immanence have already been touched on.
Sunk in the world of 'It1, man's time is spent in 
such activities as using, and in 'specialized utilization', in
3£acquiring and exploiting the fruits of the experience of others©
This utilization tends towards a better organization of man's social 
and economic structures. When men talk of 'a progressive develop-
3Q£
iment of the spiritual life* this is the meaning they give it©
But the cultivation of the life of the spirit does not consist in
I
becoming a better user, a better organizer, of the world of 'It', a
more skilful acquirer of information. Indeed, Buber holds that
the following of such activities, far from sharpening the spiritual
faculties, actually dulls and blunts them. For these activities are
engaged in at the expense of the ability to enter into relation, to
*The 'classical' instance of this is the way in which scientific re- 
:suits, as a body of 'assured results', are taken over and used with- 
sout the experimentation which produced them having to be repeated©
**1 and Thou, p. 38.
to relinquish the world of fIt * momentarily for the meeting, for the 
encounter* For it is this ability which is the content .of the
Xspiritual life —  and attention and cultivation paid to it are alone
3€3£worthy of the name, 'cultivation of the spirit'. Han becomes 
cultivated spiritually only in so far as, becoming aware of his own 
radical historicity, he .directs himself existentially to the world 
of history, events, and persons, which stream toward him continually 
in time* becoming (or having the potentiality to become) 'Thou' for 
him* So says Buber : "Through the Thou a man becomes I "•
50£3€5£
"All real living is meeting". Turned in upon himself in
nysticism, in self-contemplation, man misses his real existence, 
because that is offered to him only in his time and in his history.
In affirming and going out to the world, the world of events and 
persons actually cultivate and shape him as a spiritual being*
I
'Spirit'for Buber is not a substance in the soul 
which requires cultivation and care by means of spiritual exercises 
carried out in solitude* For him, spirit is not IN, but BETWEEN.
It realizes existence IN meeting, IN encounter. Thus Buber writes?
In other words, Bultmann's, the alternative view would seem to hold 
that it was possible for us to acquire and utilize as a Weitanschau- 
:ung secondary revelation, without that immersion, encounter,meeting, 
re-living, so characteristic of primary revelation*
**This theme of Buber's is of course developed in his paper, Of 
Teaching and Learning, pps. 157-145 i*1 Israel and the World, = 
Herberg, pps0 517-524*
k,:» '/
"Spirit is not the ’I1, hut between 'I1 and 'Thou'. It is not like 
the blood that circulates in you, but like the air in which you
breathe. Man lives in the spirit, if he is able to respond to his
•Thou*. He is able to, if he enters into relation with his whole 
being. Only by virtue of his power to enter into relation is he
3£3£able to live in the spirit". That man must learn to direct him-
Jself existentially to history and time is meant again by Buber when 
he writes s "The 'I1 is real in virtue of its sharing in reality.
The fuller its sharing, the more real it becomes". It would be 
wrong though to conclude from this that in the encounter, in the 
sharing, the * I* is lost, is so connected to what it encounters that
it disappears, merged in the other. No, the ’moment1 can be repres­
ented as a swinging movement — • into relation and back again into
3Q0Eisolation like a pendulum. In this movement, the ’I1 retains its
identity —  as Buber says : "The seed remains in it". Yet in
the movement it changes in the sense that it develops and matures;
before it swings back again into isolation, the * If approaches nearer 
to its authentic existence. "In subjectivity the spiritual substance 
of the person matures". And Buber further describes this move­
ment by saying of it that each swing into relation intensifies the
3GQ€
desire for yet more sharing and so further maturity. In this
Gf. substantial theories of soul and of immanence, 
op. cit., p. 59*
XXX .. ctlop. cit., p. 65.
sense too, we can say that man’s decision to open himself up towards 
histoiy and time means his entering upon a course whereby he will be 
cultivated spiritually.
At this point we may make two observations. First,
we see the typically existentialist pattern in which man is always on
the way (Bultmann), always in a perpetual state of becoming, only
pointing towards finality, his genuine self. V/e note also that Bub-
:er, like his existentialist colleagues never prescribes WHAT man mus
havebecome, but only THAT man must become. Second,we. noted over and
over again the conviction of Bultmann and Buber that the criterion
of a valid Weltanschauung is whether or not it points man to his time
and history as the sphere where his genuine self is to be achieved, 
in
This is/complete accord with this doctrine of the spiritual life 
which emphasises man’s obligation to go out into relation so that heI
may become. Here again, we witness the consistency of the existent­
ialist tradition.
Certain views of immanence have held that there is in 
man, implanted at his creation, a so-called divine spark, an element 
in man which enables him to perceive and know God 'in his heart'.
We discovered in chapter II, that in St. Bonaventure, followed by 
Mr. H.P. Owen, this was thought of as an 'impress' left in the soul 
of man by his creator, St. Bonaventure commended as a spiritual 
exercise 'contuition', a process in which by reflecting upon himself, 
upon the divine image impressed within, man could come to a knowledge
of God* Let us compare Buber's position with this* The only 
'divine spark' in man allowed by Buber is man's 'sense of Thou' 
which, says Buber, had 'the Thou present to it from the beginning*.* 
But this sense is no more than a mere ’Ankntlpfungspunkt's3€ for the 
relational 'moment', for true relation with the 'Thou1 is only real- 
lised when man goes out to the 'reality of the hallowed life of the 
world'• This sense or longing is only satisfied when man treats
the world of history and time as holy as the sphere where God is
to be met* We have already, in chapter II, compared Buber's posit- 
:ion here to that of Bultmann.
Buber can put this in a different way by saying
X3E3Ethat in the 'moment' there is given, imparted, to man something 
which hitherto he did not possess — — or that in the 'moment1 some- 
: thing happens to man which makes him different from what he was
I
, o 3GOO£
before* » ... a man does not pass from the moment of the
supreme meeting the same as he entered it. The moment of meeting 
is not an 'experience' that stirs in the receptive soul and grows 
to perfect blessedness; rather in that moment something happens to tin 
m a n ..... . the man who emerges from the act of pure relation that
HI and Thou, p. 80.
3°€We shall return to a detailed definition of this term and its im- 
:plications in our conclusions.
MMXAs we shall see later, the theology of the 'moment' is a theology 
of1 impart at ion*
so involves his being has now in his being something more that has 
grown in him, ... of which he did not know before and whose origin
he is not able to indicate the reality is that we receive
what we did not hitherto have, and receive it in such a way that we
know it has been given to us. ". Thus for Buber also revelation
is an event in that something comes to man from outwith himself, 
for the reception of which his own existence only contains an 
'Anlmdpfungspunkt1. Thus Buber writes : "Genuine responsibility
3£5Eexists only where there is real responding" ; this"presupposes 
one who addresses me primarily, from a realm independent of myself, 
and to whom I am answerable".*** Thus there is given to me some- 
:thing from a realm independent of myself. "Our answering-for-our-
5L3€3€3€
:selves is essentially our answering to a divine address".
Buber can imply the same kind of thing by use of his celebrated 
term Jturning1, ’fuming towards...*. Thus W. Herberg writes i
I
"The 'turning* is 'something that happens in the immediacy of the 
reality between man and God1. It has its 'subjective* and psycho­
logical aspects, of course, but essentially it is 'as little a 
'psychic' event as is a man's birth or death; it comes upon the
*oP. cit., p. 109.
**Between Man and Man, 'Dialogue', p. 16, quoted by W. Herberg, op. 
cit., Introduction, p. 20.
***Between Han and Man, 'The Question to the Single One', p. 45.
****At the Turning,1 The Dialogue between Heaven and Earth', p. 56.
whole person, is carried out by the whole person....’« All of life, 
individual and corporate, depends on the 'turning' — —  the 'turning'
and the 're-turning' --  of man to God. 'For the sake of the
'turning'1, the Ilasidic masters have said, 'was the v/orld created'"« 
Thus man gains knowledge of God by 'turning towards him', not by 
'looking in upon him within himself'. The mutuality of dialogue, 
and the existence of God as a being who is outwith me, and addresses 
me from a point independent of myself is expressed by Buber thus s 
"Responsibility presupposes one who addresses me primarily, that is, 
from a realm independent of myself, and to whom I am answerable. He 
addresses me about something that he has entrusted to me and that I 
am bound to take care of loyally. He addresses me from his trust, 
and I respond in my loyalty or refuse to respond in my disloyalty; or 
having fallen into disloyalty, I wrestle free of it by the loyalty 
of the response. To be so answerable to a trusting person about
I
an entrusted matter that loyalty and disloyalty step into the light
of day -—  but both are not of the same right, for now loyalty, bom
again, is permitted to conquer disloyalty --  this is the reality of
responsibility. Where no primary address and claim can touch me,
where everything is 'my property', responsibility has become a phan-
*v. Herberg, op. cit., Introduction, p« 29, paraphrasing Buber,
Israel and the World. 'The Faith of Judaism', p. 20.
phantom/. At the same time, life's character of mutuality is dissip- 
sated. He who ceases to make a response ceases to hear the Word"." 
Nowhere does the divergence between Buber's thought and the 
St. Bonaventure-Owen school of thought become plainer than here ;
"Two traits.... set (the Old Testament)... apart from the other great 
books of the v/orld religions. One trait is that in the 'Old 
Testament', both events and words are placed in the midst of the 
people, of history, of the world* What happens does not happen in 
a vacuum existing between God and the individual* The Word travels 
by way of the individual to the people, so that they may hear and 
translate it into reality* What happens is not superior to the hist- 
soiy of the people, it is nothing but the secret of the people's hist- 
sory made manifest".35* When we recall that in chapter I we criticiz­
e d  St. Bonaventure's and H.P. Owen's notion of revelation because it 
was unhistorical, because it held that the God-to-man disclosure
3E3E3E
took place in an 'existential Vacuum', we perceive even more clearly 
how averse Buber is to the St. Bonaventure-type of*immanentkgt" 
revelation, ’contuition'.
Two comments require to be made here. First, the
*Buber, Between Man and Man, 'The Question to the Single One', pps. 
40-61, 65, 69-71 = Herberg, pps. 63-88, see p. 68.
^Israel and the World, 'The Man of Today and the Jewish Bible’, pps. 
89-102 = Herberg, pps. 239-250, see p. 241*
r a Cf. Rudolf Bultmann's criticism of Hamack's Das We sen des Christ- 
:entums, because it holds that revelation concerns only 'God and the 
soul' in a vacuum, in Kerygma and Myth, p. 13* See also Bultmann's 
introduction to the new American edition of Hamack's What is Christ- 
:ianity ? (New York 1957)? pps. xiii, fo
general similarities between Buber's notion of disclosure as 'impart- 
: at ion' and Bultmann.'s is clear enough. And it is not without sig- 
inificance that Buber seems to hold his view not primarily for 
philosophical reasons, but because of the dialogue, the address, the 
notion of the Word that he finds in the Hebrew Bible, Second, it 
is clear enough also how Buber’s idea of revelation, of disclosure, 
stands in stark contradiction to 7immanent^ views of revelation such 
as we have analysed in chapter II. In our next chapter, on Kierke- 
Jgaard, we shall see his abhorrence of all doctrines of immanence 
arid the spiritual life which suggest that the knowledge of God must 
simply be perceived in or extracted from man's soul. It was perhaps 
one of Kierkegaard's greatest contributions to modem theological 
thought that he made theologians face up to the transcendent GIFT, 
the giving and receiving of which, in time and in history, is the 
condition of 'becoming a Christian'. This whole question of imman-
I
sence, the question of the ' Ankntlpfungspunkt' which revela/tion seems 
to require, will be re-opened in our concluding chapter when we shall 
compare for the final time the views of Bultmann and Tillich on this 
matters
oOO'
POSTSCRIPT M3) CONCLUSION TO OUR STUDY OF THE WORK OF BUBER.
The main object of this section is to guard against
an objection and a misunderstanding.
The objection is that the 'moment' may be thought 
unsatisfactory on account of its brief, fragmentary nature. It may 
be supposed that the 'moment' is so brief and so disjointed from othei 
'moments1 that it can have little to do with the remainder of our
time, and thus leads ultimately to the rejection of the world and of
history. We must admit that any doctrine of the 'moment' lies open 
to this danger, and may succumb to it. Care must therefore be taken 
to ascribe to the 'moments' of personal existence the significance 
and decisiveness which they deserve*
I
Buber guards against this objection carefully by 
allowing a certain genuine continuity between 'moments', to which 
we must now briefly turn* I have found that Buber allows six kinds 
of continuity, which are as follows
(i) There is first the propensity which a past, recorded 'moment'
(as an 'It' in the world of 'It') has to blaze up again into present- 
sness, in the present of an interpreter. We have already compared 
this to the existentialist (Bultmann/Dilthey/Collingwood) understand- 
:ing of history. There are thus close links between Buber and 
existentialist hermeneutics, in that the disclosure is intensely
interpersonal. This propensity of historical records represents
an important dimension of continuity*
(ii) There is second the fact that experience of the ’moment’ brings 
to man awareness of his own historicity and temporality, that the 
world around him is full of entities with the potentiality to become 
'Thou1 for him, to assume presentness for him? that disclosure of 
God and persons takes place not only in time but through time. In so 
far as man retains knowledge of this essential historicity and cult­
ivates it by going out to meet the world, this represents another 
important dimension of continuity.
(iii) There is third the fact that experience of ’momentary' relat­
i o n  leaves man unsatiated, dissatisfied, a dissatisfaction which 
draws man out again to the world to renew the relational act. This 
is because Buber holds that man has a 'sense of the Thou' which can
I
only, receive its fulfilment in the 'moments' of the 'hallowed life 
of this world'. And we have compared this to the whole of Bultmann'£ 
argument in The Question of batural Revelation, analysed fully in 
chapter II.
(iv) There is fourth the 'teacher-concept'. Experience of the 
'moment* confers the status of teacher in the sense that one is now 
enabled to direct others to the world of the 'moment' and of present- 
mess by becoming a 'Thou' for others in their present. Such a teach- 
:er can only direct others to become, but cannot instruct them what to 
become. But this represents yet another dimension of continuity,
z y 6
for as persons spring up in the world having experienced the 'moment’ 
their existence lends itself to the achievement of authentic personal­
ity.
(v)This in turn leads to an increased frequency of occurrence of the 
’moment’ in the world of ’It', in which the ’moments', from having 
the appearance of isolated stars shining in darkness, come to
take on the solidity and consistency of the ’moon’. And this repres- 
sents yet another dimension of continuity between isolated ’moments'•
(vi)There is sixth, and finally, the continuity that comes from gen- 
:uine community. Those who have the 'moment' in common form the 
radii of a circle which point towards a common Centre. Those on the 
circumference of the circle are there only through the radius joining 
them to the centre; there can be no question of joining the circle at
3£the circumference alone. In the existence of such a genuine commun- 
:ity, in the common experience of the members within it, we have a
I
dimension of continuity.
Not only have we included this section to show how 
Buber guards himself against a charge of over-fragmentariness, but also 
because these points will re-emerge in our conclusions. For example,
*We shall return to this conviction of Buber's in our concluding chap- 
:ter when we deal with the problem of church and community.
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the •teacher-concept' is of considerable importance in building- up a 
valid, view of church and community, as we shall see.
Having dealt with the objection, let us now turn to 
the misunderstanding. It might be enquired: does not the worker in 
other- lines of enquiry, in science for instance, also have his 
'moment' ? Is there for him also a time of discovery, a time of 
disclosure, a moment of truth ? Are there not scientific 'moments' 
also ?
aooo We must point out that there are vast differences
between the process we have outlined in this thesis and the process 
by which the scientist or technologist makes a discovery or has some- 
:thing disclosed to him. There are in fact six vital differences.
(i) The scientist can procure his substance, sometimes change its
I
form or size, and arrange it in certain relationships with other 
substances or apparatus. He CUR choose his time and his conditions. 
But the "substance" of human existence cannot be thus regulated or 
controlled; man cannot 'choose his time', it is given to him. It comes 
at such unsuitable times that the authentic person's relationship 
to the everyday world can only be dialectical.
‘r* ’ 
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(ii) The scientist's results can be written down, transmitted, and 
understood quite independent of repetition of or participation in 
the original disclosure-event, the experiment • Thus a young 
scientist starting his training does not require to repeat all the 
experiments which built up his text-books and tables. He simply 
uses them and builds his own work on them as an agreed body of truth. 
But in the existential sphere, in a sense we have all to 'start 
from ioratch1 • In a sense we are all neophytes. There does not 
exist for us an agreed body of conceptual truth analogical to the 
assured results and information available to scientific neophyte. 
There is no Weltanschauung but that which teaches us our own radical 
historicity.
(iii) The scientist's moment, his occasion, is relatively unim- 
Jportant. If his results were not discovered in this way in this
I
moment, they would be in some other way at some other time. If not 
within the time of one research worker, then in the time of another— ■ 
—  it simply does not matter. The real importance attaches to the
XXXdetachable results. But in the sphere of human existence,
the 'moment' is of value in itself,*it is not a matter of indifference 
who experiences the 'moment*. In a sense, the person who exper-
*We shall return to this insight in our conclusions when we deal 
with the problem of church and community.
term which Kierkegaard uses for the Socratic philosophy.
*** Thus the scientific view of a disclosure event is identical with 
the view of biblical event taken by the XlXthliberal theologians 
we have criticized in the preface. / , -
experiences/ the 'moment' stands alone in his experience. Communic 
:ation is only possible within the community of those who have this 
experience in common, only possible within the theological circle 
(Tillich).
(iv) Thus proof, demonstration, persuasion, are quite different in 
the two spheres. The truth of scientific propositions can be 
demonstrated from one scientist to another on the basis of certain 
intellectual canons which they share. But the "proof" of what 
comes in the 'moment* is dependent upon experience of the 'moment' ; 
as Buber sayss each man must prove it 'in the singleness of his 
being' •
(v) A further difference is apparent in that generally speaking
a great deal of scientific results are useful in that they can be 
applied through technological processes to easing our life in this 
world. can make life more convenient, or time-saving, or more
immune from danger they can give us better health or longer life.
In contrast to all this stands existential knowledge. Buber holds 
that it does not 'help to sustain our life here in this world'.
It helps us to achieve....auAhen.tic_pg££.onal existence. Its aim is to
*It can of course be argued that scientific work should not be under- 
;taken for the sake of practical useful results, but because the 
pursuit of truth itself is valuable. Nevertheless, perfectly sound 
scientific work can be done without holding this view, and it rem- 
:ains true that a great deal of scientific research has practical 
applicability. A vast amount of scientific research is undertaken 
because of its practical value, for example, cancer research. And 
there is the fact of the tremendous financial help given by industry 
to the Universities in order that such practical results might be ob­
tained.
produce real persons.
(vi) Finally, generally speaking science is concerned with causality. 
It is interested in, and in utilizing, the laws by which one state of 
affairs inexorably produces another state of affairs. Science 
might be defined as the systematic investigation and utilization of 
causality. In contrast, the 'moment' derives its significance from 
the fact that it dislocates causal process within personal exist­
ence. Buber has demonstrated how the 'moment' offends the 
scientific world of 'It' (in the form of theories of mechanistic 
psychology and deterministic sociology) because of the freedom from 
causality which it claims to bring. And Bultmann has demonstrated 
how catastrophic the results are when scientific causality invades 
the sphere of human existence, in the case where such thinking as 
applied to history has produced 'historicism', history understood
I
in analogy with nature.
Bfrom this analysis of the difference between scientif- 
sic and existentialist thought, it is not difficult to hazard a 
guess that the doctrine of the 'moment' will not be easily received 
into our modem world. And we can see this more clearly if we remem 
:ber that a great deal of modem existentialist thinking (e.g. that 
of Jaspers, Buber) has been worked out in reaction to an era do min­
iated by scientific ways of thought.
When we read Buber's views on the 'moment', it is 
hard not to conclude that he means that in it' yV man receives some
kind of vision. It is hard, not to conclude that what he means by 
the 'moment' can only be fully understood by recalling biblical incid- 
:ents such as the vision granted to Elisha's servant-lad. when they 
were in danger from the King of Syria, as in II Eg.2:6. Of that 
incident we may say that it is a highly personal experience, it is 
transforming, shaking, it brings an absolute minimum of detachable 
propositional content; it is brief, only a glimpse of another sphere 
in and thorough this sphere, bringing a reality which is personal; its 
value as a recorded 'moment' is that it points us to histoiy and to 
time as the spheres where we encounter reality. It is to misinter- 
spret Buber to forget that not only is he a philosopher and a sociol- 
sogist of note; he is also a celebrated student of the Hebrew Bible 
and a noted Rabbinical and Hasidic scholar. That Buber has a vision 
in mind is confirmed by his own words ; "When I drafted the first 
sketch of this book (more than forty years ago), I was impelled by 
an inner necessity. A vision which had come to me again and againI
since my youth, and which had been clouded over again and again, had 
now reached steady clarity. This clarity was so manifestly supraper-
*In the Postscript to the new American edition of I and Thou, transi. 
by R. Gregor Smith, (New York 1958), P« 123.
V ■ ’ •}v^* 'J
sup rape rsonal/ in its nature that I knew at once that I had to
bear witness to it*
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On the last page of the Philosophical Fragments 
Kierkegaard gives a schema of what he has tried to set forth in the 
book, a list of the key-concepts that he has used, whose significance 
will be developed in his Concluding Unscientific Postscript*
In the Fragments«according to Kierkegaard, he has been tiying to posit 
the following s-
(1) A new organ s Faith©
(2) A new presupposition s the consciousness of Sin©
(3) A new decision : the Moment*
(4) A new Teacher : God in Time.
In this chapter we shall try to assess the significanceI
that Kierkegaard gives to number (3)> the Moment, and to compare it 
with the concept as used by other existentialist writers* Since 
we commenced the earlier chapters by examining how the word was used 
by each thinker in his works, we can commence here by pointing out 
that Kierkegaard uses the term self-consciously and very deliberate­
ly; it is printed with an initial capital, i.e. the Moment*
^Transl.by David F. Swenson (Princeton 1936), p. 93.
^Translo by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton 194l)«
There can be little doubt that Kierkegaard is trying to establish 
the term as a concept. As he says, the Philosophical Fragments 
was written to posit the Moment (with other terms) as a concept of 
thought. This removal of ambiguity will lighten our task consider­
ably.
We shall now begin an examination, under several main 
headings (as we did in the case of Bultmann and Buber), of Kierke- 
:gaardfs use of this term, comparing it with other uses where possib­
le, criticizing it, keeping in mind throughout that a great deal 
of recent and contemporary theological thought owes a great debt to 
Kierkegaard in this matter, even when they appear to differ radically 
from his teaching on the Moment. The following then are Kierke- 
:gaardfs main uses of the term ’Moment1 in his work©
• T
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(!) THE MOMENT MEANS ABSOLUTE NEWNESS; TEB CONDITION OF TOILERSTANDING 
THE TRUTH IS GIFTED AMD BIPARTED IN THE MOMENT; THUS IT IS HOT 
RECOLLECTION; THE CONDITION IS FAITH; THIS IS NOT INCLUDED IN MAN’S
CREATION, MAN HAS NO ETERNAL KNOWLEDGE OF IT.
If the ‘Truth1 were something embedded, in me, 
so to speak, from creation, the time of discoveiy would he no Mom- 
sent, hut simply an1occasion’® The time when I perceive that I 
knew the Truth all along, would at once vanish into the maw of eter- 
:nity without trace. In eternal consciousness there is no concrete 
point, no decisive Moment; hut only, as Kierkegaard says, ’an
3£ubique and nusquam1, In much the same way, if man were able to
will himself free from the bondage of sin and error, there would be
for him no Moment of decisivq significance --  for his past state
(bondage) would vanish into the maw of time, for the man would not 
be aware*^hat he had bound himself and that he had freed himself; 
bondage and freedom would be unconscious states; the transition- 
point from one to the other would therefore be infinitesimally small,
unworthy of notice. It certainly would not be the Moment it
would lack the necessaiy decisive quality inseperable from the 
Moment *
^Philosophical Fragments, p. 8.
^^Like Bultmann after him, Kierkegaard is very much preoccupied with 
consciousness, awareness®
“ Op. cit., pps. 11-12.
The Moment, for Kierkegaard, is also absolutely decisive 
because it is the temporal point of re-birth. It is the transition - 
point of being and non-being. It is a conscious Moment, because 
in it man is aware of both his previous j^ ate and his new state*
If' man*-s previous state had been of being, there would take place no 
transition. The Moment would not be decisive because there would 
not be any new factor brought in* So Kierkegaard can say that the 
two states are so seperated by the decisive Moment that man cannot 
return from one to the other? in the Moment "the breach is made"*
The dialectic of the Moment is set by Kierkegaard over against the 
Socratic method of Recollection; in this there is brought forth from ‘ 
the learner that of which the seed always^ifPfhe learner* Here 
again there is nothing absolutely new and decisive* The occas-
:ion of truth, of apprehension, vanishes into the maw of time. The 
consciousness of Recollection knows no concrete here-and-now, decis-
I
sive and new. Thus in this Socratic method there can be no Moment* 
As we shall see more fully later, what makes the Moment
3E3QBBE
really decisive is that God comes in it* It is this that makes
the Moment something new, startling, something far removed from an
*Qp. cit., p. 15*
, 0p. cit., p. 14*
300Cfhis is diametrically opposed to the theology of ' impart at ion1. 
^ O p .  cit., p. 24.
****%. cit., p. 44*
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’occasion1. The relationship involved in the Moment is vertical, 
and not merely horizontal (Socratic), This can be put another way 
by saying that whereas the Socratic occasion is concerned merely 
with time, the Moment is concerned with eternity.3** It is the 
beginning of eternity, and without it there is no possibility of 
advance for man. The Moment is thus concerned with that which 
"refuses to be reduced to a moment of merely occasional significance".
Kierkegaard rejects absolutely any doctrine that assumes 
that God in creation has given man the condition for coming to know-
of 3€50£3£
:ledge of 'andunderstanding the truth. In chapter II on the
doctrine of Immanence we stated that any theology that derived from 
the thought of Kierkegaard is bound to diverge sharply from the 
contuition doctrine of St. Bonaventure, favoured by Mr. H.P. Owen in 
his Revelation and Existence. Thus there is an ultimate incompat-
I  ff
:ibility between Kierkegaard’s notion of impartation and any doct- 
:rine teaching that God has planted within man’s soul an image of 
himself by reflection on which man comes to have a knowledge of 
God. Since both Bultmann and Buber are within the existentialist 
tradition, it is little wonder that the theologies of Bultmann, of
K0p. cit., p. 44*
**0p. cit., p. 4^.
“ Op. cit., p. 47.
* * * % .  cit., p. 50.
Buber, and. of Kierkegaard on the one hand, diverge so widely from the 
thought of St, Bonaventure and Owen on the other.
When Kierkegaard comes to discuss the nature of contemp- 
soraneity in apprehending the meaning of historical events, he
allows the immediate contemporary only this the immediacy of his
contemporaneity can serve and only serve as an occasion for perceiv- 
sing the truth. For Kierkegaard, what enables anyone to perceive the 
truth in the Moment is the condition imparted by God in time, the
XXcondition without which there can be no perception of the truth.
At this point some comments on Kierkegaard’s thought are 
relevant. We can see already that in his doctrine of the Moment 
ItflUt/if Kierkegaard is more concerned with life than with thought *
We see that in the course of life (in time and in history) Kierke-
I
X:gaard believes that something must be imparted to man. We see 
also in Kierkegaard's thought the germ of the notion of ’encounter’ 
(with that which is outwith, over against man), which has played such 
a vast role in post-Kierkegaardian theology. We note also his 
stress on the concrete; we see his distrust of the 'eternal', of the
xThe theology of 'impartation' again.
^See Fragments, pps. 56 f*
’infinite', of the 'universal' in so far as they lend themselves to 
vagueness over against the here-and-now Moment; rather than represent 
ring concreteness, they represent the 'uhique et nusquam'. We see 
in Kierkegaard's thought the modem doctrine that the Moment must
"be decisive man must be aware of it or it is no Moment;he must
experience its newness and its startling character. It follows from 
these comments that without the Moment, without this brief but start- 
sling eruption into time, there can be no question of human 'advance' 
'progress’, 'becoming'* Without the decisive Moment, man, with all 
his information and science, is left precisely where he was. The 
Moment is the crucial and indispensable condition of change and 
improvement. We have already witnessed the development of this 
doctrine in the thought of Bultmann and of Buber. It will now be 
obvious that in our examination of Kierkegaard's work we are going to 
find in place after place how he anticipated and fertilized much mod-
I
:ern theology and philosophy, and not least in his exposition of and 
in .his emphasis on the Moment*
(2) THE MOMENT IS DECISIVE IN_ THAT IT BRINGS CONVERSION, NEW BIRTH, 
A TRANSITION FROM NONBEING TO BEING, A NEW CREATION: IT MAKES AN
IRREPARABLE BREACH WITH THE PAST IN WHICH MAN WAS IN ERROR i THE 
MOMENT IS DECISIVE FOR ETERNITY.
The Moment is decisive for eternity, it is 
filled with eternity; it brings conversion, the new birth;it marks 
the transition from nonbeing to being*
One of the main purposes of this section will 
be to show that in these notions of Kierkegaard are to be found the 
roots of much contemporary theological thought* Let us compare 
Kierkegaard's views on the decisiveness of the Moment with Bultmann’ 
We remember that for Bultmann the 'moment' was significant in that 
it marks the end of the believer's history as the 'old' man; in the
I
'moment', God breaks the power of man's past, and gives him the poss 
sibility of a new history as a 'new' man, as a free man. For the 
Christian, history is meaningful because he can, in Christ, stand at 
its end. In the 'moment' of Christian revelation the old world 
has reached its end for the believer. He is freed from the deter- 
smining sway of his sinful past, and can decide what to accept and
xSee Philosophical Fragments, pps* 8, 15, 15, 24, 44, 46-7, 56-7°
what to reject of what lies behind him. Thus in the ’moment' , for 
Bultmann, causality, running from past to future through the present, 
is dislocated. Thus we can see why Bultmann ascribes to the 'mom­
ent' vast decisiveness as the indispensable transition-point in gen- 
:uine human becoming.
The 'moment', for Bultmann, is an eschatological 
one. It brings the believer out of an old age and into a new age. 
For Bultmann too, the Church (made up of such believers) is the 
eschatological community ’par excellence’. Jesus Christ for Bult- 
:mann is the eschatological event. He brings the believer's old 
history to an end and gives him a new one. He is therefore the 
existential transition-point, indispensable for authentic human 
change and advance. Bultmann can say that in his faith the Christ- 
:ian believer is lifted out of history into eternity and yet paradox­
ically remains within, or is simultaneously thrust back into, 
history. Thus it is possible for us to make the following comments 
about Bultmann's 'moment' also
(a) It is absolutely decisive, being the transition-point from old 
existence to new existence.
(b) It represents new birth in it the old man is done away with
and there emerges a new man, a free man.
(c) It is the transition-point from nonbeing to being, in so far as 
prior to its occurrence determinism and causality held sway in the 
human sphere; its occurrence means that man is able to decide what to 
become, able to decide on possibilities to accept and possibilities to 
reject.
hi h
(d) It is a decisive breach, in that man has become a new kind of
creature, freed from the irresistable sway of instinct and his hab-
:itual past; now man sees the world as a quite new place, consisting 
of events, people, encounters,in which God speaks his Word to him, 
and through which he may become a genuine person,
(e) It is a ’moment' in which the believer is lifted into eternity
while paradoxically having his true existence before him within 
time *
Thus when we compare Kierkegaard's Moment with 
Bultmann's 'moment', we find in the thought of the former many of 
the roots and seeds of recent and contemporary theological thought. 
There are differences too, which we shall discuss later, but this 
makes the similarities none the less striking.
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(5) MAN DISCOTERS THAT HE WAS IN ERROR IN THE MOMENT.
This follows from Kierkegaard's argument.
In the Moment, man receives the Truth. But if the Truth is something
quite new to h i m  something that hitherto man did not possess — —
it follows that hitherto he was devoid of it, that is, in error .R
3Q£Thus the Moment is also one of self-awareness. T h e  Moment thus 
corrects man, sets him off on a new, right, road.
This is an integral part of the analysis of 
the Moment as that in which there comes to man something new and decis- 
:ive. Unless the state which precedes the Moment were radically 
different from the state that follows it, there would he no Moment 
for Kierkegaard, but only an 'occasion' which disappears into the 
maw of time. Thus in both Kierkegaard and Bultmann we have the 
notion that the Moment is the decisive transition-point from one exist- 
sential state to another, one negative and the other positive, and that 
the nature of the antecedent state is revealed in the Moment, by 
contrast with the state that commences in and through the Moment.
^Fragments, p. 9 M
saw how in Bultmann the 'moment' is invariably one of self- 
unde rs tanding,
c) .i
In Kierkegaard there can little dispute about the 
antecedent state, which he defines as Error, which means Sin, which 
means absence from God, or the absence of God.55 Of course this 
is not untrue when applied to Bultmann. In his celebrated essay 
The Question of Natural Revelation, Bultmann, in asserting that 
nature just fails to give man true knowledge of the living God, 
has actually admitted that apart from 'momentary* impart ation of God's 
liberating word in Christ, man is also without knowledge of God.
But we shall have to return to this question shortly; Kierkegaard 
also sharply diverges from Bultmann on the question of natural 
revelation.
*In the case of Bultmann, there has of course been a dispute wheth- 
ier Bultmann1 s emphasis on 'inauthenticity of life' as analysed by 
Heidegger (definable as " ... moving in the established ruts and 
routes of the organized world'*, H.J. B^ackham, Six Existentialist 
Thinkers, p. 93) is not ultimately incompatible with the classical 
Christian notion of sin, koude °£  &
APPREHENDING IT.*
The condition of which Kierkegaard speaks is 
faith, which enables the learner to perceive the Truth. It is by 
means of this condition only that the learner can learn the Truth, 
that is, receive God's dosclosure of himself. The condition is 
gifted only in the Moment, it has no antecedent existence in the 
learner. This assertion is so crucial to the argument of the 
Fragments that it must be examined further.
First, we note that Kierkegaard makes a break 
with traditional * immanentist^ theology which is so thoroughly un- 
stemporal that it has no need of the idea of \mpartatiorf or en count- 
;er. With an assertion that man stands as a subject in relation 
to himself as object in order for revelation to occur Kierkegaard 
will have nothing to do. ^Impartation^ is a necessity. But it 
may be asked if Kierkegaard does not go too far in asserting that 
nothing is required but the imparted condition for revelation to 
occur. Is there nothing in man which acts as a revelato^
^Fragments,pps. 10, 21,
catalyst ? Is all that is required for revelation to occur a com­
pletely transcendent gift from the God-ward side ?
We can perhaps develop a preliminary criticism of 
Kierkegaard by means of several comparisons First let us compare 
him to Bultmann* We remember that in The Question of Natural Revel-
3£
:ation, Bultmann argued that man’s experience of transience, decay, 
bondage, guilt, determinism,helps man to recognise God when God 
discloses himself in the ’moment' • It is most important to realise 
that experience of these elements is universal in human existence 
qua human, and quite antecedent to the occurrence of any ’moment' of 
revelation. Our exasperation with bondage and determinism, our 
craving for freedom in the existential sense, make us eager to meet 
with and recognize God* They prepare us for the 'moment' when God 
speaks to us his highly concrete word in the here and now, liberates
I
us, and grants us fresh possibilities for existence* Thus in Bult- 
smann, faith is not only gifted by God to us directly in his 
momentaiy approach (we should never deny it), but is also provoked 
and engendered in us by God's approach* Faith has therefore two 
roots® One is the direct^impartation^of Godj and the other is 
man1 s existential situation. To use terminology- popularized in 
the Barth-Brunner controversy, man's existential situation is the
^Analysed in full in chapter II above.
3£'Ankntipfungspimkt1 without which man could not possibly receive the 
revelation of God, In view of this, it is hard not to reach the 
conclusion that Kierkegaard is here over-occupied with the wholly 
transcendent, and that he attaches too little importance to the 
structure of antecedent human existence.
Second, let us compare Kierkegaard with Buber,
For Buber too, God, antecedent to his approach to man in the 
1 moment1, is not wholly unknown. For Buber, in analysing the human 
situation, can say that man has a sense of the 'Thou', 'from the 
beginning', 'Thou', for Buber, is the primary word of human exist­
ence, This sense requires fulfilment and realisation (as did
the longings and cravings in Bultmann's analysis of man), and this 
fulfilment is reached when man actually encounters the living God 
in the historic 'moment'. Therefore for Buber also, the condition 
is not completely that which is gifted for the first time in the 
'moment', Buber, as a Jew, is well aware that God is the 'wholly 
Other', but as an existentialist he is aware that God is the very 
near. To describe God adequately we need both these dimensions of 
faith --  does not Kierkegaard over-emphasise only one ?
A concept to which we shall return in greater detail in our conclus- 
: iohs when we deal with the problem of existentialism and ontology.
Or in other words; if man is truly historical and temporal, does the 
authentic ’moment’s’ occurrence not require both God’s ’time’ and 
our ’time' ? Kierkegaard's doctrine that the condition of faith 
granted only in the Moment is all-sufficient is one that we cannot 
accept without grave qualification.
We have spoken of God's self-disclosure. For 
Kierkegaard, it is God, the Teacher, who is disclosed in the Moment* 
The Moment is significant because God discloses himself to the learn- 
ter in it. Man receives in the Moment the Truth, and the Teacher is 
the Truth, For our theme in this thesis, this is extremely import- 
:ant, for in this assertion we have the roots of a great deal of mod- 
:em theological and philosophical thinking.
The Teacher is Truth, the Teacher is God, who 
coiies to man in the servant-formjthis is the Paradox, and the Moment 
is the Paradox in its most abbreviated form. It is Kierkegaard's 
assertion that God himself is the 1 content' of the Moment that 
concerns us here.
About this Kierkegaardian insight we may perhaps
m a k e  the following comments. Throughout this thesis^(we might almost
KSee Fragments, chapter II, pps. 17-28, 'God as Teacher and Saviour:
An Essays of the Imagination'.
say on every page of it), we have pointed out that in theologians of 
the existentialist tradition we find that what is revealed and im- 
sparted in the Moment is not propositions, nor information, nor 
ideas, out^Chich could be constructed a Weltanschauung or system into 
which man is able to fit and adjust his experience. We have seen 
in chapter I how Bultmann is almost terrified of a notion of revel- 
:ation of this kind. Buber too, scorns it. Both of these re- 
*iterate that the 'content* of the disclosure-'moment* cannot be 
abstracted from its real-life situation and transmitted generally 
from man to man or from group to group. Buber, we saw in chapter
III, can go as far as to say that the 'moment* has no content.
Man receives in it a Presence as powerjhe is unable to say what has
come to him in the 'moment';what comes in the 'moment' is a 'Thou';
there is no objectifiable content which could become generally 
current. The content of the revelatoiy 'moment' for Buber is person 
sal; in the supreme, consummating 'moment', the 'content' is God.
Now I am convinced that it is possible to find 
the seeds and roots of this type of modem theology in the Kierke- 
sgaardian revolution against the Hegelian system and We 11anschauung. 
So Kierkegaard writes s "Let a doubting youth, an existing doubter, 
imbued with a lovable and unlimited youthful confidence in a hero of 
thought, confidingly seek in Hegel's positive philosophy the truth,
the truth for existence:....let him submit himself unconditionally,
in feminine devotion, but with sufficient vigour of determination
to hold fast to his problem: he will become a satirist without suspect 
sing it. The youth is an existing doubter. Hovering in doubt 
and without a foothold for his life, he reaches out for the truth 
in order to exist in it. He is negative and the philosophy of 
Hegel is positive —  what wonder then he seeks anchorage in Hegel*
But a philosophy of pure thought is for an existing individual a chim- 
sera, if the truth that is sought is something to exist in. To 
exist under the guidance of pure thought is like travelling in Ben- 
* mark with the help of a small map of Europe, on which Denmark shows 
no larger than a steel pen-point —  aye, it is still more impossible. 
The admiration and enthusiasm of the youth, his boundless confidence
Xin Hegel, is precisely the satire upon Hegel". His dislike of the 
Weltanschauung-type of philosophy is revealed also by his choice of 
titles for two of his most important philosophical works, Philosophic-
:al Fragments, and Concluding Unscientific Postscript, as by the
1 xx
title of one of the sections of another, Diapsalmata. One of
Kierkegaard’s expositors, Mr. II.J. Blackham, describes Kierkegaard’s
philosophical mission this : "He is a prophet denouncing a generation
which'has sold its birthright of inquisitive ignorance for a mass of
irjnr
information". Thus he witnesses to the fact that for Kierkegaard 
knowledge did not consist of’items of information' (Buber), or of
^Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 275.
^^ither/Or, 2 vols., (Oxford 1946), 'Diapsalmata', vol. 1, pps. 13 f« 
^^Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 6.
'ideas', 'propositions', or ' Weltanschauungen' (Bultmann). "The
object of faith", writes Kierkegaard, "is the reality of the teacher,
that the teacher really exists. The answer of faith is therefore
unconditionally yes or no. For it does not concern a doctrine as
to whether this is true or not; it is the answer to a question con-
seeming a facts 'Do you or do you not suppose that he has really
existed ?' And the answer, it must be noted, is with infinite
passion. In the case of a human being, it is thoughtlessness to
lay so great and infinite a stress on the question whether he has
existed or not. If the object of faith is a human being, therefore,
the whole proposal is the vagaiy of a stupid person, who has not
even understood the spirit of the intellectual and the aesthetic.
The object of faith is hence the reality of the God-man in the sense
of his existence". Thus the content of the Moment for him is
personal, a Thou, and not propositional or conceptual. And here we
have a satire upon the 'philosopher' who is bogged down only with
information s "In Greece, philosophizing was a mode of action, and
the philosopher was therefore an existing individual. He may not
have possessed a great amount of knowledge, but what he did know he
knew to some profit, because he busied himself early and late with
the same thing. But nowadays, just what is it to philosophize, and 
^Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 290,
what does a philosopher really know ? For of course I do not deny 
that he knows everything".* Here we have a contrast between a
vast, vague/ Weltanschauung on the one hand, and the small, concrete, 
definite geometrical point of the Moment on the other. Mr.
Blackham sums up Kierkegaard’s philosophical mission perfectly when he 
says t "The only way to vitalize accumulating knowledge and sift its 
relative importance was to call attention to the neglected HOW of 
appropriation and ignore the venerated WHAT of approximation, raising
the question of its relation to the will, to human interests, not
A
least the primary inejjrest of becoming a human being". And, of 
course, the focal point of this ’HOW’ , as we shall see, Kierkegaard 
found in the Moment. Thus when we consider such a protest against 
the Weltanschauung-type of philosophy (of which Hegel’s is the class­
ical example), against the veneration of propositional systems, 
against the dissipating quest for the 'infinite’ in universal
I
knowledge, as against concentrating intensely upon the geometrical
point, upon the concrete here and now of the Moment, the Moment of
appropriation, it is very hard not to conclude that here we have the
seed-plot of a great many of the theological and philosophical
g r o w t h s  of the XXth. century. This will perhaps become a little
*0p. cit., p. 295*
^^Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 15*
eleai^ if we proceed a little further. Throughout this thesis we 
have reached the conclusion that revelation has a two-fold character? 
and the two aspects of revelation we have called (i) Primary, and 
(ii) Secondary revelation. Primary revelation is the disclosure !
of God bjji himself, His person, presence, a revelation which is |
'momentary1, concrete, highly personal, shaking, transforming. j
Secondary revelation consists of Christian insights, 'information 
about divine matters' (Tillich), the dogmatic repu^cussions for our 
thinking and acting of primary revelation. Mow it is absolutely 
clear that Kierkegaard's notion of revelation would be confined to 
the primary type. The 'content' of his Moment is God, the Saviour, j
the Teacher, and God alone. We do not mean that Kierkegaard's is j
i
an adequate definition of revelation (it may be that he narrows down !
j
too much the possibility of Christian ethical and social concepts)? |
I
but we contend that from the point of view of historical theology? j
it is of the first importance. Without it it would be hard to ;
explain the emphases of much modem theological thought, and not 
least that of Bultmann and Buber. We conclude then, that the 
work of Kierkegaard is a striking testimony to the insight that the
j
'content' of the Moment of disclosure is above all personal.
(5) THE MOMENT IS 1 FULLNESS ' OF TIME —  IT IS FILLED WITH
ETERNITY.
We have seen that the Moment is decisive in 
that it brings conversion and re-birth, in it the course of man's 
life is turned about; in it man passes from nonbeing to being, from 
Error to Truth; these demarcate the Moment off from other occasions
3E
within time. Yet there are similarities too; all moments and 
occasions of time are brief, temporal, transient, past. Hut the
Moment is different in that it is the fullness of time; it is filled 
with the eternal.
Let us make the following comments upon 
Kierkegaard's meaning here. , First, and obviously, the Moment is 
eternal for him because it is filled with the Eternal One, with God 
himself. This is certainly one of Kierkegaard's meanings. Second, 
the Moment is eternal because it possesses eternal, that is, lasting 
significance and decisiveness. One quality possessed by time is 
.expressed by the term 'flux'. One instant is not only rapidly succ
^Fragments, p. 1 3 *
9 s
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succeeded/ by another, but is also rapidly absorbed by another* 
Poetically, it can be described thus : ’’Time, like an ever-rolling 
stream, bears all its sons away... They fly forgotten, as a dream
* Kdies....,.”. The result is an appalling sameness, against which 
Kierkegaard protested with all his life and thought. He compared 
contemporaiy life to an ocean, smooth, glassy, undisturbed. Thus 
writes Blackham s ’’Kierkegaard had the •.. vision of the tendency 
of the age which reached its limit in an unlimited panorama of 
abstract infinity, unrelieved by even the smallest eminence, undis- 
sturbed by even the smallest interest, a sea of desert”.
Kierkegaard’s doctrine of the Moment is an important aspect of this 
protest; it is his protest against the sameness of time, against its 
unremitting flux. For him, the Moment is that eruption into the 
glassy sea of time from eternity, not at all subject to that flux of 
time which ’bears all its sons away’. ■ Firmly rooted in the eter-
I
snal, having lasting significance, it remains whilst other human 
occasions disappear into the maw of time. It stands out firmly 
and unmistakably like a lighthouse piercing unruffled water. It 
is hard not to conclude here that Kierkegaard’s anxiety for the 
Moment's lastingness, its eternity, has radically affected Rudolf
xIsaac Watts (1674-1748), R.C.H. No. 601.
^Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 34*
Bultmann1s concern for the 'moment', for the concrete here-and-now.
So Bultmann writes : " ...if man really saw God and lived from God, 
it would not be permissible for him to characterize the here and now 
as transient and symbolic, but, on the contrary, it would be necess- 
:ary for him to see it as having finality and reality and as being 
that in which he really does hear God* s word, and the sphere in
X —which he really does God's will". And Bultmann thus gives express™
:ion to that vision which Kierkegaard deplored and attacked in his 
doctrine of the Moment : " ... man has no life of his own; life in 
time is not taken into consideration; there is no 'moment' which tells
XXhim anything specifically or brings anything new to him, but all 
is just the same; man has no longer any destiny of his own, and just 
as nothing that comes his way can do harm to him, so nothing can
XX XXXendow him with anything; nothing that confronts him concerns him".
Ehis is a most interesting illustration of how Kierkegaard's anxiety
for the Moment's eternity has infected a modern theologian in the
existentialist tradition. But third, the Moment is eternal for
another reason t the peculiarity of occasions within time is that
they are seperated from each other and that no direct relation can
exist between them. For Kierkegaard, it does not matter whether 
“r . Bultmann, Essays, p. 107»
^^mpartation* again.
^ ^Essays, p. 99*
Q ' '1
occasions are separated by ten years or ten thousand, they are sener- 
sated and therefore disjointed. There is no common factor binding 
them together. Kierkegaard sets his problem (the solution of which 
occupies both the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding 
Unscientific Postscript ) on the title page of the Fragments —  'Is 
an historical point of departure possible for an eternal conscious­
ness; how can such a point of departure have any other than a mere 
historical interest; is it possible to base an eternal happiness upon 
historical knowledge ?* And, of course, this is still one of the 
greatest problems that face the theologian* Kierkegaard's solution 
is that there is a common factor in that Moment, several thousand years 
ago, when the Christ-event occurred, and that Moment of time when that 
event is appropriated now. This common factor is the eternal. In 
both Moments there comes the Word of God. This comes from outwith 
time and is not subject to the flux of time. To all intents and pur™
:poses, Kierkegaard would say that both Moments are identical. They
I
are fused together, although seperated in clock-tirae, by the timeless, 
by the eternal. And we see right away the influence of Kierkegaard 
upon Mltmann's position, analysed in chapter I, that the Christ-event 
is EPHAPAX precisely because it is repeatable. Kierkegaard's posit- 
sion here has been well-noted by his commentators. Thus Chaning- 
Pearce writes of him s "The instant is not an atom of time but of eter- 
snity .... it is short indeed, and temporal as every instant is, gone 
like all instants, the following instants, and yet it is decisive,and 
yet it is full of eternity". Chaning-Pearce quotes Walter Lowrie %
*M. Chaning-Pearce, Spren KierkegaardsA Study, p. 71®
“ if ' ij
tl ^  ...
"An instant, if it is only an instant in time, is 'filled vith empti- 
sness1. What fills it with eternity is the apprehension of the 
paradox that God became man. It is then the decisive Instant of 
faith". And commenting on this, Chaning-Pearce says s "And that 
instant is eternity; it is the instant of 'repetition' in which past, 
present, and future are fused in an 'immortal moment'". Chaning- 
Pearce quotes Paul Claudel's Le Pere Humilie that "Eternity and 
Resurrection are ceaselessly renewed in the Instant", and states 
his opinion that "the instant is thus a fundamental Christian 
category". The identity between the Moment of Christ in universal
history and our Moment of appropriation is finely dated in this pass- 
sage from Chaning-Pearce : "In that instant .... the inward and the 
eternal meet in a timeless he re-and-now- reached through and within, 
yet ever beyond, our space-time continuum. There is the point of 
intersection when the longitudinal line of human life, love (EROS),
I
thought and time meet the vertical line of eternity and the down- 
pouring love (AGAPE) of God. For the Christian, for Kierkegaard, 
that instant of intersection^ is the cross of the incarnate Christ,
XXXThere is the paradox of faith". And this identity between
Christ's Moment and ours is further emphasised when Chaning-Pearce 
states s .In Kierkegaard's language ... the 'appropriation'
*0p. eit., p. 72.
**0p. cit., p. 73e We shall argue in our conclusions that the part­
icular events of Christ’s life and ministry are transferred to man's 
historic life, and that this makes the 'moment', from a Christian 
point of view, an inevitable and important theological category.
Op. cit., p. (?*
of that 'timeless moment1 'is the occupation for a saint'. X We 
have stated already that Kierkegaard's influence in modern theologic- 
*al thought has been powerful in producing an emphasis on temporality 
and thus on the temporal 'moment'; Chaning-Pearce voices a similar 
opinion when he writes s "His (i.e. Kierkegaard's) conception of this 
inward meeting of time and eternity in an Instant filled with eternity, 
the fulfilment and perfection of time and existence, is one which
XXgrows increasingly salient in modem thought and feeling". In 
other words, Kierkegaard's Moment and its exposition has been a seed­
bed for a great deal of recent and contemporary thinking. I am con- 
:vinced that this striking influence comes out in no one stronger 
than in Bultmann. We have noted already. Bultmann's opinion that 
the Christian, in his faith, " ... is already above time and
XXXhistory". For Bultmann, " ...... although the advent of Christ
is an historical event which happened 'once' in the past, it is, at
I
the same time, an eternal event which occurs again and again in the
soul of any Christian in whose soul Christ is bom, suffers, dies,
xxxxand is raised up to eternal life". This quotation from the
o.
Gifford Lectures is not an isol^ed one; we have seen in chapter I 
how its like could be multiplied many times over from Bultmann's
*0p. cit., p. 74• 
cit., p. 73*
^^History aniUIschatology, p. 153»
3aaBtHistory and Eschatology, p. 153;thus again we have the identity 
posited between Christ's 'moment' in past history, and our contempor- 
:aiy 'moment' of appropriation.
rJ1
other works. It is difficult not to conclude that much modem 
theological thinking, typified by, say, Bultmann, has its roots 
partly at least in Kierkegaard's doctrine of the Moment, the 
'Fulness of Time', the Instant filled with Eternity.
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(6) FREEDOM IS GIFTED IN THE MOMENT.
We include this section not only for the sake of com- 
spleteness, but also to further develop* our argument that in Kierke- 
sgaard1 s doctrine of the Moment we have the roots of much modem 
theological thinking which focusses itself on the decisive ’moments' 
of human existence.
Kierkegaard devotes his attention to a consideration 
of the two states, one preceding the Moment's occurrence, and the 
other the state that the Moment brings about. These two states 
he describes as bondage and freedom. Let us look, very briefly, 
at what Kierkegaard has to say about these two states. "Yet
(man), is in reality unfree and bound and exiled; for to be free from 
the Truth is to be exiled from the Truth, and to be exiled by one's 
own self is to be bound."* "He (man) was not aware that he had
bound himself   "(Man) ... forges the chains of his
bondage with the strength of his freedom, since he exists in it with-
;out compulsion; and thus his bonds grow strong, and all his powers
3£JE
unite to make him the slave of sin". Speaking of God who comes
*Philosophical Fragments, p. 11,
**0?. cit., p. 12.
in the Moment, Kierkegaard asks % "V/hat nov; shall we call such a
Teacher ?....... Let us call him Saviour, for he saves the learner
from his bondage and from himself; let us call him Redeemer, for he 
redeems the learner from the captivity into which he had plunged 1dm- 
:self, and no captivity is so terrible and so impossible to break, 
as that in which the individual keeps himself'* .* As for1 freedom1,
3£3£references are plentiful in the pages cited. The terms
'saviour1 and 'redeemer' also imply it, Kierkegaard introduces 
this argument in order to show that the two states are so different 
one from another that the Moment in which the transition is made 
must be absolutely decisive*
But in Bultmann too, the 'moment' is precisely that 
instant of time in which freedom is gifted and exists, We have 
seen that in Bultmann's thought the causal connection between past 
and future is broken by a lacuna, the present, in which man may 
decide what to accept and reject of his past, and what meaning his 
future is to have. For Bultmann, freedom exists only in the 
'moment' of the present for man* We have seen to how Bultmann 
holds that Christianity holds that natural man does not in fact poss- 
iess the freedom necessary for a decision of this kind. That man's
XQp. cit,, p. 12.
**0p. cit,, pps. 11-12.
bondage is bis own fault is thus expressed by Bultmann : "In actual
fact, man is not free to respond to the future, nor is he free in his 
has
decisions, for he^always in reality decided in favour of his past as 
it is. He remains involved in dread and sin, and in everything he 
does he: gets more and more securely attached to them",31 sD for
Bultmann too, man's antecedent state is that of bondage.
For Bultmann too, the Moment comes next, intervening 
between man's antecedent state, bondage, and his authentic state, 
which is freedom. The 'moment', for Bultmann, involves a highly
concrete word spoken to you or to me. In the 'moment' man is set 
free from various inauthentic motive forces from his past, and set 
free for his genuine, future, self. Thus freedom is not a possess-
:able quality, but is only a 'momentary' event, at a given time.
1
We have seen also that the 'moment', in Bultmann, removes man from 
under the sway of the causal process; thus man is historical because 
he is free, and not pre-determined as he appears to be in those 
philosophies of history which Bultmann terms 'historicism'. In all 
these many ways, there is the closest connection between the
'moment' and the event of freedom, and of the gift of new
^Essays, p. 84? an interesting comparison is that just as Bultmann 
holds that man has bound himself by deciding for his inauthentic past 
Kierkegaard,in Fragments, p. 11,sayso that man incurred guilt through 
his bondage; man put himself into bondage through abuse of his own 
freedom.
possibilities. It should now be clear how much Kierkegaard antic­
ipated our important modem discussions of existential freedom, 
and the possibilities of fresh modes of existence in a world which 
has become increasingly conscious of the pressure of motive forces 
from without, in face of which humanity has felt so much despair and 
hopelessness*
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(7) THE TEACHER IS UNFORGETTABLE.
The subject of ‘history and memory1 is of course 
immensely important for our subject, and we have already made refer- 
sence to it elsewhere* It is important in so far as memory is 
an aspect of continuity between 'moments1, a continuity without 
which the 'moment' would stand revealed as a flimsy and inadequate 
basis for a theological superstructure* Obviously something must 
remain as retainable after the occurrence of the ' moment ’. And 
obviously there must be something inherent in the 'moment* that must 
be remembered, that must not be forgotten*
According to the existentialist understanding of hist-
I
:ory, there are several functions of memory which must be judged
inauthentic. The first one is that memoiy should preserve con-
scepts, insights, ideas, propositions, Weltanschaungen, which are
k/ate.
utilizable in subsequent experience. If this^memory's function, 
the remembering person would thereby cast off, rid himself of, his 
own essential historicity and temporality. Memoiy, that is to say, 
would replace man's immersion of himself in history and thus his exper 
sience of the 'moment'. The second one is that memoiy should 
preserve past events as history 'wie es eigentlich gewesen*; that is, 
past events in their 'purely worldly actuality’, as they were in 
their mere outwardness, in their purely causal connections to other
events within a stream of events j that is, past events in their sheer 
worldly actuality without the self-understanding which their reprod­
uction involves0 Memory, understood in either of these two ways,
must he rejected by any understanding of history which holds to the 
radical historicity of man#
We have indicated already that the inejfcrpretation of
j,
memory within the existentialist understanding of history, stems, 
historically in the modern (i.e. XXth. century) period from the 
hierkegaardian notion of memory. hut what is that ? What function 
does Kierkegaard ascribe to memoiy within his doctrine of the 
Moment ? Let us now turn to that.
It seems that memory is indispensable to Lierke-
sgaard's argument. For Kierkegaard, as we have seen over and over
1
again, the Moment must be decisive. In it occurs liberation, 
the new birth, conversion} in it man meets God who is his Saviour, 
his Redeemer, the Eternal One. Thus the Moment must be decisive„ 
how the point about this decisive Moment is that it is filled with 
the Teacher; not with ideas, propositions, concepts, insights, but 
with a person encountered in time, the Teacher. He is, so to 
speak, the ‘content* of the Moment. Since the Teacher is God, and 
God is in the Paradox, and the Moment is the Paradox in its most abb­
reviated form, we may say that for Kierkegaard, the moment and God
h
are identical. After the Moment, what is the relationship between 
learner and Teacher ? It is this i "Such a Teacher the learner will
n ' -1
ct « .  -•
never be able to forget. For the moment he forgets him he sinks 
back again into himself, .just as one who while in original possession 
of the condition forgot that God exists, and thereby sank into
X
bondage". What comes to man in the Moment is a trust for which
• 3€3€man is required to render an account to God the Judge* The means
by which man alientates this trust is by forgetting. Kierkegaard
tells us what the object of memory is : "Even when the learner has
most completely appropriated the condition, and most profoundly 
\
apprehended the Truth, he cannot forget the Teacher, or let him
xxxxvanish Socratically". The function of memory is a necessity
because decisiveness is a necessity s " ... the moment in time must 
have a decisive significance, so that I will never be able to forget 
it in time or in eternity; because the eternal, which hitherto did 
not exist, came into being in this moment". Once more Kierke-
sgaard emphasises what the object of memory is : "When the Teacher is
I
gone from the disciple in death, memory may bring his figure before 
him; but it is not on this account that the disciple believes, but 
because he received the condition from God, and hence is enabled to
^Fragments, p. 12 ; can we deduce from this that according to 
Kierkegaard man’s original transgression was ’forgetting’ ?
^Op. cit., p. 12.
vacs?
According to Kierkegaard, faith is m  some sense possessable and 
retainable; it is for this reason that Kierkegaard, in his schema of 
^he Fragments (see title-page) describes faith as ’a new organ’,
3BE3€X_ . .  ^  1 0
Ojp• Cit « ji ]D • -L*- *
****%. cit., p. 8o
see, in memory's trustworthy image, the person of God. So the dis- 
sciple, who knows that he would have seen nothing without the condit- 
:ion, since the first thing he learned to understand was that he was 
in Error".*
We are now perhaps in a better position to sum up 
Kierkegaard's views on the function of memoiy and their relation to 
contemporaiy theological discussion. We may do this by making the 
following three comments. First, and negatively, there is not 
the slightest hint in Kierkegaard's thought that the function of 
memoiy is to retain knowledge of propositions, conceptual knowledge 
of God, ideas, the framework of a Weltanschauung. This function 
will be seen to be absolutely excluded by our second comment.
Second, and positively, what memoiy does record is strictly personal; 
it is 'the Teacher', the Teacher's 'figure1, the 'person of God', 
that is retained by memory. ' Hence again Kierkegaard's notion of rev- 
:elation is strictly primary. In this of course he comes very close 
to Bultmann and Buber. Third, memoiy renews a past encounter; a 
man does not recall by memory past facts in their worldly actuality; 
he remembers a past encounter with God by means of the condition,
*0p. cit., p. 53*
'W
faith, gran ted  in  the Moment* Thus man, by memoiy, recalls the 
person of God as God was to his faith in a past Moment* Thus man 
remembers an intensely subjective experience* We can say therefore 
that man re-encounters past revelatory events through memoiy, which 
is Bultmann’s view also. But we ought not to overlook either that 
■Kierkegaard says quite definitely* that man ought not to forget 
that a Moment has happened in time in which the eternal came to 
him; is this not tantamount to saying that man ought not to forget 
that he is a temporal creature in that he encounters reality in and 
through hi© time, and is this not Bultmann* s view also. We have 
already pointed out that for both Bultmann and Buber the only possess- 
sable and retainable Weltanschauung is that man is a radically 
historical and temporal creature* And certainly Kierkegaard would 
agree that for the Moment to be the Moment, for it to be decisive, 
man must retain the knowledge that it has occurred in time and that 
he has encountered the ultimate reality, God himself, in it. There- 
sfore, in holding that memoiy enables man to encounter the past 
existentially, and that man must retain knowledge of his own tempor- 
sality, we conclude that Kierkegaard's influence on the modem 
existentialist view of memory's function has been potent indeed*
*0p. cit., p. 8.
At the sane tine, a comment differentiating the 
thought of Kierkegaard from that of Bultmann and Buber requires to 
be made. It is that obviously Kierkegaard makes much more of 
'continuity between moments' through memory than do Bultmann and 
BubCr. It is clear that memory plays a much more vital and well- 
developed part in Kierkegaard's argument than in the theology of 
Bultmann or of Buber. Bultmann find his 'continuity' more in 
man's awareness of his historicly and temporality pushing him into 
the futurejhistoricity means that man thinks of himself as someone 
future, as someone who will receive his future genuine self in and 
through future events, people, 'Widerfahmisse'. So also in the 
case of Buber; a 'momentary' encounter with the 'Thou' makes man 
long to re-engage the encounter with the 'Thou' in the future. 
Indeed, we saw in chapter III that Buber holds that reflection to 
the 'Thou' in a past moment can be inauthentic in making redundant
I
man's present and future historicity and temporality. I am con­
vinced that in the case of both Bultmann and Buber it is their pow- 
:erful emphasis on man as a future being that leads them to seem to
3Eignore continuity through memory. What this adds up to of course 
is that Kierkegaard seems weak on future encounter, and indeed, on
*We have spoken in connection with Bultmann of 'the existentialist 
understanding of memoiy' ; in fact, in the Entmythologisierung contro 
sversy, Bultmann dealt with memoryAoecause by introducing memoiy, J. 
Schniewind criticised his argument. See Schniewind's criticisms of 
Bultmann on this score, Kerygma and Myth, pps, 79-90, and Bultraann's 
reply, where he deals with memoiy, op. cit., pps. 115-116.
•encounter* in general. For encounter implies an 'other'; the world, 
persons, events, happenings. And it is very hard to find that these 
are involved in Kierkegaard's Moment. The encounter of which he 
speaks seems to be merely an encounter of man with the eternal in 
time, that is, seperated in time from God's original dislosure in 
Jesus. Thus Kierkegaard so emphasises 'temporality' that he seems 
to have left very little room for 'historicity'. This is a prelimin- 
sary criticism of Kierkegaard, one that will be developed later, but 
one that does spring out of Kierkegaard's account of memory; it 
points to a weakness, a grave weakness, in his thought, which has 
been corrected in the thought at least of Bultmann and Buber. But, 
as I have said, we shall return to this criticism later*
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(8) THE MOMENT IS NOT AND DOES HOT REQUIRE! A HUMAN OCCASION,
That the Moment is not itself and does not 
require for its occurrence what Kierkegaard terms an ’occasion1, is 
expressed especially in the Philosophical Fragments, pps* 18, 47s 
56-57* We can perhaps do no better than quote a paragraph which is 
typical of the whole argument of the book* ’’But God needs no dis- 
sciple to help him understand himself, nor can he be so determined 
by any occasion that there is as much significance in the occasion 
as in the resolve. What could then move him to make his appearance ? 
He must indeed move himself, and continue to exemplify what Aristot- 
sle says of him s AKINETOS PANTA KINEI. But if he moves himself 
it follows that he is not moved by some need as if he could not 
break out in speech* But if he moves himself, and is not moved by 
need, what else can move him but love ? For love finds its satis- 
:faction within and not without* His resolve, which stands in no 
equal reciprocal relation to the occasion, must be from eternity, 
though when realized in time i£ constitutes precisely the MOMENT; 
for when the occasion and the occasioned correspond, and are as
it
commensurable as the answer of the desert and the cry that evokes^ , 
the Moment does not appear, but is lost in the eternity of Recoil- 
section. The Moment makes its appearance when an eternal resolve 
comes into relation with an incommensurable occasion. Unless this 
is realized we shall be thrown back on Socrates, and shall then have
neither God as Teacher, nor an Eternal Purpose, nor the Moment".
The general motive behind Kierkegaard's thought 
here is easy enough to ascertain. It is simply a certain anxiety. 
Kierkegaard is anxious to preserve the Moment's decisiveness; he feels 
that if the Moment were reduced to a mere crisis or occasion in 
everyday humdrum life, it would vanish tracelessly into the flux of 
the many human instants, crises, occasions, of which life consists© 
Thus he states that a human occasion is not sufficient to move God, 
nor does God move himself in response to a mere 'need' . The Moment 
is not merely God's answer to man1s 'cry'. Such a. divine response 
would not, Kierkegaard feels, be the Moment. Why must the Moment 
be so decisive ? Because the Moment of appropriation for Kierkegaard 
must be identical with the Moment of the Christ-event. And 
that event is "that historical phenomenon which refuses to be reduc-
3£3£
:ed to a moment of merely occasional significance" since it brings 
the eternal, since it is the beginning of eternity. Now we must 
sympathise with Kierkegaard in his anxiety to preserve the utter dec- 
sisiveness of the Moment, so that it does not disappear tracelessly.
To interpret Kierkegaard against the Hegelian background, we must
fragments, p. 18. 
^Op. cit., p. 47•
perceive that he felt obliged to represent the Moment as the quite 
shattering, vertical, unprepared-for and unlooked-for stroke of a 
transcendent God which cuts across and into the stream of human time- 
— so that it will be decisive and unforgettable* But at the same 
time, there is surely another side to the matter in which modem 
existentialist thought has corrected Kierkegaard’s over-emphasis.
Thus it would seem that the following criticism of Kierkegaard is not 
unreasonable* May we not say that Kierkegaard is too concerned with 
a God who is Wholly Other ? Does not his doctrine of the Moment 
imply that God is uninterested in and unconcerned with the crises 
and events and needs of eveiyday life, and is this not therefore
3£incompatible with the biblical picture of God ? Is there not some- 
: thing to be said here for the views of both Bultmann and Buber over 
against the views of Bultmann ? We have already seen that in the 
theology of Bultmann there is posited a preparation for God's
I
self-disclosure within the structure of human existence as existence- 
in-the-world, in man's relation to time and history, in his sense of 
finitude, obligation,guilt, transience, decay, unachievement, all of
H 1/which open a door at least to God's impartation of himself« It would
XCf. Mt*6s52 " ...your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of
all these things".
^See again Bultmann's essay, The Question of Natural Revelation.
seem that a valid theology would need in some sense to correlate 
man's longings, lacks, and needs, with the fulness of God, And if 
so, does not the Kierkegaardian argument radically ignore man's 
concrete life here in the world, and leave us wondering about the 
relevance, if any, of man's historical (worldly) existence ? We saw 
in chapter III how vitally concerned Buber is with man's everyday life, 
with man's obligation to hallow the everyday, in order to meet God 
and his fellows. We saw too how Buber deplored a 'moment' of 
heavenly bliss which has 'nothing to do with my poor earthly moment1 . 
When we come to our concluding chapter we shall refer again to 
Erich Auerbach's classic on realist literature, Mimesis, where we 
shall find that Auerbach contends that it was only with the writing 
of the New Testament Gospels that there emerged a recognition of the 
real world of eveiyday events and happenings and crises as the sphere 
in which reality is encountered* According to Auerbach, that was
I
the really great gift that Christianity gave to the literature of 
the Western world. And, of course, it this insight in Auerbach's 
book that makes Bultmann admire it so much. But it is doubtful in- 
sdeed if any of these insights into historicity in its radical sense 
can be found in the thought of Kierkegaard© These criticisms add 
up of course to the criticism which we started to develop in our 
preceding section ——  that compared, say,- to Bultmann or Buber, 
Kierkegaard is gravely deficient in this recognition of man's vital 
connection to the ' Widerfahraisse? which continually stream towards 
him, and in response to which he becomes a genuine human person*
To develop this not unimportant criticism a stage further, 
we must refer to two specific criticisms of Kierkegaard, the first 
by a Jew, the second by a humanist. First, there is the radical 
criticism of Buber^the Jew, directed against Kierkegaard, the Christ- 
sian* Thus W. Herberg points out that Buber " •••• refuses to 
limit the dialogue to the self with itself and God. As against 
Kierkegaard* s assertion that * everyone should be chaiy about having 
anything to do with ’the others', and should essentially speak only 
with God and with himself1, Buber insists that that fundamental
relation is TRIADIC the self, God, and the 'other*. 'Real
relationship with God cannot be achieved on earth if real relation- 
sships to the world and mankind are lacking', (Buber, At the Turning;; 
Three Addresses on Judaism, p. 39)* but real relationship with other 
human beings is possible only in terms of a real relationship to 
God. (The triadic relation of K., the Castle, and the Village in
I
Kafka's The Castle will occur to the reader). What is more,
jofnfug
Buber points out, Kierkegaard's '^$8$ of the'with God' with the 
'with himself is a serious incompatibility that nothing can miti- 
;gate ... Speaking with God is something TOTO GEKSRE different from 
'speaking with oneself; whereas, remarkably enough, it is not some- 
:thing TOTO GENERE different from speaking with another human 
being* (Between Man and Man, p. 50)* Buber refers Kierkegaard to
Jesus, who when he linked the two 'great commandments' the
commandment to love God with all one's heart and the commandment to 
love one's neighbour as oneself — - made it clear that the1 absolute' 
relation to God is as inclusive as it is exclusive: while barring
all other ’absolute' relations, it not only makes room for but demands 
an authentic relation to one's fellow men1 (Between Man and Man, pps* 
40-65)* 'He who enters on the absolute relation * © » (for him) 
everything is gathered up in the relation' (i and Thou, p. 78) "
Buber of course develops his criticisms of this line of Kierkegaard's 
argment in 'The Question to the Single One', in Between Man and Man, 
of which this comment by Buber is typical s "Kierkegaard, the 
Christian concerned with 'contemporaneity* with Jesus, here contract- 
sicts his master"* Thus it is most significant that a Jew can 
criticize the theology of Kierkegaar^kecause of Kierkegaard's infid- 
selity to the teaching of Jesus, and we must admit that such critic- 
sisms flow also out of Rudolf Bultmann's view of historicity*
Second; there is the significant criticism of 
Kierkegaard by a humanist, Mr. H.J. Blackham* Blackham writes of
I
Kierkegaard's doctrine of the Moment s "Kierkegaard's case is pecul- 
siar* His perpetuation of the moment of absolute choice is morbid, 
not a perpetuation in a sequence of phases in which the choice is 
made good in the developement of a personality and of a 'work', but 
a concentration of the whole life in a repetition of the empty
Herberg, The Writings of Martin Buber, Introduction, p* 16*
^Between Man and Man, pps® 40-61, 65, 69-71 = Herberg, op. cit*, 
pps* 65-88, see p® 74*
abstract decision itself with increasing intensity. This fatal 
hypertrophy of will has a terrible fascination for one sees in the 
dilated organ a living decision repeating itself like an accelerate 
sing pulse, seperated from the withered body it should have
3£animated". Exactly, there is a most dangerous gap in the theology 
of Kierkegaard between the Moment itself, and the remainder of the 
historical-concrete-worldly-relational life of man with which the 
Moment should be intimately involved. Thus we conclude that Kierke- 
sgaard’s conviction that the Moment is not itself and does not 
require a human 'occasion1 leads us into an unhistorical strand in 
his thought incompatible with and unacceptable to not only Christian­
ity, but also Hasidic Judaism and ethical humanism#
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APPENDIX and note TO SECTION (8).
The identity posited in Kierkegaard's thought between 
the Moment of the Christ-event in the past and our present Moment is 
not without importance. Kierkegaard ascribes to our present Moment 
attributes derived from the Christ-Moment of past history. Thus he 
makes the point that our present Moment must be absolutely shatter- 
decisive, unforgettable, unlooked-for and unprepared-for 
because this was how it was with the original Christ-Moment in past 
history. But is this really so ?
Kierkegaard's argument comes up against the hard fact 
today that many theologians (including both Old and New Testament 
scholars) hold that, for example, the Old Testament revelation is a
preparation for the New, without which the New itself would be in-
1 3itcomprehensible and therefore unacceptable. And New Testament
scholars would point to many elements in the first century Judaistic
and Hellenistic worlds which were essential to the reception of the
New Testament KERYGMA. Certainly Paul Tillich, for example, can be 
XX'*thus classified. Thus writes Tillich t "Without the symbols
KSee Hoskyns and Davey, The Riddle of the New Testament. (London 
1958), pps. 57-59.
See his Systematic Theology, vol. 1, 'The History of Revelation', 
pps. 153 f*
created by universal revelation the final revelation would not be 
understandable"** " ... if a revelation whose historical preparat- 
sion is denied is final, the necessity of its historical reception 
marks, the unique revelatory event a strange body which has no relat- 
*ion whatsoever to human existence and history". And speaking
of the Old Testament revelation, Tillich writes : "The biblical term- 
sinology is full of words whose meaning and connotations would be 
completely strange to listeners and readers if there had been no 
preceding revelations in Judaism as well as in p a g a n i s m " . T o  
think thus of revelation has a grave result : "To assert that a rev- 
selation is final revelation without pointing to a history of revel- 
sation in which there has been a preparation for it dehumanises man 
and demonises God".
I include this appendix not only to further demon-
I
sstratelthe totally unhistorical nature of Kierkegaard's Moment in 
universal history and in existence. In the concluding chapter I 
am going to argue that the Christian existentialist understanding of 
histoiy logically implies an analogy between, on the one hand, the 
Heilsgeschicht^ pivoting on the final revelation in Christ, and, on
xSyst. Theol., 1, p. 154*
^Op. cit., p. 155*
the other, the authentic,personal, existence of the Christian, bounded 
by his life-span, on the other. Thus, preliminarily, we may say that 
both entities involve a three-fold division, with the Christ-Moment 
in the centre, thus : the preparatory stage, the final stage, and the 
receiving or appropriating stage. We shall argue that this three­
fold schema,(though perhaps not just in these terms), derived from 
the Heilsgeschichte finally revealed in Christ, must be capable of 
application to the authentic, personal, Christian life, if the radical 
historicity and temporality of man be accepted. The point is raised 
at this point because section (8) of our study of Kierkegaard 
reveals that the work of Kierkegaard, in so far as it is relevant for 
a historical analogy, is weak so far as the first, preparatory stage 
of the schema of revelation is concerned; strong from the point of 
view of temporality indeed, but weak from the point of view of 
historicity. It does seem though, that Kierkegaard has allowed his
I
view of what the appropriating-Moment ought to be (in view of his 
contemporary Hegelian background over against which his thought is 
worked out) to influence what he considers the circumstances of the 
original Christ-event to have been. The valid order, of course, 
should be a reversal of Kierkegaard’s. But to this question, the 
question of an historical analogy, we shall return in our final and 
concluding chapter.
(9) GOD DISCLOSES HIMSELF IK THE MOMENT, IK THE PARADOX. IN THE 
SERVAKT-FQRM : THIS IS A CAUSE OF OFFENCE,
We come now to that part of the Kierkegaardian 
argument which is perhaps better known than any other, and which 
has received a great deal of attention in recent philosophy and theol 
*ogy* The Moment, says Kierkegaard, is the Paradox*3* The Moment 
is the Paradox in its most abbreviated form. The Paradox is the 
appearapfje of God in the servant-form0 The poles of the Kierkegaard- 
*ian Paradox are (i) the divine, and (ii) the human, between which
-tkC7C
he holdsAto be an infinite qualitative difference* Any conceptual 
conjunction of them, such as that postulated by the traditional 
•doctrine’ of the Incarnation, Kierkegaard holds to be an absurdity* 
The Moment is an offence, a scandal, to the consciousness of the
I
learner. The Moment sets Reason aside, plots its downfall. The 
Paradox is that which cannot be apprehended, absorbed, digested, by
Reason* This is certainly a cause of offence but the Moment is
also a cause of offence for another reason --  because it implies for
man a new beginning in time, and thus the judgement that man’s
antecedent state was that of Sin. Error. It is therefore not to be
*For this section of our study see Philosophical Fragments. pps*
18, 38, 41, 42, 43.
wondered at that the offended consciousness regards the Moment, the 
Paradox, as folly. This is but consciousness’s absurd retaliation 
to the Paradox's contention that Reason must resign and abdicate from 
it haughty position. It is therefore an ’acoustic' illusion, the 
echo of the Paradox’s charge against Reason. The two sides of the 
Paradox must be lived out in passionate awareness of the disparity
of and the distance between the two sides these two cannot be
brought into a reconciliation by Reason*
Kierkegaard's argument here has provoked, of course, 
in both philosophical and theological circles, the most violent 
criticism and disagreement. His disjunction between Faith and 
Reason has been described as schizophrenic, his delight in 
'absurdity' as neurotic. His statements have been taken from their 
context in his life and thought, and have been thus analysed to 
show their inconsistencies and illogicalities. Hut we doubt wheth- 
*er this is a fair or possible procedure.
For one thing, in interpreting Kierkegaard's posit- 
:ion here, we must note again Kierkegaard's anxiety. In establish- 
:ing the Moment firmly, he believed that he was engaging in a life- 
or-death struggle for the survival of Christainity in his time.
"Here again", he writes, "we have the Moment, on which everything 
depends "•* Thus Kierkegaard develops his position over
^Fragments, p. 41*
against the 'Socratic' procedure in which the occasions of man’s 
time are swallowed up and digested in the insatiable maw of time*
This position Kierkegaard assaults vigourouslv in the fragments, as 
the extremity of his language shows* And he carries out this 
assault by making the Moment catastrophic, shattering, disturbing, 
by making it immovable and startling in the glassy sea of man's time, 
a protuberance which cannot be eliminated or got round. The Moment 
is thus the spearhead of his assault on the 'Socratic point of view'
Kin which 'the Moment is invisible and indistinguishable...*'•
Now it is in analogy with this situation that we 
must interpret Kierkegaard's assault on 'Reason'. Actually the 
core of this discussion is in the question s what does Kierkegaard
mean by Reason ? If he means by it cognitive reason, and if he
z,
means that the appea^nce of God destroys man’s rational structure,
I
then he obviously lies open to all those criticisms which have been 
brought against him* There then would be an end to the discussion—  
Kierkegaard could be dismissed as an irrationalist or as an anti- ;
rationalist • It is therefore to this question  what does Kierke-
sgaard mean by 'Reason' ? -—  that we now apply ourselves*
Op. cit., p. 41*
It is not just a coincidence that we find that what 
Kierkegaard means by 'Reason* is completely in accord with what is 
meant by it in both Bultmann and Buber, as that which finds its high' 
sest aptitude in constructing a Weltanschauung. In a note to 
p. 39 of the Fragments, the late Professor David F. Swenson makes 
the point that within the argument of the fragments the term 
'Season' is not employed in 'any abstract-intellectual sense', but, 
as oyer against the Paradox, "the reflecively organized common sense 
of mankind, including as its essential core a sense of life's 
values. Over against the 'Paradox' it is therefore the self- 
assurance and self-assertiveness of man* s nature in its totality*
To identify it with any abstract intellectual function, like the 
function of scientific cognition, or of general ideas, or of the 
a priori, or of self-consistency in thinking, &tc., is wholly to 
misunderstand the exposition of the Fragments. Specifically, Kant's
I
distinction between Reason and Understanding, or any other similar
distinction, is wholly beside the point. The Danish word here
translated 'Reason* is FORSTANDEN; but this should not mislead any-
4,
sone into thinking that it ought to be translated by 'understanmg',
A
and interpreted in contradistinction to 'Reason'." Exactly, what
X "
See Fragments, pp.s 99-100.
Kierkegaard intends by 'Reason1 is defined essentially by self- 
assurance and self-assertiveness; thus Kierkegaard has in mind, we 
contend, the rationalist who asserts that he already possesses truth 
within his own system or ideology; the rationalist who believes that 
already he grasps self-awareness in his Weltanschauung, and that 
there is no need for something further to be imparted from without, 
simply because this ^ impartation* implies the judgements ’Error1,
’Sin1, and a ’new beginning’. Reason thus cries back to the Paradox
its own accusation, ’Polly’. Thus we are lead to suspect that by
’Reason’, in the context of the Fragments, Kierkegaard intends to 
convey not only man’s ingeniousness in constructing thought-systems, 
in finding a place within them for everything that occurs, but also 
his pride and self-assertiveness in their possession. For if it 
were possible for this type of rationalist to slip Kierkegaard’s 
Moment into his s^tem, then the whole argument of the Fragments and
I
the Postscript would be in vain! We have used here the term
’system'. This we have done deliberately, because even a cursory
examination of the argument of the Postscript leads us to the conclus-
:ion that in Kierkegaardian thought there is the closest possible
connection between Kierkegaard’s criticisms of ’Reason’, his crit­
iqueC
sicism of ’Pure Thought' and of 'Abstract Thought'>Athe Hegelian
S
thinker armed with his syftem, the 'hospitable' system of Hegel,
the sytenatist; that thought which although valid enough in examining
s'"
the world of external phenomena is invalid when turned
hack in upon an existing individual; the (Hegelian) system which 
includes all hut the all-necessary, Ethics (which investigates the 
agonizing decisions and choices of an existing person). Pure or 
abstract thought, valid in the scientific sphere, is set over against 
what Kierkegaard calls 'concrete thought', which is that type of 
thought apposite to human existence0 "What is concrete thought ?
It is thought with a relation to a thinker, and to a definite particul 
:ar something which is thought, existence giving to the existing
XXthinker thought, time, and place". Kierkegaard's violent polem- 
sic is thus directed against the invasion by pure (i.e. abstract) 
thought of the sphere of existence. " ... Although ... Kierkegaard 
makes some exces.sive remarks which obscure the true import of his 
position, his main thesis is not that faith conflicts with reason as
I
such, but rather with reason which has forgotten its own proper lim- 
sits. Dc^tless he was wrong to assume that to philosophize is, 
almost necessarily, to forget those limits, and yet the history of
XXX
metaphysics provides copious support for his assumption".
References to these themes can be found in Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript, pps. 16 (note l), 97—99» 101-3, 106, 108, 110-113, 223- 
4, 269. 270, 272 (note), 273-9, 283, 292, 296, 298.
**0p. cit., p. 296.
30gEExistentialism and Religious Belief, David E. Roberts, (hew York
1959). P° no. ~
The late Profesor David. E. Roberts points out that life, based on 
pure, abstract, scientific thought alone would be nightmarish; he 
describes a type of insanity to be found in that type of 1 rational­
ist* which we have already described; this insanity is to be found 
" * • • • in the sort of man who knows a great deal about natural 
science or psychology, but who himself has become dehumanized. His 
habit of viewing the world as raw material for experiment, observat- 
sion, and the dispassionate discovexy of laws has made him insensit­
ive -to those dimensions of nature and man that can only be apprehend 
Jed as the unique and mysterious THISNESS of each individual which 
awakens in us an answering response of feeling. This man has, like 
a chameleon, taken on the color of his view of the world. It is as 
though he had a card file, a calculating machine, a laboratory inside 
of him Jibtead of a heart" •* Thus we conclude that the Kierkegaardian 
polemic directed in the Fragments against 'Reason1 is not to be taken 
as against reason in the philosophical or scientific-cognitive sense, 
but against a quite historically conditioned type of 'reason', repres 
Pented by that which has given rise to the Hegelian 'system' and 
'systematist', against a sinful self-assertion which claims to have 
discovered and to possess truth within a closed ideology, against 
an application of the objective scientific approach to the fragile, 
delicate, elusive entity we call human existence.
Ravid E. Roberts, op. cit., p. 106.
We have yet to enquire about the effect this trend of 
Kierkegaardian thought has had in more recent theological thought. 
Certainly, in respect to Bultmann and Buber, the other two thinkers 
whom we have investigated, Kierkegaard seems to have had his effect. 
Thus too, for Bultmann, one bitter enemy of the 'moment' is that 
element in man which makes him want to construct and hold on to 
Weltanschauungen, a 'system' which he brings ready-made to the 
changing situations of life and by means of which he is enabled to 
escape from the claims, the enigma, of the mysterious 'moment' of 
imuartation. And we have seen how Bultmann criticizes that aspect 
Of hiiman rationality which occupies itself with ideas, propositions, 
generalization^ when that aspect oversteps itself and interferes 
with the occurrence of true belief in God* Buber too distinguishes 
between the 'idea of knowledge' current in the It- world and the 
glimpse, the insight,brought by the 'moment' of the Thou. The
I
It-world's idea of knowledge is that it consists of 'items of inform- 
satmon' constructed into a vast system of knowledge; the 'moment' 
'offends' the It-world by the 'exclusiveness' claimed by the 
'moment'. The amazing similarity between Kierkegaard and Buber on 
a certain vital point cannot possibily be explained by mere coincid- 
sences that is Buber's conviction that a 'moment' may enter the It- 
sphere and become hardened into an It, swallowed up by It and left 
dead within the great mass of It, and the Merkegaardian conviction 
that the Moment (in 'Socratic' procedure) may be swallowed up and lost 
in the maw of merely human time, passing away as a human occasion 
buried in the mass of infinite human occasions. this, I repeat,
as sheer coincidence, is too good to be true0 And there can be
little doubt as to the general similarity between, on the one hand,
Thou.
Buber's distinction between the m  -world approach and the WUAWi I t *  
world approach, and, on the other, Kierkegaard's distinction between 
•Faith' and (system-building, self-assertive) 'Reason'.
by fnsifHAg
We conclude this section then,^that Kierkegaard.,
in launching his polemic against 'Reason' in the Fragments, was
actually attacking a falsification of Reason, an overstretching of
its proper limits, and that so far as the works of Bultmann and
Buber are concerned, this aspect of Kierkegaardian thought has had
its influence in formulating the notions that existential knowledge
cannot be possessed in a system, just as the 'knowledge of God'
cannot, and that the proper approach to the religious and existent-
w *sial realities involves something a lot more than pure reason, and
m *i 1that pure reason, in so far as it is imported out of the territory-
proper to itself, and in so far as it is itself falsified, can be
a great hindrance to the achievement of genuine belief in God and
of authentic personal existence®
APPENDIX TO SECTION (9).
One subject given considerable attention in recent 
discussion is hermeneutics, to which we have already made extensive 
reference* Hermeneutics is the science which concerns the interpret 
sation of historical documents and texts* In our discussion of 
Kierkegaard in section (9) certain existentialist hermeneutical 
principles have obviously been utilized* In order to enquire about 
their validity we must ask s are works like Kierkegaard*s Fragments 
Postscript historical documents ? The answer is yes ; their 
concern is with man, and they were written over a hundred years 
ago* Throughout our discussion we have treated these texts as hav-
sing grown out of a quite distinct, concrete, historical background,
and have said that if interpreted apart from this background, they
I
are handled with violence* One hermeneutical rule elucidated by 
Bultmann (from the philosophy of Dilthey probably) is that the inter­
preter must have the same attitude to life as had the original 
writer or recorder. Unless this is so, the interpretation will 
fail to yield the meaning at which the original writer was aiming.
He must approach the recorded problems with something of the same 
thoughts, feelings, aims, assumptions, sympathies, as the original 
writer had when he wrote* This is what we have been trying to do
in section (9)* We have tried to share Kierkegaard's anxious and
desperate concern that the Moment should remain and not be eliminate 
:ed* We have seen that if we do this, his main concepts (Error,
' “I
Sin, the Paradox, Polly, Absurdity,) take on a certain meaning and 
unity which otherwise they would not have. In the words of R,G. 
Collingwood, we have so approached the kierkegaardian texts as to 
make what is recorded in them ’vibrate in our minds’ ; if Colling- 
swood's standpoint is correct, our failure to make them vibrate in 
our minds, our failure to make a past recorded ’moment' blaze up into 
presentness (Buber), would have been a judgement of the texts on our- 
sselves, and not wholly a judgement on the texts. Our agreement in 
the main (or our disagreement) should therefore be directed towards 
Kierkegaard’s burning concern elucidated from the texts, the concern 
that the Moment, utterly decisive, should remain, and not pass away 
like any mere human occasion, and not towards Kierkegaard's individ­
ual propositions interpreted apart from their historical context©
ik-;vd ■■ . in yyihi oncoun U y .  Cod' oa
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NOTES TO SECTION (9).
Throughout this chapter we have been looking for the
roots of much modem theological thinking in the thought of Kierke-
sgaard* The impression that this section leaves us with is that
revelation and the achievement of genuine existence are achieved in
time* They are events, happenings, which punctuate time and give
of authentic existence 
it meaning. Thus revelation and the achievement^re in Kierkegaard1s
thought conceived of as dynamic processes* This is of course the
drift of much modem thought of which we have already observed
ti> k ,
Bultmann1s typical. But there is a not unimportant difference* 
Bultmann says that ,f .... since human life is lived out in space and 
time, man1s encounter with God can only be a specific event here
Xand now11* The importance of such a quotation is that it demonstrat-
'"r; " i
:es that whereas Kierkegaard is strong in emphasising that man!s 
life is lived out in time and therefore can only encounter God now, 
he is weak in that strand that insists that since man!s life is 
lived out in space his encounter with God can only be an event here,
that is, in concrete historical happenings. We can put this another
^Kerygma and Myth, p. 196.
way by saying that while one set of Bultmann*s existential categories 
(the temporal ones, in time, in the 'now'), might be described as 
Kierkegaardian, the other ones (the historical ones, in space, here), 
could not®* Whereas Bultmann ( and also Heidegger, Buber) would 
insist that man is a historical-temporal creature, we must conclude 
that Kierkegaard’s view is that man is essentially temporal® Kierke- 
sgaard's thought does not betray an awareness that man lives a concrete 
psychosomatic sp/acial-historical existence, although vividly aware 
that man lives in and is subject to a flux of temporal instants©
This is is a criticism and a limitation of Kierke- 
sgaard’s thought* I think that the roots of the insight that man 
is a historical creature (in being ’Dasein1) must be sought elsewhere
X’’Christian faith ... believes that God acts upon us and addresses us 
in the specific here and, now”. Kerygma and Myth, p. 197* "...Faith 
can only be an event occurring on specific occasions, and it can only 
remain alive when the believer is constantly asking himself what God 
is saying to him here and now", Kepygma and Myth, p. 199* "That 
Scripture is the Word of God is something which happens only in the 
here and now of encounter.. . Kerygma and Myth, p. 201. "Jesus 
Christ is the esehatological event not as an established fact of past 
time but as repeatedly present, as addressing you and me here and now 
in preaching", History and Bschatology, pps. 151-2.
Marcel's views on historicity would also seem to distinguish his 
thought from that of Kierkegaard. Thus Marcel writes s "My most in-
:timate and unshakable conviction — - and if it is heretical so much
the worse for orthodoxy   is. whatever so many of the pious and
learned people may have said about it, that God does not at all want 
to be loved by us over A.GAIKST the created, but to be glorified 
through the created and starting from it. This God standing against 
the created and in some way jealous of his own works is in my eyes 
nothing but an idol. It is an escape for me to have written this. And 
I declare till a new dispensation that I shall be insincere each time 
that I shall seem to affirm anything contrary to what I have just 
written", Being and Having (London 1950), pps. 196-7*
than in the thought of Kierkegaard. This criticism does not invalid- 
sate the contribution that Kierkegaard made to thought in teaching 
that revelation and the achievement of existence must be temporal, 
dynamic processes. It could be argued that the categories time and 
space always imply each other, but this is not evident in Kierke- 
sgaard. We must conclude that theology and philosophy have added 
a major category to our understanding since Kierkegaard, that of 
historicity in its radical sense. We can perhaps see something of 
this modem addition from something that Tillich has written % 
"Historical revelation is not a revelation in history,but through 
history. Since man is essentially historical, every revelation, 
even if it is mediated through a rock or a tree, occurs in history„ 
But history itself is revelatory only if a special event or a series
Xof events is experienced ecstatically as miracle".
(lo) THE MOMENT INVOLVES DANGER, RISK, AKXIETY.*
We have already discovered the 'mysteriousness' of 
the 'moment1 in both Bultmann and Buber. Again and again Bultmann
3GEdescribes the 'moment' as 'enigmatic'. The 'moment' throws man 
into mystery, into a dilemma, from which man attempts to escape by 
means of a Weltanschauung, or of mysticism, or of a false form of 
living-together, community. The 'moment' is dangerous for Bultmann 
because it represents the needle-like balancing-point between 
inauthentic and authentic existence; in it there is given the 
possibility of gaining or losing one's real existence. In the 
'moment' man ventures his all; his life hangs precariously in the 
balance in the 'moment'. Buber too realises the precariousness of 
the 'moment'. In it man is invited to renounce the visible,
I
tangible, secure world of aims and practical concerns for a sphere 
of insecurity and unreliability, having neither duration nor contin- 
:uity, which no sooner comes than it is gone. Buber speaks of 
'the graciousness of its comings and the solemn sadness of its
KS* /W,9n'goings'. Upon this 'moment' too depends man’s becoming a realy^
*For this section of our study, see especially Philosophical 
Fragments, pps. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27.
DOESee e.g. Essays, pps. 8, 19*
If he says 'yes' to this mysterious approach he grasps his destiny, 
if he says 'no', his real existence remains unachieved. For Buber 
too the 'moment1 implies decisiveness, danger, and risk.
Kierkegaard surveys the Moment's occurrence 
'sub specie aetemitatis1, from, the side of God, and finds in it 
incalculable risk, danger, and anxiety. Thus Kierkegaard strikes 
his opening note: "If the Moment is to have decisive significance, 
how unspeakable will be God's anxiety". God is anxious for the 
Moment's decisive occurrence, and the structure of God’s anxiety is 
this* ‘There is a great qualitative gulf seperating God from man. 
Kierkegaard points out that the Jews held that no man can see God 
and live* How therefore is revelation possible ? How can God 
disclose himself to man and yet not destroy him ? There is sorrow 
in heaven because God must deny man something --- man with his
I
human eyes cannot look upon the unveiled gloiy of Gode The Moment
must be absolutely decisive (i.e. non-Socratic), and yet must come
about without sintering the learner with a blast of the glory of
God* The dilemma is needle-sharp; the learner must owe everything
to God, and this is identical with the learner becoming as nothing. 
^Fragments, p. 23*
Therefore the only way for the Moment to come about without the learn-
:er being shattered is by, says Kierkegaard, the process of
condescension, the appearance of God in lo w ly servant-form, a 
servant-form which is not a disguise nor a mere cloak, but is actually 
God's nature;God is in reality the servant of all* Therefore we 
have the necessity for the ’condition1, faith, which opens man’s 
eyes.and enables him to see that this is God, the servant without a 
resting-place for his head© Therefore we have danger, risk, 
anxiety© This is the suffering of God in which the learner's real 
existence and its achievement must share* God is anxious because 
the servant-form involves the possibility of being misunderstood!
The Moment involves the danger of wrecking man’s confidence so that
after the Moment he cannot live how could he live if it were dis­
closed to him that he really was as nothing!? So Kierkegaard can 
write, " . • . how close each moment to misunderstanding"©* Kierke- 
sgaard’s Moment is decisive because it is the precarious, risky, 
dangerous transition-point between nonbeing and being, Error and 
Truth, it is the point of re-birth, conversion© Once again we 
conclude that Kierkegaard's argument for the Moment is rooted in 
anxiety for its quite decisive occurrence, an anxiety which Kierke- 
sgaard believed to be rooted in and a reflection of the anxiety of 
God for the learner's authentic conversion*
^Fragments, p* 27*
(ll) THE MOMENT IS A 'LEAP' —  IN IT GOD'S EXISTENCE IS PRESUPPOSED,
Kierkegaard argues against the validity of 
the traditional, classical arguments for the existence of God.
For him it is an impossibility to argue for the existence of a person 
He rightly perceives that when a man argues for the existence of God, 
he does so because he is already convinced of that existence. The 
classical proofs, contends Kierkegaard, assume, presuppose the exist­
ence of God. When I begin a discussion by saying, 'I will now 
prove God's existence thus the 'proof' is no proof at all;
by introducing in my opening remark the term 'God' I have 'let the 
cat out of the bag'; I reveal to my hearers that prior to the 'proof 
I am convinced of God's existence. Kierkegaard points out that his 
master Socrates gave an exposition of the so-called teleological arg- 
sument for the existence of God. But he did it honestly; he 
presupposed the truth of God's existence, and then armed with this 
belief in a purposive God, he searched nature for examples of pur- 
:pose to support his presupposition. For Kierkegaard therefore,
God comes at the beginning of the 'argument1, not at the end! He is
^ o r  this eleventh section of our study of Kierkegaard, see the 
Philosophical Fragments, pps. 33 f*> and 46 f.
the premiss, not the conclusion. Nowhere is it more apparent that 
much recent theological thinking has its roots in Kierkegaard than in 
his rejection of the possibility of arguing for God's existence from 
nature or from histoiy. Modem Protestant theology hardly ever 
attempts to 'prove* God's existence at all. For example, we have 
already seen over and over again that while Bultmann admits that an 
examination of human existence affords man a 'notion' of God, this 
is not genuine knowledge of the Inring God, which is always dynamic,
Xtemporal, and historical. Someone has written somewhere that
human nature, according to Bultmann, just fails to give (give) know-
:ledge of God, and this is tantamount to holding that man is unable
to argue from existence to God. Tillich too, although his thought
(as we shall see in our concluding chapter) is so strongly ontolog-
:ical, acknowledges the radical inadequacy of the classical arguments
XXfor the existence of God. The so-called ontological argument, 
for example, is a description of the actual human situation which 
brings out the way there is included the awareness of infinity in- 
man ’s consciousness of finitude. But this procedure, Tillich is 
at pains to insist, is not a logical proof which ends with the exist­
ence of God. Buber, too, pays no tribute to the classical
arguments. Examination of human existence yields nothing more than
*See again Bultmann's The question of Natural Revelation.
**Cf. Syst. Theol., I, pps. 228 f.
%• ’I
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a mere sense of the ’Thou’, which requires fulfilment and. realizat­
ion in the historical encounters of the everyday world. The real­
ization of the inadequacy of the classical proofs of God’s exist- 
:ence does seem to stem from the work of Kierkegaard, partly at 
least.
Kierkegaard starts from the presupposition of God’s 
existence, and at the point at which this presupposition makes it- 
sself most obvious is the Moment, the temporal point of revelation. 
The Moment is brief, it is the ’now’, perhaps only an instantaneous
3E'now1; it is a 1leap'. It is a leap between striving to demon-
3£sstrate God’s existence and seeing that existence as there.
This will perhaps let us see more clearly what is really meant by
the Kierkegaardian ’leap’, which has caused so much bitter contro- 
£>v '
sversy and/ account of which Kierkegaard has been accused of 
irrationalism and obscurantism. Thus Kierkegaard asks : " . . . 
how does the learner come to realize an understanding with the 
Paradox ? . . .  It comes to pass when the Reason and the Paradox 
encounter one another happily in the Moment; when the Reason
3E3E
sets itself aside and the Paradox bestows itself”. Now the act 
fragments, p. 34*
**Gp. cit., p. 47*
in which the Reason ’sets itself aside1 is absolutely identical with 
’the act of letting go’,(i.e. the act of letting go hold of a deraon- 
sstration of the existence of God), through which the actuality of 
God's existence exhibits itself to the learner. This 'exhibiting of 
itself' is absolutely identical with the act in 'which the Paradox 
bestows itself'. It is most interesting that Buber, in the same 
kind of context, also speaks of this 'letting go' s "In contrast to 
religion so understood, philosophy is here regarded as the process, 
reaching from the time when reflection first became independent to 
itjs more contemporary crisis, the last stage of which is the letting 
go of God".*
What does this mean ? Does it mean that Kierkegaard's 
actof faith, his 'leap', is irrational and unacceptable, hot at 
all ; it is not irrational in the philosophical, cognitive, sense.
k 1
To assert this^to forget that Kierkegaard's use of the term Reason 
is highly polemical and acutely historically conditioned«> We have 
already seen that 'Reason' (in both Kierkegaard's Fragments and 
Postscript) indicates man's faculty for constructing systems and find- 
sing a place for everything in them. This is obviously an anti-
^Buber, Eclipse of God:Studies in the Relation Between Religion and 
Philosophy, chapter VIII, 'God and the Spirit of Man', = Herberg, 
ppSo 108-113, see p. 108. There is no doubt from the context that 
the philosophy which 'lets go' of God is the one tine* which imprisons 
God within concepts, or within a conceptual image, cf. p. 109®
XHegelian use of Reason, the reason obsessed with the ’system’.
And we have already examined Professor Swenson’s definition of the 
Kierkegaardian ’Reason1 as the concrete ’reflectively organised 
common sense of mankind inclusing as its essential core a sense of 
life’s values# Over against the Paradox, it is the self-assurance 
and Self-assertiveness of man’s nature in its totality’. Keeping 
this in mind, lejfc us now re-examine Kierkegaard’s ’leap of faith’.
First, there is ’the act of letting go.’ This is 
the act in which I will to relinquish hold of the faculty obsessed 
with System-building. It is also the relinquishment of the exist- 
:ing system as the criterion and the vessel of truth. In letting 
go of the systematic demonstration of that which cannot be demonstrat- 
sed, and the attitude of mind that lies behind it and produces it,
I bring myself into that existential state wherein God can disclose
I
his existence to me* As Kierkegaard says, ’’When I let the proof 
go, the existence is there” (Fragments, p. 34) > he also says, ”As
*See Alexander Dru’s Introduction to the shorter version of Kierke- 
:gaard1s Journals (London, Collins, 195S)> P* 22 * "Kierkegaard’s 
insistence on ’the choice’ and the ’leap of faith’ are so prominent 
in.his work that, in the context of his attack on rationalism and 
humanism, they are sometimes allowed to suggest a narrow, fanatical, 
and irrational philosophy of religion. In fact his argument is alto- 
:gether different. The choice and leap of faith are not counsels of 
despair nor a ’bet’ as in Pascal’s argument but a necessary step to- 
:wards the fusion of thought and existence. Faith and reason are 
opposed as long as reason is the reason of the rationalist, that is 
to say isolated from every other faculty in man and consequently div­
orced from existence. ’In the fantastic medium of abstraction’, 
faith is absurd, because existence itself is absurd. It can only be 
seen as a paradox, since the language of rationalism is of its nature 
incapable of grasping and expressing existence, but man is not a 
rational animal and thought which is not the expression of a fully 
mature and developed personality in whom intellect, will, and feel- 
:ing are harmonised, is thought divorced from existence".
long as I keep hold on the proof • • o the existence does not come 
out, if for no other reason than that I am engaged in proving it c *
X.
• Thus self-assertive system-obsessed reason is actually an
enemy of real belief in God. Second, there is the first part of 
Swenson's definition of the Danish 'Forstanden** 'To set Heason
3E3E •aside1 is absolutely identical with the suspension of my already
organised common sense with its already formulated sense of values.
The more advanced is the 'organization1 and the 'formulation' inher- 
:ent in this, the less room there is obviously for anything new to
3E30E
imparted; the less room there is for the imparting of some- 
sthing that hitherto was not included in my consciousness or under- 
sstanding* Therefore, as Kierkegaard says, when Reason (in this
3€3£3€3£
sense) sets itself aside, "The Paradox bestows itself".
Third, to deal with the second part of Swenson's definition of
'Forstanden'. The 'setting aside of Reason' (which is the indispen- 
:sable condition of revelation) is absolutely identical with the 
relinquishment of man's self-assurance and self-assertiveness, which 
really means repentance of his intellectual and spiritual HUBRIS.
For the Moment to come about, man must realize that truth is not
^Fragments, p. 33*
**0p. cit., p. 47*
The theology of ’ impart at ion' again,*
yaryy
Op. cit., p. 47* it is hardly necessary to point to the process 
of 'impartation' once more.
something eternally possessed by him, not his 'achievement*; to use 
Pauline language, it is not something which is his 'work' and in 
the possession of which he can 'boast' himself. The Moment 
therefore requires breaking with HUBRIS and entering upon humility, 
which in our present context means the realization that man is, in 
his intellectual achievement (viewed as the construction of a 
systemXor Weltanschauung, or as the discovery of immanent truth),
JL
as nothing in the sight of God. "The truth then is that the 
learner owes the Teacher everything . . .  that the learner becomes 
as nothing and yet is not destroyed; that he comes to owe everything 
to the Teacher and yet retains his confidence . . .  that he 
apprehends the guilt of his Error and yet that his confidence rises 
victorious in the Truth". One implication of these words is
that genuine revelation means humility, and a break with pride and 
self-assertiveness. Truth, in Kierkegaard's sense, can only be
I
imparted to man as a gift. What we have been here describing links 
up with the teaching of Jesus on the virtue of humility, on meekness, 
on childlikeness of heart, and no doubt a full exposition of
In his Dogmatics, Hermann Diem makes the following interesting comm­
ent : "In fact, on the basis of his wtg/n presuppositions, Kierke- 
:gaard would surely have seen that same 'hybris' against which he 
himself had striven go fiercely now, Heidegger's existentialist 
ontology, undertaking the impossible task of constructing a 'system 
of existence"', (p. 22).
^Fragments, p. 24.
Kierkegaard’s argument in the Fragments would require to refer to 
the Hew Testament passages dealing with these virtues**' In this 
leap there is something wholly mine, something which I alone can 
contribute and without which God is unable to act; "this act of 
letting go • • • is indeed a contribution of mine"*** This act, 
which is wholly human, is the leap;this leap is between two points, 
and we are now ready to define it in three simple ways* First, it 
is a leap from the limit of my system-building faculty to that point 
where I am able to receive a new (existentially speaking) imparted 
truth incapable of being systematized* Second, the leap is from 
the limit of my organized and formulated sense of values to that 
point where I am able to receive an imparted gift for which I am. not 
required to find a prepared place in ray system. It is constituted, 
third, from the limit of my intellectual arrogance, self-assurance, 
and self-assertiveness, to that point at which I repent of .my intell-
I
sectual HUBRIS and am humble enough to receive the truth as a gift 
from the hand of God* Without the leap there is no Moment, and 
without my part which really is my part, there can be no leap.
KIn Mimesis,(Princeton 1953)* a book much admired and cited by Bult- 
smann, Erich Auerbach mkes this point : " „*• Holy Scripture favors 
those whose hearts are simple and filled with faith;that such a 
heart is a,prerequisite to ’sharing1 in it, for sharing and not a pure 
sly rational understanding is what it seeks to offer ....as Augustine 
puts it in the Confessions, that one must read it as a child would .
(p. 155)*
^Fragments, p. 34»
The thought of Kierkegaard at this point is of course 
closely paralleled by that of -Bultmann and Buber. In the thought of 
Bultmann, we saw that man must make a breach with the cares and con- 
scerns and plans of everyday life in order that he may be ready for 
the Moment. flan must see that his longing- for the possession of 
a Weltanschauung is inauthentic and is a stumbling-block to the occur: 
sence of the ’moment'. The will to make such a breach, is, of 
course, a mark of authentic man's dialectical relationship to the 
world. In the thought of Buber we have found the demand being 
reiterated that man, sunk in the means and ends and concerns of 
the world of It must resolve or will to make such a brea,ch, and 
step into relationship with the unreliable reality which approaches 
him in the ’moment' and which then vanishes again. For the 
occurrence of the 'moment', man must break with that conception of 
knowledge which is current in the scientific and technological
I
sphere of It. Thus the Moment requires the leap, and this leap
is man's act, and his alone s ” . . .  this act of letting go is
surely also something; it is indeed a contribution of mine. Must
not this also be taken into account, this little moment, brief as it
may be --  it need not be long, for it is a 'leap'. However brief
this moment, if only an instantaneous now, this 'now' must also be
included in the reckoning”. This serves to make clear that the
theology of Kierkegaard, does not hold, as do certain theologies 
^Fragments, p. 34*
supposedly derived from his, that God discloses himself to 'stocks 
and stones', in which disclosure man has no real part.K
out
Thus with^the leap there cannot take place transit- 
:ion from nonbeing to being, from Error to Truth, conversion, re­
birth. The leap, and this is perhaps the most important point of 
all from the point of view of this thesis, is, as we have tried to 
show, a quite indispensable dimension of the theology of"impartat-
u 30£:ion, especially as we see it in the works of Bultmann and Buber.
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*See John Baillie, Our Knowledge of God, (London 1939)> pps. 21 f., 
where such theologies are criticised.
**As we shall see in the conclusions, the 'lea.p' serves to disting­
uish existentialist theology from ontological theology as we have 
it in, say, Paul Tillich.
(12) A CHANGE IN THE IMMUTABILITY OF THE PAST IS BROUGHT ABOUT IN
THE MOMENT.
We have seen throughout this study that the 
Moment is indispensable in that there can be no human 'progress' or 
'advance' without it. Without it, man cannot move from Error to 
Truth, nonbeing to being, bondage to liberty. Without the Moment, 
Error continues as Error, nonbeing as nonbeing, in the inexorable 
flux of succeeding instants. This flux is comprised of the past 
into the future via the present, without any decisive, interrupting, 
breach* From this point of view, the whole argument of the Frag­
ments points to the Moment as a decisive breach in the sway of 
causality within human existence. We have already seen in Bultmann 
that.the 'moment' is one of decision, relating the past authentically 
to the future in the present; the 'moment' thus dislocates the causal 
effect of the past in man's present, and offers to him the possibil­
ity of a new and open future. In Buber we saw that the sphere of 
!It' was characterized by the 'unlimited sway of causality’. But 
the reality into which man is invited in the*moment of meeting is one 
that does not know this 3way of causality and one in which man is del 
:ivered from its power, and enabled to become a real person in accord 
:ance with his own decision. It is rather hard not to reach the 
conclusion that the thought of Kierkegaard has anticipated many of 
these views in more modern thought, and that here again we come 
across the roots of much modern theology and. philosophy.
Kierkegaard is anxious to invalidate the thought that 
the past and its events possess^ necessity.* The immutability of
the past consists only in that that a certain event has happened, 
and that, of course, cannot be altered. That is the limit to the 
definition of necessity. But this is quite different from asserting 
that a past event had to happen in the way that it did; as Kierkegaard 
says,^the thought that ” . . .  the past’s possible 'how1 could not 
have been realized in a different manner”. Kierkegaard is anxious 
because if the past is necessary, then so is every event in it, and 
this comes to include all events of the present and the future.
That is, past, present, and future would come to comprise a solid 
and irresistable stream of time, without breach or interruption.
"If the past had become necessaiy it would not be possible to infer 
the opposite about the future, but it would rather follow that the 
future was also necessary. , If necessity could gain a foothold at a 
single point, there would no longer 1>g any distinguishing between
3Ethe past and the future”. If a generation held such a view of
3Q£the past it would be a prophesying or predicting generation.
Such prophesying would consist in following the causal line from 
the past through the present into the future;the study of necessity
^Fragments, pps. 63 f»
cit., pps. 63~4>we remember that Buber, in the same sort of con- 
:text argues against 'prediction'.
r5>
would suggest hypotheses and causal laws, analogous to the laws of 
the natural sciences; the result would he what Bultmann has called 
historicism, or history understood in analogy with nature. But 
according to Kierkegaard, our relation to past events if of quite a 
different order. The value of the study of the past is that it 
reveals to us that the past has come into being through changes e 
That is, it reveals to us that what we call immutability has been 
brought about by a past change, and if this is so, it is clear that 
change is not excluded from the temporal process. The past has been 
brought into being by 1 becoming’ and by this Kierkegaard means " • »
• • a change in actuality brought about by freedom". Our relation- 
sship to the past therefore involves a search for freedom rather 
than for necessity. We (and the historian) should therefore examine 
past events in order to discover in them the freedom which allowed 
them to enter actuality. In the flux of instants, in past, present,I
and future, " . • • all change is excluded . . .  only by being ex~
XX:eluded in every moment". The positive way of putting this is 
to say that change is included within the temporal process in the 
moment. Without the Moment we have man as animal and history as 
brute existence. Without it we would have the It-sphere's
*0p• cit., p. 64. 
^Op. cit., p. 63*
'unlimited sway of causality', or Bultmann's historicism. But the 
Moment offers itself as a radical dislocation in that process by which 
man would otherwise be constituted by his past through his present 
into his future. Without the Moment, man would have no history.
Thus the Moment is yet another dimension of Kierkegaard's intense 
anxiety that man's real, genuine self should stand out firmly from 
nonbeing, out of that placid sea of sameness and anonymity which 
Kierkegaard detested above all else.*
XThe view that history asjjstudy is most valuable because it yields 
evidence in the past of free becoming through human decision in face 
of causal forces, finds striking expression in Miss Barbara Ward's 
Faith and Freedom l A Study of Western Society, (London 1954)* The 
book is a study of the history of the West in which Miss Ward illus­
trates significant periods of spiritual and cultural advance, in 
spite of determining forces; the study of history indicates that free- 
:dom is not an illusion,and that necessity has not always the last 
say; she assesses the contribution to this of the great world-relig- 
:ions, amongst which she has many interesting comments to make on 
Judaism;she finds freedom in the Life of Christ in the Gospels. If 
a scholar convinced of the truth of 'historicism' were to search past 
history for economic, geographical, climatic causal factors, he would 
find many instances of free and utterly unexpected becoming that would 
cast serious dubiety on the truth of his thesis. See Faith and 
Freedom, pps. 5> 7-8» 8-9? H >  21, 22,23, 27, 33-5? 44» 56* Miss Ward 
has not failed in her task of showing that historical investigation 
demonstrates that what 'happened' in the past 'came into being', and 
by doing so proved that it did not always do so by necessity, but also 
by freedom.
(3.3) IMMEDIATE CQNTE^IPQRAKEITY WITH CHRIST IS NO ADVANTAGE i TO
ENCOUNTER HIM THE MOMENT IS REQUIRED.*
We have actually already touched on Kierkegaard's 
argument here, when in chapter I we considered the meaning Bultmann 
gives to the concept EPHAPAX. We noted then that Kierkegaard holds 
that even an immediate contemporaiy of Christ believed only because 
God gave a Moment in which there was gifted the condition, faith, by 
which the witness was able to perceive God in the servant-form. The
witness's confession of faith could serve only as an occasion for our
contemporaiy belief, no more. The only importance that Kierkegaard 
could ascribe to the apostolic witnesses to Christ is that their test­
imony is the first in a series of Moments the common element in
I
which is the condition, faith, by means of which belief becomes a poss­
ibility; there is no possibility of our being able to believe now 
by means of the apostolic testimony alone. It does seem that for 
Kierkegaard those who believe in Christ today are in exactly the same
condition as his contemporary believers. In the Moment, all
*For this thirteenth section of our study, see especially Fragments, 
pps.56 f.
believers are 'contemporaries' with Christ possessing an identical 
statuse We have already linked these Kierkegaardian views with
Bultmann's views on the 'moment'; indeed, it is not going too fan* to 
say that Bultmann's views on contemporaneity are identical with 
Kierkegaard's. Thus Bultmann can write : " . . . although the 
advent of Christ is an historical event which happened 'once' in 
the past, it is, at the same time, an eternal event which occurs
3£2£
again and again in the soul of any Christian in whose soul Christ
XXMis bom, suffers, dies, and is raised up to eternal life. In his 
faith the Christian is a contemporary of Christ, and time and the
X X X X
world's history are overcome". \je must not underestimate the
importance of such Bultmannian and Kierkegaardian views for Christ- 
:ian theology as a whole. Traces of them can be found on almost 
every page of this thesis, and we shall have to re-assess them fin­
sally in our conclusions. , But there is one criticism of them 
which we have so far left unmentioned, and to it we now turn. It is
XXXXXto be found in Oscar Cullmann's important Christ and Time,
especially in the 4th. section of Part II, 'The Present Stage of
Redemptive History and Its Relation to the Christ-event at the Mid-
Point'. There we find criticisms of Kierkegaard's notion of
contemporaneity. The kernel of Cullmann's criticism is that
^EPHAPAX.
X X i.e., in 'moment' after 'moment'.
XXXIn our conclusions we shall see another significance in such a 
Bultmannian passage, in transferring the 'particularity' of the 
events of Christ's life to the personal life of the Christian.
30BQ£Rudolf Bultmann, History and Eschatology, p. 153«
London 1951*
" • • • the emphasis on our being'contemporaneous1 with that event of 
the past, a position so dear to the heart of Kierkegaard, must not 
lead us to use this position to abolish the time character of the re™ 
sdemptive process". For Cullmann, it is not competent for the
X3Ebeliever to "leap over the periods of time". Cullmann comes closer 
his
to the core of/(criticism when he writes : " . • • Kierkegaard, with 
his concept of 'contemporaneity', mistakes the significance of the 
present for redemptive history. According to him, faith transfers 
us back into the time of the incarnation; it makes us contemporaries 
of the apostles. In this view it is correct that faith permits us 
actually to survey the entire redemptive line and share in its fruits, 
as we have explained in the chapter concerning the divine Lordship 
over time. But the concept of contemporaneity presupposes that 
basically time as redemptive time has already come to a, standstill 
with Jesus Christ; hence we can only go back to him in order to enterI
the realm of salvation. But is this the conception of Primitive 
Christianity ? . . . The redemptive history continues; CHRIST SITS 
AT THE RIGHT HAM) OF GOB, now, today". He repeats much the same 
thing in different words s " . . . we . . emphasise . . in contrast
*Gullmann, Christ and Time, p. 53> n. E  •T]’
“ Op, cit., p. 76#
^ O p .  cit., p. 146.
to the extreme conclusion of Protestantism, as it has been drawn, for
example, by Kierkegaard ——  that the return to the Christ-event at
the mid-point must not so mislead us that we fail to recognize that
the post-Easter present signifies a continuance in time of the redenp-
itive process'*. Again Cullmann attacks Kierkegaard's notion of
contemporaneity : " . . . All talk concerning a 'contemporaneity'
which faith should establish with the incarnate Jesus lacks
support in the writings of the New Testament. Kierkegaard, who has
emphasised most strongly this contemporaneity, thereby implicitly
rlnm'it’pwj1 r? destroys the redemptive line, inasmuch as he really abstracts
the present from it. He emphasises the necessity of an '©verleap-
:ingf, because otherwise, as our distance in time from Christ's
death continues to increase, we would also be removed ever farther
from this event's essential meaning, that is, its significance for
salvation. But he thereby overlooks the fact that, according to
the New Testament faith, Christ now rules invisibly over heaven and
earth, and works visibly in and through the Church; his function in
eveiy relation, including his high-priestly work, is now continuing,
in that he intercedes for us with the Father and brings all our pray-
sers before him (John 14*14 f.)".** Cullmann again attacks
Kierkegaard's disregard for the Church's present In
*0p. cit., pps. 146-7*
**0p. cit., p. 168*
Kierkegaard the time from the present to the Christ—event at the mid­
point is, so to speak, overleaped in a backward direction . . .
In Kierkegaard the peculiar significance of the present for redemp-
3E.Jtiveis undervalued"* Cullmann again emphasises the importance
of the present for redemption over against Kierkegaard’s emphasis 
on return to the past : " • . * in opposition to a cramped Protest- 
santism we have emphasised that the redemptive histoiy has been advanc 
sing 'Continuously ever since the ascension of Christ, and that our 
present period has its particular meaning for redemptive history"*
At the outset, there does seem to be some- 
t thing in what Cullmann says about Kierkegaard’s theology* There 
does seem to be an apparent lack in his work of a present ecclesiast- 
sical background, and to those of us who have come to Christianity 
through the Church it may seem that Kierkegaard’s thought is defic- 
iient in its almost complete lack of reference to the Church’s 
present* Mr. K.J* Blackham has these interesting words about :
Kierkegaard s "Kierkegaard's argument deals with the object of Christ- 
sian faith and the manner of apprehending it. That a man b o m  and
*0p. cit., p. 169.
^Op. cit., p. 174°
living in histoiy says that he is God and dies in humiliation plunges 
into a dileimna those who would build their lives on him and his wordo 
Nothing has happened since to lighten by one scruple the strain on 
belief. The historical success of Christianity is worthless evid-
j ence. The present generation is exactly in the position of the 
contemporaries of Christ who witnessed his humiliation on the cross. 
Faith today, unless it is faith in the faith of the Apostles, is riot 
other than their faith in the man who makes the most absurd of 
claims. The truth of this claim cannot in the nature of the case
be made objectively certain, or even investigated : on the contrary, 
the absolute'discontinuity between the human and the divine which in- 
sheres in the conception of God makes it unthinkable, so that it 
cannot by any human mind be recognized as true, cannot be entertain-
3£:ed as a possibility". We ought not fail to recognize that F.ierke-
:gaard1s thought focuses upon a geometrical point which is the point 
3ESix Existentialist Thinkers, pP 4* Although we shall argue that 
Cullmann*s criticisms of contemporaneity do not count against Kierke- i 
:gaard in any radical sense, it is easy to see how people like CnlJ- 
imann reach such criticisms. There is a trace of truth in Cull- 
smarm's dislike of Kierkegaard's undervaluing of the present in so far, 
as we have already pointed out, Kierkegaard's Moment is almost purely 
temporal, and not historical5in Kierkegaard's Moment mam's present, 
with its concrete relations and problems and questions, does not seem 
to be involved. 'Contemporaneity with the apostles', in Kierkegaard's 
sense, almost involves a mystical procedure! But Cullmann's critic­
isms of 'contemporaneity' do not count at all against Bultmann, be- 
scause Bultmann is always crystal clear that to the contemporaneous 
Christ whom we encounter in the 'moment' we bring our concrete hist- 
:orical present existence, and allow it to itlt®T-act with him end his 
word.
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of transition between non-Christianity and Christianity? upon the
problem (which dominates both the Fragments and the Postscript) of
n.
becoming a Christian,” Kierkegaard was a Christian ’apologist1
(in the classical and correct meaning of the term). Thus we see
that the standpoint of Kierkegaard was radically different from that
of Cullmann, who takes his stand s q u a r e l y  within the Christian Church 
3E3£and her Tradition, He seems to presuppose the truth of the
dogmas of the Church, including, for instance, the doctrine of the 
inspiration of Scripture, a presupposition which is bound to be shar- 
se& by many (but not all) of his readers. In a sense therefore it 
is natural for his conclusions to be quite different from those of 
Kieikegaard, whose presupposition is undoubtedly that his readers 
are passionately concerned to find a truth by which they can live.
To put the same thing in a different way, Cullmann is quite clear that 
the perceptions of which he writes (e.g. the Lordship of Christ over
I
heaven and earth) are perceived by faith; but Kierkegaard, and it is 
vital to grasp this, takes his stand with the ‘learner’ without 
faith, and traces, with him and for him, the transition into faith, 
via the Moment, Kierkegaard, as a theologian^takes as his stand­
point that tense and risky boundaiy-line between faith and^unbelief,
*We shall argue in our conclusions that the ’problem of becoming a 
Christian’is the starting point of the theologies of both Bultmann and 
Kierkegaard, and that whoever does not appreciate this, fails to uncler- 
:stand both theologies.
**1/6 shall argue in the conclusions that many pseudo-theological 
statements are really ecclesiastical ’readings-back' from the exper- 
sience of Christians*
nonbeing and being, Error and Truth. Things th e r e fo r e which are 
obvious for Cullmann and his fellow-churchmen are not at all so 
obvious for Kierkegaard and the learner with whom Kierkegaard ident­
ifies himself.
We must note that whatever value is ultimately ascrib 
sed to Cullmann's criticism® of Kierkegaard, it cannot possibly be 
a radical criticism. This is because Cullmann realizes that the 
'present age1, the ’intermediate period’, draws its significance 
from the past. So in the knowledge of the present Jesus (for 
example in community phenomena like the Sacraments), " ... we are 
constantly referred back to the unique deed at the mid-point”.*
Now it is precisely with this ’unique deed at the mid-point’, 
contemporaneity with Jesus, that Kierkegaard’s Moment is concerned. 
And what is this referring back but an 'overleaping of time in a
I
backward direction’ to which Cullmann elsewhere takes so much except 
sion ? When Cullmann says that ” ... the ecclesiastical 
'tradition' may not be regarded as of equal importance with that
3Lwhich then took place at the mid-point" , Kierkegaard simply goes 
further and says that God’s deed at the mid-point completely over­
*Christ and Time, p. 168.
overshadows / in significance what has happened since ecclesiastic­
ally O So much so, that we must come to terms with it existent!ally 
first of all. To use Tillich's terminology, the deed at the mid­
point is our 'ultimate concern*.
To be fair to Cullmann, he does recognize the harm 
done by the Catholic Church in absolutizing the ecclesiastical 
period in history and writes of it : "The centre is neither the
3€present nor the future, but rather the earthly work of Christ". 
Kierkegaard concerns himself with this centre in the past, and tries 
to show its vast significance for man's present. Of the whole 
argument of Christ and Time Cullmann writes t "Hie necessity, which 
we have indicated in this work, of constant orientation to the 
unique, once-for-all event of the mid-point is indeed granted
3E3Ethroughout". Again we must be permitted to suggest that this
I
constant orientation towards the past in the present (as posited by
Cullmann) does imply in some sense an 'overleaping of time backwards'
which Cullmann finds so objectionable in Kierkegaard's theology*
It is for reasons like these that I maintain that whatever Value is
ascribed ultimately to Cullmann's criticisms of Kierkegaard's
'contemporaneity', his criticisms cannot be radical ones.
*0p. cit., p. 168.
^Op. cit., p. 169.
It is evident from Christ and Time that the signific 
:ance of the intemediate period in history is derived from the sig­
nificance of the Church, the Christian community. The Church is 
historically significant for the following reasons.* The Church 
is the spatial centre of Christ's Lordship. The Church is the 
sphere of the activity of the Holy Spirit, present as 'earnest', 
'first-fruits*. The Church is God’s highest gift of salvation in 
the intermediate period. (Here, we hope that Cullmann has in 
mind the Church as an intermediary agency, as a proclaimer of the 
KERYGMA). The Church is the place where the Eucharist (the 
greatest of God’s 'eschatological miracles') is celebrated, in which 
Christ is present, pointing towards both past and future. The miss 
*iOnaiy proclamation of the Church, rooted in the mid-roint in the 
past, gains its meaning from Christ's present Lordship, and is sig­
nificant because 'it hastens histoiy towards its end', which will
I
end when all have had an opportunity to hear the Gospel. The
Church dominates, then, the intermediate period, and it is this,
says Cullmann, that Kierkegaard ignores by his emphasis on
contemporaneity, in which this 'present age*, this 'intermediate
period*jis overleaped in time.________;_______
X0p. cit., pps. 154-8*
This criticism is important because it raises the whole 
question of Kierkegaard's relationship to the Church, and of the way 
in which the Church figures in his writings. To that we now turn*
We must note that each 'mark' or 'note' of the Church, for Kierke- 
:gaard, refers to the mid-point deed, the Christ-event. For him, 
none of these 'marks' " . . .  lightens by one scruple the strain on 
belief" (Blackham). "The historical success of Christianity", says 
Blackham, writing of Kierkegaard's philosophy, "is worthless evid- 
sence". That means that the divine 'marks' themselves are not
objectively obvious to historical research qua historical research' ; 
it also means that they are related to the Christ-event in depending 
upon it for their validity, and not vice-versa. What the believer, 
or more strictly speaking, the learner, concerns himself with is 
therefore the Christ-event, which is Kierkegaard’s dominant emphas- 
sis. The 'marks' of the Church are marks only for faith,and this
I
faith is primarily and crucially faith in God's deed at the mid­
point. These marks could not possibly prove the truth of Christ­
ianity. They are all question-begging, and all raise the crucial 
question as to the identity and significance of Jesus of Nazareth, 
enshrined at the heart of each of them. Kierkegaard himself sums
^Blackham, Op. cit., p. 4»
**We have argued in Chapter I against Tillich, Owen, and Macquarrie, 
that the act of God is not open to the examination of the objective 
historian independent of his subjective existential decision.
this up neatly when he writes s "If this fact came into the world, as 
the Absolute Paradox, nothing' that happens subsequently can avail to 
change this. The consequences will in all eternity remain the con- 
ssequences of a paradox, and hence in an ultimate view will be prec­
isely as improbable as the Paradox itself; unless it is to be supp- 
Josed that the consequences, which as such are derivative, have retro 
sactive power to transform the Paradox, which would be about as reas- 
tonable to suppose that a son had retroactive power to transform his 
own father. Even if the consequences be conceived in a purely 
logical relation to their cause, and hence under the form of imma.n- 
Jence, it still remains true that they can be conceived only as 
identical and homogeneous with their cause; least of all will they 
have a transforming power. To have the consequences as a datum is 
then precisely as dubious an advantage as to have an immediate cert-
:aintyj whoever takes the consequences immediately to his credit is
1
deceived, precisely as one who takes the immediate certainty for
v~ ir
faith"** This demons/a jbes what is meant when we said that the 
marks of the Church are derivative from the deed at the mid-point, 
and depend on it for their validity*
It also seems certain that Kierkegaard would have 
said that the 'marks' of the Church, spread throughout the whole 
^Philosophical Fragments, pps. 79-80.
world (we can have a clear idea of what this means from Professor 
Latourette's books), have the dubious advantage in giving the impress- 
:ion that the Church and what it is based upon is a quite natural 
phenomenon. The Church becomes absorbed into the social and polit- 
Jical and cultural structures; men become used to it there; they come 
to feel that there is nothing more natural and logical that the Church 
should be there1 This is probably what Kierkegaard means when he
ifspeaks of the 'naturalization1 of the Christian fact. ' Nov/ v/hen we 
read Christ and Time, it is hard not to conclude that Cullmann 
implies that the existence of the world-wide Christian community 
adds weight to the Christian Gospel. Kierkegaard would insist that 
this process of naturalization is invalid, as he would, of the argu­
ment that Christianity is very probable because of the v/orld-wide 
existence and spread of the Church over twenty centuries. Unless we 
grasp that Kierkegaard holds that the marks of the Church (what he 
calls the 'consequences') clerive from the absurd premiss of the 
Incarnation, we fail completely to grasp his meaning#
Kierkegaard is clear how the world-wide spread of
* Fragments# pps. 80 f«
Christianity has come to pass it has done so by 'a succession of
3£steps*. Each step consists in coming into a direct relationship 
with the Christ-event (the Paradox)* In the transmission of Christ 
:ianity, the nature of ecclesiastical phenomena, of the ’consequences 
must be made clear s '* • • • consequences founded on a paradox are 
humanly speaking built over a yawning chasm, and their total content, 
which can be transmitted to the individual only with the express 
understanding that they rest upon a paradox, are not to be approp­
riated as a settled estate, for their entire value trembles in the 
balance”• In so far as Cullmann’s argument in Christ and Time
imply a ’naturalization* of the Church’s KERYGMA, then the above is 
clearly Kierkegaard’s reply to such a description of Church and 
KERYGMA.
, Further, Cullmann perceives the great difficulties
I
inherent in arguing that the existence of the Church does anything 
to ’prove’ the truth or probability of Christianity, and in holding
3E3E5Ethat the Church really is ’God's greatest gift of salvation’.
"Just as the entire redemptive history can only be believed but not 
proved, so above all the Church also can only be believed, and it 
really takes a quite special courage of faith to see the centre of
*0p. cit., p. 82.
jrsr
Op. cit., p. 82 ; within the context of this thesis, we could apply 
these same words to a Christian Weltanschauung or to a propositional 
theology, which cannot be transmitted without reference to the con- 
:crete 'moment' or 'moments’ from which they are derived.
*3Q€see Christ and Time, p. 155»
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the present Lordship of Christ in this Church which from its very 
beginning is so imperfect and all too human".3* Cullmann cites 
’ecclesiastical conflicts' (beginning in Apostolic times), and 
'murmurings' of members against each other (sometimes for quite 
wordly reasons) as further difficulties in the way of the Church- 
being believed to be God’s highest gift of salvation in the present
3E3E
a@e* Against these, Cullmann cites 'eschatological miracles', 
glossolalia, healings, and such like, but this only serves to show 
that the Church’s histoiy, from the point of the view of the KKRYGMA, 
is fragmentary and ambiguous, and requires decision for identificat- 
sion with it# Ecclesiastical histoiy clearly shows that scandals 
are more or less apparent in different periods* And in Kierke- 
sgaard’s time ecclesiastical scandals of a theological type seem to 
have been so apparent that to posit that Church as the ground of 
divine revelation was a dangerous, not to say ludicrous, procedure*
I
Kierkegaard felt moved to bring this fact to light in a way that can 
only be described as a corrective, "Christianity does not exist" 9 
(Walter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, Oxford 1938? P* 525)* "Parsons 
canonize bourgeois mediocrity", (Kierkegaard, Jou.rnaJs,transl. Dru,
3EOp, cit., p. 1555 as we shall see shortly, Kierkegaard could say the
same thing, except much more strongly and satirically. We shall
argue in our conclusions (in ’The Problem of Church and Community') 
that a decision for the Church is just as necessary and as subject­
ive as a decision for the KERYGMA itself,
**It is possible to go much farther than Cullmann does in his critic­
isms of the Church, To read those periods in ecclesias hical hist- 
sory when the Church persecuted, say, witchcraft, is to come to the 
conclusion that periods in the Church's histoiy shows the (visible) 
Church to have been demonic and diabolical,
KKX«I could stand Christ, did he not come dragging His leprous Bri de 
the Church with Him' - Swinburne (1857-1909)*
Oxford 1938? 1134)* "Official Christianity is both aesthetically 
and intellectually ludicrous and indecent, a scandal in the Christian 
sense". Thus the Church at a given period may hinder rather than 
help the achievement of belief, which is what Cullmann supposes it 
does. Thus Kierkegaard avowed that he "came out polemically against
3GEhis age". If the Danish Lutheran Church of Kierkegaard’s day
was as bad as he tells us, then this is adequate enough explanation 
of that 'lack1 in his thought of which Cullmann complains. To 
state, with Cullmann, that the Church is God's highest gift of salvat- 
:ion in the present, would have been a calamitous statement for 
Kierkegaard to make. Kierkegaard, like every other theologian, 
must be interpreted against his historical background.
What was the exact relationship between Kierkegaard and 
the Church ? Kierkegaard grew out of the background of ecclesiast-
I
sical Christianity and without it Kierkegaard would perhaps not have 
developed as he did. "As a child I was strictly and austerely 
brought up in Christianity a child crazily travestied as a mel-
3E3E3Esancholy old man". As a child Kierkegaard got to know the official 
contemporary Christianity from his father, whose spiritual adviser 
*Walter Lowrie, A Short Life of Kierkegaard, Oxford 1943? p* 2460
3€3EJournals, p. 588; i.e. against, his ecclesiastical as well as his 
philosophical age,
5QOValter Lowrie, Kierkegaard, p. 48.
was Bishop Mynster. Adulthood did not mean for him a break with 
the Church and its ord.ina.nces* Writing of his 1838 ' conversion* , 
Chaning-Pearce says s "It is to be noted that for him return to God 
also implied return to his Church? in July he went to public confess-
3E:ion and received holy communion'1. Lowrie tells us that "Kierke-
3 Q €sgaard was a regular churchgoer"* Kierkegaard was a ’high church­
man1 in that he " . . . holds to the custom of infant baptism . . ,
3C3€3€and he expresses his antipathy to sectarian movements". Even
his death-bed act of refusing Communion from an official of the 
Church demonstrates that he is still related to the Church* fhere is 
truth in what Chaning Pearce says of him s that Kierkegaard’s 
reconception of what he believed to be a real Christianity " * . , 
led him to a profound religious realism which could only reject much 
of the religion of his time as unreal, and to what may be termed an
3E3€3£2HEauthentic Christianity of the spirit". It does seem as though
the ’lack’ of which Cullmann complains is not so much an unconscious 
lack as a positive rejection, because of the spiritual condition of 
the Church of Kierkegaard’s day, and that his work can legitimately 
be regarded as an attempt to bring the existing Church into line with 
^Soren Kierkegaard:A Study, p. 19*
^Concluding Unscientific Postscript, note on p. of* p* 418*
^^^Walter Lowrie, in a note on p. 519 of the Postscript, cf. p. 42* 
30KXMelville Chaning-Pearce, op. cit*, p© 43*
the somewhat ideal Church described by Cullmann in Christ and Time© 
Chaning-Pearce further writes of the Church's effect on Kierkegaard: 
"His early training in Christianity, his father's influence and the 
force of his own conversion in 18.38 had rooted within him a fundamen 
sal faith in God and the Christian vision of life which no storm 
could destroy. His soul, like that of the modem Western world, 
was too deeply christianized to permit of any pre- or sub-Christian 
faith* Ha. might rebel against the form of Christianity which he 
encountered; he might flirt with infidelity as a gesture of defiance 
but he could not really escape from the Christian pattern of life 
and thought". Thus Kierkegaard's Christian upbringing and eccles 
siast.ical background do seem indispensable to his developement*
It seems to me that the main fault of the ecclesiolater
is(and Cullmann is not free of it either), that the Church which
really does influence the 'man in the street', the Church which
really mediates redemption to us, is not some ideal Church described
in Ephesians or in the book of Revelation, not a Church that 'used
the
to be' or that 'will be', not the Church of^Apostolic Age or of the
sub-Apostolic Age, but the Church,so to speak, 'round the comer',
*0p. cit., p. 44-
the Church that we know and see and that confronts us amongst the 
institutions of society. Otherwise the term 'present age1 becomes 
meaningless. In ecclesiastical history we are continually finding 
ecclesiastics overleaping time in a backward direction.55 And this 
overleaping is done so that the present ecclesiastical position is 
judged by the Church of a former age; the modem Roman Church contin- 
sually returns to the mediaeval Church as example and criterion;
Hew man and the Tractarians returned to the Church of the Apostolic 
Fathers and of the Caroline divines in order to judge and reform 
the early XlXth. century Church of England; the Reformers returned 
to the Church of Hew Testament times in order to judge and criticise 
the late Latin Church. Kierkegaard but carries out the same proced­
ure radically. And by returning to the Christ-Moment as criter- 
sion, Kierkegaard finds one absolutely free from sinfulness and 
distortion. The Church that Kierkegaard knew was one that he consid- 
sered hindered rather than helped the KERYGMA. The exact offence 
of which Kierkegaard believed that Church to be guilty was that it 
had approximated itself and its KERYGMA to the contemporaiy world.
*This ' overleaping' (which displeases Cullmann) is an interesting pro- 
scess* There is a process described by Tillich which is not wholly 
unlike it in intention. Tillich deals with critical mysticism: 
"Mysticism has criticised the demoniacally distorted sacramental- 
priestly substance by devaluing every medium of revelation and by try- 
ring to unite the soul directly with the ground of being, to make it 
enter the mystery of ex is ten ce without the help of a finite medium. 
Revelation occurs in the depths of the soul; the objective side is 
accidental. The impact of the anti-demonic fight of mysticism on 
large sections of the people has been and. still is, tremendous”,
(S.yst. Theol., I, p. 156). The differences are obvious, but the 
similarities are interesting.
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To use Cullmann's language in Christ and Time, it had made the'inter- 
smediate era1 so dominant that it had forgotten the deed at the'mid-
3£
point*. The Danish Established Church of Kierkegaard* s day (attack- 
led by Kierkegaard in Per Augenblick) had forgotten the supreme and 
normative position of the Christ-Moment. In his book Kierkegaard, 
Dr. Walter Lowrie has stated that Kierkegaard "remained a conservat- 
:ive to the end of his days". One meaning of this is that he 
preached a return, a reversion, an * overleaping1 to that unique 
Moment which initiated Christianity, and beside which the contenpor- 
:ary dogma of the Church paled into insignificance. We must con- 
:elude therefore that Cullmann*s criticisms of Kierkegaard's posit­
ion, (that Cod discloses himself in a Moment of time so that in a 
sense we become contemporaries of Christ), are not so serious as tuey 
at first seem, and that they are based upon an interpretation of his 
works apart from their historical and ecclesiastical background.
I
There are two other important points that must be 
examined before we leave our consideration of Cullmann* s Christ and 
Time# The first is this s Cullmann*s criticisms imply that Kierke- 
sgaard's Moment means a complete overleaping of time to the Christ-
*This is a fault with which Cullmann has charged the Church of Rome.
event without any reference whatsoever to what has happened in the 
1 Heilsgeschichte1 since. This is in fact not so. Kierkegaard has 
pointed out that the conversion of a past believer may serve as an 
occasion for the conversion of someone in the present t "The 
successor believes BY MEANS OP (this expresses the occasional) the 
testimony of the contemporary, and IN VIRTUE OP the condition he him- 
i self receives from God. The testimony of the contemporary prov­
ides. an occasion for the successor, just as the immediate contempor- 
ianeity provides an occasion for the contemporary". Kierkegaard 
does.not of course identify the past believer with the Church of any 
period, but these words show clearly that he was not blind to the 
potential significance of ecclesiastical phenomena* They could 
be used as the foundation of a doctrine of the Church's mediatorship, 
but. this aspect of Kierkegaardian thought Cullmann seems to ignore.
I
The second point to be considered is the validity 
of the 'time-line' of Christ and Time itself. It is hard to dis- 
s cover from Cullmann's book the exact significance he ascribes to the 
intermediate period, the present age, but it seems not unfair to con- 
selude that Cullmann gives the impression that the redemptive-line 
represents some continuous advance or 'progress', so that the situation
fragments, pps. 87-88.
faced by the potential Christian disciple today is quite different 
from that which faced Jesus’ contemporaries, (and, we might add, more 
hopeful). It is I think for this reason that Cullmann accuses 
Kierkegaard of not seeing that with the Ascension time did not stop. 
Cullmann is fond of the term.1 continuous advance' ; "In opposition to 
a cramped Protestantism we have emphasised that the redemptive hist- 
:oiy has been advancing continuously ever since the Ascension of 
Christ". " . . .  The post-Easter present' signifies a contdr--
t-uance in time of the redemptive process . . . “ This language
seems to me dangerous in so far as it may suggest that 'history' 
implies progress along a line, inevitably and inexorably; if so, 
then Cullmann would leave himself open to the objections brought 
against Herbert Spencer and his disciples, as to objections from the 
New Testament itself, which does not at all regard history as a 
clearly defined line of progress or advance on the earthly level.
I
It may also be argued that there are periods in ecclesiastical hist-
soiy which represent regress rather than progress. For reasons like
these, it seems far from certain that redemptive history appears as a
continuous line of advance since Christ's Ascension. It is of course
perfectly true that each period of histoiy has its own significance
for God, the Lord of Time, who, transcending the historical process,
^Christ and Time, p. 174*
**0p. cit., pps. 146-7*
can see a pattern in tlie course of the centuries. hut we are only 
men, and these things, it seems, are conceled from us. For us,
A,
immersed in the historical process, history has sometimes the charact- 
ter of ambiguity and sometimes of fragmenlfcajriness« The notion 
that history is from our standpoint fragmentary is to be found in 
Dr. John McIntyre's book to which we £jgw€ already referred.
McIntyre writes : " . . . history is unitary for God and fragmentary 
for us, except in so far as God, through His Revelation of Himself 
and of His purposes, makes known to us in some measure its unitari- 
tness. I should prefer to say, however, that for God, while history 
is unitary, it is not unified . . . there are certain things within 
history? irrationalities and evils, which cannot be included in some 
comprehensive system in which they lose their essential character.
They persist even in a universe where God is sovereign, and they
3QEX
will persist until the Last Judgement". This position leads
I
McIntyre to criticise Cullmann’s Christ and Time radically. Thus 
he writes ; "It is the reality of this fragmentariness of histoiy 
which would lead me to question the continuity of the 'redemption- 
line' which Cullmann traces through history. Since the -Bible would
The notion that history is for our interpretation highly ambiguous 
is to be found in Bultmann's volume of essays. Thus Bultmann writes? 
"In short, every phenomenon of history is ambiguous, and none r e v -  
seals God's will in tiself; and now more than ever EVERY HISTORICAL 
PHENOMENON is ambiguous . . .  THE MESSAGE OF H I S T O R Y  IS O B S CURE . . . 
and there is a risk if we pay heed to it . . . K A N  IN T H E  FACE O F  GOD 
is a SINNER . . .AND HIS HISTORY IS A HISTORY OF SINFUL MEN, and 
therefore in actual fact enshrouds God in a veil", Bultmann, Essays, 
pps. 105-6.
^The Christian Doctrine of History.
Op. cit., p. 40*
appear to know nothing of the continuity of which Cullmann speaks it
would be interesting to learn whence he derived the notion. It
r
would be, to say the least, embarassing, if after all, the origin of<\
this idea of continuity were Creek. We have not only Aristotle’s 
explicit statement that ’time is a CONTINUOUS flux’ (Physics, IV, 
xi, 219b), but also the whole interest of the pre-Socratics in the 
nature of infinity, which is the same problem as that of continuous
3£series. It may be simply that Cullmann has unwittingly accepted an 
evolutionary type of theory concerning the nature of history and 
transcribed;it into his own terms of the redemptive time-line. This 
suggestion would be confirmed by his otherwise un-Biblical and incorn- 
:prehensible statement that the redemptive time-line is UPWARD 
SLOPING. But the Hebrew mind and the Christian mind (even when it 
is Hellenistieally inclined) within the limits of Old and New festa- 
:ment thought have shown no concern about the problems of philosophy
I
and physics connected with infinity and continuity; whereas the intro 
Pduction of evolutionary concepts into the interpretation of the 
Biblical view of time and history is the grossest anachronism end 
immediately invalidates any theory which commits this sort of error"^3
*Iita/iiote on p. 22, McIntyre again ascribes Cullmann’s notion of 
time to Aristotle. ’’The continuity of the time-series is not a.
Biblical notion for time is the countable thing that we are
counting” •
“ Op. cit., pps. 42-3*
We conclude then that Cullmann's criticisms of 
Mierkegaard's notion of a Moment of 'contemporaneity' depend, in 1 
last analysis, the integrity of the continuous redemptive time­
line of history (which introduces 'progress' in such a way that tl 
state of affirs which faced the actual contemporaries of Jesus is 
now essentially altered), and that the time-line notion of Christ 
Time is of very doubtful validity*
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INTRODUCTION t THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE OF PARTICULARITY AND THE
HISTORICITY OF HUMAN EXISTENCE
In the introductory chapter we raised and ponder- 
sed the question, 'What is the meaning of history ?', and interpreted 
it finally as meaning 'What is the essentially historical ?',
'What is the nature of history ?’,'what is the essence of history 
and the 'historical' ?’. We discovered that if there is a specifical 
sly Christian doctrine of history, if Christianity has something 
distinctive and unique to contribute to the discussion, it must be 
something like this; that within the context of the time-process, 
there are certain quite definite, concrete, times and events in which 
•meaning’ is imparted toman* The 'events' and 'times' of the 
biblical revelation (culminating in the life and career of Christ)
are
0$ the basis of this doctrine. We may call this doctrine tne 
doctrine (and also, the scandal) of particularity. This scandal 
of particularity with which the life of Christ confronts man is 
transferred to man's own personal life. Because within the total 
salvation-history there occurred (for faith) certain events and a 
certain concrete life, which shed meaning on the rest, it must 
follow that within the total personal life, there is the possibility 
of certain events and times which offer meaning to that personal
3Elife as a whole# The general meaning of the Kerygma for man is 
that it proclaims that man must attain to authentic existence in and 
through quite concrete and particular events and encounters and 
'moments1 within the context of space and time# To "preach the 
Bible” and to "preach Christ" is inescapably and simultaneously to 
preach historic particularity# We may call this doctrine the 
doctrine of the particularity of times, 'moments', events# and 
encounters #
Thus we see that the 'doctrine of the moment', the 
basic concern of this thesis, is not merely or even mainly an aspect 
or implication of modem existentialist philosophy, nor the discov- 
:eiy or formulation of any individual philosopher# The doctrine 
is a logical and necessary consequence of the essential historicity 
of biblical revelation in general, and of the doctrine of the 
incarnation of Christ in particular# The life, death, and resurr- 
section of Christ reveal the cruciality of certain spacial-temporal 
events in a way unknown to 'liberal' XlXth. century theology#
They confront man with the doctrine (and scandal) of particularity«
*Thus Bultmann can write: " . . .  the advent of Christ is . . .  an 
eternal event which occurs again and again in the soul of any Christ* 
:ian in whose soul Christ is bom, suffers, dies and is raised up to 
eternal life . • . the process of history has gained a new meaning 
as the pressure and friction . . under which the Christian has to 
refine his soul and under which, alone, he can fulfil his true 
destiny", History and Eschatology, p. 155*
with the doctrine (and scandal) of fragmentariness. If the events
of Christ's career are not to remain meaningless for human existence,
they must be permitted to transfer their own particularity to
personal existence* This 'particular1, from the temporal point
of view we have designated throughout this enquiry the 'moment* ♦
a
Thus we must conclude that the 'moment' as/key- cate gory of theology 
follows inexorably from belief in historic biblical event and from 
the Confession of significance in the life and work of Christ*
If this is so, if the life and career of Christ, 
properly interpreted, involves us in the doctrine of the 'moment', 
certain crucially important things follow logically and necessarily. 
Critics of the category should be made aware that their criticisms, 
directed in the first instance against the 'moment', are ultimately 
directed against the thorpughly Christian doctrine and scandal of 
particularity, against the concrete, spacial-temporal life and min- 
Jistry which stand behind the doctrine of the 'moment' and which form 
its basis* Naturally care must be taken that critics are not really 
rejecting mis-statements of the doctrine. Therefore, to be involved 
in Christian committment (within existence) is to be involved by 
necessity in the doctrine of the 'moment'; from this situation there 
is no valid escape. The full historicity of Christ's life, and its 
implication, the 'moment', are so intimately linked together, that it
is hard to make any statement about the one which does not have 
implications for the other. Thus, if the doctrine of the 'moment1 
were criticised on account of its alleged fragmentariness, the logic- 
:al reply would he to point to the fact that God's revelation to man 
in time and history is itself extremely fragmentary and particular : 
"God, who at SUNDRY TIMES and in DIVERS MANNERS spake in time past 
unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto 
us by His Son . . .  "(Heb. 1:1,2). The life of Christ and the 
authentic human life are both deeply involved in the scandal of 
fragmentariness. Any valid criticism of the doctrine of the 
'moment' would therefore require to be stated in such a manner that 
it would no'fyinvalidate the essential historicity and temporality of 
the life and ministry of Christ. In this sense, the doctrine of 
the 'moment' is but a logical exposition of the significance of the 
basic events of the Christ-revelation. It is really no help at
i
this point to suggest that Christian "particularity" is transferred 
from the events of Christ to the life, doctrine, worship, sacraments 
of the Church, so that the Church becomes the Christian particular 
'par excellence'. This will not do, as we shall see more clearly 
(when we come to deal with the problem of the Church and community), 
for this assertion begs the question 'how is the man without faith 
to relate himself to the Church's life and teaching ?' As we shall 
see, even his decision for the Church's Kerygma and life involve 
him in historical and temporal particularity again. The existence
of the Church (and this point also we shall have to re-examine), 
simply cannot cancel out the essential historicity and temporality 
of man as man-in-the-world. We shall take these points up again 
when we consider the problem of Church and community.
■two
It is not by chance that of the chief exposit­
ors of this doctrine of history are within the Christian tradition 
(Kierkegaard and Bultmann), and that the third (Buber) is within the 
Hebrew tradition, holding to the radical historicity of the biblical 
revelation. A rejection of the doctrine of the 1 moment* as a key- 
category of human existence would therefore seem, in the long run, 
to commit one to a view of biblical event which is thoroughly 
'liberal1, in the XlXth. century meaning of the word. We therefore 
conclude that the terms 'historicity' and 'temporality*, so current 
in contemporary theological discussion, must not be regarded merely 
as terms which theology has borrowed from fashionable existentialist 
philosophy, but thoroughly Christian categories without which the 
events of the Bible (both in Old and New Testaments) would become 
meaningless and irrelevant for the achievement of authentic human 
existence today. To argue for them, and for the 'moment' which 
they imply, means simply to argue for biblical revelation and its 
relevance to existence. The Bible and Christianity imply historic- 
:ity and temporality and both of these imply the 'moment'.
One subject in modern theology which has not been tackled 
inadequately is of course the effect which existentialist thought 
has had on Christian theology. But the doctrine of the 'moment* 
raises the converse question which is perhaps equally important but 
which so far has not received anything like the same question; 
namely, how far has Christian theology in its various forms influenc- 
*ed the existentialist tradition ? It has of course been pointed 
out that the effect of Christianity can be seen even in the case of 
a thinker like Heidegger who seems to deny God, or at any rate to 
leave the question of his existence open. Heidegger's earliest 
work, says E.L. Allen, " . . .  was done on medieval philosophy, and 
this concern with Christianity in its Catholic form has deeply col­
oured his thought ever since. That, as we shall see, is even more 
true of Sartre". Now so far as the their doctrine of the 'moment* 
is concerned (and it is pretty basic to their works as a whole),
i
the effect of biblical religion on Bultmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard 
is clear enough, and to this subject we must now briefly turn*
Not only can the effect of biblical revelation on
Bultmann's theology be seen clearly from his works as a whole, but we
^Existentialism from Within, p. 19 ; Allen mentions at this point 
Heidegger's Die Kategorien — - und Bedeutungslehre des Buns Scotus 
(1916).
perceive it most obviously perhaps in Bultmann*s great admiration 
for Auerbach's classic, Mimesis. In a 1949 essay Bultmann has 
called Mimesis 'impressive', in a 1950 essay 'excellent', and in the 
1955 Gifford Lectures ' b r i l l i a n t ' T h e  core of Bultmann's 
admiration for Auerbach's book is to be found in his strong agreement 
with Auerbach's contention that the historicity of Christ’s life 
gives new meaning to everyday human life as the sphere where reality 
is to be met. Auerbach contends that in the life of Christ 
'sublimitas' is revealed in and through 'humilitas' (through the 
'menial'). This has as an implication that ' sublimitas* can only be 
attained in and through the moments of our eveiyday*humilitas’.
Thus we have Auerbach's main literary conclusion in Mimesis that the 
Christian scriptures first produced radically realist literature.
The influence of Christianity upon Kierkegaard's Moment is almost too 
apparent to require comment. The original Christ-Moment and our
I
Moment of appropriation are identical. In chapter III on Buber 
we discovered the strong influence that the biblical revelation has 
had on Buber's doctrine of the 'moment* e s p e c i a l l y  through the 
effect of the Hasidic interpretation of the Bible, with its strong 
stress on* eveiydayness'. There can be veiy little doubt that the
*E.T. Princeton 1954 5 especially Bultmann, Essays»pps. 231, 
265-6, 105.
^See History and Eschatology,pps. 105 £•
Old Testament as well as the New implies the ’moment1 as a key- 
category of existence. Auerbach, discussing the Old Testament 
notion of revelation and how the Old Testament narratives imply the 
radical historicity of existence*, has this to say: ’’The sublime
3£3£influence of God here reached so deeply into the everyday that the
XXtwo realms of the sublime and the eveiyday are not only actually
XXXunseperated but basically inseperable". Rudolf Bultmann, speak-
:ing of the mixture of ’sublimitas1 and 'humilitas1 characteristic
of Christian literature, says this; "That here not only Jewish Old
Testament literature but also Christian literature is an operative
influence is self-evident. But this differentiation plays no part
from the standpoint which we have taken up, as the literature of the
New Testament is for the most part stamped with the spirit of that
xxxxof the Jewish Old Testament". Thus we conclude that it is
arguable that the 'moment' as an existential category is a logical
I
and necessary implication of biblical revelation, and this conclus­
ion we shall presuppose through^1 this concluding chapter.
From what has already been said in this introduction
*In Mimesis, chapter I, pps. 3-23•
**Interestingly, this is also Buber's term.
***Mimesis, pp.s 22-3.
^^^The Significance of Jewish Old Testament Tradition for the Christ* 
:ian West,in Essays, pps. 262 f.;see p. 2 6 6 . This essay is of con- 
:siderable interest and importance for our subject here.
to our conclusions, the following implication would seem to be 
true also. The core of this introduction asserts that the particul­
arity and fragmentariness of the life of Christ reveals the necess- 
sazy particularity and fragmentariness of personal existence. It 
would therefore seem that there is some kind of analogy between, 
on the one hand, the ’Heilsgeschichte' culminating in the Christ- 
event, and personal existence on the other. Let us investigate 
further the nature of this historical analogy. In, for example, 
the theology of Bultmann, the Christ-event is the temporal fulcrum 
between the ’old life’ and the 'new life' (eschatological existence) 
within the context of the New Testament histoiy; there would seem to 
he an analogy between this and the ’moment’, the fulcrum seperating 
the'old man' and the ’new man' in the personal existence of the 
Christian.* Thus, it is hard not to hold that there is a clear anal- 
sogy between the whole New Testament 'Heilsgeschichte* and the person-
f
sal life of the Christian. There are hints of a not dissimilar 
analogy in the theology of Tillich also.** JftUMPA Tillich divides 
the history of revelation (what might be called the Heilsgeschichte)
*See the schema of Part II of Bultmann's Theology of the New Testa- 
:ment,vol. 1, in the 'Contents', pps. viii-ix, MAN PRIOR TO THE 
REVELATION OF FAITH, and MAN UNDER FAITH, which are obviously seper- 
sated by the advent of Christ.
**See his Systematic Theology, vol. 1, pps. 153 f*> 'The History of 
Revelation'.
into three definite stages, the so-called Preparatory Stage, the 
Pinal Stage (Christ), and the Receiving Stage. Tillich hints that 
these terms may he applied to the lives both of individuals and of 
the Church. Some of these may still be in the Preparatory Stage. 
And of course there is the danger that the churches can lapse back 
into the Preparatory Stage. We ought to note that Tillich's 
analogy differs from Bultmann's in two respects; for him the first 
stage (or the first head of the analogy) embraces the Old Testament 
revelation and does not exclude pre-Christian profane (or pagan)
XX
histoiy* And for Tillich the analogy can apply not only to the 
personal life, but also to the lives of churches, congregations, and 
groups* But the two analogies are not dissimilar;they are both 
rigidly threefold. In Tillich the analogy would seem to be the 
pre-Christian revelation (both inside and outside the Old Testament), 
the Pinal Stage (in Jesus as the Christ), and the Receiving Stage.
f
An analogy in the thought of M.erkegaard would also seem to be
XXXimplied by the late Professor David E. Roberts. He writes:
"There is a coincidence for him (i.e. Kierkegaard) momentous--
between (a)Christ as the point in time where the Eternal offers
X0p. cit., p. 160*
“ qp. cit., p. 155*
**^See his Existentialism and Religious Belief* pps. J J f•
V?
salvation, and (b) faith as the point in time where man’s relation-
sship to Cod is decisively determined". Roberts in convinced
that although Kierkegaard was at great pains to attack the system-
builders (e.g. Hegel) in his works, his passionate protest should not
x
blind us to this schema which underlies his own point of view 1 
At any rate, we do seem to have here an analogy of sorts between the
Heilsgeschichte on the one hand and the personal existence of the 
Christian on the other, an analogy which resembles those of -^ultmann 
and Tillich in being rigidly threefold with a ’moment’ of revelation 
or of appropriation at its centre. But we ought not to overlook 
that Aierkegaard's thought is not the best source for such an histor­
ical analogy simply because Kierkegaard’s ’first stage’ is so 
deficient; as we indicated in Chapter IV there is no room in Kierke- 
sgaard’s thought for a ’preparation’ for revelation, for an
to
’Ankntipfungspunkt’; as we have indicated, Kierkegaard’s Moment seemsA
I
strike down vertically into man’s time without any previous prepar­
ation for its occurrence or appropriation being necessary. Thus, 
the following criticism of Tillich’s would seem to be quite valid 
against Kierkegaard’s type of theology s " . . .  if a revelation
-oP . cit., p. 81.
whose historical preparation is denied is final, the necessity of 
its historical reception makes the unique revelatory event a strange 
body which has no relation whatsoever to human existence and hist- 
sory”.*
It does seem to me rather striking that we do seem to 
have this definitely threefold analogy in the works of these three 
thinkers who, whatever the divergences between them, are broadly 
speaking within the existentialist tradition* It does seems that 
if the particularity of Christ’s career is transferred to the person­
a l  life this leads to some kind of analogy between history (espec­
ially the salvation-histoiy) and the authentic personal existence as 
a whole. The elaboration and criticism of such an analogy falls 
unfortunately outside the scope of this thesis, but if this work 
were carried out, it wodld seem to be a not unfruitful enquiry.
For example, it might make the whole hible relevant to personal 
existence, perhaps shedding some light on the many and not altogether 
satisfactory attempts to find some allegorical meaning in Old Testa-
yg
:ment histoiy. Also, the elaboration of such an analogy might
gSyst. Theol., I, p. 154 J criticisms of this type could be multi-
*plied from pps. 154 f«
^One of the best treatments of the allegorical or typological 
interpretations of Scripture is to be found in Alan Richardson, 
Christian Apologetics, especially VIII,’The Argument from Prophecy’, 
pps. 177 f. See more especially § 5> ’The Re-statement of the 
Argument from Prophecy', pps. 199 f»> where Richardson has sketched 
in outline a typological histoiy of the Church.
help to produce a more positive account of pagan-profane histoiy 
as being in a 'preparatory stage' and therefore being imbued with 
hope and possibilityj this would be preferable to the negative 
interpretations of profane history (as being unrelievedly sinful), 
interpretations which do a great disservice for Christian theology* 
Also, such an analogy might well preserve the thoroughly biblical 
notion of historicity, and help to inculcate the process of 
'nacherleben' which historicity seems to imply. We must make one 
more point before we leave this question of an historical analogy* 
The absence of Buber will have been noticed at this point* This 
is because so far as the histoiy of past salvation is concerned, 
Buber denies the existence of a fixed mid-point, and this makes the 
construction of an analogy impossible in the threefold sense out­
lined above* Thus Buber writes: "The Jewish Bible does not set a 
past event as a mid-point between origin and goal* It interposes
I
a movable, circling midpoint which cannot be pinned to any set time,
for it is the moment when I, the reader, the hearer, the man, catch
wA/c/v
through the words of the Bible the voice^from earliest beginnings 
has been speaking in the direction of the goal • , . The Revelation 
at Sinai is not this midpoint, but the perceiving of it, and such 
perception is possible at any time".* Thus it would seem that 
the analogy of which we have been speaking is a thoroughly 
^Israel and the World, 'The Man of Today and the Jewish Bible', p*
94.
Christian concept.
In the foregoing chapters of the thesis, certain 
differences between Bultmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard in their 
doctrines of the 'moment’ have been analysed and evaluated. But, 
at the same time, we should stress that there is also a great and 
pretty obvious unity between them on this matter, so great that 
modem theology ignores it at its peril, so great that we must reach 
the conclusion that these three thinkers do constitute a tradition, 
or even a 'school' with common roots, with the 'moment' as the under* 
lying common factor. In this connection Mr. H.J. Blackham has 
certain wise words which are worth rememberings "It is time to 
discriminate between these thinkers; they are not exponents of a 
school, and yet not the least impressive thing about their highly 
individual thought, seperated by age, nationality, and temperament,
I
is the interrelatedness of their thinking s they lead into each 
other; they form a natural family; each throws light on the others, 
and together they develop the content of certain common themes".*
It is a conclusion of this thesis that one of the most basic of 
these common themes is simply the 'moment* as an existential cate- 
sgory*
3ESix Existentialist Thinkers, p. v.
The three thinkers with whom we are mainly concerned 
all hold the radical temporality (Bultmann, Buber, Kierkegaard), and 
two of them (Bultmann, Buber) hold the radical historicity of man*
Let us now ask these questions; what implications are common to all 
three in their doctrines of the 'moment* ? What minimal character- j 
sistics does such a ’moment* necessarily possess (i.e., if historicity! 
and temporality are posited) ? We shall,in the first place, try to 
answer these by sketching, in the briefest form possible, the main 
characteristics of their 'moment' which has emerged out of our re- j
s
:search, and we shall do this under five main headings. Then, in ; 
the second place, we must admit that postulating such a 'moment*
i
as a theological key-cate go ly does involves us in certain grave 
difficulties, in so far as it seems to conflict with, and implies 
a radical re-thinking and re-evaluation of certain traditional 
theological emphases. (These emphases are discussed in the problem 
of propositional theology, in the problem of the Church and commun- 
;ity, and in the problem of immanence (in the sense of 'natural 
theology* ^ problems which seem to be of outstanding importance in the 
context of this thesis. We shall therefore have to relate the con­
cept to basic themes such as these in such a way that we discover 
how the concept criticizes their traditional presentations, and how 
it is criticized by them.
j
Ii
The following, then, are the main characteristics 
of the concept, the 'moment', and the theological problems with which |
the concept must reckon, problems which, as we shall see 
presently, are also interrelated, in a special way, leading into 
one another at one point after another®
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(!) THE REALITY OF THE PRESENT FOMENT1.
In both Bultmann and Buber we find synonyms for 
the ’moment1; e,g,, in Bultmann, encounter, meeting, concrete event, 
happening, &tc,; in Buber, the present, the instant when • . ,, 
the act of relation, the meeting, the appearance, the hour when • o ., 
the glimpse; and in both Bultmann and Buber, the concrete ’here and 
now1. In Buber the ’moment’ is ’immortal’; in Kierkegaard it is 
’eternal’, filled with eternity; in Bultmann, in it man is lifted out 
of history into eternity and simultaneously thrust back into hist- 
:oiy, or Bultmann can also say, in it history has come to an end, and 
yet, paradoxically, history continues. In both Bultmann and Buber 
the ’moment’ is enigmatic, mysterious, risky, and thus its ’content’ 
is unpossessable and unmanagable. It is not open to arrangement
I
and investigation in the scientific sense, and it does not have a 
utilitarian-technological application to life in this world. In 
Kierkegaard too, the Moment is extremely risky, in so far as there is 
in it as great a chance of concealing God as revealing him. For 
both Bultmann and Kierkegaard the ’moment’ is one of encounter, for 
Buber one of meeting, relation. Living in a world of things, in 
the sphere of It, man regards the moment's appearance as enigmatic, 
mysterious, (Bultmann), as uncanny, even magical (Buber).
The ’Moment’ is one in which a recorded past ’moment’ becomes pres- 
:ent, amongst other ways, in Kerygma, speaking to us, challenging us, 
presenting for our decision new, developing, and correcting self- 
understandings, Scripture becomes the 'word of God only in the
'moment*, it is not such continuously in any substantial sense;
W
herb^neutics involves the recurrence of 'moments' (Bultmann), Ilistor- 
iical interpretation involves the nacherleben of experiences through 
the medium of Erlebnisausdrftcke ('expressions of experience1, W. 
Dilthey).* So too for Buber historical interpretation involves 
communication •between men', 'between man and man'. Proper historical 
interpretation involves an^ f interpersonal, intersubjective communicat- 
:ion. A past recorded 'moment', embedded in an. historical record as 
an 'It', can blaze up again and again, assuming and re-assuming pres- 
sentness in the present, R.G, Collingwood, whose reflections on the 
nature of history are admired by Bultmann, also speaks of reliving 
past experiences , and of the historical interpreter re-thinking past 
recorded thoughts by means of a sympathetic subjective approach to the 
documents. For Kierkegaard too, the Moment is repeatable, for our 
present Moment and the original Christ-Moment are both filled with the 
Etemaljin both, God discloses himself. Both are 'timeless', 
because both are filled with God and the Paradox, For Kierkegaard 
therefore 'Moments' are identical, they are infinitely repeatable.
The Moment of Christ's historical appearance is but the first in a
3EThe geim of a notion of Nacherleben can be found in Auerbach's |
Mimesis, Thus Auerbach contends that events described in the New Test) 
:ament narratives " . . lay claim to being limitless and the direct 
concern of everybody"(p. 43)* Peter is " • • the image of man in the I 
highest, deepest, and most tragic sense"(p. 41)• Events of Peter's 
career and of the whole New Testament are " . , concerned with the sam« 
question, the same conflict with which every human being is basically 
confronted and which therefore remains infinite and eternally pend- 
:ing"(p. 43). It is by virtue " .. of the fact that we too are human 
beings and thus are subject to fate and passion, that we experience 
fear and pity . ." with the New Testament characters (p. 43)* Peter 
and the other New Testament characters are caught in a universal move- 
:ment " ., which lays claim to being listless and the direct concern 
of everybody" (p. 43)* The Peter-story (i.e. the denial) "speaks to 
everybody; everybody is urged and indeed required to take sides for 
or against it. Even ignoring it implies taking sides" (p. 48),
series, and ultimately indistinguishable from other members of the 
series. A contemporarary of a past Moment enjoys no advantage over
a successor for insight into the meaning of any Moment the cond-
:ition, faith, is necessary. In their teaching on the ’moment', 
all three (Bultmann, Buber, Kierkegaard) show a profound distrust of 
the institution and of the organization. For Buber the institution 
is 'momentless1 because 'relationless'; compare Bultmann's suspicion 
of organization and of institutions in his essay, The Idea of 
Freedom for Western Civilization. Kierkegaard's distrust of instit­
utions is rooted in his attack on contemporaiy society and on the 
Danish 'Volkskirche' in Per Augenblick. In the 'moment' I have the 
possibility of grasping being (Buber). For Bultmann the 'moment' 
is likewise the point at which my old life may be done away and a 
new life imparted; it is the point where authentic eschatological 
existence may begin. For Kierkegaard too, the Moment is the decis-
I
sive instant seperating nonbeing from being, it is the point of re­
birth, the point of 'conversion'. For Buber, the 'moment' necessar- 
:ily involves decision (it is the 'primal mysterious decision'). A 
devil for Buber is not one who decides against God but one who comes 
to no decision at all! For Buber, the 'moment' involves the decis- 
:ion to decide over and over again, "from time to time, at every 
parting of ways"; man retains and must possess knowledge of this 
obligation of his, to approach and re-approach his destiny through 
decision. For Bultmann too, of course, the 'moment' involves man 
in decision, giving him the opportunity to decide how his past is to 
be related to his future. Radical freedom so to decide, Bultmann
contends, is only the gift of God in his word in Christ. The possib­
ility of this decision demarcates history off from nature, authentic 
existence off from inauthentic, real historical interpretation 
off from historicism. For Pvierkegaard too, the effectiveness of the 
Moment depends very radically upon iigr decision. I must decide to 
allow the Paradox to confront my ’Reason1 and offend it; in it, "I 
must let go"; without decision, part, there could be no Moment. 
All three (Bultmann, Buber, Kierkegaard) are united in stressing 
that thought ought to concentrate its attention upon 'this side' 
rather than upon 'the other side'. In the words of Buber, upon 
immanence rather than upon transcendence, upon 'our side' rather than 
the 'other side', upon will rather than grace. Bultmann's theology 
has been so oriented that it has been called ' anthropology';Bultmann 
warns us that if God has transcendent depths unknowable to man these 
cannot possibly be the concern of theology. Kierkegaard too is 
only interested in God so far as he can be realised within the life
of an existing individual, in dogma in so far as it can become
are
'effective'. Both Bultmann and Buber/strongly convinced of man's 
essential historicity and temporality. Faith 'grows out of' man's 
continual, repeated, encounter with events and persons (Bultmann).
Man encounters the unfathomable, the ineffable, in a continual ex- 
jploration of "the life of things and of conditioned being", here in 
^Hermann Diem, Dogmatics,p. 20, quoting Kierkegaard.
this world; the man who is aware of his historicity is he who "hallows 
this life" and thus "meets the living God" (Buber). Kierkegaard, 
although holding man to be essentially temporal, shows no evidence 
of holding man to be essentially historical; he does not link up man's 
becoming (as do Bultmann and Buber) with the stream of events, persons, 
and things, which cultivate and mature man.
(2) THE 'MOMENT* . AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIMARY AND SECONDARY
REVELATION.
What comes to man in the 'moment' is not retainable 
and possessable, for instance, within a 'Weltanschauung1. The Know­
ledge of God is not available within propositional descriptions, 
generally and universal^ communicable. Revelation is not 
'information about divine matters’ (Tillich's phrase). For Buber, 
propositions, characterisations, ideas, are 'representations of incid- 
sents and situations which are specifically relational'. A 'moment', 
when it has run its course, becomes an It, embedded in the world of 
things. But the 'moment' does not impart, Buber insists, 'items of 
knowledge' generally current in the world of It. In both Bultmann 
and Buber, secondaiy revelation is firmly rooted in primary. Second- 
:aiy revelation is always called in question; it derives its validity 
from the primaiy, and is ultimately undetachable from the primary.
The disclosure of the primary is always interpersonal, intersubject- 
:ive, between men. For both Bultmann and Buber, one type of propos-
/ is valid. This is one which enshrines historicity,one
which has (sometimes concealed) existential reference. In Bultmann,
we find that 'Weltanschauungen' expressing historicity are forever
recurring in histoiy and are valid. In Buber, valid 'teaching1 is
only that which invites the pupil, by becoming a 'Thou* for him,
into the sphere of 'Thou-ness' and presentness, that which invites
the pupil to face up to his own historicity, whose content, essence,
the teaching is unable to impart. The true teachers says "I am"
(without prescribing essence), and directs his pupil "know thyself"
(again, without prescribing essence), so that the'content* of the
'moment1 is exclusively personal. Thus it seems that dogmas,
propositions, and ideas, are always objectifications of this inter-
personal encounter, never wholly meaningful apart from the encounter
itself. Neither Bultmann nor Buber are happy about reflexion to a
past 'moment' and its encounter as the practice of historicity --
rather do they find the 'experience of the past 'moment' valuable in
its imparting of historicity, that is, in convincing the person that
his authentic becoming lies in future repetition; in the plunging
and continual re-plunging into the oncoming stream of history as that 
\jh‘ch
force^moulds and re-moulds man as a real person. But 'reflexion' to 
the past Moment through faith is enjoined by Kierkegaard. Both
Bultmann and Buber seem to fear that such reflexion might become an
escape from the obligation to become through future encounter. For 
Bultmann, the exercise of memory is only authentic when it makes a
past encounter a present reality for the whole person.
From the point of view of the history of theology,
Kierkegaard's thought is vitally important here. His work pioneered the 
notion that the content of the Moment is personal, that is, God, the 
Teacher, the God-man© Kierkegaard* s intense dislike of propositions arid 
systems of thought »ase~ revealed in the titles Philosophical Fragments 
and Concluding Unscientific Postscript.x Kierkegaard, says H. J. Black- 
sham, conceived his mission thus: ” . . .  to call attention to the neglect' 
sed how of appropriation and ignore the venerated what of approximation”. ; 
"The objective accent", says Kierkegaard, "falls on WHAT is said, the 
subjective accent on HOW it is said”.
A  PROBLEM RAISED BY SECTION ( 2 )  THE PROBLEM OF PROPOSITIQNAL
THEOLOGY.
Here is one important point where the doctrine of the 
'moment* can expect difficulty and conflict —  traditionally, theology ;
I
has been regarded as a supremely propositional business. From the point j
of view of this thesis, the trouble would seem to be that if \
K,*The object of faith is the reality of another • . • The object of faith 
is not a doctrine • • . The object of faith is not a teacher with a
doctrine • . . The object of faith is the reality of the teacher, that
the teacher really exists • • . The object of faith is hence the reality 
of the God-man in the sense of his existence . . • The object of faith
is thus God’s reality in existence as a particular individual, the fact
that God has existed as an individual human being”, Concluding Unscient- . 
sific Postscript, p. 290© " « • • Eveiy misunderstanding of Chris tian-
sity may at once be recognized by . • transforming it into a doctrine, 
transferring it to the sphere of the intellectual”, op. cit,, p. 291.
^Postscript, p. 181.
propositional knowledge of God is available (i.e., knowledge of God 
attained in some way apart from encounter and event in space and time), 
this would constitute a wholesale attack upon human historicity, which 
is a logical and necessary implication of the historicty of Christ (and 
of the historicity of biblical revelation in general); thus it would seem ; 
that strictly propositional knowledge is ultimately incompatible with
i
the notion of biblical revelation itself.
Now certainly a protest against this can be made in so 
far as many may think that such an abolition of propositional theology 
will mean an impossible restriction of Christian action in the world.
It may be objected that if Bultmann and his colleagues are right, commun- 
sication between the Church and society will be seriously restricted.
Let us consider, for instance, a book like the late L.H. Marshall's
itThe Challenge of New Testament Ethics. Marshall there addresses himself 
to the unbeliever, and attempts to show how sane, sound, and healthyI
modem society would be if it investigated and followed the ethical teach- 
sing of Jesus. Admitting that Marshall ignores the eschatological and 
unworldly aspects of Jesus's teaching, can we really regard his book as !
completely irrelevant and out of place ? Is it impossible to regard his j
book as at least a basis for discussion between believers and unbeliev- j
sers ? Or let us consider another 'ethical1 matter the matter of
*London 1950.
racial discrimination and persecution. Is not the Christian 'doctrine* 
of man a propositional matter ('God is the Father of all men', 'Christ 
died for all men'), and in the case of racial persecution must not the 
Christian take his stand for a secondaiy type of revelation ? Is not 
secondary revelation here the basis of Christian prophetic action ? Now 
I do not think that such criticisms of Bultmann's position count for very 
much in the long run. For in both cases, the raising of ethical issues 1 
by Christians, raises implicitly, whether it is realised or not, the 
basis of ethical insights, that is to say, the Kerygma. For in the case j 
of Marshall's book, the issues raised beg the question of the identity j 
of Jesus, and in the second instance the prophetic protest raises the 
question of God and of the work of Christ. Thus we see that in both 
cases what is fundamental in Christian communication is the primary 
keiygmatic communication from which are derived secondaiy ethical in- 
:sights, a position identical with Bultmann's. This is not an argument 
against prophetic action and protest against social injustice, it is simp-
I
:ly an elucidation that this cannot be done without a proclamation of the 
Kexygma itself;secondaiy revelation (propositional or otherwise)cannot 
be detached from primary and attain to an independent validity.
This discloses to us a not uncommon misunderstanding© 
For what Bultmann's standpoint demands is not an abolition of proposit- | 
:ional theology, but a new interpretation of it. For both Bultmann and 
Buber, all propositions are not tabu. One class is both valid and nec- 
sessary, propositions enshrining man's essential historicity and temp- 
:orality. In brief, existential propositions, propositions with 
(sometimes concealed) existential reference. " . . .  Only such statements
about God are legitimate", says Bultmann, "as express the existential 
relation between God and man".X Bultmann holds that our language unavoid 
:ably involves speaking in terms of general conceptions, but this does 
not mean, Bultmann insists strongly, that the issue in hand is a general 
one* The real issue, he insists, is always a particular, concrete,
3Q£here-and-now one* If Bultmann is correct here, then the history of
dogma appears as the history of the objectification through general- 
conceptual language of the action of God in the 'moment1 ,in the he re-and-
3E3QEnow of encounter* Thus, if I say, "God is Almighty Father", this
refers in the first instance to God's Fatherly care and protection over 
me disclosed in a particular 'moment'* But because 'God' and 'Father* 
are conceptions, they become regarded as general and universal, accept­
able and valid in abstraction from, in detachment from, God's action 
upon me in the concrete, 'momentary' encounter* Now we know already 
that in the 'Entmythologisierung' controversy, one of Bultmann's object- 
:ions to myth was just that it speaks of God in this-worldly terms as
3QQE3E
an impersonal thing, as a wordly force. Myth, that is to say,
do
depersonalizes God. Now in a sense, in Bultmann's view, so dogma,
theological propositions. It 'generalizes' God and makes him into an 
object. And just as myth requires 'demythoiogizing' so does dogma.
HJesus Christ and Mythology* p. 69*
^See op. cit., pps. 66-67.
3E3€XThis view of the history of dogma is, interestingly, that of Alfred 
Loisy also, a view condemned by the Roman Church in 1907* See Ludwig 
Ott, Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, (Cork i960), p. 5> of. H. Denzinger, 
Enchiridion Symbolorum,(51st.edit., Frey burg 194-6), 2022, 2078 f*
3QQEKSee Keiygma and Myth, pps. 10-11*
But in the case of dogma I should like to suggest another translation of
1 Entmythologisierung' than 'demythologising'* ---  either 1 de-objeotif-
sication' or 1 de-generalization1. Thtts I contend that a more fruitful 
approach to Church dogmas would be to investigate them with a view to 
giving them a concrete, particular, here-and-now, existential reference, 
which, it may be claimed, has been in them ever since their formulation, 
and which was the motive towards their formulation in the first place.
But just as Bultmann has pointed out that the task of demythologising is 
one that will task the resources of a theological generation, so too, 
we must insist, is the task of degeneralizing Church dogma. This task 
will involve the re-investigation of Church dogma with a view to isolat- 
silig those existential situations out of which the dogmas grew. Thus 
the view we put forward here is a theological hypothesis, but it seems to i 
me to be a probable one, because of the essential historicity of man 
enshrined in biblical revelation®
I
Certainly the -table itself lends strong support to 
this view we have suggested. We remember how the Old Testament speaks 
of the living God as "the God of . • the God of Abraham, of Isaac, 
of Jacob". This preposition "of" expresses the existential, relational
X0n reflection, it seems a pity that 'Entmythologisierung' was ever trans­
slated as 1 demythologising* in the debate in this country, because of 
the negative, derogatory, meaning of the term 'myth' in English.
reference* IvIartin Buber writes: " c . . the deepest basis of the Jew- 
*ish idea of God can be achieved only by plunging into that word by which 
God revealed himself to Moses, "I shall be there" (Ex* 3*14* part of the 
phrase commonly translated "I am that I am"). It gives exact expression 
to the personal 'existence1 of God (not to his abstract 'being'), and 
expression even to his living presence, which most directly of all his 
attributes touches the man to whom he manifests himself* The speaker's 
self-designation as the God of Abraham, God of Isaac, and God of Jacob 
(Ex* 3*15) is indissolubly united with that manifestation of "I shall 
be there" and he cannot be reduced to a God of the philosophers" •* Thus 
Buber also locates statements about God in concrete experience of him 
in history, and distinguishes such a God from the God of speculation* 
Another distinguished Old Testament scholar comes to something very like
XXthe same conclusion* Professor Edmond Jacob of Strasbourg writes : 
"Yahweh's action goes from the particular to the general . . • God's 
presence in history is that of the hidden God whose intentions always 
remain full of mysteiy in men’s eyes (is* 45*15* 55*3), but the hie den 
God is also the one who comes at certain moments in time to demonstrate 
through certain events the totality of his being and of his action" e 
Jacob seems to regard this ’generalizing' as a valid and probably
^Buber, Eclipse of God:Studies in the Relation between Religion and Phil- 
sosophy, (New York 1952), chapter IV, 'The Love of God and the Idea of 
Deity', pps* 67-84 = Ilerberg, op. cit», pps. 97-107* see p. 106*
^See Edmond Jacob, Theology of the Old Testament, (London 1958), Part 
Two, IV, 'God the Lord of History', pps. 183 f., especially (c) The 
Historical Foundation of Israel's Faith, pps* 188 f*
x3E3E0p. cit., p. 189.
unavoidable procedure, but to his view we must add Bultmann1 s view that 
just because generalizing is involved, the correct approach to such state- 
:ments about God is that of 'degeneralization1.*
It would be a mistake to assume that there was anything 
radically new (i.e. XXth. century) in Bultmann's approach to dogma0 
We know for instance that J.G. Hamann, an XVIIIth. century precursor of 
Kierkegaard, (whose thought was a potent influence on Kierkegaardfs), 
favoured this existential approach to Christian doctrines. Honald 
Gregor Smith thus describes Hamann's approach to creation and second 
coming: "The clue lies in our personal, and in the present recognition 
of all history as God's history. The mythological is simply a descript­
ion, a sign or allegory, of our actual existence. That God has created
XIt is possible to hold that the Jewish Bible is a collection of encount­
ers* Thus Buber can write : "The theme of the Bible is the encounter 
between a group of people and the Lord of the world in the course of hist- 
:oiy, the sequence of events occurring on earth. Either explicitly or 
by implication, the stories are reports of encounters. The songs lament 
the denial of the grace of encounter, plead that it may be repeated, or 
give thanks because it has been vouchsafed. The prophecies summon man who 
has gone astray to turn, to return to where the encounter1 took place,prom- 
sising him that the tom bond shall once more be made whole" - Israel and 
the World,pps. 89-102 = Herberg, pps. 239-250, see p. 239* Erich Auer- 
sbach regards the New Testament as the product of the pre-theological era 
of Christianity, and thus also a 'book of encounters'. For Auerbach, 
the Christian movement is one that "..can as yet be neither clearly grasp- 
:ed or expressed (it is after all one of its essential characteristics 
that it does not lend itself to simple definitions and explanations),its 
effects are already described (i.e. in the New Testament)in numerous examp­
les of its driving dynamism, its surging hither and thither among the 
people",(Mimesis,p. 45)* In the New Testament "..time and again the im- 
:pact of Jesus' teachings, personality, and fate upon this and that indiv­
idual is described", (op. cit., p. 43). "..In the New Testament writings
any raising of historical forces to the level of consciousness is totally 
'unscientific' sit clings to the concrete and fails to progress to a sys- 
stematization of experience in new concepts"(op. cit., p. 44). In Auer- 
sbach's opinion the categories of the New Testament (e.g. the eras of law, 
sin, grace, faith, justice,&tc., concepts like love,power, spirit, sin, 
death, &tc.) are closely connected with inner rebirth and change;they 
represent an intrahistorical transformation (on an eschatological level), 
(op. cit., pps. 44-45).
ME is the existential significance, for me, of the creation story.
That I live under the promise and in hope is the existential significance, 
for me, of the second coming. To transpose this significance into any 
other would-be objective terms, or stubbornly to cling to the images per 
se, is to empty them of their historicity, and to edge man out of his 
central place, with God, in the whole story* The images are truly hist­
orical when they become signs for me in my present historical exist-
X
sence". We see that a thinker's view of the Bible determines his view 
of dogma;and we also see that Hamann knew well enough the danger of 
dogma in transposing dynamic existential images into objective dogmas, 
thus emptying them of their power. Kierkegaard also approached Church 
dogma from an existential standpoint, attempting to 1degeneralize' it.
So Kierkegaard describes the existential approach: "While abstract thought 
seeks to understand the concrete abstractly, the subjective thinker has 
conversely to understand the abstract concretely. Abstract thought 
turns from concrete men to consider man in general; the subjective think-
I
:er seeks to understand the abstract determination of being human in
1C3C
terms of this particular existing human being". Thus we can see clear- 
*iy the foundations that were laid for views like those of Buber and 
Bultmann in the 'existentialist tradition'. We must not miss the main
■r . Gregor Smith, J.G. Hamann:A Study in Christian Existence. (London
i960), p. 101.
^Concluding Unscientific Postscript, p. 315*
point though; this negative view of dogma does seem to spring from a view 
of the Bible as a 'record of encounters', as a history-book of God and 
man in discontinuous relation one with another. If this view is held, 
a negative view of objective dogma follows logically and necessarily;but 
if one holds to the objectivity of dogma, this certainly presupposes a 
different view of the Scriptures than that held by the existentialists. 
Dogma, after all, (even Roman Catholic dogma), claims to be an extension 
of, a working out of the implications of, Holy Scripture.
This existential approach to dogma has another 
immense advantage; it sheds a vast deal of light on the history of dogma 
in so far as it shows that seemingly insoluble problems in dogmatics 
never were valid problems at all, meant for our 'solution'. If dogma, 
(like the Scriptures), addresses itself primarily TO ME in my concrete 
historical situation, certain consequences of the first importance at 
once follow. The poles of existential paradoxes must be LIVED OUT, but 
they may not be THOUGHT OUT, in abstraction from existence! But how can 
I live out the poles of another person's paradox ? Certainly I cannot; 
but I may (quite invalidly) generalize, abstract from, the existential 
situations of others, and puzzle endlessly (quite literally, endlessly) 
over them. The existentialist approach to dogma suggest that this is 
what has been happening in the history of dogma. Consider, for example, 
the so-called 'problem of suffering'. Does the problem exist? Are we 
obliged to find a solution to this problem ? Is it not rather the case 
that each one of us has our own share of contradictoiy experience, and 
that from within it we are obliged to live out the contradictions ? Thus 
le6'suffering', evil', :xa? 'contradictoiy experience', not strictly 
speaking 'generalizations' (or 'abstractions'), which can only be dealt
d ' f'
with by a process of ’degeneralization1, or ’particularization* or
’concretization1 ? This, I think, is the conclusion of existentialist
found
thought. We have already/this in Bultmann’s stress on 'Entmythologis- 
iierung1 (’degeneralization’ ), in Hamann’s interpretation of history, and 
in Kierkegaard's definition of the subjective, concrete, thinker. But 
the same stress is present in, say,(the existentialist) Tillich, and in 
Buber* Thus Tillich can writes "All theological statements are existent- 
sialj they imply the man who makes the statement or who asks the quest- 
sion. The creaturely existence of which theology speaks is 'my' 
creaturely existence, and only on this basis is the consideration of
3Lcreatureliness in general meaningful”. So far Tillich's stress is 
clear; but he gives this principle concrete illustrations "Double 
predestination is not a genuine religious symbolj it is a logical con-
3£3£ssequence drawn from the religious idea of predestination. But it 
is a wrong consequence, as are all logical theological consequences which 
are not rooted in existential participation. There is no existential 
participation in the eternal condemnation of others. There is the 
existential experience of the threat of one's own self-exclusion from 
eternal life. This is the basis of the symbol of condemnation”.
3€3£3£Tillich goes on to speak of a polarity between freedom and destiny*
»
There is little doubt that Tillich's thought at this point exhibits his
indebtedness to the 'existentialist tradition'. Martin Buber also
^Systematic Theology» I, p. 299*
^i.e., abstraction, generalization.
^ O p .  cit., p. 317*
(from the standpoint of his interpretation of the Jewish Bible as a
record of a 'dialogue*, of encounters, between God and man), regards
the transposition of this dialogue into objective concepts as leading
thought into a frustrating blind-alley from which only the existential
stress can rescue it. "It is only", writes Buber, "when reality is turn-
sed into logic, and A and non-A dare no longer dwell together, that we
%get determinism and indeterminism, a doctrine of predestination and 
a doctrine of freedom, each excluding the other. According to the logic 
sal conception of truth, only one of two contraries can be true; but in
the reality of life as one lives it, they are inseperable........The
unity of the contraries is the mystery at the innermost core of the 
dialogue".*** Buber's emphasis on the existential approach to the 
Bible and to dogma is clear. And when we understand it, we appreciate 
even more fully the vast implications of the XlXth. century Kierkegaard- 
sian revolt, and Kierkegaard's insistence that 'Reason'(as that faculty 
apposite to investigating the reality of the objective world of things) 
cannot 'think existence', a^ id that 'Reason'(so understood)must allow it- 
sself to be offended by Him who approaches man in the 'moment' and estab- 
slishes a dialogue with him.
We conclude then that the existential approach to dogma, 
derived from the existential approach to Scripture, is a most fruitful
*i.e., an idea, a generalization, an abstraction, again.
^i.e. a 'mystery', not a 'problem' capable of being 'solved'.
3QO£Israel and the World, 'The Faith of Judaism*, pps. 13-27 = Herberg, 
pps. 253-265, see ppsT"256-7.
approach that modem theology ignores at its great peril. This approach 
safeguards and enshrines that radical historicity at the heart of the 
Bible; it thus makes biblical revelation relevant to our sometimes very 
contradictoiy existence; and it makes a great deal of sense of the history 
of dogma in showing the unreal nature of many traditional and insoluble 
theological problems*
A SECOND PROBLEM RAISED BY SECTION (2) — - THE PROBLEM AS TO THE NATURE 
OF CHRISTIAN FAITH AS POSED BY MARTIN BUBER'S 'TWO TYPES OF FAITH1.
According to Buber, Christianity differs from Judaism 
mainly because of their two different kinds of faith, PISTIS as contrasted
3£with EMUNAH. According to Buber, the differences are these.
(a) THE FAITH OF ISRAEL. 'EMUHAH'.
Emunah, contends Buber, originated in the actual experiences of the nation 
Israel, based on the fact of the guidance experienced by early Israel.
This, which happened only once, is the birth of Emunah. Emunah is the 
state of 'persevering', 'trust' in the existential sense. The personal 
Emunah, insists Buber, remains embodied in that of the nation and draws 
its strength from the living memory of generations in the great leadings 
of early times. Therefore Emunah, says Buber, has a PSYCHICAL^foundation.
XSee especially Two Types of Faith. (London 1951)> translated by N.P. 
Goldhawk, pps* 170 fo
**0p. cit., p. 171J a term of the first importance.
In much the same way, Buber makes the point that the faith of the Jews 
that, for example, on Sinai there took place a divine revelation confirms 
the HEREDITARY*actuality of the faith of the Jew who hears it. Jewish  
faith is not only psychical and hereditary, it is also PRIMEVAL. "Judaism’ 
says Buber, "will live only if it brings to life the primeval Jewish 
relationship to God • • .".3€X He also writes: "One center of the Jewish 
soul is the primeval experience that God is wholly raised above man, that 
he is beyond the grasp of man, and yet that he is present in an immediate
yyy
relationship with ... human beings...". Thus, in contradistinction to 
Christian faith ('Pistis'), Jewish faith is psychical, hereditary, and 
primeval•
(b) THE FAITH OF CHRISTIANITY, 'PISTIS1.
In comparison with Emunah (which confirms the faith of the Jew), Pistis 
is distinctive in that it changes the believer's faith, by challenging him 
to believe THAT ........ Pistis was bom outside the historical exper­
iences of nations, in the souls of individuals, to believe that 'a man
3QOE3Ecrucified in Jerusalem was their saviour'. Such faith is 'logical'
and 'noetic1, meaning the accepting and recognising as true of a proposit- 
sion pronounced about the object of faith. The typical attitude of
the Christian, says Buber, is shown by his confession, 'I believe that it 
is so'. "Faith", insists Buber, "should not be taken in the sense given
X3ZXXXto it in the Epistle to the Hebrews, as faith that God exists".
XOp. cit., p. 98? another term of the first importance.
XHAt the Turning,(New York 1952), 'The Silent Question', p. 44.
X3£XIsrael and the World, 'The Two Foci of the Jewish Soul', pps. 28-40 = 
Herberg, pps. 266-276 , see p. 268.
^^^Two Types of Faith, p. 172.
3€3Q€3£X'The Two Foci of the Jewish Soul' = Herberg, p. 267.
And this, in Buber's opinion, is a Greek attitude, the acknowledgement of 
a fact beyond the current circle of conceptions; this Christian assent or 
acknowledgement (in contradistinction to Jewish Emunah), seperates the 
believer from the community of his nation** Therefore, in Christendom, 
the individuals as individuals, not the nations, become Christian, that is.
3£3£
subject to Christ* "Christian believers possessed at every period a 
twofold beings as individuals in the realm of the person and as partici-
3Q€spants in the public life of their nations"* The great problem for 
Christianity lies in " • • • the disparity between the sanctification of 
the individual as such and the accepted unholiness of his community as 
such, and the disparity is necessarily transferred to the inner dialectic
yy
of the human soul".
Now all this is very interesting for existentialist theology 
as a whole. It is interesting and significant that, for example, both 
Kierkegaard and Bultmann* are agreed that 'faith' is not merely a matter
I
of believing 'that' such and such a proposition is true; Christianity 
would then be reduced to a matter of sheer factual credulity, and the 
Christian faith would become a 'Weltanschauung' which one could possess 
and utilize. Both Kierkegaard and Bultmann regard this as anathema. 
Kierkegaardian and Bultmannian notions of 'faith' are thus much nearer
*Two Types of Faith, pps. 171-2.
^Op. cit., p. 173.
Buber's Emunah than many other Christian notions of ’faith'. Also,
Buber's analysis of the strain placed on Christian belief by modem hist- 
*ory is acute;his analysis hinges on the difficulty of getting people to 
'believe that • . . '. This difficulty is basic to the theologies of 
both Kierkegaard and Bultmann, both of whom, of course, concentrate their 
attention on the PRIMARY stage of Christian belief, the problem of init­
iation, the problem (to use Kierkegaardian terminology) of 1 becoming 
a Christian'. The disparity between the Christian individual and contemp- 
:oraiy society is focussed upon and magnified almost grotesquely by Kierke- 
sgaard, and is present also in the work of Bultmann. Buber is quite 
right that this is one of the great perennial problems that faces Christ­
ianity.
Let us now examine a little more deeply Buber's analysis of 
Christian Pistis. I think that Buber uses Emunah in a psychical- 
primeval-hereditary sense so that he overcomes Kierkegaard's basic prob­
lem, that of becoming (for the first time), a believer. But is Buber's
1 solution1 to this acute problem acceptable to theology;)* I do not think
13
that it is# First, we should like more assurance that a psychical-
\v'» I ‘
hereditary-primeval 'trust1 survive for long in the modem world ofiv
criticism and pluralistic societies. Such a 'trust' would not, I feel 
sure, survive for long that blast of criticism which would undoubtedly 
come from modern science and psychology and philosophy. Emunah would 
have to face the charge that its basis appeared to many as irrational#
It seems'to me that the only chance of Emunah's survival is if Israel 
could live in a ghetto, hermetically sealed off from the fierce winds of 
empirical criticism which blow strongly in practically every part of the 
XXth. century world. Indeed, it is arguable that Emunah has only
survived into our modem world in the way it has because of two factors, 
the ghetto-like isolation of the Jewish community both in Europe and in 
America until comparatively recent times, and the comparatively recent 
founding of the new State of Israel. And as for this matter of a 'imtion- 
*al' or community trust, is it not always in danger of lapsing into a 
mere formalistic lip-service, as witnessed by Kierkegaard's raging ag^nst 
the 'faith1 of Christendom, and the many criticisms that have been brought 
against Constantine's 'Christianization' of the Empire ? But what ult­
imately seperates Buber's notion of faith from the Kierkegaardian and 
Bultmannian one, is simply that there is an obligation on both of these 
latter that is not so strong for the Jew — - namely the missionary oblig­
ation on the Christian to preach the Gospel of Christ to all men, an 
obligation which, we shall argue later, is taken very seriously by both 
Kierkegaard and Bultmann. This missionary obligation can be interpreted 
of course as love, as the desire to see men achieve authentic existence;
I do not mean that Buber does not experience this desire. He does, but 
he gives it expression by wanting to see a revival within Israel of Is-
3£3£
srael's religion. Buber is, in fact, intensely Jewish* On the other 
hand, Kierkegaard and Bultmann tend to conceive of their task as involv- 
:ing the conversion of persons actually existing now within a secular, 
pluralistic society. Thus the stress of Bultmann on 'keiygma', preaching, 
proclamation.
3ESee the interesting discussion of these themes in the sociological 
study, THE GHETTO, by Louis V/irth, (University of Chicago Press, 1928 and 
1956), especially Chapter XII, THE VANISHING GHETTO, 1st section, 'The 
Flight from the Ghetto', pps. 24I f*
** Buber's intense Jewishness is criticized by ¥. Herberg in his introduct­
ion to The Writings of Martin Buber; Herberg argues that Buber tends to 
see the solution of great problems too much against the background of the 
new agricultural State of Israel. Thus Buber is, says Herberg, a 'religio- 
social Zionist'; see pps. 21-22.
On the other hand, we must face the fact the Kierkegaard and Bult- 
:mann may be criticized for being weak just where Buber is strong* It 
is possible to say that Kierkegaard and Bultmann have in their theolog- 
sies contributed too little to the question of religious community in gen- 
:eral. For instance, there is almost totally lacking from their thought 
the notion of the Church as a social vehicle of an existential attitude 
to reality, a vehicle transcending individuals, generations, and cent- 
suries* Is the call to the actually existing individual to come to terms 
with his own personal existence, while ignoring or even denigrating the 
community or nation (Buber), enough ? Many will want to know if the 
theologies of Kierkegaard and Bultmann have anything more to say of comm- 
:unity than that it is constantly in danger of degenerating into a menace 
to authentic personal existence* We shall not take up these criticisms 
here because we shall have to examine them in our next problem (the prob- 
slem of Church and community), especially when we consider Bultmann and 
Kierkegaard as missionaries rather than theologians*
I
Both Buber and Bultmann are agreed that ’faith* is related to 
historical event, in one way or another* But I doubt whether the ways 
in which Judaism and Christianity regard historical event in the past are 
so radically different as Buber asserts* I do not think that Emunah, 
in the last analysis, can dispense altogether with ’believing that * •’* 
Thus when Buber says that the Emunah of the Jew is confirmed and strength' 
:ened by the fact ’that on Sinai a divine revelation took place”, he
^Two Types of Faith, p. 98*
admits the possibility that if a Jew were to conclude that on Sinai no 
such revelation took place, his hereditaiy Emunah would not be strengthen- 
:ed but weakened, and threatened with extinction. This, as Louis V/irth's 
book proves, is the very danger for the modem Jew who emerges from either 
the compulsory or voluntary ghetto into the modem world of criticism.
Thus, in the circumstances of our pluralistic world, I do not think that 
Buber1s rigid distinction between Emunah and Pistis can be maintained, 
Israel faces as much as does the Christian community the problem of 
’becoming a believer1 over against the ’emancipated’, ’secularized’, 
assimilated Jew.
We must raise a further question. Is not Christianity 
unique because of a unique scandal of particularity ? Has Buber really 
come to terms with that element in the Christian faith which asserts 
that God is present in Jesus Christ in a way that he was not manifested 
in Abraham or Moses or at Sinai ? And is this not the Christian scandal ? 
And is this Christian scandal not the Jewish scandal (historic particular- 
sity)raised to an infinite pdwer ? I think that it cannot be denied that
3Eit is, I do so because I can see no grounds for holding there to be a
radical difference between the historicity of the Old Testament and the
Hew. If this is so, then much of the sting is taken from Buber's critic- 
:isms of the nature of Christian Pistis. When Buber suggeststhat a
*H.P. Owen, in his Revelation and Existence, p. 118, rightly perceives that 
according to Bultmann, the essence of the Christian scandal is identical 
with the scandal of ’God’s revelation on Sinai'.
K3£As we shall see later, it is more than probable that when Buber critic-
sizes Pistis, his notion of it is pretty much that of the Western Latin
Church. The Roman Church insists of course that ’faith’ contains a 
strong element of ’assent’ to the truth of dogmatic propositions. It seems 
clear that Buber's notion of Christian faith is not that of modern ’ sub- 
jjectivist’ Christian theology.
certain double-movement may yet give a certain unity to Judaism and 
Christianity he seems to confirm much of what we have said.x Buber 
suggest that the obligation on Judaism is to strive after a renewal of 
its faith through the re-birth of the person; the obligation on Christian 
:ity is to strive for the renewal of its faith through the renewal of 
nations. This is probably true enough? but one thing is certain : if 
Judaism does apply itself to the conversion of the person as such, it 
will have to traverse theological paths already worn by the passage of 
Kierkegaard and his successors and heirs,
A THIRD PROBLEM RAISED BY SECTION (2) THE PROBLEM OF CHURCH AND
COMMUNITY.
The alleged out-and-out subjectivity of theologians like Kierke- 
sgaard and Bultmann has been, in various quarters, criticized most severe
I
sly as not doing justice to the social and communal expressions of 
Christianity, in short, to the Church. To mention only several, we may 
note that Oscar Cullmann has criticized Kierkegaard’s thought because, it 
is alleged, Kierkegaard ignores the place of the Church in the so-called
yy
intermediate eras Georges Florovsky has criticized Bultmann end his
xSee Two Types of Faith, pps. 173-4•
^See Christ and Time,chapter 4 t PPS*> 144 our discussion of Cull-
jmann’s book in chapter IV of the thesis.
existentialist colleagues for failing to recognize the Church’s function 
m  the Heilsgeschichte John Macquarrie has criticized Bultmann1 s theol- 
sogy as being weak on the question of the Church and Christian comi.iun.ity;
t
H.P* Owen has criticized Bultmann for failing to perceive the fulfilment 
of Christ’s work in the Churcho300*
It is surely time that this question of the attitude of exist
sentialist theologians to the Church is raised and thoroughly examined•
Now it seems to me that critics of Bultmann1 s estimate of the Church must
is
be made to see that it^rooted firmly in his view of the awareness of God
and of the self, in his view of revelation* It is true that Bultmann
and his colleagues sometimes criticize the Church for secondary reasons
(which may obscure the real issue) — - for instance, that the Church may
believe that it possesses the truth in its creeds and dogmas* This is,
of course, absolutely unacceptable to Kierkegaard and Bultmann (and to
Buber also)* It is undeniable that the Church may define (and has in fact
defined at times) what God is, thus obscuring what God does* Thus Buber
holds that a religious community may make God into an ’object' of worship;
it may try to secure a continuum of God in space and time. Similarly, a
community may try to possess God in an idea which is applied again and
again to the riddles of life. Obviously this is inauthentic, according
to the existentialists* But such criticisms, important as they are, do
XIn an essay, ’The Predicament of the Christian Historian’, included in 
Religion and Culture:Essays in Honor of Paul Tillich, edit* W. Leibrecht, 
(London 1958)> pps# 140 f; for the criticisms of Bultmann, see pps. I64 fe
xgAn Existentialist Theology. IX, ’Existence in the Community’, pps.215 f.
^^^evelation and Existence, chapter 7> ’The Historical Element', pps.
Ill f. See especially pps. 133-4*
not reach the heart of the matter. The heart of the matter is that 
thinkers like Bultmann and Buber seem to under-estimate the community 
because of the high value they place on the world as the sphere of God’s 
redeeming activity and self-disclosure. Just because they focus their 
eyes so closely on the world, they seem to have turned their eyes away from 
the Church. Thus we have seen over and over again the existentialist 
stress on the becoming-of-the-self-in-the-world. The typically existent­
ialist view of history outlined in these pages is of history as a great 
stream of events, people, things, happenings, into which the person is 
enjoined to immerse himself -•—  he assumes authentic being in so far as 
he has contact with this stream. This is^what we mean by ’historicity1.
In theological terms, it means that the world takes on a new aspect, as 
that sphere teeming with persons, things and opportunities in and through 
which the living God may manifest himself and mature man. It is basically 
a question of the amount of stress one is going to place on two spheres —  
the Church and the world. Thus if one places enormous stress upon the 
Church, the world is depreciated, and vice-versa. Moreover, if the 
Church is regarded as supremely the sphere of revelation, the world tends 
to be regarded as evil; if the world is regarded as the sphere of revel- 
:ation, the Church tends to be regarded as a refuge, a hiding-place, in 
which man flees from his own historicity. Obviously a thinker like Bult­
mann (or Buber) regards the world as pre-eminently the sphere where rev- 
selation takes place, and thus the Church receives relatively less stress 
in his thought. Why, we must ask, have the existentialists chosen to 
stress the world in this way ? For, I believe, two broad reasons.
First, a good case can be made out that the Bible teaches that the whole 
world and not just a community (say, Israel, the Church) is the sphere of 
God’s revelation; we can point here to the Old Testament's emphasis on
the 'eveiyday', the special .re-discovery of Hasidism, an emphasis accepte< 
by Buber. Parallel with this in the hew Testament is the Incarnation of 
Christ in the world, in the world of 'humilitas' and of the 'menial*, not 
in an unworldly context of religious symbol, sacrament, and rite, a 
truth brilliantly elaborated in Auerbach's Mimesis, whose central theme 
is accepted and admired by Bultmann. It is possible to interpret from 
this point of view Christ's humble birth in a non-ecclesiastical house­
hold, his 'worldly' Ministry amongst men, his rejection of and by
Pharisaism and Sadducism, his crucifixion outside the community symboliz-
:ed by Jerusalem. No doubt the community has an important function in 
guarding and proclaiming this message, but this does not mean that it has 
the right to negate it in arrogating to itself God's gift to the world, 
a disclosure of itself as the sphere where revelation is to take place. 
Thus I am convinced that it is arguable that Bultmann's and Buber’s 
stress on the world is the stress of biblical revelation itself! But 
then, second, there is a pragmatic reason for Bultmann's seeming 'prefer­
ence* for the world over against the Church it is to be found in
Bultmann's desire to make the Kerygma meaningful to unbelieving, secular-
sized men actually living in a pluralistic society now. Because modem 
man lives (in the main) in the world and not in a religious community, 
if God were not be encountered in man's actual context, it is hard to see 
why modem man should identify himself with the life of the Church. In 
so doing, Bultmann and his colleagues can point to the missionary obligat­
ion on the Christian to preach the Gospel throughout the whole world; he 
could also argue that it is a pre-requisite to understanding the hew Test- 
;ament to realize that these writings are themselves missionary 
documents. And just because Bultmann (like Kierkegaard before him) 
takes his stand between unbelief and belief, he must shed himself of much
that is unquestioned within the Church. There is a sense in which Bulb- 
:mann's theological position is like that of a foreign missionary who 
leaves behind him the 'home Church' to live and work within a context in 
which little or nothing familiar within this Church can be taken for gran. 
:ed. To the similarity between Bultmann and a missionary we shall have 
to return shortly. For the present, we must note carefully why it is
that there is a seeming lack of emphasis in his work on the Church it
is because basically he takes a quite specific view of the world as the 
sphere of God's disclosure to man.
We must note that there is a certain close similarity 
between the views of Bul tmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard on the nature of 
Church and community. For Bultmann, the Church is a community of 
1eschatological folk', a 'gathered congregation' of those whose 'old 
lives' have been brought to an end through their decision for the self- 
understanding given in the Kerygma, and who have each accepted the 'new 
existence' offered to them by God as a personal gift. Buber compares 
authentic community to a cartwheel;its basic structure lies in its spokes 
pointing inward towards the hub, thus building up the circumference. So 
genuine community is constituted by persons attaching themselves to the 
divine centre; it is the common attachment to the centre that makes the 
community. There can be no question of people constituting the commun- 
sity by merely attaching themselves to the circumference. The strength 
and structure of the cartwheel lies in the link between spoke and hub.
And for Kierkegaard community, genuine Christendom, was quite simply the 
aggregate of individual believers; for Kierkegaard the Church was no 
more, no less. If we grasp these views of community, we can grasp 
another important criticism which might be made against Bultmann and his 
colleagues.
On the face of it, it may seem to some that all three are deficient 
in failing to recognise that a religious community is actually something 
more than the mere aggregate of believers actually existing at any one 
time. This "something more than . . . "  may carry several implications. 
It may be some normative, objective standard possessed by the community 
as such which regulates and controls the experience, decisions, and bel- 
:iefs of individuals. It may be some element within the community which 
makes the community1 s Kerygma seem more probable; for example, a spirit 
of togetherness, solidarity, assurrance, experienced in the community- 
life; it may be the splendid example of the Church's saints and martyrs, 
the pride in 2000 years of Christendom, or something like that. It may 
be some tradition within the community which supports and supplements the
existential relevance of the Kerygma for instance, an historically
'objective' portrait of the actual Jesus, demonstrating for all to see 
the factual possibility and limits of authentic existence. In short, 
does not the religious community represent an extra-kerygmatic instrument 
for the fertilization of faith and belief, and is it not the grave weak­
ness of existentialist theology generally that it ignores this charaet- 
seristic of the community? Certainly, something veiy like this question 
would seem to lie behind the many criticisms of existentialist theology's 
alleged weakness on Church and community. We must now examine such 
criticisms more closely.
First, if the community stands above, is normative for the indiv­
idual's deciding and believing, does the community possess a standard of 
judgement, a norm, a special'paradosis', which is non-existentially 
(i.e. objectively) apprehended ? It would seem that such a criticism of 
Bultmann commits the critic to something like this. Now we saw in chap­
iter I, in our examination of Tillich, Owen, and h'acquarrie, that it is
well-nigh impossible to produce an objectivej^r(i.e. non-existentially,1 
apprehended norm for Christian belief and decision. The Kerygma. can 
only be apprehended by means of man's total, concrete, historical life0 
That is an obvious conclusion that I draw from the argument of chapter I, 
Similarly, if it be argued that I ought to decide for the Kerygma be cause 
thousands of the saints in the mystical Church of Christ have already 
done so, what does this mean ? Does it mean that direct faith in r,he 
Kerygma is insufficient ? If not, why point to the examples of the 
saints ? Many others in past history did not decide for the Kerygma — —  
why were they wrong and the saints right ? The message of history, as 
Bultmann has rightly reminded us, is always ambiguous. In other words, 
if I decide for the Kerygma, partly at least because the saints have done 
so, it must be clear to me that this is because I have decided for the 
saints' decision for the Kerygma.* I have decided that they were right 
and the unbelievers wrong. But it cannot be made too clear that my decis- 
:ion for this, and ray decision for the Kerygma of the saints are ultimate-
I
sly identical and indistinguishable© It is not a little difficult to 
see why the example of the saints in the mystical Church was introduced at 
all. But perhaps the example of the saints is introduced to illustrate 
the 'embodiment' of the Kerygma, clothe it with flesh, so to speak; if 
so, as we shall see, this is both valid and necessaiy for a doctrine of 
the Church. But if the example were introduced in order to demonstrate
*"Faith to-day, unless it is faith in the faith of the Apostles, is not 
other than their faith in the man who makes the most absurd of claims", 
H.J. Blackham on Kierkegaard, Six Existentialist Thinkers, p. 4®
that ’surely all the saints and martyrs cannot be wrong’, then the 
argument is ineffective. After all, the Bible contains a firm strand of 
conviction that at times all depends on the’ remnant1 ; it warns against 
persecution of the authentic few by the inauthentic many; it warns that 
there be only few that find the way to authentic existence; it believes 
in the Cross, a symbol of 'aloneness' and rejection. Thus we conclude 
that there is no non-existential element in the Church’s life which 
could either displace or supplement personal decision for the Kerygma it- 
:self. We fare little better if we investigate the possibility of there 
being in the Church's keeping an 'objective' picture, say, of the histor- 
sical Jesus, which supplements the relevance of the Kerygma to my exist­
ence* As we saw, in discussing John Macquarrie's criticisms of Bult-
Xjmann in chapter I of the thesis, because there can be no direct observa’ 
:ion of the past, and thus because it is impossible to construct a factua 
portrait of Jesus, objective in the way mathematical statements are 
objective, (but at the most a probable sketch derived from the existent- 
sially appropriated Kerygma), it is again impossible to circumvent 
decision* If, therefore, we offer to a person along with the Kerygma 
an allegedly factual portrait of Jesus, it must be made clear to him that 
his decision for its validity depends, in the last analysis, on his dec- 
:ision for the Kerygma itself* The Kerygma (like the whole corpus of the 
New Testament) is primarily a missionary instrument; its acceptance may 
entail identifying oneself with the life of a community, the Church. If
KIn The Scope of Demythologising.
it be suggested that grounds for a decision for the Kerygma reside within 
the Church, it must at the same time he stressed that these grounds are 
themselves 'kerygmatic' (i.e. derived from the Kerygma), or that one dec- 
:ides for them only because one has decided for the Kerygma. A not
unimportant consequence follows we saw how the biblical notion of
historic revelation implies a doctrine of particularity, and we argued 
that such particularity must be transferred to man’s existence-in-the- 
world. If it be argued against this that the particularity implied by 
the Keiygma is transferred to the existence of the Church, even this 
argument, if accepted, cannot possibly cancel out the necessity for hist- 
:oric decision. In so far as the Kerygma is directed to men living in 
the world, their decision for this Christian ’particularity' located 
within the Church, like their decision for the Kerygma, must be made in 
one historic 'moment' or another, in the world of space, time, and 
histo:ry. When we see this clearly, we must conclude that a great many 
unquestioned assumptions and not a little unclear thinking lie behind 
many of the traditional arguments for the Church in fostering faith.
It may also be asked whether there is not an ecclesiology 
in which Bultmann (because of his excessive European Protestantism) is
3£weak which is recognized by, say, Eastern Orthodox Christians. The 
Orthodox viewpoint sees the Church as a vast sanctifying and purifying 
stream flowing through history and transforming human societies through
HCf. Georges Florovsky, 'The Predicament of the Christian Historian', in 
Religion and Culture, pps. 165-6.
the centuries. Undoubtedly the Church has had great rej^urcussions in 
certain spheres, in philanthropy, in compassion, in reform, in respect 
for humanity generally and for the significance of the individual; no 
doubt that the Church has played a great part as a catalyst in social
idea of the Church, which has a great deal to say for itself, but we 
should like to distinguisfylt from the viewpoints of, say, Bultmann and 
Kierkegaard. First, we must note that the Orthodox idea of history is 
just not Bultmann1 s; the Orthodox idea implies that man is able to 
transcend the centuries and look down upon the unfolding of the centurie 
as we have seen, in our Introduction, Bultmann and his colleagues reject 
this possibility. Second, we remember Bultmann's insistence that the 
message of histoiy is ambiguous. Third, this implies that in the
midst of this ambiguity, man canj igation to decide for or
against a certain significance in histoiy. Thus, we must insist that 
if a man does perceive in history the significance given to it by East- 
:em Orthodoxy, he does so because he has already decided for the relev- 
:ance of the K©rygpia that is, because he has already participated
HSee Nicolas Zernov, The Church of the Eastern Christians. (London 1942) 
where the Orthodox viewpoint is thus described: "Eastern Christians look 
upon the world as one great organism; they approach the diverse manifest 
:ations of life as an expression of the same ultimate reality * . . the 
Church for them is therefore a living community, but not /an institution; 
it includes the whole cosmos, and the relation of all who belong to it 
is substantially that of members of the same organism" (p. 53)• "The 
East does not think about salvation in terms of the individual soul 
returning to its maker; it is visualised rather as a gradual process of 
transfiguration of the whole cosmos, culminating in TKEOSIS, or the dei­
fication in Christ of the members of the church as representatives and 
spokesmen of the entire creation . . . Han is saved, not from the world 
but with the world, because he is its guardian and master . . ." (p. 54)
^See especially Essays, pps. 105 f.
• 3£and ethical reform. how we should not like to denigrate the Orthodox
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existentially in the Kerygma, and has experienced its transforming 
possibilities. It is also obvious that it is decision that gives a man 
this view of history, because in the last generation or so scientific 
humanists in particular have been assiduously demonstrating that in the 
case of great social and ethical reforms the Church was not the only 
factor operative in the situations concerned; moreover, the same group 
has been pointing out that there have been eras in history where the 
Church opposed reforms in whose achievement we all take pride today. It 
seems certain that the Eastern Orthodox view of the Church's place and 
achievement in history has not been produced apart from the Orthodox 
prior decision for the Christian Kerygma itself. Fourth, and perhaps 
most important of all, Bultmann (and Kierkegaard) must be distinguished 
from Eastern Orthodoxy because of the radical difference in viewpoints 
involved. We have already indicated that the key to understanding the 
theologies of Bultmann and Kierkegaard is to be found in their profound 
interest in the 'problem of becoming a Christian'. If there were no 
missionary obligation ©H the Christian, then the theological ventures of 
both Bultmann and Kierkegaard would be called radically in question!
In a sense they both take their stand on the dominical commission deliver- 
:ed to the Apostles to preach the Gospel to all men, throughout all the 
world. Indeed, we may seriously ask if Bultmann and Kierkegaard are
not more pioneering missionaries to the unchurched, rather than theolog-
*
:ians in the classical sense, and whether their peculalLr standpoints 
have not been chosen for them because of their situations in thoroughly 
unchurched and secularized societies ? We have already noticed that one 
of the main reasons why Bultmann wrote his shattering Neues Testament 
und Mythologie was his conviction that modem man was no longer able to
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understand Christianity as a live option for his existenceo* It follows 
that ^iiltmann is therefore more interested in conscious acceptance of the 
Kerygma, and the understanding it conveys* Kierkegaard's self-confessed
; j  ( I  I
aim was simply to investigate the 'problem of becoming a Christian' and 
his theology flows from this standpoint.** That is, both bultmann and 
Kierkegaard take their stand upon the point of initiation, on the tense 
boundary-line between unbelief and belief, and the recognition of this is 
basic to understanding their theologies. Thus Bultmann is more interest- 
:ed in primsuy than in secondary revelation, in the cause rather than in 
the consequences* In contradistinction to this, we must recognize that 
the Eastern Orthodox view of the Church presupposes a standpoint within 
the Church, and above histoiy, so that the centuries may be surveyed, 
and the Church's significance in various eras and situations (we must 
again insist), decided for.
3£Cf. Ian Henderson, Myth in the New Testament, (London 1952), where 
Professor Henderson points out that the experiences of German theolog- 
sians who had served as army'chaplains in the 1959-45 war " . • had 
thrown them into contact with those outside the Church and convinced them 
both of the need and the difficulty of presenting Christianity in such a 
way that it would at anyrate not be meaningless to the latter", (p. 9)» 
Also, " . • the thesis of Bultmann is that something has to be done with 
what he calls the mythology of the New Testament. As long as this is 
taken at its face value as literally true, Christianity remains meaning- 
iless to modem man", (op. cit., p. 9)«
**Cf. Concluding Unscientific Postscript, pps. 540 f. -'THE PROBLEM OF 
THE 'FRAGMENTS' VIEWED AS AH INTRODUCTION-PROBLEM, NOT TO CHRISTIANITY, 
BUT TO BECOMING A CHRISTIAN'.
"Philosophy offers an immediate introduction to Christianity, and so do 
the historical and rhetorical introductions. These introductions succeed, 
because they introduce to a doctrine, but not to becoming a Christian",
(p« 545)• Kierkegaard points out that his introduction to the problem 
of becoming a Christian " . • is quite unlike any introduction which 
proceeds upon the assumption that Christianity is a doctrine. An intro­
duction of this kind does not lead to becoming a Christian, but leads at 
most to the perception, historically motivated, that Christianity has 
certain advantages over paganism, Judaism, and so forth", (p. 541)* "The 
introduction that I  propose to offer will be . . an existential communic- 
sation", (pps, 541-2).
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And iii leaving tliis aspect of our problem, we must not fail to notice 
that the notion that the Church must be decided for in the same way as 
the Keiygma must be decided for has never been more insistently put for- 
sward than by Kierkegaard himself, whose thought here still exerts a 
tremendously strong influence on contemporary theology.*
We must now look at a possible objection to the existentialist view 
of the Church, which is, perhaps, the most important of all. It can be 
stated thus : if experience of the 'moment’ is so all-important as 
the existentialist theologians seem to suggest, does this not make the 
individual's decision more than a little arbitrary and arrogant ? Where 
is the humility in the assertion that the fulness of God and the richness
*See Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Book One, THE OBJECTIVE PROBLEM 
CONCERN If G THE TRUTH OF CHRISTUM: ITT, Chapter I, § 2, • 'The Church', pps.
35 To "Just as it was the -^ ible which was to decide objectively what is , 
Christianity and what is not, so now it is the Church that is to serve as 
the certain objective recourse. More specifically, it is the living word 
in the Church, the confession of faith, and the word in connection with 
the sacraments", (p. 37). If, we speak of the Church as Christian and 
Apostolic, the j^edicate Christian " . . is thus more than a present pre­
dicate. When predicated of the present it implies a past, and thus in- 
ivolves a historicity in quite the same sense as the Bible" (p. 39)* Thus 
the Christianity and Apostolicity of the Church must be decided for just 
as the word of the Bible requires decision. "The moment we make use of 
the living word to urge the continued existence of the Church through 
past centuries, the issue is brought back to precisely the same point 
where it was in the Bible theoiy", (p. 39). As regaras the Church theory, 
the problem should be transferred " . . to the realm of the subjective 
where it properly belongs • .", (pps. 39-40). "The living word declares 
the existence of the Church , . But the living word does not suffice to 
declare that the Church has been in existence for eighteen centuries,that 
it is essentially the same, that it has persisted in a wholly unaltered 
form, and so forth", (p. 40). Kierkegaard's conclusion is that " . . the 
problem ought to be put subjectively, and that it is precisely a misunder­
standing to seek an objective assurance, thereby avoiding the risk in 
which passion chooses and continues to live, re-affirming its choice,
(p. 41). " . . It ♦ . would have been a tremendous injustice if any later
generation were enabled safely, that is objectively, to enter Christianity 
and thus secure a share in that which the first generation has bought in 
the extremity of subjectivity . .
of the Gospel can be appropriated in a brief, even slender and puny 
'moment1 ? Is not my slender experience of the 'moment' far too frail 
a foundation for the Christian faith ? It is hard not to suspect that 
it is questions like these that lie behind the attacks on out-and-out 
subjectivity which we discussed in chapter I, the attacks of Tillich and 
Owen (q.v.). Certainly such questions seem to be implied by Tillich's 
use (which we have examined) of terms like 'participation', 'entering 
into • .". And Owen also speaks of the believer coming to share in 
Christ's Risen Life within the Church, the Body of Christo* On the face 
of it, these alternatives seem to represent a stronger and more satisfact­
ion position than Bultmann's 'isolated individual'.
These criticisms of the existentialist position are so far-reaching 
that they deserve careful examination and evaluation. I think that it 
is possible to answer them; and for the sake of convenience, I should 
like to do so under four propositions which sum up and develop the
I
existentialist notions of humility and the existence-with-others in the 
religious community.
(u The virtue of humility is enriched and not diminished by the
existentialist concept of historicity --  because 'historicity' implies
that the totality of God transcends in every direction my experience of 
the 'moment'; 'historicity' means that God pre-exists the 'moment's'
*See Revelation and Existence, p. 133*
occurrence and that God's self-disclosure is not exhausted by any one 
'moment'.
The totality of God transcends in every direction my 
experience of the 'moment' because I am related to God in the past, in 
the future, and on both sides of me (as we shall see presently), in my 
neighbour* In no sense is a man's experience of a 'moment' final — — 
if it were, this assertion would be arrogant indeed. Kather the 
'moment's' occurrence leaves man partially unfulfilled, so that he re­
squires to have his knowledge of God and of himself constantly enriched 
and corrected. So Bultmann writes : "In faith man understands himself 
ever anew. This new self-understanding can be maintained only as a 
continual response to the word of God which proclaims his action in Jesus 
Christ. It is the same in ordinary human life. The new self-under­
standing which grows out of the encounter of man with man can be maintain- 
sed only if the actual relation between man and man is maintained. "The 
kindness of God is new every looming'; yes, provided I perceive it anew 
every morning. For this is not a timeless truth, like a mathematical 
statement. I can speak of the kindness of God which is new every morning
3£
only if I myself am renewed everymoming". Man remains humble just 
because, being tied to history, he realizes that the insight of a mere 
'moment' may yet be revolutionized by his historical contacts; thus his 
'knowledge' of God or of himself can never claim fulness or finality; he 
is forever on the way; in so far as he realizes this, he remains humble.
*Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 76,
ihe personal sell-understanding1 gained in the ’moment1 is " . . put to 
the test, is called into question (ist in Erage gestelft) in every situat-
• X:ion of encounter*1. ”As my life goes on, my self-understanding may 
prove inadequate or it may become clearer or deeper as the result of furth
XX:er experiences and encounters”. ’’Entering into decisive encounters 
I may achieve a totally new self-understanding as a result of the love 
which is bestowed upon me when, for example, I marry or make a new
XXXfriend”. If I so understand my existence, I am safeguarded from an 
arrogant lack of humility because ” . . .  I cannot possess this self- 
understanding as a timeless truth, a conviction accepted once and for 
all".***
It is thus clear that the doctrine of the ’moment’ implies that 
the totality of revelation infinitely transcends that of which I am given 
awareness in any one ’moment’.
(2) The virtue of humility is enriched and not diminished by the concept 
of ’historicity* in so far as'this means (especially in the works of 
Bultmann and Buber) the understanding of man as always someone future, 
as someone whose genuine self lies before him as a possibility to be 
grasped and realized.
We have already, in chapter I, examined Bultmann’s conviction
that man's genuine existence lies before him in the future --- there is 
hardly a stronger emphasis in all of Bultmann’s writings* We refer to 
it again very briefly here: " . . .  it .. is precisely demythologising 
which makes clear the true meaning of God as acting in the future*
Faith includes free and complete openness to the future’’.* "Faith as 
openness to the future . . . .  PROM ourselves as the old selves, and 
FOR ourselves as the new selves”.** This emphasis on man as a future 
creature is of course to be found also in the work of Buber; thus, speak- 
sing of the ’moments’ of existence, Buber has this to say: "Eveiy relat­
ional event is a stage that affords him a glimpse into the consummating
XXXevent". Thus the experience of the ’moment’ has future reference. 
Man’s " . . sense of Thou . . cannot be satiated till he finds the 
endless Thou . . »»**** Thus the totality of what is disclosed to man is 
not exhausted by the experience of any one relational ’moment1. And 
we have already encountered Buber’s translation of the Hebrew of Exodus
XXXX
3:14 as "I shall be there as I there shall be”. It matters little
whether Buber is right in his translation; what is important is that it 
does show how he understands man as a being who looks forward into the 
future for further self-disclosures of God. Thus it is again clear 
that experience of the 'moment1 is not necessarily arrogant and arbit­
rary  in so far as I understand myself as a future being, and the
revelation of God as something which will be disclosed to me over and
Jesus Christ and Mythology, p. 77*
XXOp. cit., p. 78* For further references to Bultmann’s stress on man 
as a Future creature, see History and Eschatology, 99-100, 109t 121 f., 
150 f.; cf. Essays,138 f•> 222, 253> 309«
***! and Thou (1st edit.), p. 80.
****See Herberg, op. cit., pps. 106 and 268.
over again in the future, in increasing fulness, correcting and enriching 
what was given in previous 1 moments'•
There is an interesting consequence of all this. What can 
existentialists and demythologizers make, for instance, of a New Testa- 
:ment boiak like Hebrews, which certainly seems to hold that our Lord’s 
’objective’, risen Life, is in some way available to believers.* lu so 
far as existentialists can answer this, their answer would seem to be 
along these lines ; statements from Hebrews must be demythologized, that 
is, interpreted existentially. What they indicate in general is that our 
Lord’s existence and work transcends individual ’moments’ of experience; 
they mean that our Lord’s being has future reference. They mean that 
Christ is ever before me, in the potentiality of his revelation, and that 
he pre-exists my decision and belief, just as a person with whom I come 
to have a relationship pre-exists the relationship*
(3) Existenoe-with-others in,Church or religious community is given posit- 
:ive meaning by the existentialist insight that encounters with others 
both deepen and broaden the awareness of God and the self given in the 
'moment'; such encounters may have increasing, enriching, and correcting 
effects. This insight also enriches and does not diminish humility*
This means that my personal decision in the ’moment' should
be tentative in the sense that it ought not to exclude the possibility
*Cf, H.P. Owen's fondness for Hebrews, which we have discussed in chap­
iter I when dealing with Owen's Revelation and Existence.
that I tftiy in the future encounter richer and. as yet unthought of 
understandingy and implementations of the Kerygma through my encounter 
with other Thous. These encounters may of course he of two kinds.
First, they may be interpersonal, face to face; thus the Church may take 
on enormous importance as the sphere where I-Thou relationships between 
Christians take place, enriching and deepening and correcting each others* 
grasp of the Kerygma. It is hard to underestimate the importance of the 
Church in so far as this function is fulfilled within her.* Second, 
such encounters may be by means of the recorded experiences (W. Dilthey: 
'ErlebnisausdrtLcke') of believers who are not, who cannot, be actually 
physically present to us. Thus we may encounter the Kerygma in, for
XXexample, Dietrich Bonhoeffer , St Francis of Assisi,,and Kagawa. Or in 
a biography, or an autobiography, say, of St Augustine or of St Theresa,
I might encounter an as yet unperceived possibility of Christian exist­
ence which confronts my understanding with enrichment or correction.
Thus I should like to understand the encounters of Christians with the 
•saints1, with David Livingst,one, with Albert Schweizer. Christian
humility would thus mean my awareness that the understanding given in 
the 'moment’ may yet be enriched, increased, adjusted,and corrected in
my future encounters with Thous both inside and outside the Church, both
XSo we may understand a text like Rom.l:12, ”. . .  that I may be encouraged 
by meeting you, I by your faith, and you by mine”(Moffat).
**In, especially, his Letters and Papers from Prison, (London 1953)*
XXXThis, needless to say, is quite different from, for example, the 
relationship between the Roman Catholic and a saint like St. Thomas 
Aquinas, whose ideas on Christianity are imposed on believers by author- 
:ity; also, here there is no obligation to encounter the totality of St 
Thomas' s personality. For the place of authority which St Thomas holds in 
the Roman Church, see H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, 2191 f„
living and dead. If they are of the past, their recorded ‘momenta have 
still the propensity within them to blaze up and assume presentness again > 
and again when looked upon in the present ‘moment1 (Buber)* Such !
a doctrine gives positive meaning and significance to our existence-with- 
others in the Church* And we ought not to overlook the fact that we 
can find the seeds of such a doctrine in the writings of Bultmann him”- j
3 £  *:selff especially in the significance that he gives to autobiography* j
|
But ‘encounters* between Christians in the Church are not exhausted by 
encounters which are face-to-face, mediated through 'ErlebnisausdrtLcke*, 
biographies, autobiographies, for surely (as we discovered when dealing 
with the problem of propositions! theology) encounters may be mediated 
no less by dogma ? If it is so, as we tried to show, that Church 
dogmas originated in existential situations, and if, as we insisted, 
the correct approach to Church dogma involves not their rejection but 
their 'degeneralization' or 'de-objectification', surely what we have
*See Bultmann's Gifford Lectures, History and Esciiatology, especially 
pps# I46 f. " . • it must be; stressed that what we call PERSONALITY is 
also temporal-historical, and is constant only as a possibility which is 
ever to be realised”, (p. 146). " • * the I is an ever-growing, ever-
becoming, ever increasing entity. Personality experiences its own history 
within the frame of universal history and interwoven with it, but never­
theless as a history which has its own meaning and is not merged into 
universal history",(p* 146). "This is the justification of autobio- 
jgraphy" (p. I46), in which " . . the author gives an account of the per­
sonal history of his life" (p. 147)* " • • autobiographies may gain an 
extraordinary importance for universal history, as, for instance, the 
'Confessions’ of Augustine . . . This clearly shows that histoiy has a 
dimension not included in the concept of it as the histoiy of problems"
(p* 147). The significance and value of these autobiographies are to be 
found in " . . . permanent possibilites of human self-understanding which 
once they have found expression in histoiy remain# as ever-present possib­
ilities coming to life at different times in different forms" (p. 148). 
Thus, says Bultmann, " . . real autobiography arose for the first time 
within Christianity", (p. 149). Cf. Jesus Christ and ifwthology, pps. 74-
75.
in dogma is a wealth of understandings gained in contact with history, 
potentially powerful for our grasp of the Kerygma, understandings which 
it would indeed he arrogant to ignore, indeed, which we ignore at our 
peril, Thus dogma is another element which expresses the insight that 
the totality of revelation transcends what is actually given in any one 
’moment1 at a given time. Thus we can say of Church dogma that it 
represents my genuine self lying before me, to be realised in the future, 
through encounter with the understandings of those whose grasp of the 
Kerygma and its possibilities is enshrined in the dogmas themselves. Thus 
the existential approach to dogma gives more positive meaning to exist- 
:ence-with-others in the Church,
If this is so, then for the existentialist theologians the 
proposition ’extra ecclesia^ nulla salvatio’ is not altogether invalid.
The emphasis on the necessity of encounter and repeated re-encounter with 
others (in preached or personal modes) may validly be interpreted to 
mean that without such repeated contact with the Kerygma authentic exist­
ence is in constant danger of lapsing back into inauthentic existence.
In this special sense, but only in this sense, the Church is generally 
necessary for salvation; man, if he is to be saved, thus requires 
Church-existence0
(4) Existence with others in a religious community is given positive mean- 
ting by Martin Buber’s concent of ’Teaching’, in which encounter may take 
Place between persons or between generations, which may give rise to, not 
the impartation of ideas and propositions, but to an ’existence-communic- 
tation'.
ABuber’s emphasis on the contact between one generation and another
is of great importance for the Christian Church; it has much to impart
to, for example, the Church’s educational office, whether in formal teach-
sing, or in its ministry to the parents of children. Buber stresses the 
obligation
sacred^of one generation towards another. "In these recurring encounters 
between a generation which has reached its full development and one which 
is still developing, the ultimate aim is not to transmit a seperable some- 
thing". Thus, as we have argued throughout, secondaiy revelation cannot
be seperated from primary --  therefore, teaching within the religious
community does not have as its aim the impartation of a ’ Weltanschauung' 
or of a set of ideas. "The teachings cannot be severed from the deed,
♦ XXbut neither can the deed be severed from the teachings!" What matters 
is that time and again an older generation, staking its entire existence 
on that act, comes to a younger with the desire to teach, waken, and
XXXshape it; then the holy spark leaps across the gap". Buber’s use of
the term 'holy spark' excludes the notion that codified, conceptual, 
teachings are imparted; what is imparted is humanity, imparted by a human
XXXbeing. The human beings who thus impart existence to a new generat­
ion, are says Buber, Israel; "Israel is renewed, not by what they say, " 
but by what they are, "by the totality of their existence" .S30€ The 
significance of this for the Church is that religious education, the
religious training of children, the spread of the Kerygma, and so-on, 
^Israel and the World, 'Teaching and Deed', pps. 137-145 = Herberg, pps.
317-324, P. 319
^Op. cit., p. 323*
3€X3E Q
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are brought about not so nuch by asking assent to propositions, but by 
interpersonal I-Thou encounter — - thus we have the importance of encount™ 
:er between man and man, young and old, enlightened and unenlightened, 
parent and child, teacher and pupil, and so-'on. If this is so, the 
religious community, Israel, the Church, assume incalculable importance 
as the spheres where this encounter is realized and encouraged. Thus, 
says Buber, " . . .  it is impossible to teach or learn without living,
The teachings must not be treated as a collection of knowable material? 
they resist such treatment. Either the teachings live in the life of 
a responsible human being, or they are not alive at all. The teachings 
do not center in themselves; they do not exist for their own sake. They 
refer to, they are directed toward, the deed. In this connection, the 
concept of 'deed1 M. . connotes • . life that realizes the teachings in 
the changing potentialities of every hour". Buber quotes the Talmud,
"He who studies with an intent other than to act, it would have been more 
fitting for him never to have been created". What counts for Buber 
" . . is not the extent of spiritual possessions, not the thoroughness of 
knowledge, nor the keenness of thought, but to know what one knows, and 
to believe what one believes, so directly that it can be translated into 
the life one lives". In so far as we think of the Church as that 
continuity by means of which the 'Faith once delivered to the saints' 
is delivered intact from one generation to another, we can hardly do
*0p. cit., p. 519*
**0p. cit., p. 329f quoting Pal. Talmud, 'Shabbat' 3b.
“ op. cit., p. 321.
better than ponder these words of -duber : !* . . we are confronted with 
the concepts of continuity and spontaneity, the bond of transmission ana 
begetting. The teachings themselves are the way. Their full content 
is not comprehended in any book, in any code, in any formulation. Nothing 
that has ever existed is broad enough to show what they are. In order 
that they may live and bring forth life generations must continue to 
meet, and the teachings assume the form of a human link, awakening and
• • X.activating our common bond with our Father”. Thus we conclude that if 
one grasps the full meaning of ’historicity1, the understanding of man 
as someone future, the significance of encounter with others in their 
’Erlebnisausdrdcke', biographies, autobiographies, and the significance 
of present, face-to-face encounters in the flesh (between man and man or 
between generation and generation), one perceives the great wealth of 
insight that existentialist theology may offer to the Church, to help 
her to understand once more her own nature and function.
I
Finally this question must be faced s is there not another 
aspect of the Church overlooked by the existentialists when they speak 
of decision for the Keiygma, an aspect put forward- and developed in, for 
instance, St Paul’s Epistle to the Ephesians ? The late E.F. Scott has 
this to say of Ephesians s ” . . .  in the Church we can see the mysterious
*0p. cit., pps. 325-4*
plan of God fulfilling itself. Hostile races, natures that apparently
have nothing in common — - all the discordant elements in human life are
here brought together and subjected to the power of Christ. In virtue of
their very differences they are able to fit together into an harmonious 
X
whole”. And commenting on Eph. 4*1-16, Scott points out that there 
St Paul enjoins to modesty, gentleness, mutual forbearance, love, which 
are SQQio-l duties tending towards true community. St Paul speaks also 
of the unity of the Spirit, the bond of peace, One Lord, one faith, one 
baptism, one God and Father of all, the unity of the faith and know­
ledge of God's Son, and so-on. The members of the Church are to be
XX'wedded together and compacted'. Is it so that the existentialists, 
say Bultmann, have ignored this ? That the community may well be a 
visible social expression of God's reconciling Kerygma ? It seems that 
reconciled races and natures may be every bit as much a part of of the 
Kerygma as a proclamatory sermon, and, it may be added, even more power- 
:ful in its influence. If sq, does not Bultmann also ignore the social 
obligations placed on the Christian by God ? Has he not been over­
influenced by the typically existentialist indifference to community ?
Is it not so that sometimes the reconciling Keiygma requires the Christian 
to get into the community, stay in it, even conform to it, maintaining 
the 'unity of the Spirit', and the'bond of peace', and thus proclaiming
*E.F. Scott, Moffat! Commentaiy to Colossians, to Philemon, and to the 
Ephesians, (London 1930), pps. 127-8.
**0p. cit., pps. 201 f.
by communal, social^ means^God’s reconciling word in Christ ?
It may well be that there is an iota of truth in this 
criticism of existentialist theology. Community does not, it is true, 
occupy the forefront of their thought, a point to which we shall return 
presently. But nothing that can be adduced from Ephesians can nullify 
the Christian’s obligation sometimes to break with the community, or 
to criticize it, if a gap appears between the community life and witness 
and the Keiygma itself. This is only to say that the community's unity 
cannot be achieved at any price, but only in accordance with the 
Keiygma itself. Unity, to use traditional language, is not the only 
attribute of the Church, but also holiness and apostolicity. And some­
times ecclesiastical history demonstrates that a certain unity is incom­
patible with either or both of these two. The ideal $£) blend of all 
three must be an ideal for which the Church must ever strive, and for 
which we must all hope and pray. The word 'ideal' in this connection 
is not accidental; for we must point out, that if the 'Church' is brought 
forward as a mode of, as an embodiment of the Kerygma, confronting man- 
in-the-world, it cannot be insisted too strongly (as we have already done 
in chapter IV), that what influences the 'plain man', the so-called man 
in the street, is not some ideal Church described in Ephesians or in 
Revelation 21, but the actually existing Church at the street-comer or
X
along the road! And it is when we realize this that we really grasp 
the pertinence of the existentialist stress on the unity between doctrine 
and concrete life.
*This, we argued in chapter IV, is the whole point behind Kierkegaard's 
attack on the Danish Established Church.
We have pointed out that questions of community, in their posit- 
:ive aspects, do not occupy the forefront of existentialist theolog:- es®
I think that this is undeniable; when we wish to know what these positive 
aspects are, we only find them like isolated bricks buried in existent­
ialist writings, for which we have to dig, and which we must then 
build up into a meaningful whole. That is more or less what we have had 
to do in this present discussion of community. I think that there are 
two broad reasons why this is so. First, the existentialist thinkers 
and theologians of the XXth. centuiy have been strongly conditioned by 
false, inauthentic forms of community; a theologian like Bultmann has 
had to live through the horrors of the Nazi State, in which a strong 
section of the Church (the German National Church) rejected the kerygma 
as absolutely normative for theology; a philosopher like Jaspers had to 
live and suffer in the same State; consequently, existentialists generally 
tend to be vividly aware of how community can degenerate not only into 
political dictatorship but into inauthentic forms dominated by all kinds
of mass-opinions. Thus, XXth. century history has had its effect on
which
the backwardness of existentialists with regard to community, an effectyj 
it ought to be noted, has had a stronger influence on the Continent than 
in these islands. Second, theistic and Christian forms of contemporary 
existentialist thought owe a heavy debt of gratitude to Kierkegaard;the 
thought of Kierkegaard never really produced much positive insight into 
the problem of existence-with-others. I think that to a certain extent 
contemporary existentialist thought has inherited this kierkegaardian 
deficiency. It is hard nowadays to read a commentary on Kierkegaard 
and avoid reading about this deficiency. Thus the late Professor David 
E. Roberts has this to say of his thought : "Kierkegaard failed to attach 
as much weight to the problem of community as to the problem of the
single individual. Yet if Christianity is true at all, its solution to 
the peril of 1 the crowd' must at the same time he the solution to the 
peril of isolation . . . 'the neighbour', for all its concreteness as a 
noun, was an abstraction for Kierkegaard's feeling . . . .  he could not 
enter into inter-personal relationships fully and naturally. He was 
cursed by shut-upness . . He could not allow himself to have a wife, a 
professorship, a pastorate; . . . (he was) a man who never knew much at 
first hand about the meaning of fellowship, either religious or secular",35 
Thus it would seem that Kierkegaard's thought, as it stands, works as a 
corrective. This is more or less true of a great many theologies and 
philosophies which derive from him. But theology must expect something 
more than a mere corrective; it is therefore to be hoped that Christian 
theologians, although aware of the contribution existentialism can make 
to discussions of community, will, by encountering a thinker like Buber, 
have a great deal of positive import to say about Church and community in 
the future.
*David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief, PPS. 140-1; cf. 
the rather similar criticisms of Kierkegaard by Buber in 'The Question to 
the Single One1, from Between Man and Man.
(3) CAUSALITY« FREEDOM, ABB THE FOMENT* .
For Bultmann, the ’moment’ is one of decision in the 
present, by which the meaning of the future is chosen over against, (hut
A
not wholly over a^nst, since the choosing is selective), the past. Only
because this ’moment' is possible, is man distinguishable from nature,
and thus able to have a 'history' as well as a 'life-cycle' • Because 
*
the 'moment' do^locates the causal nexus between past and future man is 
a person and not a thing, an animal. For this veiy reason, the centre 
of the historian's study is man, man himself, his thought^ motives, 
choices, and so-on. Thus Bultmann, Dilthey, Collingwood conceive of the 
historian's task.
For Martin Buber too, the world or sphere of 'It' is 
characterized by the unlimited sway of the causal process. For man, and 
here man is again distinguished from nature, this sway is not absolute. 
From 'time to time', in 'moment' after 'moment', in presentness, man
I
can leave the It-sphere of causality for the world of 'Thou', of relation, 
of meeting, where genuine chosen becoming is a real possibility. It is 
clear that certain types of modem thought ignore these insights. For 
Bultmann, this type of thought is supremely 'historicism', which means 
for him the understanding of man and history in analogy with nature.
For Buber, this type of thought is supremely that "quasi-biological and 
quasi-historical thought of today”; it is the thought; suggests Buber, 
which is dominated by "fate which does not know spirit”. It is the type 
of thought manifest in, for example, certain universal morphologies of 
history, mechanistic psychologies and sociologies, and those philosophies 
of history aimed at elucidating the 'laws' inherent in historical happen- 
iings. For this reason, Buber warns against 'prediction'e Modern
thought of this type, insists Buber, fastening upon necessity alone, 
forgets that the human situation, properly understood, swings between, 
is the antinomy between, both necessity and freedom. In demanding that 
this antinomy or paradox must be lived out, and in insisting that it 
cannot be thought out, Buber is of course close to Kierkegaard. For 
Kierkegaard too, without the Moment man is bound, exiled, and unfree.
The Teacher who comes in the Moment is, says Kierkegaard, the Saviour, 
the Redeemer, who redeems the learner from his captivity,. The Moment 
is absolutely crucial for Kierkegaard because it demarcates off captivity 
from freedom. A change, says Kierkegaard, in the immutability of the 
past is brought about in the Moment. Kierkegaard expresses his anxiety 
thus : "If the past had become necessary it would not be possible to in- 
:fer the opposite about the future, but it would rather follow that the 
future was also necessary . . . This would lead, Kierkegaard points
out, to the terrifying spectacle of a prophesying generation. For 
Kierkegaard, the study of history is valuable because it reveals that the 
past came into being through1 changes; from history we learn that change 
is not excluded from the temporal process, because ” . .change is exclud­
e d  only by being excluded in every moment”. But the moment, of whose 
reality Kierkegaard is convinced, is just that instant of time bringing 
with it the possibility of genuine becoming.
This section of our research is interesting not only 
because it is of interest to the historian, but also because it demonst-
^Philosophical Fragments, p. 65.
demonstrates/ theological thought developing in relation and in opposit­
ion to contemporary 'secular' thought --  in this case, to the scientif­
ically and technologically conditioned thought of the XXth century. But
the thought of Kierkegaard shows that this movement had already got under 
y\f n /
-weigh* in the mid-XIXth. century*
(4) THE ENEMIES OF THE 'MOMENT'.
All three, Bultmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard, agree 
that the sphere of human existence is a sort of battlefield in which 
authentic revelations and disclosures are in constant danger of being 
stifled by inauthentic elements which rise up and oppose them. Thus 
for all three the sphere of existence is dynamic rather tn.n static«
For Bultmann, the 'moment' and its demands may be 
stifled by many elements from ordinary everyday life, elements which are
I
paradoxical in nature; we cannot live quite without them, but we are 
always liable to get them out of perspective* Bultmann, it will be 
recalled, lists cares, pleasures, wishes, plans, crazes, false forms 
of living together, action and work, moralistic security through duty- 
doing, a false (i.e. propositional and therefore possessable) form of 
belief in God, man's love for 'Weltanschauungen', self-will, extreme 
suffering, and mysticism. Thus Bultmann's insistence that the relation- 
:ship of the authentic man to the world can only be dialectical, describ- 
sed, as Bultmann never tires of pointing out, in I Cor. 7-27 f* This 
means that he must keep an inner reserve, detachment, from worldly con­
cerns while busying himself in them, so that he is able to turn from
them should the 'moment1 occur, confronting him with the gain or loss of 
his genuine existence! For Buber, amongst the enemies of the 'moment* we 
find the world of 'It', the 'It'-sphere's dislike of the 'moment's* 
exclusiveness, man's dislike of enigma, his lust for worldly possessions; 
man's love of comfort, security, reliability, safety; the process of 
causality, immanentist theories of substantial soul, mysticism of the 
totally 'unworldly' variety, (Bultmann and Buber both dislike this type 
of mysticism for identical reasons); man's longing for 'continuity* and. 
'duration', for a systematized 'Weltanschauung'; the order to which man 
becomes accustomed by life in the It-sphere; the delight he comes to have 
in the utilizing of the technological It-world. It is therefore not 
surprising that in Buber we find also a 'dialectical' relationship of the 
authentic person to the world being insisted on*35 Other enemies of the 
'moment' are false forms of faith and worship,in which these come to
replace rather than 'respond to' moments of disclosure and re1ation•
*We have already discussed this fully in chapter III. Cf. W. Herberg, 
'Introduction* to The Writings of Martin Buber, pps. 17-18 s "The call 
comes in the midst of life. 'God speaks to man in the things and beings 
he sends him in life. Man answers through his dealings with these things 
and beings'(Buber, Hasidism, Hew York 1948? P« 99) • Religious man is dia- 
:logical man, the man 'who commits his whole being in God's dialogue with 
the world, and who stands firm throughout this dialogue' (Israel and the 
World, pps. 131-2). It is a dialogue in which 'God speaks to every man. 
through the life which he gives him again and again . . . i^ and in which) 
man can only answer God with the whole of life, with the way in which he 
lives his given life' (Israel and the World, p. 33)• In contrast to this, 
man can of course immerse himself in means and ends, in experiencing and 
using, so that the dialogue is stifled before it has had a chance to 
begin.
^Here there is an obvious link with the view we put forward when consider 
:ing the problem of Church and. community; there we suggested that it was 
vastly important how m;.ch stress there is put relatively upon Church or 
world; if one held that the Church and its worship was the sphere of revel 
:ation 'par excellence', then this meant that the world was more or less 
discounted. There is no doubt at all that Buber realises fully this 
threat to the 'worldliness' of revelation which can be wielded, by the 
religious community, its doctrine and its worship.
ls b
ruber, like rultmann, is alive to the dangers inherent in organization 
and over-organization, as he is to those in the technological notion of 
knowledge as 'items of information'. It is hard not to conclude that 
there is constant, mutual opposition going on between the Thou-dimension 
and the It-dimension. Buber draws a, picture of the brief, delicate 
'moment' trying to gain an entrance into a tightly organized world of 
'It', covered, to use Buber's own term, by a 'crust'.
In Kierkegaardian thought, the Moment (bringing the 
Paradox) offends, shocks, scandalizes, and is in turn opposed by what 
Kierkegaard calls 'Reason'. By Reason, Kierkegaard means of course 
man's self-asserting and self-assured faculty of organizing, conceptual­
izing, categorizing, and system-building. The Moment is also opposed
by the Socratic notion of 'recollection' --  in which that which is
taught by the Teacher always was within the learner from the beginning; 
all that is required by the Teacher is to extract this and bring it out 
into consciousness by a kind of 'Socratic midwifery'. Within this 
Socratic context there is neither room nor relevance for the Moment.
With this Socratic procedure we may compare certain theories of immanence 
like St Bonaventure' s 'cont^uition', already discussed in chapter II, 
and which we shall refer to again in our next section. In Kierkegaard 
too we find that man's love for security and safety (expressed in the 
anonymity man may achieve in society) militate* against the incalculable 
risk and danger and anxiety of the Moment.
(5) THE 'MOMENT* , THE SPIRITUAL LIFE, AND THE DOCTRINE OF M#1AKEHCE.
Immanence was of course fully discussed, in chapter 
II. There we discovered Bultmann's view of God as 'immanent' in the 
totality of historical existence, in contrast to a view like that of 
St Bonaventure, (followed by Mr. H.P. Owen), which suggests that God 
is immanent in the substantial soul, and that God is perceivable by man 
in isolation from the world, from history, and from time. In contrast 
to this latter view, the theologies of Bultmann, Buber, and Kierkegaard, 
are all supremely "impartationalI
In Bultmann we find that the spiritual life, and 
the practice of spiritual cultivation, depend upon man's awareness of his 
own radical historicity and temporality, that he is 'essentially' an 
historical and temporal creature. This, for Bultmann, is the only poss- 
:ible possessable 'Weltanschauung'. For Buber, the basis of the spirit- 
:ual life consists in the 'I' swinging 'into relation'; before it swings 
back again, the 'I' matures spiritually. It is obvious how close this 
view is to Bultmann’s. For them both, the 'I' matures, man becomes an 
authentic person, in so far as man orientates himself towards, and 
encounters the persons streaming towards him within, his time and hist- 
:oiy. This swinging into relation, this orientation, is the spiritual 
'exercise' which is fundamentally opposed to the classical view that 
spiritual culture can be practised in isolation, apart from the other, 
apart from the world and history. Buber's view can be summed up thus 
in his own words: ” . . .  a man does not pass from the moment of supreme
meeting the same as he entered it"*
Kierkegaard too abhors any doctrine which assumes that 
knowledge of God is given totally in creation, that it is wholly imman- 
sent in man (Socratic), so that nothing in time, in the world, in hist- 
:ory, need 'happen to' man in order for such knowledge to be imparted 
to him.
We must not fail to note that the doctrine of the 'moment' 
would seem to require some kind of natural theology. We encountered 
Bultmann's view of this in chapter II. Man's experience of transience, 
decay, guilt, bondage, and determinism, help man to form some minimal 
notion of 'God* which serves only as an 'Anknttpfungspunkt1 for the self­
disclosure of the living God when he actually reveals himself and 
redeems man in the 'moment'. This minimal idea of 'God' is, so to 
speak, immanent in, suggested by man's total concrete historical and 
temporal situation. Similarly, Buber's view is that man has a ' sense 
of the Thou' present in him 'from the beginning', which can be fulfill-
I
:ed and satisfied only in the 'moment* of meeting, relation. When 
Buber insists that there is immanent within man no more than this 
longing, craving for relation, we see that this is not at all dissimilar 
to Bultmann's analysis of man as filled with existential dissatisfact­
ion. In contrast to Buber and Bultmann, Kierkegaard is not so
clear about these insights. I# can find in Kierkegaard's work, as I 
indicated in chapter IV, no indication that the outside world of persons 
and events and encounters, in short, man's concrete historical situat­
ion, is integral to the occurrence of the 'moment'. Rather does
Kierkegaard insist that the occurrence of the iioment is God’s work* 
not at all dependent upon a merely human 'occasion1. This aspect of 
Kierkegaardian thought, as I have already suggestedj is one of the 
least satisfactory of Kierkegaard’s contributions.
y
This section of out study has important repercussions 
in one direction in particular. This emphasis of existentialist 
theology which we have been discussing seems to cut across one tradit- 
Jional strand of systematic theology which is of enormous importance 5 
namely, the question of natural theology in general, and in particular 
the precise content that should be given to such a natural theology. 
This comes out very clearly if we compare strictly existentialist 
theology with the theology, say, of Paul Tillich, who, although 
heavily indebted to existentialist analysis, is by no means, as may 
be mistakenly supposed, an existentialist pure and simple© For 
Tillich's theology, as we shall now see, although availing itself lib- 
rerally of existentialist insights, is actually rooted in the 
classical ontological approach. To the important problem of the 
differences between the two approaches, the existentialist and the 
ontological, we must now turn*
A PROBLEM RAISED BY SECT. (5) —  THE PROBLEM OF THE ONTOLOGICAL jX D  
EXISTENTIALIST APPROACHES TO THEOLOGY.
Paul Tillich, like Bultmann, analyses man's existent­
ial situation. In doing so, he points out,for example, that man, 
although finite, has the power of infinite self-transcendence. That 
is, man, although within existence, can yet raise himself above and 
look down upop. it, perceiving his own finitude from this exalted 
standpoint. This power of self-transcendence is the indication that
man is the creature of God, it represents natural man's link with God,
x
it is the 'deus in nobis'. So far the existential analysis of man 
is clear. But at this point a certain definite duality in the 
theology of Tillich appears which indicates the two strands of which 
his thought consists s-
I
G O  There is a strand in Tillich in which Tillich is aware of the 
important role of the concrete encounter. For example, Tillich 
speaks of the power of the New Being in Jesus as the Christ overcoming
X X
and setting right our existential estrangements.
(B) But there is another strand in Tillich in which he implies that 
our existential analysis (e.g. of finitude) of man could, if pursued
sSee Systematic Theology, I, pps. 212 f.
K3€See especially Systematic Theology, II, XXI-THE NEW BEING IN JESUS AS 
THE CHRIST AS THE POWER OF SALVATION, pps. 191-208.
far enough, itself give the answer implied in the existential 
question, QUITE APART FROM an event, a ’moment1, an encounter in 
space and time* Thus Walter Leibrecht rightly writes of Tillich’s
3E
theology : "Characteristically, he (Tillich) does not begin his think- 
:ing by speculating in the clouds; he digs his results out of the 
earth. He is never satisfied, however, with mere existential anal­
ysis; he drives beyond it to that point of identity where the infin- 
site reveals itself in the finite, where the split of subject and
3Q£object is overcome"* And in a note to this sentence Leibrecht 
pertinently points out : "Tillich’s statement that God is being itself 
is rejected by Heidegger, Bultmann, Barth and Niebuhr, all of whom 
reject classical metaphysics unreservedly”* This brings us a little 
nearer the real crux of the matter; it seems that Bultmann must 
reject Tillich’s position here because Bultmann's thought hinges on 
the concrete spacial-temporal ’moment’ in which, as we have insisted, 
God IMPARTS HIMSELF throdgh his action* In this second strand of 
Tillich’s thought this seems not to be necessary since God appears 
to be immanent in, in some sense, man's ontological enquiry. This 
brings us veiy close, I think, to the real and irreducible point 
of divergence between, on the hand, Bultmann and his existentialist
XIn 'The Life and Mind of Paul Tillich', published in Religion and 
Culture ; Essays in Honour of Paul Tillich, (London 1958), P* 6*~"
“ Op. cit., p* 355*
colleagues, and on the other, an ontological theologian like Tillich. 
This is the reason why we dare not, without reservation, call Tillich 
an 'existentialist'.
We are now in a position, perhaps, to compare in greater 
detail these two main approaches to systematic theology, the 
ontological and the existentialist.
(i) THE ONTOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THEOLOGY.
It seems to me that the basic tenet of the ontological 
approach is that man, in analysing, for example, his own finitude, 
comes upon infinity within it. But this infinity is no mere 'Anknttp- 
:fungspunktf, not an empty notion without real content. Rather does 
it seem that a real knowledge of God is possible in this way; and this 
knowledge is such that in 'some sense the historical-dynamic revelation 
of God confirms it, and conforms to it. Metaphorically speaking, 
the ontological analysis is a vessel into which historical revelation 
is poured, to which it conforms itself, and without which the historic 
Jal revelation could not be received. Thus, such an ontological know 
:ledge comes to have something of a normative function over man's 
subsequent appropriation of God's historic self disclosure. There is 
here a sense in which historic 'revelation' is merely 'confirmation'
of that of which .becomes aware in his existential self-analysis.
A
If we grasp this basic assumption of the ontological approach, we 
can proceed to interpret certain interesting comments Tillich has to 
make about it.*
Tillich states the -priority of the ontological enquiry 
when he writes : "It is . . wrong to derive the question implied in 
human existence from the revelatory answer. This is impossible because 
the revelatory answer is meaningless if there is no question to which 
it is the answer. Man cannot receive an answer to a question he has 
not asked". jje does practically the same thing when he asserts :
" . . . the form of the theological answer is NOT independent of the 
form of the existential question".*** does so again : "The 
answer ’the Christ’ cannot be created by man, but man can receive it
3Q63Eand express it according to the way he has asked for it." Again
Tillich presses home the priority of the ontological enquiry : " . . .
man cannot receive answers to questions he has never asked" .3QOG*
Tillich summarises the so-called method of correlation in this way,
which highlights his divergence from an existentialist like nultmann:
"Theology formulates the answers implied in human divine self-manifest-
sation under the guidance of the questions implied in human existence.
This is a circle which drives man to a, point where question and ans-
swer are not seperated. This point, however, is not a moment in time
It belongs to man's essential being, to the unity of his finitude with
*The classical instance of ontologism is to be found of course with-in 
the Roman Catholic dogmatic system, where it is held to be heretical 
to deny the 'natural knowability of God' by reason. See Ludwig Gtt, 
Fundamentals of Catholic Dogma, 4th. edit., (Cork i960), pps. 13 f*
**S.yst. Theol., II, p. 15*
***Syst« Theo1., II? p. 1?•
3°°**Svsto Theol., I, p. 73
ttfttfftit the infinity in which he was created and from which he is separat­
ed. A symptom of both the essential unity and the existential seper- 
sation of finite man from his infinity is his ability to ask about the 
infinite to which he belongss the fact that he must ask about it indic- 
:ates that he is seperated from it".* Nov/ the fact of supreme 
importance for our purposes here is that question and answer, finitude 
and infinity CONJOIN AT A POINT WHICH IS NOT A MOMENT IN TIME; that 
is,the answer manifests itself, infinity bestows itself, within man’s 
being, and thus ARE NOT IMPARTED TO MAN FROM OUTWITS HIMSELF AT A POINT 
IN TIME, IN HISTORY, IN TEE WORLD IN WHICH MAN EXPERIENCES RELATION. 
Thus we see that it is characteristic of this ontological approach of 
Tillich's that man's enquiry itself becomes normative for the percept­
ion of revelation, and that the revelation itself is not necessarily 
an historical and temporal 'occurrence'.
To be fair to iTillich, he admits that this method of 
theologizing does raise an enormous problem. He is aware that this 
controlling, normative function of man's enquiry may proceed so far 
that it prejduces the content of revelation. Of this problem, a great 
perennial problem of systematic theology, Tillich writes s "Since
*Syst. Theol., I, p. 69. The ontological nature of Tillich’s theology 
can be easily seen in the following places: Syst. Theol., I, pps0 69, 
72, 73, 173, 181, 207, 210-11, 212, 231, 263; Syst. Theol., II, pps. 
12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 144, 212.
Schleiermacher, it has also "been present whenever a philosophy of rel­
igion was used as an entering door into the theological system, and 
the problem arose of how far the door determines the structure of the 
house, or the house the door".35’ As we shall see presently, it is 
just this problem which is at the basis of the divergence between 
ontological and existentialist theology* Tillich is too great a 
theologian not to admit the possibility that " . . . the question can 
prejudice the answer to such a degree that the revelatoiy character 
of the answer is lost. No method is a guaranty against such failure. 
Theology, like all enterprises of the human mind, is ambiguous'1 .KK
tt
We are now ready to turn to the second approach to systemtic theology,A
(ii) THE EXISTENTIALIST APPROACH TO THEOLOGY.
It seems to me that the basic tenet of the existential-
I
:ist approach is that man, in analysing his own existence, can do no 
more than to become aware of his own ’ incompleteness1, which 
/ awareness serves as nothing more than an *Ankntlpfungspunkt’ for God’s 
dynamic and historical self-manifestation in a ’moment’ of time and 
history. We have seen this view-point again and again, especially 
in Bultmann's argument in The Question of Natural Revelation.
^Syst. Theol., II, p. 16.
^Op. cit., p. 18.
Buitmann1s essay Points of Contact and Conflict^ makes it quite clear 
that God’s historic self-disclosure does not require to accomadate 
itself to man’s awareness of the transcendent which he gains in nis 
existential self-analysis. Thus the 1 AnkntLpfungspunkt1 which man has 
in his self-analysis is no more than a geometrical point which is the 
beginning of a wider and deeper relationship which in content 
transcends the point of contact. Thus for the existentialist theol- 
Jogian it is unthinkable, not to say abhorrent, that man’s ’natural’ 
awareness of the transcendent could have a controlling and definitive 
function over God’s self-impartation which takes place in the 
’moment', in the spacial-temporal encounter. Thus the existentialist 
may insist .that 'revelation reveals'; it reveals that which was
^Essays, pps. 133 f*J this essay is important in that it indicates 
Bultmann1 s definition of 'AnkntLpfungspunkt'. For this see especially 
pps. 135-138. We have already referred to passages from these pages, 
but this quotation is typical t "GOD'S ACTION WITH MAN through his 
Word naturally has NO POINT OF CONTACT (' AnkntLpfungspunkt' ) IN MAN or in 
human intellectual life, to which God must accomadate himself"(p. 135)« 
Such quotations could of course be multiplied from Bultmann's essays.
It is important to note that what Bultmann fears is the accomadation 
of God’s subsequent action to man's enquiry, which is the basic fear 
of ontological theology experienced by existentialists. The use of 
the word 'AnkntLpfungspunkt' in modern German is interesting. As a 
theological term it was of course popularized in the Barth-Bnmner 
controversy, Barth's’famous Beini being directed against the notion 
that God's Word required a human 'AnkntLpfungspunkt' at all. Bultmann 
thus occupies a kind of half-way position between a theologian like 
Barth and one like Tillich. He is not prepared to deny it wholly as is 
Barth, but is unwilling to give it the content and controlling function 
that Tillich suggests. In modern German, the verb 'anknftfpfen' is used 
almost exclusively of interpersonal relationships. It can therefore 
mean begin, enter into (a friendship, relationship), find a common 
ground, interest, from which a relationship might grow. A common usage 
is, for instance, 'Ich suche einen AnkntLpfungspunkt ftLr eine weitere 
Bekanntschaft mit X'. But such an 'AnkntLpfungspunkt' only serves as 
a beginning; it does not necessarily control or prejudice the subse­
quent form of the friendship.
(ajiknu.pj€Jt)
hitherto not accessible to man. Existentialist theology insists
upon this insight. It fears that an ontologiical theology in the\
last analysis does away with this notion of revelation; it fears that 
if man's ontological insight has a controlling function and a positive 
content, God's historic 'momentary' self-disclosure merely CONFIMS 
that of which man already had an awareness. It fears, and we have 
seen that Tillich admits that the fear is not groundless, that ontolog- 
sical theology may substitute 'confirmation' for 'revelation'.
Thus we can explain Bultmann's fear of theological prop- 
sositions (i.e. propositions which are not expressions of historicity). 
Thus also we can explain his zeal for the 'moment' , for the concrete 
historical encounter. If a thoroughly ontological theology of the 
type existentialists fear were accepted, the 'moment' of impart at ion, 
of genuine encounter, would be vastly diminished in importance. If 
it had any function left at all, this would be merely to confirm
I
what man had already discovered. And if this were to happen, the 
concepts revelation, historicity, temporality and so4on would be 
dislodged from that central position accorded them, as we have insisted 
throughout this thesis, by the biblical notion of historic revelation, 
and by the radical historicity of the career of Jesus Christ. This,
I should like to conclude, is the crux of the divergence between 
existentialist and ontologist. We saw how Tillich described the prob-
:lem in these terms whether the door determines the structure of
the house, or the house the door. In terms of existentialist theology 
we may say that the existentialist fears that the door will indeed 
determine the structure of the house; it is for this reason that he
will allow a 'door' of the smallest possible area, not one which 
will determine the only possible framework or scaffolding to which 
the house itself must conform. We saw also how Tillich denied that 
the point at which question and answer, finitude and infinity 
co-incide was a moment in time — —  but for Bultmann this point is 
precisely that, a 'moment1 in time.X
We have said that these fears, experienced by Bultmann 
are 'existentialist' ones. This is, I think, true. In order to 
show that such fears are not confined to Bultmann, let us glance brief 
sly at several other thinkers in the 'existentialist tradition’. Thus 
David E. Roberts says of the thought of Pascal : "Through nature, in 
short, we can dimly discern enough of the presence of the hidden God 
to know that we have lost true knowledge of Him, but natural theology 
cannot provide any sort of resting place. Its main function, for 
Pascal, is the negative orie of making man so aware of the inadequacy 
of philosophical knowledge of God that he sees the need for. a
XXmediator"* The similarities between Pascal's and Bultmann's posit­
ions are thus clear; it is the 'hidden God', not truly known, who is 
disclosed in nature;for Bultmann, man attains to no true knowledge of 
the living God by examining existence, but gets only the vaguest
notion of 'God'. For them both it is clear that 'natural’ knowledge
Two other essays of Bultmann of great interest for our subject here 
are of course, 'The Question of Natural Revelation,(Essays, pps. 90 f.) 
and Prophecy and Fulfilment, (Essays, pps. 182 f.).
3BEExistentialism and Religious Belief, p. 49.
of God has no more than a ne • •ative function. This function for them 
both is to make man turn towards a mediator, that is, him who manifests 
God and his action concretely, in the flesh.
In terms of this present discussion, it is also quite 
clear that Martin Buber is an 'existentialist1. Buber states his pos- 
:ition with reference to 'natural theology' in this unambiguous way : 
"The beginning of philosophizing means that this Something changes 
from an object of imagination, wishes, and feelings to one that is 
conceptually comprehensible, to an object of thought. It does not 
matter whether this object of thought is called 'Speech'(LOGOS), 
because in all and each one hears it speak, answer and directly 
address one; or’the Unlimited' (APEIRON), because it has already 
leapt over every limit that one may tiy to set for it; or simply
3E'Being1 , or whatever. If the living quality of the conception of 
God refuses to enter into this conceptual image, it is tolerated along-
I
:side of it, usually in an imprecise form, as in the end identical 
with it or at least dependent on it. Or it is depreciated as an
3£3£unsatisfactory surrogate, helpful to men incapable of thought".
We could hardly ask for a clearer statement of the 'existentialist'
*Cf. the theological terminology of Tillich here.
^Buber, Eclipse of God:Studies in the Relation Between Religion and 
Philosophy, (New York 1952), chapter VIII, 'God and the Spirit of Man', 
printed in Herberg, op. cit., pps. 108-113, see pps. 108-9.
(as contrasted with the 'ontological') position than this. Here
Buber gives expression to his fears that a conceptual image will
control a living historic disclosure, that a living historic revelat-
t ion will have to adapt itself to an ontological enquiiy and its
results, that 'revelation' will do little more than 'confirm' the
content of the conceptual image* There is little doubt that Buber's
idea of the human 'Ankntipfungspunkt' for divine self-disclosure is
almost identical with that of Bultmann. Buber describes his notion
in this way : "The turning is the greatest form of ' beginning'. When
God tells man, ' Open me the gate of the turning as narrow as the point
of a needle, and I shall open it so wide that carriages can enter it*,
or when God tells Israel, 'Turn to me, and I shall create you anew',
the meaning of human beginning becomes clear as never before. By
turning, man arises anew as God's child".* Here again we have the
human 'Ankntipfungspunkt' as narrow as a needle-point, opening the way
to the fulness of God's revelation which transcends mightily the
'Ankntipfungspunkt' which prepared it. Buber sketches the frightful
existential risks run by him who tries to preconceive God, prior to
dealing with him in the contradictions of human existence : " 'Fear of
God', accordingly, never means to the Jews that they ought to be afraid
^Israel and the World, 'The Faith of Judaism', pps. 13-27 = Herberg, 
pps 253-265, see p. 259*
of God, but that, trembling, they ought to be aware of his incomprehen 
ssibility. The fear of God is the creaturely knowledge of the 
darkness to which none of our spiritual powers can reach, and out of 
which God reveals himself. Therefore, 'the fear of God' is rightly 
called 'the beginning of knowledge' (Ps. 111:10). It is the dark 
gate through which man must pass if he is to enter into the love of 
God. He who wishes to avoid passing through this gate^ , he who begins 
to provide himself with a comprehensible God, constructed thus and 
not otherwise, runs the risk of having to despair of God in view of 
the actualities of history and life, or of falling into inner false­
hood. Only through the fear of God does man enter so deep into the 
love of God that he cannot again be cast out of it".* Thus Buber 
is convinced that by defining only a narrow 'Ankntipfungspunkt' 
is man spared the shattering experience of being torn apart between,
on the one hand, the conceptual image which he ha,s constructed of God, 
On tht oth<Yt
and,Athe actual contradictions and ambiguities of historical existence
in and through which he must eventually try to glimpse God, and decide
sometimes agonizingly, for His presence and righteousness. As does
Bultmann, Buber insists that the 'Ankntipfungspunkt' is nothing more
*Israel and the World, 'The Two Foci of the Jewish Soul', pps. 28-40,
*s Herberg, pps. 266-276, see p. 269.
than a mere ’beginning' ; its purpose is to lead man towards and into 
an interpersonal relationship with the living God; unless it does so, 
the Ankndpfungspunkt is futile. Buber describes this in this nays 
"But fear of God is just a gate; it is not a house in which one can
comfortably settle down he who should want to live in it in
adoration would neglect the performance of the essential commandment. 
God is incomprehensible, but he can be known through a bond of mutual 
relationship".x
We have considered the views of Bultmann, of
Pascal, and of Buber, all in the'existentialist’ tradition  --- what,
we must finally ask, of Kierkegaard ? Prom the point of view of the
history of theology, Kierkegaard is of course important as the so-callec
that
'founder' of the modem existentialist tradition. It is clear to mej( 
modem and contemporary existentialism in its attitude to a 'naturalI
theology' of the Tillich-type derives to a great extent from the 
Kierkegaardian attack on and rejection of 'Reason'. After all, 
Kierkegaard was appalled at the prospect of God having to accomadate 
himself to the systematization and the systems of natural man. It 
is for this reason that Kierkegaard insisted that at the advent of the
*0p. cit., p. 269*
\Paradox 'Reason1 (in Kierkegaard’s definition of it) must abdicate from 
its proud throne; thus he also insisted that God’s self-disclosure 
needs no human ’occasion’ to prepare for it. We have already argued 
that Kierkegaard went far too far so that he posited no human 
’Ankntlpfungspunkt’ at all. Nevertheless, Kierkegaard has had a deep 
effect on the contemporary theological scene, most obviously of all on 
Barth, but certainly also on those existentialists who are willing to 
allow the narrowest possible ’ Ankntlpfungspunkt', a mere starting-point 
vastly transcended by subsequent revelation*
Finally, we must asks which of the two approaches, the 
ontological or the existentialist, do we favour ? It is clear that 
the whole doctrine of the ’moment’ must favour the second, the exist™ 
sentialist, approach. It does so for these reasons. First, this 
approach does seem to safeguard revelation as revelation, and does not 
regard it as mere ’confirmation’; revelation discloses to man what he 
previously did not know. Second, the doctrine of the 'moment' 
suggests that the divine-human relationship is an interpersonal 
encounter; this notion seems to be safeguarded by the existentialist 
approach to theology. Third, another way of putting this is to point 
out that the existentialist approach enshrines the notion of’impartat- 
:ion; it holds that disclosure is made in and through historic encount- 
:ers, but that this disclosure is never final, requiring constant 
re-correction and re-adjustment by subsequent encounters and the under­
standings they bring. Fourth, yet another way of putting this same
insight is to point out that this question/answer terminology of 
Tillich (in his method of correlation) is not free from ambiguity, in 
that it might suggest that revelation is a propositional business*
We might profitably compare Tillich's question/answer approach with 
Buber1s conviction that theology is primarily concerned, with a 
'vision1, man's 'glimpse* of God* Finally, we contend that the 
existentialist approach does much to prevent that frightful spiritual 
schizophrenia in which man is faced with a yawning contradiction 
between, on the one hand, his self-constructed picture of God, and, on 
the other, the shattering events of which he is required to make sense 
(often without much success) 'in the world of time and history, the 
undoubted cause of much bitter irreligion and cynicism* Is it not 
one of the great strengths of the existentialist approach that it 
insists that man can only form gradually (sometimes by 'trial' and 
'error'), in 'moment' after 'moment', in encounter after encounter, 
an understanding of God and of himself, not in abstraction from 
suffering and contradiction and ambiguity, but in and through them ?
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